Nation Brand Management in Political Contexts:
Public Diplomacy for Turkey’s EU Accession

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vorgelegt von
Jan Dirk Kemming
Brüsseler Str. 53
50674 Köln

Gutachten durch
Prof. Dr. Claus Leggewie
Prof. Dr. Güliz Ger

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Summary
In the following a short synopsis on the situation analysis, the research ambition, main findings and the contribution of this thesis is given.

Problem and situation analysis
No matter which database is consulted, the European Union’s public opinion on Turkey’s EU membership is disenchanted. Eurobarometer data, the European Commission’s public opinion surveys, shows on average 59% of all member states’ publics opposing Turkey’s EU accession and only 28% holding a favorable opinion.

While countries like e.g. Sweden or Portugal even display a positive balance between favorable and unfavorable opinions on Turkey’s EU bid, in countries like Germany, Austria or France the negative camp exceeds positive views by more than 40%. Almost all obvious patterns trying to explain this distribution – be it a large Turkish diaspora, religion, Ottoman history, Muslim immigration, Mediterranean or new member states solidarity – fail. Similar surveys like e.g. the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends largely confirm both the supporters/opponents camps and the trend against Turkey.

Once these surveys add a conditional clause like “if Turkey fulfills all EU membership requirements”, almost half of the EU member states’ publics have a positive opinion about Turkish membership. Countries like Austria, Luxembourg or Germany however remain firmly opposed by more than 40% margin. These shifts indicate that public opinion data is clearly blurry and volatile, and not a sufficient category of explanation for Turkey’s situation.

This research project therefore employs the concept of nation branding to help explain Turkey’s EU accession puzzle and investigate the conditions of Turkey’s perception in Europe more thoroughly.

Looking at the most relevant source of data for this approach, the Nation Brand Index, it becomes apparent that Turkey suffers from a clearly negative nation brand image. Between 2005 and 2007 Turkey has never managed to leave the bottom region of the global ranking and ends up continuously among the 5 worst nation brands of 38 nations under survey. In a more detailed analysis of Turkey’s nation brand dimensions, only the value of the cultural heritage and the hospitality of the people contribute to a positive perception of Turkey, while items such as export products, trust in the government, immigration and investment intentions for Turkey all score way below the global average. In almost all dimensions furthermore the perceptions of Turkey by the European panelists are more negative than by the informants living outside of Europe despite them having a comparably clearer picture of Turkey. Analysis of Turkey’s perception in the international media shows a significant negative correlation between media mentions and negative tonality (=the more Turkey is covered, the more negative the coverage is) underscoring this trend.

The diagnosis that Turkey has a (nation brand) image problem has gained some popularity across different research domains. The term ‘image’ has be-
come a popular discursive weapon and a political catchphrase in the public debate on Turkey and the main political actors nowadays. Imagological research on the history of Turks and the Ottoman Empire in Europe brings numerous events and streams from late Middle Ages to 20th century to the fore that make clear that Turkey's contemporary image cannot be dissociated from the Turks' historical images. Marketing research on Turkey's brand image shows that the country's image is actually varying in the individual EU member states and indicates remarkable deviations between Turkey's self-image as seen from inside the country vs. the outside image from abroad. Furthermore it was found that people who have visited Turkey before hold a more positive image than those who have not, and that the overall knowledge and awareness of Turkey in Europe seems to be rather low. Overall it can be said that the public discourse of Turkey's EU accession is burdened by numerous myths and stereotypes that can be expected to also influence the official diplomatic procedures.

Despite such significant public reservations, the then 25 EU countries unanimously declared Turkey an accession candidate in 2005. And from the official positions, a clear majority of countries still positively supports Turkey in 2009, while opposition can be expected in the central countries of 'old Europe', including EU founding members like France, Luxemburg and Germany as well as Austria, and by the Republic of Cyprus. Certainly, however, after the lost referenda on the EU constitution, the trouble ratifying the Lisbon treaty and the two most recent energy-consuming enlargement rounds, Turkey knocks at EU's door during the times of one of the deepest crises of this community ever. The conflicting attitudes towards Turkey are also indicating EU’s lack of clarity about its present identity and future direction, usually polarized between the “deepening” vs. “broadening” camps. Arguments pro or con Turkey’s membership relate to common historical and cultural roots vs. fundamental cultural differences between EU-Europe and Turkey, to different (strategic) views and outlooks on the EU as a whole and to the problematic inner constitution of Turkey in the light of current political developments.

Summarizing this complex situation analysis it becomes apparent that Turkey’s EU accession process is first and foremost a public affair, representing the difficult relationship between the governing political elite and the voting European citizenry. In the scenario at hand Turkey could meet all criteria of EU accession, negotiate all chapters successfully, and would then be vetoed by one or more EU countries in a referendum or other expressions of the publics’ political will. As any policies will hardly be able to survive without public support, clearly a new mode of political communication has to be found to better account for the exchange between publics and elites.

**Theoretical framework and research ambition**

Linked to such questions in the domain of international relations theory currently the sister concepts of public diplomacy and nation branding develop with closed links to political marketing and communications theory. This emerging research perspective is chosen to analyze the managerial and oper-
ational options for Turkey’s EU accession process while trying to counteract the negative public sentiment outlined above.

The concepts of public diplomacy and nation branding rest on the fundamental distinction of hard and soft power of political entities, which evolved in the social sciences rather recently in the analysis of post-Cold War phenomena. This theoretical dichotomy discerns traditional forms of power based on economic or military clout – the power of coercion labeled hard power – and a nation’s soft power dimensions based on information, preferences, attractiveness and ‘the best story’. Clearly soft power lies not in the hand who possesses it, but rather develops largely out of control of the owner. Public opinion and images, stemming from attractiveness and persuasion, have become essential assets for a country’s foreign policy agenda, as was shown in the analysis of Turkey’s EU accession.

In marketing and communication theory the concepts of image and reputation redefined the marketplace logic in a way that is similar to the way countries’ soft powers change the landscape of international relations: behaviour based on the symbolic meaning of objects add a complementary dimension to behaviour based on functional meaning enriching the market perspective of a rational economy by the one of a symbolic economy.

Nation branding, a theory direction evolving in the general broadening of the marketing concept, rests on the assumption that globalization amplifies the competition among nations in the most different domains from tourism to investment promotion for which a differentiating unique brand positioning can provide advantages. As seen before, the interpretation of nations as brands provides valuable insights into understanding the status quo of a nation also in relationship to other entities. But also in managerial regard, as the branding approach inspires innovative methods of statesmanship.

Public diplomacy links to this as it aims to redefine all of the activities by state and non-state actors that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country’s soft power, whereas traditional diplomatic activities certainly lose relevance in the contemporary global setting. The practice of public diplomacy has developed and institutionalized mainly in the USA for more than 60 years, but really gained relevance across the globe only from the 1990s onwards. Accordingly, scholarly study of this field is still in its infancy and the multidisciplinary potential embracing political and marketing communications research has still to be exploited. Nonetheless, some interesting paradigmatic tensions also become visible in the public diplomacy domain that are too well known from contemporary discourses in e.g. communications theory, like the shifts from asymmetrical one-way models (hierarchical public diplomacy) to a symmetrical two-way understanding (network-based approach) of information and attention exchanges between the stakeholders involved. Moving beyond propaganda, public diplomacy in a current understanding ideally connects also civil societies and not only governments.
This trend necessarily has implications for organization and management of public diplomacy, which clearly exceed the scope of embassies, diplomats and ministries of foreign affairs. The governmental task is to orchestrate a network of collaboration with actors mostly outside the administrative domain, from business communities or educational and academic organizations to think tanks, NGOs or political parties. There is certainly also an important media relations component to modern public diplomacy, although the bulk of activities might eventually not become visible at the traditional mass media level. Hence, an interesting effect on public diplomacy’s future mediaization can be expected from the collaborative social evolution of the internet usually referred to as web 2.0 with citizen journalism/the blogosphere becoming a new power of its own.

Some discussion in the literature is devoted to the relationship of nation branding and public diplomacy, with some conflicting theories on the one being the subset of the other and vice versa. Also some ideological reservations are observed especially in the political/diplomatic camp that rejects the commercial nature which branding in this perspective necessarily implies. However, in line with current developments both in branding/marketing and political science theory, this thesis suggests a mature fusion of both theory threads while focusing mainly at the political spectrum of Turkey’s nation brand. For the purpose of investigating Turkey’s public diplomacy spectrum, an analytical framework consisting of the dimensions ‘purpose’, ‘time’, ‘domain’ and ‘channel’ is developed from the literature. These parameters will guide the evaluation of the current activities and future potential.

The dominant goal of this research project is – based on the extensive situation and literature analysis – to apply nation brand management theory and public diplomacy theory to the case of Turkey’s EU accession and investigate the managerial implications. Such an approach was not found in the literature before, and also at the practical end public diplomacy action in Turkey turned out to be in an infant state by the time the purpose of this research was developed. The assessments of knowledgeable experts sampled along a grid differentiating inside/outside perspective on Turkey while recruiting equally from political/diplomatic, social/medial or economic/marketing domain provided a substantial and balanced fund for deep exploratory insights.

**Key findings**
The findings can be roughly divided in structural and content-related insights. The structural section reflects the general potential of the concepts of nation branding and public diplomacy for Turkey. Then, also with regard to structural implications, the channels, time horizons and purposes of Turkey’s public diplomacy are investigated, followed by a discussion of the managerial and organizational conditions for nation branding and public diplomacy in Turkey. In the content-related section, the different domains of Turkey’s public diplomacy as strategies for the external and internal nation brand dimensions are evaluated.
**Structures and conditions**

As a first structural deficit of Turkey’s public diplomacy, the experts identified a profound lack of knowledge (and misinformation) about the country in Europe to be one important reason behind the nation’s image problems. Unanimously the need to reach the European publics better in the form of communication activities was identified as necessary condition for the negative images to change. In general therefore, the applicability of a modern public diplomacy toolset to the case of Turkey’s EU accession was agreed on.

Regarding the channels of Turkey’s public diplomacy, the need for an effective public relations system beyond the promotional advertising (e.g. for tourism or investment promotion, which is classified as not trustworthy and only monological in character), including the use of well-chosen spokesmen/testimonials and a solid media relations groundwork, was underscored. However, due to some non-negligible barriers in the respective European media systems based on ideological reservations towards Turkey, and also understanding that media will certainly have only a limited impact on the publics’ attitude formation processes, a multilateral relations management program exceeding mere press relations is called in – public relations in the best sense. This includes contact programs to key opinion leaders and stakeholders from all areas as well as lobbying communication and political elites to generate strong advocacy for Turkey’s accession.

As the experts’ evaluation of earlier and current communication activities from Turkey – pinpointed as ‘missing PR genes’ – reveals, public diplomacy so far is definitely not a strength of the Turkish public administration and generally regarded to be of subordinate priority. This is partly based on a historic lack of competence and understanding in these areas, paired with a particular Turkish mentality that is more reactive than proactive. Furthermore, Turkey was previously not good at handling the foreign media, and state-of-the-art services to correspondents were just discovered recently.

Altogether more than 30 institutions were counted in Turkey, which in one form or the other systematically provide information from Turkey to domestic or international audiences. A handful of previous or current activities deserve some special attention:

- Tourism promotion by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism
- A campaign by Turkey’s Investment Support and Promotion Agency
- A project called TÜ®KIYE, a collaboration of the country’s most relevant NGOs, developed a framework for the nation brand Turkey
- Turkey’s Industrialists’ and Business Men’s Association (TÜSIAD) runs an own 10-year campaign on Turkey’s EU ambitions
- Under the auspices of Turkey’s MFA focusing on making Turkey an accession candidate an information institution called ABIG was operated as public-private partnership

Overall, the assessment of different Turkish public diplomacy activities shows many different players, pursuing their own business interests and communi-
cating their own vision of the country independently of the others. A few orchestrated efforts were given up quickly and could not produce any sustainable effects. Moreover, a broad array of different messages is found, suggesting that it is apparently difficult to label the nation brand with only a few consistent messages or positioning statements. From all this, the need for a better coordination of Turkey’s public diplomacy becomes obvious and the call goes for an identifiable institution to do so.

It is a debatable question whether or not this institution should be within the government’s realm. Several institutions are discussed by the experts with reference to their suitability to play this role, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Directorate of Press and Information and the Secretariat General for EU Affairs, or – given their current budgets – the Ministry of Culture and Tourism or an institution attached to the Prime Minister’s office such as Investment Support and Promotion Agency. It is concluded that due to budget and hierarchy conflicts the current inclination to behave cooperatively is rather poor among Turkish governmental institutions; consequently, an independent coordination mechanism is suggested. The dominant metaphor here is the conductor of an orchestra, powerful enough to set tone and rhythm of different individual instruments, consulted by a advisory board of knowledgeable experts mainly from outside the government. Some recent discussions among the Turkish government developed in that direction: it considered founding a Public Diplomacy Agency to undertake the public relations operations parallel to Turkish foreign policy, but independent from the administrative contexts and mixed-funded from government and private budgets. The agency should not execute all measures itself, but rather coordinate initiatives and draw up guidelines for other agents.

Training of Turkish diplomats and other governmental staff is identified to be another priority on the way to establishing a new public diplomacy culture in Turkey. Given the inert public administration system in Turkey, also potentially outsourcing some of the tasks in the meantime to private contractors is discussed as an option. And certainly evaluating the efforts of Turkish public diplomacy is a challenge Turkey has to face especially with regard to the current lack of robust data on the nation brand performance.

**Contents and dimensions**

The second part of the findings deals with the contents of Turkey’s public diplomacy, i.e. the different nation brand dimensions of Turkey and their potential contribution to EU accession-related public diplomacy efforts.

A puzzling topic is a certain tourism paradox Turkey experiences. Despite an impressive growth of visitors from EU Europe in the past 10 years, the tourists’ mostly positive experiences seem not to result in a more positive attitude towards the country’s EU membership. Reasons for that were suspected in the cultural alienation of mass tourism typical for Turkey packages sold, in the lack to differentiate from similar competitors in the ‘sun&beach’-marketplace,
and in the power of persistent collective stereotypes and negative overall reputations that prevent positive individual images to cut through.

A second area of discussion in need of better communication is the booming economy, the good (until the current global recession) news of which also does not seem to get through to the European audiences. Both the great potential of Turkish export products and of the country’s investment opportunities seem not to receive the public attention they deserve. Explanations offered include closed business circles without public relevance, fear of too much dynamism in old Europe or a missing link to the debate on labor migration.

The performance by the Turkish government is another challenge for the country’s public diplomacy. On the one hand stands an impressive track record since 2002 in renovating the country, on the other hand the public behavior of certain leading figures too often leaves Western audiences irritated. Apparently, the understanding of political symbolism varies in the different cultural spheres. Empathy for domestic debates in the EU countries is recommended.

Looking at Turkey’s cultural spheres and their suitability for public diplomacy purposes, the historical heritage offers both problems and opportunities, which need to be balanced better. Certainly with regard to Turkey’s EU accession, the question of religion is of particular interest for public diplomacy efforts, recalling values of tolerance, but also respecting different religious intensities. The promotion of contemporary Turkish culture is more or less unexploited, and some potential is seen in hosting more events with international reach in Turkey. Finally, the special role of Istanbul as European capital of culture and hyped metropolis needs to be carefully evaluated both for tourism and cultural promotion purposes.

Turkey’s people as potential nation brand ambassadors are not only with regard to the special value of hospitality in this country a promising dimension to look at, but of course also in the light of the large Turkish diaspora in Europe offer both a tremendous challenge and opportunity for Turkey’s public diplomacy. In addition, European demographic problems provide an interesting playfield, as does the showcasing of Turkish people as testimonials of change, e.g. Turkey’s mostly unknown women movement. Intensifying dialogues between the civil societies seems to be a most promising approach for Turkey’s approximation to Europe.

Finally, Turkey’s public diplomacy also needs to turn inside and reflect how the Turkish identity affects and is affected by the EU accession process. The dropping support for the country’s EU plans is an alarming signal that also a great deal of information and communication has to be directed to internal audiences. Certainly, in the EU question also essential tensions in the Turkish identity and current rifts in the society become visible. Turkey could serve as
an impressive case study for the so-called nation brand effect underscoring the reciprocal amplification of internal and external identities and images.

Summarizing and evaluating these numerous challenges and opportunities for Turkey’s public diplomacy in the different nation brand domains, it becomes apparent that the handling of such a multitude is an enormous task itself. Countless polarities need to be balanced, such as similarity vs. otherness, targeting friends or foes, internal vs. external symbolism, and a weighting of rational vs. emotional messaging. In search of consistency and unity, in the end diversity itself might become the central contribution of Turkey to the EU and be highlighted as such in the public diplomacy strategy.

Discussion
Evaluating the current activities, structures and topics by applying the framework developed, with regard to the time dimensions and the degree of activity, Turkey’s public diplomacy at present seems clearly too reactive and short-sighted. In terms of channels, the measures focus too much on centralized governmental promotional activities. Looking at the purposes, the relationship management to other civil societies needs large improvement, as well as an internal common understanding needs to be found in a society-wide dialogue as an alternative to a Turkish identity that is imposed vertically. The domains of Turkey’s public diplomacy are still dominated by hard-power issues and are largely matter-of-fact driven.

Comparing the identified potential with the current activities, from a managerial standpoint a tremendous gap has to be noticed and a call goes out to considerably intensify and modernize Turkey’s public diplomacy efforts. Public opinion and images tend to change slowly – Turkey should not underestimate the extent of its challenge to win the hearts and minds of EU citizens.

Given this unquestionable need for action the persistent diffidence of the Turkish administration in terms of public diplomacy activities remains puzzling. A final visit to some insightful theoretical debates in the light of the case of Turkey indicates some new perspectives for this puzzle that might also contribute to the theoretical debate of nation branding and public diplomacy in general.

Especially in the corporate branding discourse a paradigmatic shift occurs that makes the analogy with nation branding obvious. The cultural approach to brands and brand image posits an intense relationship between brand meanings and the surrounding cultural structures and processes. In this reading, brands are interpreted symbols of cultural ideals, shared by like-minded people as foundations of a group identity – quite comparable to modern concepts of nationhood and national identity. As are commercial brands, also nation brands are socially and culturally embedded, and co-created and reified by social actors.

As marketing managers need to admit a significant loss of control over their brands nowadays, so are nation-state governments threatened by a loss of
sovereignty in handling global affairs. Eventually a new public sphere emerges that demands much more for people-to-people relationships than for government-to-government or government-to-people. In this understanding, nation branding and public diplomacy actually become almost identical in meaning.

The concept of branding undergoes a redesign and reappears as a solid methodology for consumer engagement. Consequently, in such post-modern branding contexts the model of political communication seems to change. The labels ‘open-source-politics’ and ‘empowerment’ imply a reinterpretation of power relations and participation, while obviously mass-media ‘one-size-fits-all’ campaigns and top-down hierarchical modes of public diplomacy lose relevance.

Applying these observations it is tempting to question if the current Turkish society has reached a similar stage in development to be mobilized towards rather radical shifts in the political landscape. Soft power might eventually turn out to be a quite postmodern quality in essence, and contemporary Turkey will probably not be regarded as a postmodern society with all its consequences. Kemalistic top-down Etatism on the one hand and a network-model of communications on the other hand certainly seem to conflict at first sight. A new quality of discourse and interaction between state and non-state actors has to be established in Turkey and for Turkey’s foreign policy, based on mutual trust and relationship management rather than resting on vertical hierarchies.

Both the gap between the European publics and Turkey EU application with regard to nation brand status and public diplomacy potential, as well as Turkey’s hesitance to implement a mature public diplomacy approach, might find an interpretation in that.

**Contribution and value**
The study provides a fresh perspective to Turkey’s EU accession process. It consolidates different research streams into one multidisciplinary perspective that is rarely chosen to analyze political phenomena. It contributes to theory development both in political sciences/international relations and in marketing/branding, especially when attempting to merge the infant theory streams of nation branding and public diplomacy. By the application of theoretical insights to the case of Turkey, with a general outlook on how communication and public relations in the EU context should be organized and which contents should be stressed, also practical value in the form of managerial implications is generated.
Table of contents

Summary.............................................................................................................. ii-x
Table of contents.......................................................................................... xi-xiv
List of tables and figures................................................................................ xv-xvi
List of abbreviations...................................................................................... xvii

1 Introduction................................................................................................. 1-5
  1.1 Research goal and data fundus............................................................... 1
  1.2 Theory background.............................................................................. 1-2
  1.3 Inspirations and previous research ....................................................... 3
  1.4 Possibilities and limitations .................................................................. 4-5
  1.5 Structure of the study ........................................................................... 5

2 Situation analysis: Turkey’s nation brand and EU accession................. 6-55
  2.1 European Public Opinion on Turkey....................................................... 6-20
      2.1.1 Clear-cut opposition ..................................................................... 6-8
      2.1.2 Missing patterns .......................................................................... 9-11
      2.1.3 Stable trends................................................................................ 11-13
      2.1.4 The IF-clause: conditions for Turkey .......................................... 14-17
      2.1.5 Limitations of public opinion data .............................................. 17-18
      2.1.6 Contextualizing public opinion and attitudes.............................. 18-20
  2.2 Turkey’s nation brand status................................................................. 20-31
      2.2.1 Turkey’s performance in the Nation Brand Index ....................... 20-22
      2.2.2 Turkey’s nation brand dimensions.............................................. 23-29
      2.2.3 Global benchmarking of Turkey’s nation brand ......................... 29-31
  2.3 Turkey’s nation brand image and EU accession ................................ 31-41
      2.3.1 Topicality of Turkey’s image ....................................................... 31-34
      2.3.2 Imagological perspektive on the history of Turks in Europe.... 34-38
          2.3.2.1 Historical roots .................................................................... 34-38
          2.3.2.2 Today’s relevance of historical images.................................. 38-39
      2.3.3 Turkey’s image in a marketing perspective................................. 39-43
          2.3.3.1 Expert study on Turkey’s nation brand image ...................... 39-41
          2.3.3.2 Survey on Turkey’s country image ....................................... 41-43
  2.4 Political positions regarding Turkey’s EU accession ......................... 43-53
      2.4.1 Turkey’s EU accession history ..................................................... 43-46
      2.4.2 EU member-states political positions on Turkey ....................... 46-50
      2.4.3 EU’s identity crisis and Turkey .................................................... 50-51
      2.4.4 Turkey’s Pros and Cons ............................................................... 51-53
  2.5 Turkey’s EU accession as a public affair ............................................. 53-55

3 Backgrounds: theory of nation branding and public diplomacy............ 56-79
  3.1 Terminological distinctions: nations and national identity ............... 56-58
  3.2 The common ground: soft power of nations ...................................... 58-60
  3.3 Marketing terms: image, identity and reputation .............................. 60-63
  3.4 Nation Branding .................................................................................. 63-66
      3.4.1 Broadening the marketing concept .......................................... 63-64
      3.4.2 Development of Place Branding ............................................... 64-66
3.5 Public diplomacy ................................................................. 66-75
  3.5.1 Becoming fashionable: public diplomacy on the rise........ 67-68
  3.5.2 Closer to Main Street .................................................... 68-69
  3.5.3 Scholarly study of public diplomacy ............................... 69-70
  3.5.4 From Selling to Listening: public diplomacy paradigms..... 70-72
  3.5.5 Management of public diplomacy .................................. 72-73
  3.5.6 Public diplomacy institutions ....................................... 73-74
  3.5.7 Media of public diplomacy ........................................... 74-75
3.6 Modeling public diplomacy ................................................. 75-77
  3.6.1 Parameters of the public diplomacy model ..................... 75-76
  3.6.2 Analytical framework .................................................. 76-77
3.7 Public diplomacy and nation branding ................................. 78-79

4 Research design: exploration of Turkey's potential ........... 80-90
  4.1 Research questions ....................................................... 80
  4.2 Explorative approach .................................................... 80-81
  4.3 Sampling decisions ....................................................... 81-84
    4.3.1 Sampling unit experts ............................................. 82-83
    4.3.2 Sampling unit countries ........................................... 83-84
  4.4 Access to informants ..................................................... 84-86
  4.5 Critical assessment of the research design ....................... 86-87
  4.6 Interview design and analysis ........................................ 87-90
    4.6.1 Flow of the interview and topic guide ......................... 88-89
    4.6.2 Interview conduction and data analysis ....................... 89-90

5 Findings: Public diplomacy for Turkey's EU accession ....... 91-220
  5.1 Escaping the image trap ................................................ 91-95
    5.1.1 Information deficit as starting point .......................... 91-93
    5.1.2 The need to reach the publics .................................... 93-94
    5.1.3 Chances for images to change ..................................... 94-95
  5.2 The channels of public diplomacy for Turkey .................... 95-102
    5.2.1 Public Relations beyond promotional advertising .......... 95-96
    5.2.2 Barriers within domestic media systems ...................... 96-99
    5.2.3 Exceeding press relations: multilateral relations management 99-100
    5.2.4 Lobbying and multiplication ...................................... 100-102
  5.3 Missing PR genes: Turkey's public diplomacy history ........ 102-114
    5.3.1 Historical lacks of competence and understanding ........... 102-103
    5.3.2 Overcoming the poor performance in the public space .... 103-104
  5.3.3 Campaigns pro Turkey.................................................. 105-114
    5.3.3.1 Tourism promotion for Turkey .................................. 105-108
    5.3.3.2 Investment promotion ........................................... 108-109
    5.3.3.3 The TÜİKYE-Project ............................................. 109-111
    5.3.3.4 The TÜSİAD Initiative .......................................... 111-112
    5.3.3.5 The joint attempt of ABIG ..................................... 113-114
    5.3.3.6 Evaluation of previous Turkish public diplomacy efforts 114
  5.4 Public diplomacy management: coordinating brand Turkey .... 115-130
    5.4.1 A need for coordination? ........................................... 115-116
    5.4.2 Institutional coordination .......................................... 116-125
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2.1 Governmental institutions</td>
<td>116-121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2.2 Independent coordination</td>
<td>121-122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2.3 Turkey’s Public Diplomacy Agency</td>
<td>123-125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3 Coordination and Kemalism</td>
<td>125-130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3.1 Etatism and network-models</td>
<td>126-127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3.2 Networking with the NGO-sector</td>
<td>127-128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3.3 NGO participation in public diplomacy</td>
<td>128-130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 Learning, development and handling of public diplomacy</td>
<td>130-137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1 Training Turkey’s diplomats</td>
<td>131-133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2 Implementing public diplomacy services in Turkey</td>
<td>133-135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3 Researching and evaluating Turkey’s perception</td>
<td>135-137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 Public diplomacy strategies for Turkey’s brand dimensions</td>
<td>137-192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.1 Destination branding: Tourism as a two-edged sword</td>
<td>138-145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.1.1 Positive impact of tourism</td>
<td>138-139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.1.2 Cultural alienation by mass tourism</td>
<td>139-140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.1.3 Turkey’s full picture</td>
<td>140-141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.1.4 Achievements of direct experiences</td>
<td>141-142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.1.5 Image vs. reputation: Turkey’s tourism paradox</td>
<td>142-144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.1.6 Integrating tourism advocacy for Turkey</td>
<td>144-145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.2 Spreading the word of boom: Turkey’s economy</td>
<td>145-153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.2.1 Exports as Turkey’s unknown modernity</td>
<td>146-148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.2.2 The rising star: Turkey’s investment case</td>
<td>148-149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.2.3 Positive news won’t get through</td>
<td>149-153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.3 Good governance speaks louder than words</td>
<td>153-163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.3.1 Stable on track</td>
<td>154-155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.3.2 Improve the weak sides</td>
<td>155-156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.3.3 Split personalities: Politicians’ public behavior</td>
<td>156-158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.3.4 Pride meets truth</td>
<td>158-160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.3.5 Perception and reality in public diplomacy</td>
<td>160-161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.3.6 Relate to foreign domestic debates</td>
<td>161-163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.4 Worlds apart? Turkey’s cultural spheres</td>
<td>163-178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.4.1 Chances and burdens of history</td>
<td>164-166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.4.2 The special role of religion</td>
<td>166-171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.4.3 Not for sale: cultural promotion abroad</td>
<td>171-175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.4.4 Positive events in Turkey</td>
<td>175-177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.4.5 Istanbul: Europe’s cultural capital vs. the rest of Turkey</td>
<td>177-178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.5 Here and there: Turkey’s people</td>
<td>178-192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.5.1 Learning by coming</td>
<td>179-180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.5.2 Same, same, but different: Turkish diaspora</td>
<td>180-182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.5.3 Closing the gap by diaspora diplomacy</td>
<td>182-185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.5.4 Media outreach and diaspora diplomacy</td>
<td>185-187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.5.5 Testimonials of change</td>
<td>187-189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.5.6 Fortune and fear of demographics</td>
<td>189-190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.5.7 People relationship management: civil society dialogues</td>
<td>190-192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7 Public diplomacy inside: Turkey’s identity and EU accession......</td>
<td>192-204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7.1 Dropping support</td>
<td>192-194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7.2 Decision-making at home</td>
<td>194-195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7.3 Communicate to the inside</td>
<td>195-197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of tables and figures

Tables

Table 2-1: Balance between “pro” and “con” Turkey .......................... 9
Table 2-2: Accession if Turkey complies with all EU conditions; balance of favorable vs. against .................................................. 16
Table 2-3: Attitudes on Turkey joining the EU .................................. 18
Table 2-4: Attitudes towards Turkey’s EU accession .......................... 19-20
Table 2-5: Nation brand rankings 2005-2007 ................................. 21-22
Table 2-6: Turkey’s performance in the NBPI .................................. 31
Table 2-7: Summaries of Turkey’s nation brand image dimensions .. 40-41
Table 2-8: Pros and cons of Turkish accession in the political discourse ......................................................................................... 51-52
Table 3-1: Hard power and soft power ............................................. 59
Table 4-1: Sampling of EU countries ................................................. 84
Table 4-2: Sample of informants by sampling dimension.................. 85
Table 4-3: Sample of informants by country ...................................... 85
Table 5-1: Tourism to Turkey vs. Eurobarometer Opinions .............. 142
Table 5-2: Turkey’s GDP, Exports and FDI vs. Eurobarometer Opinions .......................................................................................... 145
Table 7-1: Power categories of nations ............................................. 235

Figures

Figure 1-1: Multidisciplinary contributions to public diplomacy ....... 2
Figure 2-1: Opinion on potential EU members .............................. 7
Figure 2-2: “No” to Turkey’s EU accession over time ....................... 7
Figure 2-3: Distribution of opinion against Turkey’s EU accession .. 8
Figure 2-4: Distribution of opinion in favor of Turkey’s EU accession 8
Figure 2-5: Distribution of ‘no opinion’ (“Don’t know”) on Turkey’s EU accession ........................................................................... 10
Figure 2-6: Balance between Turkey’s membership being a “good thing” vs. a “bad thing” .............................................................. 11
Figure 2-7: Turkey’s EU membership a “good thing” ....................... 12
Figure 2-8: Opinion on Turkey over time ........................................ 13
Figure 2-9: “Turkey should be invited to join the EU” ....................... 13
Figure 2-10: “Turkey should be invited to join the EU if Turkey implements reforms desired by EU” .................................................. 14
Figure 2-11: “Against Turkey’s EU accession” vs. “opposed, if Turkey complies with all conditions by EU” ................................. 15
Figure 2-12: “In favor of Turkey’s EU accession” vs. “in favor if Turkey complies with all conditions by the EU” .............................. 16
Figure 2-13: Nation brand hexagon ................................................. 21
Figure 2-14: Changes in nation brand scores Q4 2005 – Q1 2007 ... 22
Figure 2-15: Turkey’s nation brand perception ................................ 23
Figure 2-16: Turkey’s current economic and social condition ......... 24
Figure 2-17: Experience of visiting Turkey ...................................... 24
Figure 2-18: Description of Turkey’s people ........................................ 25
Figure 2-19: Turkey’s people - mean comparison between European and non-European panelists ......................................................... 25
Figure 2-20: Product or service most expected from Turkey ............. 26
Figure 2-21: Cultural activity or product most expected from Turkey 26
Figure 2-22: Description of Turkey’s government ............................... 27
Figure 2-23: Turkey’s government - mean comparison between Euro-
pean and non-European panelists ................................................... 27
Figure 2-24: likeliness/willingness to spend vacation, live and work or open office in Turkey ................................................................. 28
Figure 2-25: Turkey’s nation brand hexagon .................................. 29
Figure 2-26: Other nations’ brand hexagons .................................... 29-30
Figure 3-1: Identity and Image .............................................................. 61
Figure 3-2: Interdependence of Reputation, Image and Identity ...... 62
Figure 3-3: Elements of Corporate Reputation ................................. 63
Figure 3-4: Aggregated model of public diplomacy ....................... 77
Figure 4-1: Sampling dimensions experts ......................................... 82
Figure 5-1: Iconography of Turkey’s tourism promotion ................. 106
Figure 5-2: Turkey’s investment promotion ads ............................... 108
Figure 5-3: Turkey’s FDI promotion website .................................... 109
Figure 5-4: TÜ®KIYE brand core ....................................................... 110
Figure 5-5: TÜSİAD Activities advertisings ....................................... 112
Figure 5-6: TÜSİAD-Campaign in Germany ..................................... 112
Figure 5-7: Promotion şimdi-now-Festival ..................................... 113
Figure 5-8: GDP per Capita/GDP Growth ...................................... 150
Figure 5-9: Conditions for Turkey’s EU accession ....................... 150
Figure 5-10: Evaluation of the interaction between Muslim and West-
ern World ...................................................................................... 167
Figure 5-11: Negative views of Muslims ........................................... 168
Figure 5-12: Centrality of Religion across Europe ......................... 170
Figure 5-13: Turks Exhibition London 2005 ................................... 174
Figure 5-14: Turkish view on EU membership ............................... 193
Figure 5-15: Turkey’s religious struggles ........................................ 200
Figure 5-16: National Brand Effect Cycle ....................................... 204
### List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABIG</td>
<td>Avrupa Birligi Iletisim Grubu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon.</td>
<td>Anonymus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Agence Presse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>bn</td>
<td>Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g.</td>
<td>Example given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ed(s)</td>
<td>Editor(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>et seq.</td>
<td>et sequentes (and the following ones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.e.</td>
<td>That is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ibid.</td>
<td>Ibidem (the same place)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKV</td>
<td>İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOL</td>
<td>Key Opinion Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mio</td>
<td>Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBI</td>
<td>Nation Brand Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NL</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
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<td>PT</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resp.</td>
<td>Respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small- and Medium Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWE,</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOBB</td>
<td>Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜSİAD</td>
<td>Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW</td>
<td>World War</td>
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1 Introduction

1.1 Research goal and data fundus
Many foreigners coming to Turkey for the first time and getting to know the country better by intensively traveling, living or working there have a quite similar experience: this country looks much better than it was expected.

What appears to be a trivial observation at first sight turns out to be quite momentous when looking at Turkey’s EU accession scenario, which seems threatened by negative public opinion in most EU member states.

The central conclusion is as obvious as it is meaningful: Turkey has an image problem.

This insight was the starting point for an extended research project mainly aiming at two goals:
1. To understand Turkey’s image problem better, and
2. To consider ways and strategies to cope with this image problem.

In order to understand Turkey’s image better, desk research into available quantitative and qualitative data promised a rich foundation on which to work towards the first research goal. Several insightful studies put the spotlight on different relevant facets of Turkey’s perception abroad.

For the exploratory analysis of potential strategies for Turkey to handle its image problem, especially with regard to the country’s EU accession process, a sample of knowledgeable experts on Turkey was consulted. Due to the multidisciplinary nature of this research problem, different professional backgrounds and country-specific perspectives on Turkey were considered. Also, contrasting Turkish standpoints with EU-European points of view was regarded to be meaningful for this interpretative study approach.

The bulk of the data was collected in Turkey while living in Ankara, combined with field trips to Europe in 2005-2006, followed by a subsequent field trip to Ankara in 2007 and follow-up activities from Europe in early 2008. The presence in Turkey helped not only to generate a robust information base for this research, but also to develop enough curiosity and empathy to thoroughly understand internal and external dynamics surrounding these questions.

1.2 Theory background
Research on conditions and consequences of images of nations is more or less a recent academic parvenu and draws from different research streams or disciplines (Gilboa, 2008):

- International relations theory and political sciences deal with some fundamental shifts in the power relations between nations; new foreign relations tasks and theories emerge under the label “public diplomacy”, which will become the central concept of this thesis.
The term image is linked to the domains of Public Relations and advertising research, while communications research covers the concepts of public opinion.

With the buzzword “place branding” in the more recent past an important construct emerged in the broadening of the marketing theory beyond the commercial realm.

While these streams form the core theoretical background for this study, the contributions to the developing concept of public diplomacy are even broader.

Figure 1-1: Multidisciplinary contributions to public diplomacy (Gilboa, 2008: 74)

Clearly, this research on Turkey is settled in a multidisciplinary theoretical context at the interface of political marketing communications.

Although a public diplomacy theory is still in its infancy, especially in the past five to seven years a significant amount of literature was produced in this interdisciplinary context, providing an interesting background for the study of the case of Turkey’s EU accession.

The literature provides a solid background to reflect the collected data, both to validate the description of Turkey’s position, and to evaluate the opportunities and threats seen in the light of current public diplomacy discourses.
1.3 Inspirations and previous research

In the analysis of Turkey’s image, this study connects to previous work by Ger (1991) and Altınbaşak Ebrem (2004), who both provided excellent comprehensive explorative studies on the constituents of the general image of Turkey. Furthermore, for example Sönmez/Sirakaya (2002), Ger/Askegaard/Christensen (1999) or Kuran-Burçoglu (2007) among others researched on selected dimensions of Turkey’s image like tourism destination, country-of-origin effects or historical roots.

The biannual Eurobarometer data and subsequent analyses, for example by Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca (2007), form the foundation by capturing the public opinion on Turkey’s EU accession. Carnevale/Ihrig/Weiss (2005) or Giannakopoulos/Maras (2005c) delivered deep descriptions of the media discourses on Turkey in the EU. Important work, for example, by Leggewie (2004b) or LaGro/ Jørgensen (2007a) offered valuable approaches to comprehend the complex political process of Turkey’s EU accession.

Authors like Tenscher/Viehrig (2007), Noya (2006a) or Melissen (2005b) supplied important groundwork for better understanding the new modes of political communication in international relations and the concept of public diplomacy. Truly pioneering work on nation branding and public diplomacy theory must be credited to Simon Anholt, who – besides countless important publications – not only edits the only journal directly related to the questions of "Place Branding and Public Diplomacy”, but also designed and runs the first global nation brand index.

Furthermore, successful role models like, for example, the EU accession processes of Spain or Poland (both partly comparable, not only in terms of similarities in some country specifics, but also with regard to some serious European public doubt accompanying their membership bids in the past (Domanic, 2007a; Schrijvers, 2007)) encourage to employ the public diplomacy and nation brand concepts in the case of Turkey.

Spain’s tremendous rebranding after the Franco regime is generally regarded as one of the best practice cases in nation branding (Anholt, 2007a: 118). A comparably large membership candidate in size, population and impact, with enormous structural deficits (economically rather underdeveloped and mainly agricultural in character), managed not only to access the EU rather quickly, but also achieved a completely renovated international perception within approximately 20 years (Olins, 2002b; Schwan, 2007b; Balci, 2009).

Similarly, Poland succeeded, although facing serious European public skepticism regarding the country’s size and the economic burdens, to access the EU in 2005 by a quite rigorous application of public diplomacy concepts both internally to persuade the own society and externally to positively influence public opinion in favor of Polish membership (Flórek, 2005; Ociepka/Ryniejska, 2005), and therefore serves as an insightful benchmark for Turkey’s bid (Önis, 2004).
1.4 Possibilities and limitations

This research aims to contribute to the further convergence of marketing communications and international relations theory. Broadening its scope to public diplomacy contexts and the marketing of complex political entities like nations will enrich marketing science further. International relations theory and political science, on the other hand, might gain additional insights into opinion formation and voting behaviour by applying marketing methodology and penetrating the image construct more deeply: “the application of consumer behaviour theories in the political arena can increase understanding of the dynamics of public opinion” (Omura/Talarzyk, 1985: 95).

For practical purposes, the research should further narrow the knowledge gap on Turkey’s nation brand and provide a substantial foundation for further analysis of the marketing and communication of Turkey’s EU accession. Pryor/Grossbart (2007) showed that place brands can well be understood through interpretative research. Nonetheless, to achieve sufficient empirical insights into the relationship of conditions, contexts and consequences of Turkey’s image remains a desideratum outside the scope of this thesis. Plans to set up a meaningful multi-country quantitative survey to further broaden and comprehend this data spectrum had to be given up after promises for financial resources were withdrawn in the course of some political turmoil in Turkey and alternative efforts to generate funding inside and outside of Turkey within an acceptable time period failed. Given the qualitative character of the data, this present study necessarily remains exploratory and interpretative in nature.

In the emerging field of research on nation brands and public diplomacy it is intended to contribute to three of a long list of points Anholt (2002a) outlined as relevant areas for further study, which he sees “understudied and insufficiently researched in the academic literature […]:

- The different ways in which national brands are perceived in different countries […] and how this diversity of perception can be managed in international branding campaigns. […]
- How, and to what extent it is desirable and feasible, to harmonise acts of foreign policy and diplomacy with the national brand strategy. […]

Anholt (2002a) and Olins (2002a) both underscore the high emotional loading of nation branding topics. Likewise, the current case of Turkey’s EU accession witnesses a breadth of emotional implications. In being in an outsider’s position as a foreigner with the very best scientific intentions in conducting research on this issue it should be explicitly stated that apologies are made if the discussion unconsciously transgresses into ethically difficult aspects.

This study was conducted with an understanding of science as “building a helix of never-ending search of knowledge” (Gummesson, 2002: 346). Eventually a date had to be found to deliver a result of this specific research project.
and data collection had to occur in specific temporal constraints. This thesis necessarily delivers a snapshot-impression of a complex problem. Turkey’s accession process with negotiations between EU-Europe, Turkey and all other parties will continue, consequently new questions will enter the stage and others will vanish, Analysis and explanation of these relationships must consequently be constantly reinvented.

1.5 Structure of the study
To sharpen the central problems leading to this research, in the second chapter the existing studies on Europe’s public opinion about Turkey and on Turkey’s image in communicative, marketing and a historical perspectives are summarized and investigated with regard to their contribution to understanding Turkey’s EU accession process. The history of Turkey’s EU bid and the different official positions of the EU countries on Turkey’s entry are juxtaposed against public sentiment.

The third chapter will make the necessary terminological and conceptual distinctions at the interface of international relations and marketing or communications domains by revisiting essential theoretical constructs such as power, image, identity, reputation, nation branding or public diplomacy. The literature research leads to an analytical framework providing the dimensions to be evaluated in the context of Turkey’s nation brand and public diplomacy.

In the fourth chapter the qualitative research design for the data collection on Turkey’s potential nation branding and public diplomacy strategies is introduced and discussed including research questions, sampling decisions, interview design and the procedures for data analysis.

The fifth chapter summarizes the findings of the study and discusses the results and implications with reference to the literature. The two main streams of this finding section are the organizational implications of implementing public diplomacy structures in Turkey and Turkey’s different nation brand dimensions to be employed strategically in the context of EU accession.

In the light of these findings and with Turkey’s eyes, the sixth chapter provides an outlook on the most important paradigmatic tensions within the evolving theory around the constructs of (public) diplomacy and (place) branding. Contemporary concepts such as empowerment and the postmodern context not only challenge some established theoretical assumptions and affect the relationship of public diplomacy and nation branding, but also seem to expand the fields of marketing communications and political science further into new modes and modalities of political communication.

The concluding seventh chapter hazards an outlook on Turkey’s public diplomacy potential and problems with regard to the EU accession process, given the practical and theoretical insights generated throughout this thesis.
Situation analysis: Turkey’s nation brand and EU accession

Prior to discussion of managerial areas for Turkey’s nation brand and public diplomacy, in the context of the country’s EU accession process, a groundwork consisting of a substantial analysis of the country’s current situation should be laid. The evaluation focuses on the external perception of Turkey in Europe and comprises two different measures: public opinion on Turkey’s EU accession and Turkey’s nation brand status.

For both measures, mostly publicly-accessible data are consulted, and then contrasted with research on Turkey’s nation brand image and the official European political positions towards Turkey. The year 2006 serves as the main reference point, for a large number of insightful studies were published then and could be seen in relation to each other.

2.1 European Public Opinion on Turkey

European public opinion on Turkey’s EU membership provides an important starting point into understanding Turkey’s situation. Several data sources offer insights into the detailed structures and patterns of the country’s perception in Europe. The European Commission’s semiannual public opinion surveys “Eurobarometer”, as the most extensive data pool, is concentrated on while other similar studies serve benchmarking purposes.

2.1.1 Clear-cut opposition

Looking at Eurobarometer on how the inhabitants of EU member states and candidate countries view Turkey’s potential accession, on average a clear cut verdict is spoken: while only 28% of all 25 (in 2006) member states are in favor of Turkey’s EU membership, 59% are against it (Eurobarometer, 2006a).

In the eyes of Europe’s public, Turkey is the least wanted of all potential member countries, not only trailing non-candidates like Switzerland or Norway, but also falling behind Albania and Serbia as potential future accession countries (Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca, 2007).

---

1 2006 autumn Standard Eurobarometer, report No 66, question QA 33.13: “For each of the following countries, would you be in favor or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future? (Turkey)?” (Eurobarometer, 2006a: 401). In 2008 spring Eurobarometer, report No 69 (Eurobarometer, 2008: 160), the question was repeated most recently with overall similar results, but a slight improvement of Turkey’s perception (all EU 27 55% against and 31% in favor over all 27 countries). As indicated above, the year 2006 was chosen as reference period for this study because it promised the most extensive comparable data.

2 then still with Montenegro
This categorical public opposition is not a temporary phenomenon but a stable trend for more than seven years and was sustained by the European Union growing from 15 to 25 to 27 member states during this period. On average, opinion against Turkey’s EU membership even gained approximately another 15% across all countries between 1999 and 2006, as indicated by the trend line (linear regression) below, increasing the gap between other candidate countries. In late 2000, for example, Turkey’s refusal was only 3% apart from the EU’s public opinion on Romania’s accession, then a candidate country and by now member-state of the EU (Eurobarometer, 2001: 83).
However, as univocal the trend and the general or average opinion on Turkey’s EU membership seem at first sight, the picture becomes puzzling when trying to make sense of the data on a country-by-country basis. In 2006 the opinion against Turkey becoming an EU member was distributed on a range between only 17% in Romania to 87% in Austria.

For support, the distribution remains equally broad, again with Austria with 5% in favor and Romania with 61% (in both cases leaving aside the opinion in Turkey itself and in Northern Cyprus) as the outposts.
2.1.2 Missing patterns

Obviously the picture of Europe’s opinions on Turkey is quite colorful. The divided opinion suggests that a common European public in the form of a consensual development within a European civil society is – at least with regard to the perception of Turkey – not in sight (Giannakopoulos/Maras, 2005b: 216-217).

The balances between “against” and “in favor” opinions on Turkey further underscore the extent of the EU’s diversity in this regard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In favor (positive balance)</th>
<th>Rather against (balance &lt; 20%)</th>
<th>Clearly against (balance 20-40%)</th>
<th>Largely against (balance &lt; 40%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT Portugal</td>
<td>LV Latvia</td>
<td>DK Denmark</td>
<td>AT Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE Sweden</td>
<td>IE Ireland</td>
<td>IT Italy</td>
<td>DE Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Bulgaria</td>
<td>MT Malta</td>
<td>CZ Czech Republic</td>
<td>LU Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Croatia</td>
<td>LT Lithuania</td>
<td>EE Estonia</td>
<td>CY Republic of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO Romania</td>
<td>SI Slovenia</td>
<td>BE Belgium</td>
<td>EL Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR Turkey</td>
<td>HU Hungary</td>
<td>SK Slovakia</td>
<td>FI Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY Northern Cyprus</td>
<td>PL Poland</td>
<td>UK The United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ES Spain</td>
<td>NL The Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-1: Balance between “pro” and “con” Turkey (Eurobarometer, 2006a: 401)

Önis (2004) tries to make some sense of this distribution by suggesting a schematic comparison between different EU nation states typologies. She, mostly unsuccessful, tries to find lines of division between parties and orientations such as visions of Europe’s future, left and right axes, small vs. big, elite vs. individual citizens and so on. Indeed, a number of simple explanations fail:

- A large Turkish community might provide a reason in Germany (balance -62%), but does not explain the comparably less negative opinion in the Netherlands (-21%), which has experienced a similar Turkish immigration history following the acquisition of guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s.
- In the light of the repeatedly raised “EU is a Christian club” argument, a strong religious orientation, such as in Poland, should therefore potentially contradict a strong backing for Turkey. However, Poland is only mildly opposed (-2%), while a more secular country such as the Czech Republic takes a clear cut stance against Turkey’s membership to the EU (-33%).³
- While the Balkan states share similar historical experiences with Turks/Ottomans, in Austria (-82%) Turkish membership is seen much more critically than in Hungary (-8%) or Slovenia (-10%).
- With regard to history, Spain (-1%) is also an interesting case: Numerous historic touch points with Islam including prominent reminders of a period of Muslim rule like the Alhambra at Granada or the mosque “La Mezquita” in Cordoba seem not to have major negative effects on Spanish public opinion towards Turkey’s EU accession.

³ See e.g. PEW, 2002: for the question “how important is religion in your life”, in the “very-important”-category Poland shows 36% and Czech Republic 11%.
• A large Muslim immigration history might serve as a first-hand reason for rejecting Turkey’s ambitions in France (-47%), yet this is contradicted by the milder British position (-22%) towards Turkey’s EU bid with also a large Muslim population.

• Neither would hypotheses such as Mediterranean solidarity towards Turkey (as could be assumed for example from Spain (-1%), Italy (-35%) and Greece (-51%)) or sympathy from new joint member-states like Poland (-2%) or Estonia (-30%) lead to patterns with explanatory value, given the diversity among these subgroups.

• Furthermore, neither very high involvement (potentially expressed in a low score in the DON’T KNOW -category) nor very low involvement (= high score in DON’T KNOW) explain the distribution (see figure below). Slovenia and Germany, world’s apart in the “in favor”-score, are closed neighbors in the “don’t know”-score pointing at a rather determined judgment. Spain and Slovenia however, score very similarly in the “in favor”-vote, but are almost the two outposts in the DON’T KNOW score.

Only two patterns offer consistent hypotheses about the distribution of public opinion:

• Among the most recently joined member-states (still candidate countries in the 2006 Eurobarometer survey) Romania (+44%) and Bulgaria (+13%) as well as in Croatia (+17%) as the co-candidate country seem to offer a similar sympathetic stance, albeit with significantly divergent intensities.

• And of course, the support of Turkish citizens in Turkey (+45%) and in the Northern part of Cyprus (+71%) can not surprise in the light of the hopes connected to EU Turkish membership.
Finally, there is some notable evidence in the data for a pattern expressed in a statement like: ‘the elder the EU membership, the more reluctant towards Turkey’s membership’.\(^4\) In general however, as was shown, a consistent theory about the opinion formation on Turkey in Europe is out of sight (Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca, 2007).

### 2.1.3 Stable trends

The indicated tendencies, extracted from Eurobarometer, are much the same in similar sources of data. The Transatlantic Trends, for example, which are annually conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, show a comparable distribution in the balance between supporting and disapproving public opinion in the 2006 data:\(^5\)

- Germany and France are in the camp with the most negative balance of opinion on Turkey, while Romania and Turkey show the most positive.
- In the middle range of between slightly positive and slightly negative balance, the remaining countries UK, Bulgaria, Italy, Portugal, Poland, and Spain are situated.
- As in Eurobarometer, the Netherlands and Slovakia are in a more negative camp than the average.

![Figure 2-6: Balance between Turkey’s membership being a “good thing vs. a “bad thing”](Transatlantic Trends, 2007: 10)

As the only strikingly deviant measure, the UK shows clearly better balance in the Transatlantic Trends 2006 than it did in Eurobarometer 2006. In Eurobarometer, the UK’s balance dropped in a quite vigorous shift from a net supporter in spring 2005 (+3% balance) to a clear refusal (-22%) in autumn

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\(^4\) This trend is largely in line with the general public opinion on further enlargement of the EU, irrespective of a specific candidate country, see Eurobarometer, 2006: 219.

\(^5\) Transatlantic Trends, 2007: 10. Wording Question 6a “Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey’s membership of the European Union would be [a good/bad thing]?“
In general, however, as with Eurobarometer, Transatlantic Trends also documents a steady decline in appreciation of Turkey’s EU bid over the past years, both in the EU as well as in Turkey itself; the latter being a quite dramatic descent with over 30% loss between 2004 and 2007.

Figure 2-7: Turkey’s EU membership a “good thing” (Transatlantic Trends, 2007: 10)

As with the Eurobarometer data, a turning point in opinion on Turkey’s accession in all countries observed occurs between 2004 and 2005. As will be reviewed in more detail, Turkey’s membership approach was formalized by the EU heads of state declaration of Turkey’s fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria in December 2004 and negotiations started by October 3, 2005. The Independent Commission on Turkey quotes an opinion by Turkish leaders presuming “the closer Turkey gets to EU membership, the more the resistance grows in Europe” (Independent Commission, 2004: 15).

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6 Data collection for Transatlantic Trend took place in June 2005. There are of course many other external factors and variables to be taken into account when having to explain this shift. A general EU fatigue, demonstrably partly causal for the referendum rejection of the European constitution in the Netherlands and France in June 2005, would need to be considered as would xenophobic phenomena in some of the societies in general (Steinbach/Cremer, 2006). The existing data does not tackle these interdependencies, unfortunately, and the focus of this research should still lay on Turkey’s situation.

7 The Independent Commission on Turkey is made up of former heads of state and government, foreign ministers and European commissioners, and other Europeans who have previously held high positions in public office. Martti Ahtisaari is the chairman of the Commission, which is supported by the British Council and the Open Society Institute.
As a third point of reference, an online poll conducted by Harris Interactive sponsored by the Financial Times in July 2007 also largely confirmed the previous findings concerning both distribution of opinion on and involvement in Turkey’s accession across the EU’s largest countries. Looking at the balance of positive and negative opinion, again France (-55%) and Germany (-45%) make up a cluster of their own, while Spain (-20%), UK (-23%) and Italy (-24%) gather in a less negative group. Similarly to Eurobarometer data, the “don’t know” result is quite high in Spain.

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8 Harris Interactive, 2007. This study was conducted for the first time in 2007, which makes the comparison to the other 2006 data less reliable; nonetheless the trend data are helpful.
2.1.4 The IF-clause: conditions for Turkey
The research by Harris Interactive adds another aspect to the picture, similar to a Special Eurobarometer, in summer 2006. Both studies analyzed public opinion on Turkey in conditional settings, that is, dependent on certain factors.

Along with the question whether Turkey should be invited to join the EU in general, Harris Interactive asked: “If Turkey were to implement reforms desired by some EU member states, should it be invited to join the EU”? Combining the responses to the unconditional and the conditional question, the picture becomes suddenly pro Turkey in almost all member states except France.

Figure 2-10: “Turkey should be invited to join the EU if Turkey implements reforms desired by EU” (Harris Interactive, 2007: 3)

In July 2006, the European Commission published a Special Eurobarometer on attitudes towards EU enlargement. As in the Harris Interactive poll, here the accession question was also put in conditional terms: “Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be [in favor/opposed] to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?” (Eurobarometer, 2006b: 70-71).

Comparing this conditional question of the Special Eurobarometer with the unconditional question from the Standard Eurobarometer, as with the Harris

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9 Harris Interactive, 2007: 3
10 Special Eurobarometer 255 (Eurobarometer, 2006b)
11 QD16.5
12 Unfortunately, the question from the Standard Eurobarometer “would you be in favour or against Turkey becoming part of the European Union in the future” was not included in this Special Eurobarometer with fieldwork between March and May, 2006; also the Standard Eurobarometer 65 with the same fieldwork period did not include this standard question. For the purpose of comparison data from the next wave of the Eurobarometer 66 (Eurobarometer, 2006a) with fieldwork completed between October/November, 2006 was chosen.
Interactive research, shows a remarkable shift. The comparison relates to the averages of elder (EU 15), younger (NMS, which are the 10 countries that joined in 2005) and then-2006 all current member states (EU 25).

Figure 2-11: “Against Turkey’s EU accession” vs. “opposed, if Turkey complies with all conditions by EU” (Eurobarometer 2006a and b)

Adding the condition of having to comply with all EU requirements leads to a shift in opinion of 11% into both “pro” and “against” directions on average; the effect is slightly stronger for the new member states\(^\text{13}\).

Looking at the data once more country by country, positive effects almost everywhere come to the fore. The most interesting outliers are Turkey itself and the Turkish Cypriots, for both of which a negative effect of the added condition occurs. It could be speculated that either these publics favor Turkey’s accession ‘conditio sine qua non’ and are not willing to opt into EU’s conditions. Or has the process of accession negotiation and aligning with EU’s acquis communautaire been sufficiently communicated to the publics of Turkey and Turkish Northern part of Cyprus? Some implications will be discussed later on.

\(^\text{13}\) In 2008 (Eurobarometer, 2008: 165), this shift is even more impressive. The balance between “opposed” and “favorable” is even at 45% each (Eurobarometer, 2008: 165), vs. 31% “yes” and 55% “no” in the unconditional question QA 44.8 (Eurobarometer, 2008: 160).
Figure 2-12: “In favor of Turkey’s EU accession” vs. “in favor if Turkey complies with all conditions by the EU” (Eurobarometer 2006a and b)

For the EU countries, the impact of this added condition on the balance between favorable and negative option is also interesting. In countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and even France, the effect on the balance accounts for a more than 30% change compared to the opinion without further conditions. As a result, in contrast to the picture in Eurobarometer 66 (2006a, see above), in this Special Eurobarometer 255 data (2006b), the weight between the pro and con camps becomes almost the same.

Table 2-2: Accession if Turkey complies with all EU conditions; balance of favorable vs. against (Eurobarometer, 2006b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In favor (positive balance)</th>
<th>Slightly against (balance &lt; 20%)</th>
<th>Clearly against (balance 20-40%)</th>
<th>Strongly against (balance &lt; 40%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK United Kingdom 3</td>
<td>FR France -15</td>
<td>EL Greece -34</td>
<td>AT Austria -68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT Malta 4</td>
<td>EE Estonia -14</td>
<td>CZ Czech Republic -29</td>
<td>LU Luxembourg -45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK Denmark 6</td>
<td>FI Finland -13</td>
<td>SK Slovakia -22</td>
<td>DE Germany -42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Portugal 7</td>
<td>IT Italy -13</td>
<td></td>
<td>CY Republic of Cyprus -42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE Ireland 8</td>
<td>BE Belgium -12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI Slovenia 12</td>
<td>LV Latvia -12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL The Netherlands 13</td>
<td>LT Lithuania -9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL Poland 20</td>
<td>HU Hungary -2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Bulgaria 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ES Spain 24</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE Sweden 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR Croatia 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR Turkey 32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY Northern Cyprus 52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO Romania 59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In spite of the change, Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and Cyprus still form a group of countries firmly in the “no to Turkey” camp. For these countries the scenario of Turkey meeting all EU conditions shifts the balance by not more than 20% towards more support. Even more rigid appear Czech Republic and
Slovakia, both of which hardly react to any achievement Turkey could make (changes -4% and -2%, respectively).

As before, no consistent common pattern is visible in this distribution of public opinion:

- The huge leap forward of the Netherlands compared to their ranking before makes the presence of a large Turkish diaspora a weaker argument when explaining negative sentiment in comparable migration-affected Germany and Austria.
- A dichotomy of “old vs. new Europe” is disproved not only by France’s and Belgium’s far-reaching improvements in this new ranking, but also by the almost 50% gap between Poland and Czech Republic, neighbors in the middle of Europe and both recently joined member states in 2004.
- The proximity of the Netherlands and UK in the “favor” camp, when they are clearly opposing outposts on the federalist vs. intergovernmental scale in envisioning EU’s future (Ash, 2002), suggests that general outlooks on the EU project are not fully explaining the view on Turkey, either.

2.1.5 Limitations of public opinion data

Clearly, public opinion – bluntly expressed in a headline friendly way – is a rather shallow and volatile explanation of European standpoints towards Turkey’s accession. The trend observation on the Europeans’ public opinion development about Turkey over time provided evidence how ephemeral and labile the category ‘opinion’ tends to be. Prediction into future years based merely on opinion surveys seems impossible (Barysch, 2007a).

Asking the public about conditions under which Turkey would be welcome to join provides additional indications how superficial and unhelpful the measures of public opinion can be. Both Harris Interactive and Eurobarometer surveys expressed conditions which were all inclusive but fictive since they simply express a necessary ground of Turkey’s accession, adopting the European acquis. Even so, they give fundamentally different pictures on Turkey’s accession in terms of public opinion data.

This phenomenon conclusively signifies the extent to which Turkey’s EU membership candidacy is also a matter of communicating proceedings and purpose both in EU member states and in Turkey. As Domanic (2007b: 85) points out, one of the main reasons behind the low approval is a lack of information on enlargement.

In marketing and consumer research, opinion is not regarded as a very reliable category of explanation. Opinions are looked at as rather unstable and depending on momentary circumstances (Blythe, 1997).

It is obvious that in order to understand Turkey’s situation vis-à-vis the EU other additional categories and measures are needed: “it is always hard to
prove anything when it comes to an imprecise and blurry concept like ‘public opinion’” (Svendsen, 2006: 5).

**2.1.6 Contextualizing public opinion and attitudes**

Richer explanations of behavior are expected at the level of attitude, which is a moreover learned and a less instinctive category (Blythe, 1997: 69-70).

PEW’s 2005 Global Attitude Project data (PEW, 2005b) related the attitude on migration to the opinion on Turkey’s EU accession. While the distribution of public opinion among the participating countries is quite similar to the research discussed earlier, attitudes on migration from North Africa, Middle East or Eastern Europe appear to be associated with these opinions, particularly in the Netherlands, France and Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkey Joining the European Union</th>
<th>Immigration Concerns Associated with Opposition to Turkey’s EU Bid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
<td><strong>Oppose</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-3: Attitudes on Turkey joining the EU (PEW, 2005b: 18-19)

In addition, this research found opinion on Turkey’s EU accession to be linked to the perception of Islamic extremism: “those who are more concerned about Islamic extremism in their homeland are more likely to oppose having Turkey join the E.U., especially in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, but less strongly elsewhere” (PEW, 2005b: 19).

More recent Eurobarometer research designs also tried to react to the increasing need to explain the constant decline in public support for Turkey’s EU bid in a broader context. In 2005 and 2006, additional questions measuring citizens’ attitudes towards Turkey’s accession with regard to specific aspects had been introduced to Eurobarometer questionnaires14 (Eurobarometer, 2005b; Eurobarometer, 2006a).

14 QA 34.1-34.8 of Eurobarometer, 66 (2006a): “For each of the following please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree.

- Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography
- Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history
- Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region
- The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow it to join the EU
- Turkey's accession would favour rejuvenate an ageing European population
- Turkey's joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in the EU
The items partly distinguish between different European positions towards Turkey’s EU accession, with more (concerning questions like geography or history) or less (migration) division between the member states.

- The countries in the pro-Turkey camp (by the measure of public opinion) such as Spain, Poland or Sweden do ascribe “Europeanness” in terms of history or geography to Turkey, while countries with the public taking a stance against Turkey’s membership like Austria deny both. The bulk of publics acknowledge the geographic fact but not accept Turkey’s historic belonging to Europe.
- The benefits of Turkey’s accession like rejuvenation or increased security are met with skepticism throughout almost all countries and find outspoken support by the publics in only very few countries from the pro-Turkey coalition such as Portugal or Croatia.
- Cultural differences are perceived as being too large in almost all EU 27 countries (with the exception of Hungary) as well as the fear of Turkish immigration being omnipresent in the European publics’ minds (with the exception of Luxemburg).
- The calls for a better economic performance and an improvement of Turkey’s human rights record are univocally shared among all European publics.

A look at the balances between agreement and disagreement illustrates the distribution of attitudes on Turkey’s EU membership in more detail.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>History</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Rejuvenation</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE Belgium</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>89</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Bulgaria</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ Czech Republic</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK Denmark</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE Germany</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE Estonia</td>
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<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>64</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-24</td>
<td>-27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE Ireland</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Italy</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY Republic of Cyprus</td>
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<td>-76</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-35</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>-52</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>HU Hungary</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human Rights
- To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy”
Table 2-4: Attitudes towards Turkey’s EU accession (source: Eurobarometer, 2006b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>-57</td>
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<td>-41</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT Austria</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>58</td>
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<td>69</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE Sweden</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>-16</td>
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<td>-14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>EU 15</td>
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<td>-10</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PEW and more specific Eurobarometer data substantiate the criticism that public opinion by itself will be a comparably hollow indicator, whereas measuring attitudes in specific contexts promises added explanatory value.

In general, attitudes are regarded as the methodological groundwork (and oftentimes synonyms) for the (brand) image construct (Fishbein/Ajzen, 1975; Keller, 2003a), which will be looked at below: “If you are really testing national brand image – rather than, say, public opinion – then the results should be extremely stable” (Anholt, 2007a: 47).

Analyzing the nation brand status and the image of Turkey therefore promises to provide additional insights into the conditions and contexts of Turkey’s negative perception in Europe.

2.2 Turkey’s nation brand status

Given the emerging nature of nation branding concept in theory and practice, accessible data on Turkey is certainly not abundant. However, some interesting pieces of information on nation brand status are available from different research streams that are consolidated in the following.

2.2.1 Turkey’s performance in the Nation Brand Index

The most relevant source to learn about Turkey’s brand status is the quarterly panel Nation Brand Index (NBI) that was first conducted in Q1 2005 and ran until the end of 2007. The survey was managed by pioneer nation brand researcher Simon Anholt and run by the global market research company GMI.

15 Having started with a panel size of 10.000, by 2007, the survey polled more than 25.000 informants worldwide every 3 months with an online questionnaire. For 2008 the research design, owned by Simon Anholt, was transferred from GMI to GfK, see below.
The methodological approach represented by the NBI, still with good reason claiming to be “the only analytical ranking of the world’s nation brands” (Anholt/GMI, 2007b: 2), rests on the assumption that power and appeal of a nation brand can be measured in an aggregated score composed of individual values in six brand dimensions – together forming the so called “Nation Brand Hexagon”.

![Nation Brand Hexagon](image)

The aggregated score allows for a ranking of all countries in the study. The table summarizing all publicly accessible data from the Nation Brand Index (Anholt/GMI 2005 a-d, 2006a, b, 2007a, b; Anholt 2007b, c) in the past three years shows that – while the number of countries evaluated has continuously grown from 11 in 2005 to 36 by end of 2007 – Turkey has never managed to leave the bottom region of the table.

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Figure 2-13: Nation brand hexagon (Anholt, 2005a)
Table 2-5: Nation brand rankings 2005-2007 (Anholt/GMI, 2005a-d, 2006a, b, 2007a, b; Anholt, 2007b, c)\textsuperscript{16}

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However, while Turkey trailed all countries on the last rank for the year 2005, by 2007 it had climbed up some ranks, superseding Israel and Indonesia (while in the sample) and the Baltic States, behind which Turkey had lagged before.

This effort ranks Turkey among the Top 5 most improved nation brands with an increase of 2%, if the average of the scores for each country between Q4 2005 and Q1 2006 is taken and compared with the average of Q4 2006 and Q1 2007 (Anholt/GMI, 2007a).

In general however, the developments for the nation brands are slow and their score “shouldn’t change by more than a few percentage points here and

\textsuperscript{16} In 2008, Simon Anholt traded his proprietary research method to GfK Roper and the new partners – besides some methodological variation – extended the number of countries under survey to 50, which makes the comparison to earlier data slightly more complicated; consequently, the data was not considered here. However, if only the data of Q2/2007 is taken as reference, Turkey managed to surpass also South Africa. In the 2008 ranking, Turkey furthermore leaves he newly added nations Chile, Peru, Romania, United Arab Emirates, Cuba, Ecuador, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Iran behind (GfK, 2008: 8).
there during the year. The real rate of change, when there is change, would be over years rather than months” (Anholt, 2007a: 47). Given that, Turkey has still a long way to go and would have to keep up the momentum for a longer period of time in order to improve its position in the nation brand ranking.

2.2.2 Turkey’s nation brand dimensions

By courtesy of Simon Anholt I was able to search into one set of the commercially sensitive Nation Brand Index data on Turkey’s brand perception (Anholt/GMI, 2005a) and look at the six brand dimensions for which data was collected in 2005 in more detail. The European countries in which the survey took place were UK, Germany, France and Denmark with 1000 panelists each.17

Across these four countries the two dimensions in which Turkey overall performs best are the country’s cultural heritage and the hospitality of Turkish people. With the scale ranging from 1 (= low) and 7 (=high), these are also the only brand dimensions in which Turkey scores above the center of the scale, which is – semantically put – the positive region of attribution.

![Bar chart showing Turkey's nation brand perception](image)

Figure 2-15: Turkey’s nation brand perception (Anholt/GMI, 2005a)

Asked to pick an adjective that most accurately describes Turkey’s current economic and social condition, ‘backward’, ‘developing’ and ‘irrelevant’ stick out. France shows the most negative view on Turkey, while the 20%-consent to the attribute “forward-thinking” from Germany is strikingly positive.

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17 The other panelists were recruited (again 1000 each) in USA, India, South Korea, Canada, Japan and China.
Figure 2-16: Turkey’s current economic and social condition (Anholt/GMI, 2005a)

An interesting polarization occurs when looking for the best description of the experience of visiting Turkey, which oscillates between ‘exciting’ and ‘risky’ (especially for French respondents), while German and British informants embrace the putative dichotomy between ‘predictable’ and ‘fascinating’.

Figure 2-17: Experience of visiting Turkey (Anholt/GMI, 2005a)

The description of Turkey’s people is rather opaque: on average, ‘hard-working’, ‘dishonest’ and ‘unreliable’ are the most chosen. The British perception of Turkish people is the least negative, while the German view deviates most from the other three European countries.
Comparing the average of the four European countries to the other six non-European countries in the Nation Brand Index Q1 2005, it is obvious that Turkey’s people’s image in Europe is quite distinct and significantly worse than in the rest of the world. The European panelists diverge negatively in almost all positive items like ‘polite’, ‘ambitious’ or ‘trustworthy’, while they – with more than 5% deviation from the non-European countries – choose negative character traits like ‘unreliable’ or ‘dishonest’.

Looking at products or services expected to be “Made in Turkey”, textiles, ceramics and food, all three based on rather low-skilled, pre- or low-industrialized and human labor-intensive production, stand out – with French respondents most probably expecting textiles, Germans food and British ceramics. Products resulting from more industrialized and technology-driven
fabrication or from the tertiary sector are almost not associated at all with Turkey by the European countries in the sample.

Figure 2-20: Product or service most expected from Turkey (Anholt/GMI, 2005a)

Regarding cultural activities or products most likely expected to be seen from Turkey, the answers concentrate on two clear peaks, one in Classical Sculpture and another in Museums. Neither contemporary high culture (like Opera) nor mainstream pop culture (film, videos) are attributed to Turkey.

Figure 2-21: Cultural activity or product most expected from Turkey (Anholt/GMI, 2005a)

Beyond doubt, Turkey today largely profits from its past, pre-modern and antique heritage. On the 7-point scale (1=low, 7=high), the cultural richness of Turkey’s heritage receives an average score across all 10 participating countries of 4.9, with hardly any difference between Europe and the rest of the world (Anholt/GMI, 2005a).

Turkey’s government contributes, strictly speaking, solely negatively to Turkey’s nation brand perception. In particular, Turkish governments are associated with being ‘unpredictable’, ‘dishonest’ and ‘unstable’. Denmark here leads in many noticeably negative categories.
Again, quite instructive to juxtapose the European perception of the government dimension with the global scale. It becomes clearly evident that Turkey’s nation brand in this dimension is much more negatively perceived in Europe than outside of Europe. Without exception, the four European countries rate the negative items more negatively and the positive ones less positively than the six other countries polled.

Finally, looking at the business related dimensions of Turkey’s nation brand, it is apparent that Turkey’s reputation in terms of living and working there (that is, immigration) or opening an office neither is particularly pronounced in the four European countries nor in the other six countries. Each gives a slightly positive bias towards a better perception of Turkey outside of Europe, but still below the center of the scale. The rather hesitant likeliness to spend vaca-
tions there – surprising at first sight given Turkey’s considerable tourism volume – makes sense when looking at the wording of the question: “which country you would most likely visit for a vacation if money was not a factor?” (Anholt/GMI, 2005a). It can well be assumed that Turkey, in terms of tourism, largely benefits from its low cost offers.

Figure 2-24: likeliness/willingness to spend vacation, live and work or open office in Turkey (Anholt/GMI, 2005a)

A comparative look at a tourism study conducted by the brand consultancy Future Brand, employing a combined research design analyzing expert opinions and tourism meta-data, called Country Brand Index (CBI) confirms Turkey’s strengths in delivering value-for-money. Turkey was 4th in the tourism world market in this category 2006 and still ranked 7 in 2007 (FutureBrand, 2006: 50; FutureBrand, 2007: 53).

In the same study, the category ‘History’, where Turkey held global top 10 positions (three resp. four) in 2005 and 2006 (FutureBrand, 2005; FutureBrand, 2006), was identified as central part of Turkey’s nation brand. The description of Turkish people as friendly locals, which brought Turkey the eighth rank in this category globally in 2008, corresponds to the appreciation the hospitality of Turkish people gained as the overall second most relevant nation brand dimension of Turkey in the Nation Brand Index 2005 discussed above (Anholt/GMI, 2005a).

Additional analysis into the 2007 and 2008 data specifically on Turkey (FutureBrand, 2009) reveals quite low levels of awareness and familiarity with Turkey’s nation brand, minimal preference as a destination and low to moderate levels of consideration and previous visitation compared to other global

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18 The study is grounded in a comprehensive global survey of savvy travelers (defined as people who are somewhat or extremely interested in traveling and who have taken at least two international trips for leisure or personal reasons in the past two years) and consists of a variety of measures of brand strength and development, including HDM-based (Hierarchical Decision Model) measures and country brand image ratings (FutureBrand, 2009).
tourism nation brands. All in all Turkey is considered among the ‘rising stars’, but definitely delivering on its assets in terms of nation brand value in the tourism domain (FutureBrand, 2009).

2.2.3 Global benchmarking of Turkey’s nation brand
Also in general it has to be said that Turkey has a very low profile on the world map of nation brands. Turkey fails to score significantly in any category. On the world scale "Turkey appears to be more of a 'blank canvas', a country about which most people have few opinions" (Anholt/GMI, 2005a: 3).

Globally, I tend to agree to Anholt’s conclusion that this expresses the lack of direct experience of the country itself, Turkey’s people or products (Anholt/GMI, 2005a: 3).
Comparing the Turkish profile to the nation brand hexagons of other countries, be they European or global, Turkey’s practically irrelevant status is underscored. Interesting comparisons seem to be Egypt and Ireland.

- Egypt manages to receive an outstanding perception on the culture/heritage dimension and also to capitalize on some of that reputation in tourism desirability.
- Ireland, with less than 4 million inhabitants being a very small country, achieved a remarkable turnaround in the past 20 years and profits from a very well balanced nation brand profile as of today.

These two, but also the other countries, demonstrate how long Turkey’s road to become a globally high profile and well known nation brand is still going to be.

For Turkey’s brand status in Europe it was shown that it is mostly higher profiled there than in the rest of the world, but unfortunately also more negatively graded. Turkey’s positive score for its peoples’ hospitality in Germany, presumably the result of holidays in Turkey, is a rare exception. In general, the researcher Simon Anholt concludes: Turkey has “plenty of good stories to tell, which, be it for reasons of poor brand management or audience prejudice, are simply not getting through” (Anholt/GMI, 2005b: 8).

This last presumption is partly backed by the data generated in an alternative nation brand ranking called Nation Brand Perception Index (NBPI) conducted by the US-based consultancy EastWest Communications. Other than Anholt’s NBI that measures images held by the public, this index tracks how the 192 UN member states plus 8 territories are perceived in the leading international and regional media19 (EastWest Communications, 2009; Frost, 2008). Besides counting the amount of mentions per country, by a grammatical procedure

19 The index tracks 38 major media sources, including The Economist, The Financial Times, The International Herald Tribune, The Straits Times (Asia), The China Morning News (Hong Kong), The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, and The Chicago Tribune, plus major regional publications that are translated into English and some digitized input from broadcast channels (Frost, 2008). A non-negligible language bias is inherent to this methodology, as only English-speaking (or translations) are screened, however it is argued by the research company that “English is so dominant in the world that it is fairly safe to say that major stories are likely to appear in English media, sooner or later (Frost, 2008: 2). It seems evident that this ranking at least provides another interesting approximation to Turkey’s international perception.
also the tonality of the reference – overall negative or positive – is analyzed. From the analysis of these positive and negative messages and country mentions, a score is calculated and compared to other nations.

Looking at the data on Turkey’s performance among the 200 countries in this index (see table below), it is confirmed that mostly the negative stories on Turkey make it to the international media, while the positive ones do not seem to succeed. The shifts among the 2008 data have a clear overall message: the more Turkey is mentioned, the more negative the overall balance of the perception of the nation brand becomes – statistically indicating an almost perfect negative correlation between mentions and scores.

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Table 2-6: Turkey’s performance in the NBPI (source: EastWest Communications, 2009)

The media performance partly seems to contradict Anholt’s reading of Turkey as a ‘blank canvas’ (see above). However, while Anholt looks at public opinion, EastWest Communications look at media presence and tonalities. Turkey has coverage, but potentially too little involvement by potential stakeholders (as indicated by the FutureBrand data above) to convert coverage and presence into positive attitudes and images – a challenge to which some more insights will be devoted to later on.

2.3 Turkey’s nation brand image and EU accession
To be discussed in more detail later, the perception side of a brand is usually referred to as its image (Kapferer, 1997: 95). “Image represents a simplification of a large number of associations and pieces of information connected with the place. They are a product of the mind trying to process and ‘essentialize’ huge amount of data about a place” (Kotler/Haider/Rein, 1993b: 141).

Recently, Turkey’s EU accession is frequently – inside and outside academia – related to Turkey’s image. In a way, this concept of ‘image’ seems to synthesise public opinion on Turkey’s accession with Turkey’s nation brand. That is, which images of Turkey do people in EU countries hold and how do these relate to the accession process? The ways to approach Turkey’s image range from historical and imagological research to a marketing-driven interpretation of Turkey’s image.

2.3.1 Topicality of Turkey’s image
A media analysis of events and incidents in the past three years underlines that the image of Turkey plays an important role as a factor for the nation’s

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20 Applying a proprietary methodology (Natural Language Processing text analysis system) developed and owned by a company called Performance Metrics.

21 Based on media observation of Turkish Daily News, Zaman, Hürriyet and Briefing (publications from Turkey in English) and the media analysis of the German Foreign Ministry team on
EU accession and for Turkey’s role in the world; it has appeared in many recent quotes and incidents to have a negative impact on Turkey:

- Prime Minister Erdoğan’s attacks towards Danish media and his standpoints on the issue of “freedom of expression” while visiting Denmark in December 2005 led the Economist to title an article “Turkey and the European Union. An image problem” (Anon./Economist, 2005c: 29-32).
- The political turmoil and military threat surrounding the attempt to elect Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül President of the Turkish Republic in April 2007 was described as quite harmful for Turkey’s image in Europe (Anon./AFP, 2007; Zaman, 2007). “In this situation, growing nationalism in Turkey could be as much of a problem as rising Islamism. The chances of Turkey getting closer to joining the EU are falling all the time. The army’s blundering into politics has done Turkey’s image in the world no good at all” (Anon./Economist, 2007a: 2).
- Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and coordinator for the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), Kirsty Hughes was quoted that most Europeans do not understand Turkish politics and are deeply influenced by media images: “it certainly damages the opinion of people in Europe”, she said (Anon./Anatolian Times, 2007: 1) with respect to the political unrest in Turkey related to President Gül’s election.
- Demands to reopen the Orthodox Christian seminary at Halkı near Istanbul, are continuously resisted by the Turkish government, which is blamed to be turning down the opportunity of a massive PR boost such a positive treatment of minorities would disseminate into the Christian world (Anon./Economist, 2005c: 32). Bartholomew I, the patriarch of the small Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul who did massive lobbying work for Turkey’s EU accession, was quoted: “For primarily it is the image of our country that is thereby injured in the eyes of those who […] will be called upon to pronounce in respect of (Turkey’s) European prospects” (Anon./TDN, 2004b: 5).
- “Turkey’s image in Europe has been marred”, former European Parliament rapporteur for Turkey Camiel Eurlings was quoted in the context of Orhan Pamuk’s trial for insulting Turkishness and other repressive legal action against academics and writers like Elif Shafak or Hrat Dink in 2005 and 2006 (Anon./Economist, 2005c: 32; Erdal, 2005; Innes, 2006). Earlier Foreign Minister and now President Abdullah Gül said these legal actions filed on the grounds of the Turkish Criminal Code’s Article 301 – blaming the accused of denigrating the Turkish identity – could have a harming effect on Turkey’s national image abroad (Anon./Zaman, 2005a: 1). Current Foreign Minister Ali Babacan labelled Article 301 a brand that was used to slander Turkey’s image abroad (Anon./TDN, 2007f).
- The assassination of the Armenian journalist Hrat Dink in January 2007 in Istanbul, the killing of the Catholic priest Father Andrea Santoro in

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Turkey covering German, French and English media, both framed by a “Google Alert”-search profile for the keywords “Turkey’s image” and “image of Turkey”.  

32
Trabzon in February 2006, and the murder of three Protestant Christians Necati Aydin, Uğur Yuksel (Turkish converts) and Tilmann Geske from Germany in Malatya as of April 2007 all were considered to do great harm to Turkey’s image in Europe (de Witt, 2007a).

- In the aftermath of the incidents during the World Cup Qualifier between Switzerland and Turkey in Istanbul in November 2005, deputy Prime Minister Şahin stated that no one had the right to taint Turkey’s image (Doğan, 2005b).
- Prime Minister Erdoğan’s outburst during a panel on the Gaza conflict during the World Economic Forum in Davos 2009 followed by a spectacular walkout resulting in some tensions with Israel was criticized to have “hurt Turkey’s image by breaking diplomatic rules of courtesy” (Anon/Zaman, 2009: 1).
- New nationalistic gestures by different fractions in Turkish society were judged to generally harm the nation’s image (Kalnoky 2005; Zand, 2004): “images of Turkish streets full of crowds waving Islamist and nationalist slogans are already souring Turkey’s reputation in Europe” (Pope, 2006).
- Former Foreign minister Abdullah Gül acknowledged at a conference in February 2006 in Ankara: “It seems we have an image problem abroad” (Gül, 2006: 2).
- Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Pro-Islamic standpoints especially related to the headscarf issue were sharply criticized in a memorandum by the Turkish military as “damaging the country’s image and its European aspirations” (Anon./TDN, 2005g: 1). The decision by Turkish parties AKP and MHP to relax restrictions on the headscarf in public buildings and Turkey’s Constitutional Court’s reactions had a wide appeal in European media (Ross-Thomas/Hudson, 2007) and were perceived by the ruling party to be “unfortunately weakening Turkey’s image abroad” (Anon./Zaman, 2008c: 2).
- The intervention by the police on world women’s day in Istanbul 2005 was remarked to have harmed the image of the Turkish government significantly (Bilefsky, 2005; Anon./ABC, 2005).
- A ban of the governing party AKP, as was asked from the Constitutional Court by Turkey’s Chief Prosecutor because of the party’s alleged anti-secular activities in March 2008 and turned down in July 2008, according to PR experts “would have damaged Turkey’s image as a democracy” (Anon./AP, 2008). In the eyes of president Gül, “the crisis (...) was undermining the positive image built up in recent years” (Boland, 2008: 1), when Turkey was “a country where the headlines were about reform and progress” (ibd.).

Despite all these negative moments, also some positive mentions of Turkey’s image appeared:

- Faruk Sen, former long-time director of the Essen-based Centre for Turkish studies (ZfT), saw positive events since 2001: “Turkey’s third place in the World Football Cup, Sertab Erener winning the Eurovision Contest, Fatih Akin’s film winning the top price at Berlin Film Festival,
the emergence of Turkish artists in the world of art such as Mehmet Güler or Hanefi Yeter and the success of Turkish football players in European teams have turned the image towards Turks to the positive” ( Sağmal, 2004: 1).

- A Protestant Christian organisation in Turkey plans to organise a congregation of churches from 120 countries in İzmir for a conference on faith tourism. The organization claims to be able to improve Turkey's image significantly, since most international press coverage generally sees Christians as a prosecuted minority in Turkey (Anon./TDN, 2008b).
- Pope Benedict XVI’s successful visit in late November 2006 was assessed to be improving Turkey's image in Europe (Anon./Zaman, 2006m).
- Prime Minister Erdoğan forecasted that President Abdullah Gül’s visit to Armenia following an invitation in the context of the football World Cup qualifier between Armenia and Turkey in fall 2008 – headlined as “football diplomacy” ( Çamlibel, 2008b) and honored with the FIFA Fair Play Award – will have a considerable impact on the improvement of Turkey’s image in the international arena, and it probably would have been another deterioration if Gül would have refused to (Demirtaş, 2008b).

Apparently, the term ‘image’ has become a popular discursive weapon and a political catchphrase in the public debate on Turkey, yet it remains to be seen if this has lead to any significant reaction in terms of Turkish politics.

2.3.2 Imagological perspective on the history of Turks in Europe

Evidently, there is also a historical image of Turkey and the Turks in Europe. In addition to the synchronic approach of comparing Turkey’s perception across countries, therefore a diachronic socio-cultural analysis of the image of the Turks over history is certainly rewarding.

“Image is, basically, a construction of the appearance of one culture by another culture. Images were not formed suddenly or in the course of few years. Certain aspects of images appear and evolve through the preceding centuries and continue to have a great deal of influence over the succeeding ones. In the process, images often manifest themselves as stereotypes and it becomes almost impossible to completely dissociate the prevalent images from these stereotypes” (Acun, 2003: 41).

2.3.2.1 Historical roots

The Turks have had an ambiguous and complicated relationship with Europe over centuries, looking back at a “dispute made of envy and resentment, of fascination and terror, all on a basis of prejudice where every bit of logical approach to the problem fails. Love, hatred, exclusion, affection, fear etc. got involved inextricably during centuries, giving today a situation that remains very opaque” (Fontaine, 2004a: 1).

The Turk’s presence in Europe has shaped their image over the past 700 years. The main determinants of these historical images have been the geographical proximity of the Ottoman Empire/Turkey to Europe, acts of war, re-
igious issues, conventions and traditions, conflicting social norms, value judgments, stereotypes, traditional images, explicit political strategies and hidden agendas, and cultural representations (Kuran-Burçoğlu, 2007: 156).

The terms “Turkey” and “Turks” started to be used by Europeans with reference to the lands and the people in Anatolia as early as the 12th century and earlier historical stereotypes can be traced back to the First Crusade (Acun, 2003: 41). The first substantial representations of Turks in Europe are recorded during the expansionist period of the Ottoman Empire before the conquest/fall of Constantinople and the ascendancy over the Byzantine Empire in 1453 (Fontaine, 2004a). The Turks were introduced as a cruel, barbaric enemy and at the same time as “heretics” with the historical “Sword of Islam” threatening the Christian religion (Fontaine, 2004a). Examples of this very negative image are found in the memoirs of captives of war or travel logs by business men, but also dominantly in the preaching and writings of the Christian clergy (Kuran-Burçoğlu, 2007: 162), for which the Ottoman Turks represented a dangerous religious ‘Other’.

This image of the Turk as a terrifying warrior dominated Europe’s concept of this Eastern neighbor until the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, under which the Ottomans lost most of their European holdings and the decline of the Ottoman Empire began (St. Clair, 1973: 7). Yet, despite the fact that the late 17th century marked the zenith of Ottoman expansion in Europe, “this sinister notion never entirely vanished; even today the Ottoman Empire is remembered chiefly for its unremitting threat to Europe’s eastern frontiers over the course of three centuries” (St. Clair, 1973: 7).

In the meantime a contrary current had formed that transported more favorable perceptions of the Turks. German Carnival Plays dating as early as from the mid 15th century for instance expressed a positive recognition of Turkish bravery (Kuran-Burçoğlu, 2007: 157). During the 16th century other virtues of the Ottoman society such as discipline and tolerance that Europe was lacking at that time were detected (St. Clair, 1973: 11). “The Ottoman empire was a Muslim power, but its approach to politics was far more pragmatic than an ideological commitment to Sharia or Muslim law, and it had to be given that Istanbul governed a variety of ethnic groups comprising members of all three main monotheistic faiths” (Lombardi, 2005: 12).

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22 The victories of the Ottomans expanding their seizure of European mainland included the battles of Nicopolis (1396), Varna (1444) and Kosovo (1448).
23 The fact that central European historiography to this day refers to this event as “the fall of Constantinople” indicates the dramatic impact this event had on the later history of the Occident (Nas, 2002).
24 The defeats of the Ottoman navy in Lepanto 1571 and of the Ottoman army after the sieges of Vienna in 1529 and especially in 1683 serve as important milestones for the European collective memory on that way, saving the Occident from the Orient Ottoman threat, as it has been culturally coded in the Western hemisphere ever since (Nas, 2002: 223).
The German Enlightenment, especially Kant’s plea for religious tolerance illustrated in Lessing’s ‘Nathan the Wise’, a 1779 play bridging the gaps between Judaism, Islam and Christianity, later picked up on this insight and introduced a less preoccupied perception of other religions (Kuran-Burçoğlu, 2007: 160). It can be said in general that between the 16th and 18th century, “Turco-European relations relaxed, and each side became more eager to understand the other” (St. Clair, 1973: 18).

Most illustrative for this turn, the Turchophilie Movement, also called Turcho-mania, began at the end of the 17th century as a fashion (Turqueries in art, music and literature), celebrating the Turkish way of life as a life-style, and spread from France all over Europe (St. Clair, 1973:15-17). Mozart’s Opera ‘The Abduction from the Seraglio’ (1782) or the genre ‘alla Turca’ witness this zeitgeisty phenomenon, likewise the impressive spread of coffee and tulips, both goods of Turkish origin, across Europe during the 17th century is remarkable.

Rather negatively however, a perspective on Turks as usurpers of the Classic Greco-Roman inheritance claimed by Europe as its cradle also developed during the 17th and 18th century. For example, some explicit plays and poems were written by Voltaire25, blaming the Turks as tyrants without culture and enemies of arts, since they let decay these most beautiful establishments of the Antiquity and were reigning over ruins. Accordingly, in the West some sympathy for the Greeks developed to liberalize them from the Ottoman besiegement (Fontaine, 2004b).

In historical documents of the 17th century also a great degree of confusion or mutual blending of the Turk and the Arab image can be observed (Acun, 2003). The Turks were closely associated with the Muslim community of the East, particularly with the Arabs. This association mainly aroused from the fact that religion became indispensable for determining Turkish identity (ibid.) with all negative implications:

“The most common image upheld in the minds of most of the 17th century Europeans about a Muslim was that he was a person spending much of his time in performing rituals and washing himself. [...] The other familiar image of Islam is that of a religion that relies on force when reason fails and whose adherents are naive believers in miracles” (Acun, 2003: 46).

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25 E.g. the tragedy “Le Fanatisme ou Mahomet le prophète”, which was censored in 1742 because of the arrival by the son of the Turkish Pasha Mehmet (St. Clair, 1973: 20). The following poetry example is quoted in Fontaine, 2004a: 4:

“Chase the Moslems
Break soon the barrier
Make the impertinent circumcised bite the dust
And full of a warrior passion,
trampling their turbans,
Finish with his mission
In the palace of the Ottomans” (Voltaire).
Without doubt, despite the Turkomania and all European fascination with the Oriental, it was during the 17th century that the Ottoman Empire effectively both politically and technically lost touch with the development of, and remained increasingly behind, their European adversaries: “As Europe moved forward, the Ottomans seemed mired in the past” (Lombardi, 2005: 10). This anti-modern quality of the Ottomans possibly led to the replacing of the former Turkomania by a new romantic involvement with the Near and Middle East during the 19th century, “as an object of longing, as Europe's Romantics sought rebirth in the faraway lands of Rousseau’s virtuous natural man” (St. Clair, 1973: 22). The Turk became an inspiring role model for the Western Romantics (although a small and closed circle) as they queried their values facing the consequences of the Industrial Revolution.

For the majority, the rise of European Imperialism and Colonialism in the later 19th and early 20th centuries intensified the notion of Orientalism, which – according to Edward Said’s eponymous 1978 work – profiled the East as the antithesis to the West, its negative inversion. In arts and cultural discourses, the Orient gained an exotic, decadently corrupt, occasionally eroticized tonality and was, finally, decoupled from modern imagery (Sarıyüce, 2006; Staude/Gerlach, 2006). Turkish people were attached enduring negative connotations: “the Ottoman man and woman, although exotic, were generally perceived as dirty, sexually perverse and extremely violent” (Svendsen, 2006: 5). These perceptions were fed by French or British travelogues from the 19th century, by prominent authors like Lord Byron or Victor Hugo (ibid.). Without doubt, this “Orientalist trap” has threatened Turkey even until today to become the “eternal other” (Lombardi, 2005: 10-11).

Also, the emergence of the nation-state (see Chapter 2), especially in the Balkans with Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania inter alia all striving for independence during the late 19th century, nurtured not only the famous attribution of the Ottoman Empire, in losing all of its influence on the European mainland, as the ‘sick man of Europe’26, but also by ascribing negative discourses to the former occupant further solidified an unfavorable image of the Turks (Oswald, 2004). “The Ottoman state became the sworn enemy of ‘free nations’ for whom it personified the hateful image of the imperial yoke” (Aktar, 2003: 263).

Despite the Occidental turn of Atatürk’s Turkish Republic and the strong desire to become integrated in Europe, the image of Turkey remained negative. In the founding decades of the Turkish Republic after 1923, the country was mainly occupied with internal affairs and with maintaining balances of power (for example, facing the Russian threat to Turkey’s Western democratic orientation) and could not develop a considerable international profile (Fontaine,

26 Relating to discourses on the geo-political localization of Turkey and possibly noteworthy in the context of the European debate on Turkey’s EU accession, Lombardi (2005) underlines that it was as ‘the sick man of Europe’ and not ‘the sick man of Asia’ that Turkey was referred to.
Turkey’s NATO membership after WW II did not change things fundamentally, although Turkey as an international political actor gained in being a reliable and faithful ally securing South-East of Europe (Fontaine, 2004a).

Finally, of course the migration of Turkish guest workers to Western Europe, first departing in the late 1950s as Anatolian farmers with low education and poor cultural knowledge to be recruited by recovering and booming Western European countries in need of (industrial) workers, is said to have contributed to the image of the Turks in Europe.

Wrapping up the short look at Turkey’s image’s history in Europe, with regard to some principle arguments related to the EU accession it can be reasoned that the Ottoman Empire obviously was never a part of Christendom nor was the culture considered European, but there can be no doubt that the Ottoman Empire was a member of the European state system (Lombardi, 2005: 11).

2.3.2.2 Today’s relevance of historical images

In sum, Europe’s century-long preoccupation with Turks has oscillated lengthy between admiration and disgust. Today’s Turkey was “historically constructed as the absolute ‘Other’, the exotic stranger, with whom contacts were as much wanted to learn more, as they were feared” (Schmid, 2007: 9).

It was shown that over time, the development of the Turks’ Otherness followed a pattern from the religious Other in the late Medieval to a cultural Other in the Early Modern Age and finally to a political, nationalistic Other after the emergence of the nation-states (Kuran-Burçoğlu, 2007: 160).

Europe’s present perception to a considerable extent “predates Turkey (...) and is rooted in centuries of cultural and military confrontation with Islam that were then succeeded by a clear ascendancy of the western world” (Lombardi, 2005: 9) and is certainly due to the decline of the Ottoman Empire after the 17th century. The Ottoman Turks had not only lost touch with modernity, but also lacked the discursive power to participate actively in the production of their image.

Turkey’s contemporary image therefore cannot be dissociated from the Turks’ historical images: “Many of the challenges that confront Turkey’s leaders and people today have their origins in the Ottoman past” (Lombardi, 2005: 3). The actual formation of the image of the Turks in Europe largely took place even before the 17th century. It is not very surprising therefore that the one dominant feature the “collective European imagination retained from the medieval image of the Ottoman (called ‘the Turk’, which was historically incorrect as the ‘national’ trait happened much later) was its conquering and heretic (because Muslim) character” (Aktar, 2003: 262).

From a folklore perspective, numerous tracks of the Turkish-European heritage and especially of the mostly negative discourse on Turkey are visible in the form of pejorative expressions to the very day: “In French one has ‘fort comme un Turc’, or ‘tête de turc’, which points at the strength, yet also stu-
pidity of the Turks. In German a verb for cheating/simulating is “türken”, and in Norwegian a saying goes ‘to do a Turk’, which denotes to put on perfume when there is no time to take a shower (Svendsen, 2006: 2).

Of course, Europe’s media as important institutions to shape opinion have recourse to these historical images when describing the current background: “The media's power to create perceptions and their dependence on historically formed stereotypes of Turks, form a complex background for how Europeans perceive Turkey and Turks” (Svendsen, 2006: 3). These media tales are, like any public story, results and inspirations of deeply embedded structures of thought feeding collective narratives of the societies (ibid.): “Images that may have been formed deliberately in the past may become quite independent creatures through time. (...) Once created, images start circulating and are reproduced in folk tales, works of art and nowadays the media. Yet this reproduction entails resistance and variations rather than resulting in exact replicas of the original image. This is what makes images such complex phenomena and frees them from remaining uni-dimensional and one-sided” (Tahir/Türker, 2000: 69).

Undeniably this means a substantial burden and an enormous challenge when looking at Turkey’s path into the European Union.

2.3.3 Image as a marketing construct
Besides the use in everyday language and media, image is also one of the most powerful constructs in marketing.
For Turkey, the image problem was first phrased from a marketing point of view by Kotler as early as 1987:

“Here is what a Turkish woman experienced in travelling outside of Turkey: ‘I left Turkey at the age of twenty and traveled in Europe before settling in the United States. When people learned that I was from Turkey, they were always surprised. I did not fit their image of a Turk. I was too nice, too gentle, too fun-loving. They thought I should be six feet tall, unshaven, sullen, and menacing. This struck me as doubly strange because most of the people in Turkey are more like me than like the foreigners’ image of the Turk. Clearly, we Turks at some point in history acquired a bad international image and this has stuck’” (Kotler, 1987: 9).

In the recent past, two perspectives from a marketing point of view were developed on Turkey.

2.3.3.1 Expert study on Turkey’s nation brand image
Given the scarcity of research that applies such a marketing-grounded nation brand image theory to political contexts, between 2005 and 2006 an exploratory study was conducted to provide a deeper understanding of Turkey’s perception in the context of EU accession and to develop a conceptual framework that might generate further research on the topic (Kemming/Sandıkçı, 2007).
Data were collected through semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with a total of 32 expert informants\(^27\) in Turkey and six EU member-states (The Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, and Slovenia).

Methodologically, the content of Turkey’s nation brand image was raised in two ways. First, with the help of projective techniques, overall perceptions of Turkey in the chosen EU countries were elicited. Second, specific nation brand dimensions, inspired by Anholt’s nation brand hexagon (see above), such as tourism image, economic aspects (for example, export products or investment opportunities), role of politics, and finally people- and culture-related factors were examined in more detail.

The following table wraps up the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General image</th>
<th>Tourism image</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>People/ Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Not good, but improving, badly managed, strong and colorful.</td>
<td>Dominant attribute is cheap, attractive for lower classes, positioned in sun &amp; beach category.</td>
<td>No clear image, trade develops, eg food exports grow, side aspects are young Turk. population and fears of labor migration.</td>
<td>Positive people factor in tourism, differences between Turkish and other Muslim immigrants (&quot;Turks better than Moroccans&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>Young, dynamic among high-involved experts; bad and negative across German population.</td>
<td>Good service, top value for money, sun &amp; beach packages impede substantial relationships with Turkey.</td>
<td>No visible products except food and textiles. Investment case Turkey perceived by industry and trade insiders</td>
<td>Split between fear (religion, labor migration) and support for reforms. No sentimental affair for politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Focus on openness and tolerance. Awareness of problem areas like nationalism or threats to neighbors, but in general positive.</td>
<td>Fully positive perception, mainly focusing on hospitality, exotic experience and quality for families.</td>
<td>Growing awareness for white goods, but unbranded. Successful private and industry investments, problems with administration.</td>
<td>Rift between middle- and lower-classes in media and society. Welcomed for EU strategy and vision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Good impression, associations of strength, pride, but also distrust and lying: &quot;disciplined, sly foxes.&quot;</td>
<td>Mass market not known in Spain, niches with positive image; some rivalry to Spain (in the low price sun &amp; beach segment).</td>
<td>Good textile image, unbranded trade relations, no industry image.</td>
<td>Spain in favor in the context of general EU perspective, economical points decisive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>Good looks at first sight, but quality and stamina problems.</td>
<td>Cheap and nice, positive perception.</td>
<td>Only textiles, low profile of branded products. Underdeveloped image as science place or investment case.</td>
<td>Some perception of reforms, issues like human rights, minority treatment and immigrants persist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOV</td>
<td>Diffuse, partly good, but varying throughout country; a country with quality problems.</td>
<td>Cheap, in sun &amp; beach category, Istanbul as Europe’s coming party capital. Exotic character.</td>
<td>China analogy: low quality; bad trade infrastructure. Turkish food has just started to become visible.</td>
<td>Almost no relevance in the political discourse. Partly fear of labor migration or financial burdens.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^27\) The interviewed experts stemmed from different fields such as politics, marketing or media, including EU-European expatriates settled in Turkey, EU ambassadors and embassy staff located in Ankara, European politicians with specific knowledge of Turkey, European media correspondents in Turkey, and political consultants both in Turkey and EU countries.
In summary, the general image of Turkey seems quite good in the UK and Spain, where the positive aspects of Turkey’s EU bid clearly outweigh the perceived negative ones. A mixed picture was found for Sweden and Slovenia. There are clearly more negative issues than were observed in Spain or UK, yet it could not be claimed that these would be decisive for a rejection of Turkey; the perceptions seem rather balanced. A clearly negative public image of Turkey was observed in the Netherlands and Germany.

Interesting contrasts were depicted between the Turkish self-image and the images held by the foreign experts. While foreigners often painted the picture of a quite attractive but unreliable nation, which expresses a common overestimation, the Turkish image/self-perception included complaint about underestimation. Turkey was perceived by Turks to be reliable and hard-working, but its potential was believed to be unrecognized by the outside world.

2.3.3.2 Survey on Turkey’s country image
The survey by Altınbaşak-Ebrem (2004) with Italian and British informants (n=129 each), intended to model the constituents of Turkey’s country image, delivers some more contextual information on Turkey’s perception and the relevant contexts in these two EU countries.

- In an index measuring perceptions of Turkey’s people, informants who have visited the country find Turkish people friendlier, gentler, more educated and more hardworking than the ones who did not visit Turkey (Altınbaşak-Ebrem, 2004: 160).
- Comparing knowledge and favorability of similar and supposedly competing countries, Turkey is better known than Morocco or Egypt, but less known than Spain or Greece to the British and Italian informants (ibid: 165).
- The opinion on Turkey is more positive for those who have visited the country before (ibid: 175). Also interesting is the fact that the older the informant the more positive the opinion on Turkey turns out (the critical edge is +- 35 years, ibid: 176).
- Knowledge about Turkey’s roots of civilization (Troy, Byzantine, Seljuk and Hittite heritage) is better for those who have visited or consumed more sources of information on Turkey (ibid: 183).
- Almost all informants declared that they had not received sufficient knowledge about Turkey during their education. Still they are able to

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Table 2-7: Summaries of Turkey’s nation brand image dimensions in the sampled countries (NL=The Netherlands, GER=Germany, UK=United Kingdom, ESP=Spain, SWE=Sweden, SLOV=Slovenia, TR=Turkey) (Kemming/Sandiiko, 2007: 36)
differentiate between the Ottoman and the Turkish image to a very high degree (ibid: 187).

- Turkish arts are mostly associated with architecture and secondly with mosaic, while the only relevant sports for which Turkey could be known is football (ibid: 191-192).

- Turkish writers are hardly known abroad, on average not more than 0,31 writers are recalled from a list (with Nazim Hikmet and Orhan Pamuk leading, ibid: 195).

- Istanbul and the Bosporus are the two outstanding geographic associations with Turkey (ibid: 200).

- Most frequent heard issues on Turkey were then (2002-2003) the Kurdish issue, economic/financial issues and political issues. The only issue with a universally positive tone is a tourism aspect – the natural and historical beauties (ibid: 207).

- Turkey’s economy is mainly associated with lower labor costs than Europe, a young labor force, a strategic geographic position and a developing and promising situation (ibid: 213).

- The politics of Turkey are vague: the respondents only somewhat agree that Turkey is a democratic country, they are aware of the military interventions into Turkish politics, and there is a clear uncertainty as to whether Turkey is a secular country with well implemented laws (ibid: 218).

- While there is an overwhelming intention to visit Turkey, the willingness to live or work there is rather low – similar to the Anholt/GMI Nation Brand Index data analyzed before. The intention to do business in Turkey is higher than the intention to work there. For every of these items the effect holds that visitors rate Turkey better than non-visitors (ibid: 228).

- The Turkey Index, a measurement of the country’s general image, reveals that Turkey is perceived to be rather exotic, poor and inexpensive. The British respondents find Turkey clearly more European than the Italians, who tend to perceive Turkey more as Oriental (ibid: 238).

Apparently, Turkey’s image is the result of a complex bundle of information the EU-European audiences are exposed to: “Images of certain nations, however right or wrong they might be, develop through a very complex communication process involving varied information sources. The process starts with one’s experiences in early life; in school; in children’s books, fairytales and other leisure literature; the theatre and so on, and may include accounts by relatives, acquaintances, and friends. But radio and TV transmissions of international programs, newspapers and magazines, cultural exchange programs, sports, books, news services, and so on are probably the strongest image shapers” (Kunczik, 2005: 2-3)

For the case of Turkey’s EU accession, it can be expected that alongside rational or informal official discussion, many arguments will be based on myths and stereotypes evolving over time (Lombardi, 2005: 8). As will be shown in the next chapter when looking at the official political discourse on Turkey’s EU
accession and its relationship to the public debate, it is obvious that such "popular beliefs, even if untrue, can have enormous influence on public officials and policy" (Lombardi, 2005: 16).

2.4 Political positions regarding Turkey’s EU accession

While both public opinion and Turkey’s nation brand image in EU Europe indicate and indicated a climate hostile to the country’s EU bid, nonetheless on October 3, 2005 the then 25 EU countries unanimously declared Turkey an accession candidate. In the following a comprehensive overview of the political background of Turkey’s European ambitions is provided, as well as an analysis of the broad spectrum of related official positions, opinions, attitudes and policy issues that can be considered influential for the diplomatic negotiation process during the next years.

2.4.1 Turkey’s EU accession history

After the decision by the EU council to open accession talks with Turkey and to possibly have Turkey join in December 2004, for the first time in a quite long history of EU-Turkey relationships the process had arrived at a point where for the coming years comparably stable conditions could be assumed.28

As the eldest accession candidate ever, Turkey has been more or less faithful to the European Union, waiting for more than 45 years and witnessed this development from its outsider position (Glyptis, 2005). It was as early as September 1959 that Turkey applied for a membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) for the first time. In 1963, a contractual framework known as the Ankara Agreement was signed outlining the accession perspective of Turkey. It foresaw the realization of a customs union between the two partners within 22 years.

The hesitant implementation of the Ankara Agreement started a long story of unfulfilled obligations on both sides due to a lack of political will: “one can easily come to the conclusion that the EU and its member-states did not undertake strong efforts to make the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol a success” (Kramer, 1996: 207). Political instabilities in Turkey followed by protectionist policies and military coups further damaged the aim of integration with then EC (Nas, 2002: 227).

The agreement was paused until 1986. Due to a change of policies after the 1980 coup in Turkey a strategic shift back towards the EU occurred, remarkably initially rather against the interests of the Özal government (which favored near East and US-linked policies) and mainly driven by Istanbul commerce (Kramer, 1996). This shift resulted in a premature attempt to gain member-

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28 Without any doubt however it has to be agreed with Guérot (2004) that Turkey’s road to accession will be rockier than any EU enlargement process before and the country’s bid is a special case in EU’s history. Still, the opening of the negotiation framework has provided a structure within which Turkey’s EU relationships can be seen as more stable than ever before (Hatipoğlu, 2005).
ship to the EU in 1987, which was denied by EU commission in December 1989 mainly because of economic and political instabilities (Leggewie, 2004a).

On their summit in June 1993 in Copenhagen, EU member states defined the conditions that must be fulfilled for the start of accession talks, nowadays referred to as the Copenhagen criteria. The EU Customs Union finally became effective in 1996; with Turkey being the only non-EU member state. In December 1997 during the Luxemburg summit it was evinced that Turkey might be considered as a candidate, yet it was not until the Helsinki summit in December 1999 that Turkey was officially awarded candidate status.

After extensive reforms (including among others, the abolishment of capital punishment and the permitting of the Kurdish language) in August 2002 and the victory of the AKP with the new prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in December 2002 (who clearly professed the Western orientation of Turkey and EU accession), during the Copenhagen summit the EU Commission was ordered to prepare a report by October 2004 with a recommendation on a start of accession talks (LaGro/Jørgensen, 2007b: 6).

On the basis of a positive report by the commission as of October 6 2004 (Kramer/Krauss, 2004) and acknowledging the impressive progress achieved in Turkey (Rehn, 2005: 54), in December 2004 EU heads of state declared Turkey’s fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria and decided to have negotiations started by October 3, 2005 with accession unlikely before 2015 (Chislett, 2004: 2).

After some heated debates throughout 2005, both in the EU countries and in Turkey, especially on issues not directly linked to technicalities of the accession (such as, for example the Cyprus question) on October 3 2005 the accession process finally started with the initial screening of the EU acquis. In June 2006, accession negotiations actually began with the opening of the Science

29 Copenhagen Criteria are the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, later enshrined in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union and proclaimed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

- Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
- Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
- Membership presupposes the candidate’s the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
- The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of the European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.” (Grabbe, 2004: 15)

30 The most important technicality is the assimilation of Turkey’s national laws to the so called acquis communitaire of the EU, which, organized in 35 chapters and containing more than 85,000 pages, represents the common set of rules, laws and directives of the community (Hagelüken, 2004: 2).

31 Schrijvers (2007: 32-33) and many others are right in underlining that ‘negotiation’ is a misleading term, since the candidate has hardly any negotiation power. Apart from some is-
and Research chapter. Until mid 2008, this first chapter had been provisionally closed, while seven others\textsuperscript{32} had been opened and seven more were expected to be opened.

Comparing Turkey’s bid to parallel or previous accessions, the progress has to be rated as very slow\textsuperscript{33}. The first two years into accession talks, 2006 and 2007, have been very controversial and quite eventful for Turkey. One main reason for the delayed development is that in December 2006, the EU council of Ministers suspended the talks on eight chapters due to lack of progress in the Cyprus issue.\textsuperscript{34}

Also the political unrest in Turkey throughout 2007 accompanying the parliamentary and presidential election contributed to a general slowdown of the European-Turkish convergence. Furthermore, some non-negligible shifts in the European political power game prejudicial to Turkey occurred\textsuperscript{35}, introducing alternatives to Turkey’s full EU membership such as a privileged partnership into the political discussion (LaGro/Jørgensen, 2007b).

With EU ties deteriorating slowly over the blocked membership path and at the same time also Turkey’s relationship towards the USA becoming increasingly strained, largely because of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in the West some fears regarding an alternative orientation of Turkey towards the Middle East arise (Larrabee, 2007).

\textsuperscript{32} Chapters No 6 Company Law, 7 Intellectual Property Law, 18 ‘Statistics’, 20 ‘Enterprise and industrial policy’, 21 ‘Trans-European Networks’, 28 ‘Consumer and Health Protection’ and 32 ‘Financial Control’

\textsuperscript{33} While the EU accession talks with Croatia were started at the same time as Turkey’s, by April 2008 Croatia had opened 18 chapters, talks could be finished 2009 and the country is expected to join by 2010 (Özerkan, 2008c), while Turkey’s process is declared open-ended and the negotiations are expected to last at least 10-15 years altogether. Meanwhile Macedonia was named official candidate in 2005, but talks had not started (current updates on: www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement). More recently, criticism from Turkey increased in the direction of EU that chapters that were technically ready to be opened had not been opened. EU (Bozkur, 2008). From the European Parliament on the other hand voices were raised that Turkey is more obsessed with opening chapters rather than fulfilling reforms (Anon./Zaman, 2008f).

\textsuperscript{34} As a condition to start negotiations in 2005, Turkey signed customs protocols, according to which it is obliged to open its ports to Greek Cypriot planes and vessels. Turkey refused this unilateral step so far and insists it will only do so after the EU promise to open up direct trade with the Turkish Cypriots is honored; the deadlock is completed by Greek Cyprus threats to veto the accession talks, until Turkey has fulfilled these obligations. These eight chapters (No 1 ‘Free movement of goods’, 3 ‘Right of establishment and freedom to provide services’, 9 ‘Financial services’, 11 ‘Agriculture and rural development’, 13 ‘Fisheries’, 14 ‘Transport policy’, 29 ‘Customs union’ and 30 ‘External relations’), chosen because they all relate to customs and trade issues, are frozen and no previously opened chapter will be closed until the problems are resolved (Marchetti/Altıntaş, 2007).

\textsuperscript{35} Most importantly, German chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Nicolas Sarkozy, both outspoken opponents of a full Turkish membership in the EU, took office in late 2005 and summer 2007 respectively, replacing Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac, two long-time advocates of Turkey’s accession.
With the beginning of 2008 the Turkish government fuelled some new optimis-
mism by declaring 2008 ‘the year of the EU’ (Anon./Zaman, 2008c) and an-
nouncing some advances in relevant fields of policy36. The closing case
against the ruling party AKP by Turkey’s Constitutional Court, which began in
March and was turned down in July 2008, however led to a new government
deadlock and further slowed down needed reforms (Özerkan, 2008e). Two
more negotiation chapters37 with EU were opened under the French EU presi-
dency by the end of 2008 (Birand, 2008).

2009 – demanded to be the year of reforms by the European Commission re-
port on Turkey 2008 – due to local elections in March again started slow and
for the first time only one chapter might be opened by June 2009 under
Czech presidency38. Further critical hurdles expected for 2009 might be the 10
chapters frozen in 2007 due to the Cyprus deadlock, the conditions of which
were expected to be revisited by end 2009, enlargement commissioner Olli
Rehn probably leaving office by October and European Parliament elections in
June 2009 (Gültaşlı, 2009a). On the other hand, prime minister Erdoğan vis-
ited Brussels for the first time since 2004 in January 2009, appointed a new
full-time minister for EU accession negotiations and a new minister of foreign
affairs, and with TRT 6 the government started a Kurdish speaking public
television channel; besides the largely welcomed approximation of Turkey and
Armenia, also these events were positively received in Europe (Gültaşlı,
2009b).

2.4.2 EU member-states political positions on Turkey
Although of course the decision to open Turkey’s accession process had been
univocal among all EU countries, not all political opinion-formation towards
Turkey’s membership was homogeneous among the 25/27 countries.

The group of outspokenly favorable countries contains the United Kingdom,
Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria.

- In the UK, all elites across the political spectrum have all been suppor-
tive of launching accession talks and view positively the prospect of
Turkish membership, with a more strategic, practical and cool-headed
approach compared to the more emotional rest of Europe (Anastasakis,
2004, 2005) and an outspoken conviction that the West needs Turkey
(Anon./Cihan, 2006a).

36 For example, the Turkish parliament signed a law to return property confiscated by the
state to Christian and Jewish minority foundations and long-term expected reforms of the
penal code 301 were announced and partly fulfilled (www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-
turkey-relations). EU requirements to speed up reforms in the areas of human rights, the
civilian-military relations and other details of the Turkish penal code remain to be dealt with
(Gültaşlı, 2008a).

37 Chapters No 4 ‘Free movement of capital’ and 10 ‘Information society and media’.

38 On taxation. The social policy and employment chapter probably could not be opened due
to Turkish problems passing necessary legislative reforms in time (Gültaşlı, 2009a).
• Spain also displays a solid backing for Turkey across all parties, paired by a noticeable public ignorance towards the issue (Soler i Lecha, 2005). The Alliance of Civilizations initiative, proposed by Erdoğan and Jose Luis Zapatero and launched by UN is a good example of this closed partnership (Anon./Zaman, 2008a).

• Portugal, during its EU presidency in 2007, also expressed clear support for Turkey’s bid, and rejected explicitly any alternatives to Turkey’s full membership (Kramer, 2006).

• The Italian government was an active advocate and pressured the European Council to decide opening negotiations in 2004 (Arato, 2005); nonetheless, Lega Nord and partly Alleanza Nazionale articulated their opposition to Turkey’s EU bid (Guida, 2004). President Napolitano clearly rejected having Turkey’s accession judged on the basis of religious or geographical arguments (Anon./Zaman, 2007d).

• From Finland an unrivaled support for Turkey’s accession was reported (Anon./TDN, 2005e), likewise also by all relevant policymakers in Ireland a clear backing was expressed (Kramer, 2006).

• Sweden has been continuously very outspokenly pro-Turkey, making Turkey’s membership perspective conditional solely on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria (Ehrenkrona, 2007). The debate gets by mostly without any reference to religion or culture and could be described as intergovernmentalism meets pragmatism (Langdal, 2005).

• Belgium (except the Vlaams Blok, sympathizing with Kurdish autonomy claims and mobilizing cultural-historical arguments against Turkey) is largely supportive, and outspoken against a Christian-monocultural understanding of Europe (Rochtus, 2005).

• Both in Slovenia and Slovakia the political elite’s support for Turkey is driven by the conviction that Europe should stick to its promises (‘pacta sunt servanda’) and that the full membership would be the best way to secure a lasting Europeanization of Turkey (Kramer, 2006).

• Likewise, in Hungary, regardless of a lack of a substantial societal discourse about the matter, the government turned out as a stable supporter of Turkey’s bid (Dömötörfi, 2005).

• Also Poland was a strong supporter with a backing from all relevant parties (SLD, SDPL, UP and LRP), while the question is marginal in the public debate. Trade issues, future distribution of EU aid, and migration are expected to be decisive issues (Plóciennik, 2005).

• The Czech Republic, unanimously both in the left party spectrum (CSSD, KSCM) as well as by the vast majority of the right-wing parties like ODS or KDU-CSL stands by Turkey’s quest, again accompanied by considerable public disinterest mainly for three reasons: no historical links to Turkey, no religious motivation, and almost no personal encounters with Turkish migration (Souleimanov, 2005).

• Latvia is politically generally supportive, although Turkey’s membership is definitely a low-key issue (Akule, 2007). As in the other Baltic countries, Ukraine’s potential EU membership is of much higher political relevance (Kramer, 2006).
The Romanian government was quoted more than once as fully supportive of Turkey’s EU accession (Anon./Cihan, 2006b). Bulgaria similarly pledged clear-cut support for Turkey’s EU accession process (Anon./TDN, 2007j).

The group of more or less explicit opponents centers mainly about France and Austria, while also Denmark and Luxemburg have recently displayed tendencies towards a new political stance against Turkey’s membership.

- In Austria’s political party spectrum there is a clear majority against Turkey’s EU membership among all shades from the SPÖ and ÖVP to BZÖ or FPÖ with the Greens as the only exception taking a pro-Turkey stance (ESI, 2008). Notwithstanding, the former ÖVP-chancellor Schüssel headed government – openly acknowledging the constraints of realpolitik – agreed to open negotiations in 2004. Ancient animosities with reference to the Vienna battles of 1683 still frame the political discourse (Kritzinger/Steinbauer, 2005; Kole, 2005). Austria has furthermore decided in 2005 to have a referendum on every new EU accession, excluding Croatia (van Ham, 2006).

- In France there exists a rift with clean lines inside the political system between UMP and UDF (MoDem) against Turkey in the EU, while PS (mostly), PCF, Les Verts and LCR approve of its candidacy. Despite his conservative political heritage, though, former President Chirac’s government took on a Pro-Turkey stance. His successor Nicolas Sarkozy, as is well known, revised this position and stands firm in opposing Turkey’s membership. A clause to the French constitution making referendum compulsory for all future EU accession candidate countries whose population exceed 5% of the EU population has been debated since 2005 and was revised in July 2008 (Demesmay/Weske, 2007; De Puy, 2008). France’s diplomats in 2007 and 2008 repeatedly attempted to erase the word ‘accession’ from EU documents relating to Turkey (Yınanç, 2008b). Also France is refusing to open five chapters to negotiate, which it says are directly related to accession. Sarkozy is also the driving force behind a Mediterranean Union to compliment the EU, which is sometimes considered an alternative to Turkey’s EU membership (Gültaslı/Aydın, 2008) but not accepted as such by the Turkish government.

- The fears that Europe might become too Muslim and that integration process would be too much of a task are also expressed by non-negligible proponents of the countries’ political spectrums in Denmark and Luxemburg (Kramer, 2006), which politically also belong to the “rather against”-camp in EU-Europe.

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39 Interestingly the opposition against Turkey’s accession mainly built up mainly after 2003/2004, while pro-Turkish positions were numerous in the conservative and social-democratic camp and even included political outposts like FPÖ (ESI, 2008: 4-7).

40 One of which is already suspended by the EU due to the Cyprus conflict, see above.
Germany and the Netherlands for the past two years have both remained in a rather neutral camp.

• In the Netherlands the picture is split between the leading parties. The VVD and CDA parties have displayed an increasingly reserved attitude to Turkey’s EU membership, while PvdA and D’66 are supportive (van Ham, 2006). Nonetheless, the coalition governments decided to support opening of accession negotiation, and the Dutch Christian Democrats dissociated from the German sister parties CDU/CSU in regarding EU’s Christian character ruling out Turkey’s accession (Asbeek Brusse, 2005).

• Similarly in Germany, the dividing lines are between the conservative CDU/CSU parliament group, who opposes full membership and favors a privileged partnership, and the social-democratic party, which is supportive. Discourses are closely linked to questions of immigration and integration (Steinbach/Cremer, 2006). In a way, like France, Germany is a particular case. After having been the strongest promoter of Turkey’s accession in the Schröder-led government, after 2005 in the grand coalition balancing between the two camps the country has become factually politically immobilized on the Turkey issue (Kramer, 2006), a constellation which will certainly disperse during fall 2009 election campaign there.

Somewhat special cases are Greece and (Greek) Cyprus. Both countries have had and still have most intense political issues with Turkey, yet they partly still argue they could best be settled within the EU framework and therefore officially advocate Turkey’s accession.

• (Greek) Cyprus’ political stance on Turkey is obviously the politically most muddled case of all EU member-states. It is maintained as an official political position there that Turkey first has to show it has become a truly European country. With Turkey’s refusal to accept Greek Cyprus as the only representative of the island, a rather inelastic permanent veto to Turkey’s membership issues is hardened (Kramer, 2006). Hopes by all opposing parties are delegated to a new UN-initiative to unify the island (Fischer, 2006; EU Commission, 2006b) and developing talks between the North’s and South’s leaders in 2008.

• Greece has finally, especially after Turkey’s entry into EU’s Customs Union, come to a positive stance on Turkey’s membership after 1999, mainly for foreign political necessities (Enginsoy, 2006). Leaving aside some military skirmishing in the Mediterranean, the relationship between the two neighboring countries has significantly improved over the past 10 years, also because of the successful “Earthquake Diplomacy” in 1999, with enormous Greek help to Turkey after the Izmit natural disaster (Sfatos, 2006). Questions concerning cultural or religious implications of Turkey’s accession are not discussed like they are in other EU countries (Kazakos, 2005).

For the current and expected Western Balkan accession candidacies like Croatia or Macedonia, but also Bosnia and Herzegovina, support for Turkey can be
already observed and furthermore expected. Historically closed ties between Turkey and countries from this region should lead to mutual backing for the respective membership bids (Özerkan, 2008c). Continuous attempts to advocate Turkey’s EU membership also stem from the USA by both the Bush and the Obama administration (Larrabee, 2004; Enginsoy, 2008a; Taylor, 2009), despite some significant tensions between Turkey and the US in the meantime and independent of concerns how welcome these interventions might be in Europe.

In sum, the clear majority of official political positions reveal a rather positive support for Turkey (Giannakopoulos/Maras, 2005b). The greatest political hurdles at the moment can be expected in the central countries of ‘old Europe’, including founding members like France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Germany.

This visible and outspoken opposition to Turkey’s EU accession, even if still clearly outnumbered by the supporters, hints at a growing divide among the EU member states (Giannakopoulos/Maras 2005a) and contributes further to the notion that the EU has entered into a substantial identity crisis (Islam, 2005: 28).

2.4.3 EU’s identity crisis and Turkey
With regard to further enlargement the European Union is principally of two minds about the strategic alternatives of further deepening or widening its range and relationships.

- Deepening embodies the vision of a pan-European state federation and is often connected to the question of a common European foreign policy covering questions of security and defence41; in general, advocates of this position see the EU as an inward-oriented entity (Müftüler-Baç, 2002: 50; Öniş, 2004: 19).
- Widening the European project favors a more loosely knit intergovernmental Union, which could imply the further enlargement of the EU towards a still growing common market, at the same time developing the Union as a relevant geo-strategic group and outward-orientated global actor (Wernicke, 2005) 42.

To a certain extent, this dividing line is reflected in the distribution of official country standpoints on Turkey’s EU membership.

Clearly, Turkey knocks at EU’s door during the times of one of the deepest crisis of the existence of the community (Glyptis, 2005). The lost referenda in France and Netherlands in May/June 2005 on the European Constitution and in Ireland on the treaty of Lisbon in June 2008 brought to light massive dis-

41 One of the most intensely debated projects in this context is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Hatipoğlu, 2005: 48).
42 Members of the ‘Federalist’ deepening camp are France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the Benelux states, while Britain and a number of new EU states from Central, North and East Europe represent the ‘Intergovernmentalist’ widening camp (Islam, 2005: 28).
trust and discontent from the European public about the course of the EU. After the 2004 enlargement by 10 new members and the two additions of Romania and Bulgaria of 2007, the again stretched European Union finds itself in a very fundamental search of its identity and future direction.

At least five different concepts of a European identity can be spotted. Depending on the position towards these identity concepts, pragmatic or ideological stands towards the entire project of Europe can be developed (Leggewie, 2004a: 13-14):43

- Europe as a geographical area (versus the idea of an eccentric identity of Europe and its exterritorial effects)
- Europe as a historical community joined by fate and memory (in danger in the context of generally fading historical consciousness)
- Europe as heir of the Christian Occident (more difficult to maintain vis à vis a swift decline in Christianity and growing religious pluralism)
- Europe as a capitalistic market community with elements of a welfare state (partly relativized by neo-liberal globalization process)
- Europe as cradle of democracy and human rights (hard to keep up facing a universal understanding of these values, which can not be exclusively claimed by Europe).

Europe’s identity crisis is of course not causally related to the question of Turkey, but it seems to be amplified or accentuated by the prospect of the country’s EU membership44: “the EU’s conflicting attitudes towards Turkey [are also] a sign of its lack of clarity about its own future status in international affairs. Or indeed a lack of clarity about its present identity and function” (Glyptis, 2005: 39).

2.4.4 Turkey’s Pros and Cons

Accordingly, the different concepts of European identity clearly show through the following collection of ’Pros’ and ’Cons’ of Turkey’s EU accession raised in the public discourse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROs</th>
<th>CONs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There has been a historical partnership between Ottoman Empire and Europe</td>
<td>Considering geographical location, history, religion, culture and mentality, Turkey is not a part of Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great parts of Classical Antique culture was historically transmitted by Ottomans and Arabs</td>
<td>Turkish culture is lacking major European cultural cornerstones like the Reformation, Renaissance or Enlightenment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 As the objections in brackets indicate, all of these identity concepts are easily attackable due to contemporary contexts.
44 Even if they didn’t touch on Turkey’s issue, for example the lost referenda on the European Constitution mentioned above were also discussed as indicators for Turkey’s membership fortunes (Schlötzer, 2005b; Stelzenmüller, 2005: 33, van Ham, 2005).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PROs</strong></th>
<th><strong>CONs</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The early roots of Christianity (e.g. the first councils) took place in Asia minor</td>
<td>Muslims can not be integrated into Western societies, but tend to found parallel societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geo-strategic value in energy (oil- and gas-pipelines) and defense matters (Turkey's role in NATO for regional stability)</td>
<td>Costs of Turkey's accession estimated (under current EU subsidy system⁴⁵) between € 20-28 billion p.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey's membership would contribute to the stability of a troublesome region.</td>
<td>Bordering Iran, Iraq or Syria could mean a security risk for the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU's identity would be significantly broadened.</td>
<td>Threat of reinforcing identity ruptures in the EU (deepening vs. broadening).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important trade partner, dynamic new markets; Turkey could become EU power house.</td>
<td>EU would be overstretched and economically overloaded; the current integration level could not be kept up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey's very young population will bring in desperately needed refreshment to Europe's aging population and will provide a welcome labor force.</td>
<td>In 2020, 86 mio. Turks⁴⁶ will be 'ante portas', with the country becoming the largest in the EU, and a large and poor population seeking jobs will profit from free labor migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey serves as an important strategic bridge between Europe and the Near and Middle East.</td>
<td>Turkey's doctrine of national unity being prior to individual rights is incompatible with EU values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey's membership would positively influence integration processes of Turkish or generally Muslim migrants in EU countries.</td>
<td>The Political Islamism could infringe on to Turkish diasporas in EU countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU accession as a motor for the reform politics, approximation towards EU systems of value (e.g. progress in the areas of minority rights, capital punishment, torture etc.).</td>
<td>Principle doubts about Turkey's ability to establish a working liberal democracy following the European pattern. Islam sets limits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the reform steps has been slow, but steady. The reform steps solidify Turkish democracy and EU accession works as a reform catalyst.</td>
<td>Turkish military is a non-legitimate power (Kemalist philosophy of state: politics serves the state and not the other way = pre-democratic, authoritarian idea of state).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey as political role model unifying Islam and democracy for other countries in the region.</td>
<td>Turkey witnesses a creeping Islamism (in army, schools, media); Islamic culture relies on obedience, not on individuality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid growth of NGOs who are outspokenly in favor of EU accession.</td>
<td>Underdeveloped constitutional state: priority of state over the individual, protection from 'dangerous' developments (cultural rights for Kurds, religious minorities, homosexuals).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 'no' would stop Europeanization in Turkey and could be an initial boost for a spiral downward of the country.</td>
<td>Is AKP hiding the true intentions or are the steps towards more religious rights steps in the direction of a religious state?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey plays an important role as a diplomatic power in the Near East (Gaza conflict⁴⁷, Caucasus).</td>
<td>Turkey might develop stronger bonds to Iran and Syria as an alternative scenario to the EU/Western orientation.⁴⁸</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-8: Pros and cons of Turkish accession in the political discourse based on Leggewie (2004b: 8), Kramer (2006), and Akcomak/Parto (2006)

⁴⁵ EU’s finance and subsidy system however will definitely be reformed by the time of Turkey’s accession in the course of the Nice process, which is why the accession practically could not take place before 2014 (Öğütçü, 2005).
⁴⁶ Gürsoy, 2008
⁴⁷ Yanatma, 2009; Turkey’s election as non-permanent member to the United Nations security council in late 2008 by an impressive margin compared to other candidate countries could also be read as an acknowledgement of the country’s diplomatic efforts in these regions.
⁴⁸ For more on the contemporary rediscovery of the Middle East, see Larrabee, 2007.
In sum, the arguments relate to historical and cultural roots vs. fundamental cultural differences between EU-Europe and Turkey, to different (strategic) views and outlooks on the EU as a whole and to the inner constitution of Turkey in the light of current political developments or tendencies.

The political discourses on Turkey’s membership, diverging not only across countries, but also partly differentiating parties and standpoints within countries, illustrate the extent to which the case of Turkey also is a discourse on the future of Europe.

**2.5 Turkey’s EU accession as a public affair**

Without any doubt EU’s crisis turned out to be largely also a matter of exchange between political elites and the European citizenry: “European countries have dramatically lacked communication about the EU, its progress, and its advantages. This void in public communication has left public opinion overwhelmed and to a greater extent, behind” (Guérot, 2004: 96).

Exemplifying this development affecting almost all member states, Turkey’s accession has been discussed mainly in closed circles of political experts and hasn’t made it to the public debate before the 2000s with the reality being: “Turkish membership has always been an elite-driven concept in the EU with little attention paid, until now, to popular sentiments. [...] In many ways, Ankara’s 40 year old application has always been the elephant in the room that few in Brussels have wanted to talk about for fear that the controversy would become more public than it has been. In the years to come, that controversy may well become even more public” (Lombardi, 2005: 8).

The lost referenda on the European Constitution have brought a setting into the light of the day that could very well also hold for Turkey: “There is a danger of a rift between government positions and public opinions in parts of Europe, which would not augur well for the ratification of an eventual accession treaty” (Independent Commission, 2004: 7).

A remarkable quote from almost 40 years ago on two kinds of images by the economist Kenneth E. Boulding is more current than ever in the light of the course that the European Union project has taken in the very recent past: “We deal, therefore, with two representative images, (1) the image of the small group of powerful people who make the actual decisions which lead to war or peace, the making or breaking of treaties, the invasions or withdrawals, alliances, and enmities, which make up the major events of international relations, and (2) the image of the mass of ordinary people who are deeply affected by these decisions but who take little or no direct part in making them. The tacit support of the mass, however, is of vital importance to the powerful” (Boulding, 1969: 423).

A closed consultant to French president Sarkozy pinpointed the hazard: European leaders, making Turkey a candidate country in 1999 and thus giving far-
reaching promises, did neither consult their parliaments nor their publics (Anon./Zaman, 2007e: 1). The case of Turkey shows clearly that the EU’s elitist character, often summarized as the Monnet method49 expressed in functionalist and institutional theory approaches to European unification, is facing public discontent nowadays (Leonard, 2006); the consent deficit between governing elites and voting publics is noticeable.

Only few policies will be able to survive for a long time without public support (Smith, 2007: 115). “Public opinion is becoming the arbiter of history. Opinion is a measure as well as the source of power” (Henrikson, 2006: 2). The case of Turkey shows undeniably that “the days of EU integration ‘by stealth’ are over. Today’s voters want to be convinced of the merits of every big step the EU takes” (Barysch, 2007a: 2).

In the scenario at hand Turkey could meet all criteria of EU accession, negotiate all chapters successfully for a decade, and would then be vetoed by one or more EU countries in a referendum: “We have begun the membership negotiations with the EU but have forgotten about an important detail. No matter how good we are during the negotiations, if we don’t improve our image in Europe, we can never become a full member. We should know this fact and act accordingly” (Birand, 2005c: 2). If the results of the EU member state respondents in both the public opinion surveys like Eurobarometer and in the Nation Brand Index investigated before would be taken as an approximation of a referendum on Turkey’s accession, “it looks like the firmest ‘no’ in history” (Anholt, 2006d: 1). And consequently Turkey will have to “win the hearts and minds of the European public” (Grabbe, 2004: 16).

It is therefore a debatable point whether EU heads of state and governments were ahead of their public opinion in understanding the importance of Turkey to Europe at that time when they opened an accession perspective, as Brewin (2000: 103) suggested, or if public opinion will or would withdraw their allegiance and upset EU governmental and institutional plans another time.

In any case, “Turkey will not be able to join the EU without the consent of the people” (Demesmay/Weske, 2007: 3). Hence the gap between governmental and public opinion will have to be closed (Bigler, 2005). “This does not simply imply, however, that politicians should blindly follow public opinion. It rather means that they should carefully listen and explain their points of view without stoking fears or animosity. About such a passionate issue like Turkey’s accession to the EU, the challenge is to establish a balanced dialogue: not only

49 The term ‘Monnet method’ goes back to Jean Monnet, considered as one of the most important founding fathers of the European Union and first president of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – the cradle of the European unification. Monnet was convinced that a united Europe could not be built at once, but would be built upon concrete common achievements creating a sense of solidarity among the involved European nations. Monnet placed the greatest importance on a European minded technocratic elite to be the motor of this development, as much independent of voters and governments as possible (Tsakatika, 2002: 1-2).
at vertical level between the citizens and the political elite, but also at a horizontal level between Europeans” (Demesmay/Weske, 2007: 3).

Clearly a new mode of political communication has to be found to better account for the exchange of publics and elites. It is in this context that in international relations the concept of public diplomacy has developed, which will be in the focus of the following analysis.
3 Backgrounds: theory of public diplomacy and nation branding

The scenario of publics’ opinions and attitudes towards another nation gaining relevance has caught considerable attention in political science and marketing in the past five to ten years, and has led to the emergence of new foreign policy approaches. The catchwords ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘nation branding’ in particular represent this quest to develop innovative channels and methods in international relations. In the following, these two evolving concepts are introduced based on the literature and then investigated with regard to how they could contribute to understanding Turkey’s troublesome EU bid and provide possible methods of resolution. In addition, the attempt will be made to merge the two concepts into one analytical framework for the purpose of further analysis; finally, a critical reflection of the relationship between public diplomacy and nation branding will be provided at the end of the chapter.

Public diplomacy and nation branding, both rather infant managerial concepts of statesmanship at the present state, rest on theoretical constructs like soft power, national image and national reputation; these theoretical foundations will be discussed together beforehand, following a contemporary interpretation of the terminology of nations and national identity.

3.1 Terminological distinctions: nations and national identity

In the marketing literature on the issue, the terms ‘country’, ‘nation’, ‘nation-state’ and ‘state’ are mostly used interchangeably (Kleppe/Mosberg, 2002; Hanna/Rowley, 2008). In common speech they are also casually used as synonyms. A look at political and sociological literature however offers a different perspective pointing at some relevant details.

Although broadly applied in the marketing literature on nation brands (Hanna/Rowley, 2008), ‘country’ seems to be the least precise category for the political context, since it is by strict definition related to a geographical, but not to a political unit. According to Webster’s universal dictionary, country designates “the territory of a nation [or] a state” (Webster’s, 2002: 134).

Content-richer terms when referring to the political unit of a country seem to be ‘nation’ and ‘state’. The concept of nation implies historical, social and cultural aspects, while the concept of state refers to political structures, institutional and legal questions. Modern nation-states as confluences of both concepts are characterized by the idea of citizenship (demanding duties and providing rights at the same time) on the building blocks of nationalism and community (O’Shaughnessy/O’Shaughnessy, 2000; Smith, 1992).

The concept ‘nation-state’ nowadays faces many challenges and undergoes permanent reinterpretation. Obviously, for example, the community of birth as a constitutive idea for nation-states must fail facing multicultural societies and global migration (Dunn, 1994: 8). The assumption that spheres of cultural (nation) and political (state) overlap and form an identity has become
broadly criticized and doubted (McCrone/Kiely, 2000). Many nations still push to become independent states, and minorities in many nation-states are citizens, but not nationals of their host country (the Turkish diaspora in Germany might serve as a good example). The state’s monopoly on building a nation is in retreat (Kaufmann, 2001).

At the same time the internationalization of former tasks of nation-states is witnessed. The boundaries between nation-states and supra-nation-states seem to blur. National borders become more permeable in economic and political terms in the global age (Close/Ohki-Close, 1999; Hardt/Negri, 2000; Habermas, 1996). Within the supranational EU project for example drifts in different social domains occur: while economic and military politics seem to become globalized, cultural, religious, and historical patterns of national/regional identification re-emerge.

This latter trend indicates that the nation has not lost all of its relevance, especially in the cultural domain. A broader, more pluralistic and voluntaristic reading of the nation (Smith, 1992) has no contradictions with other, supranational levels of organizations. It implies a reconfiguration of how nations are thought of and practiced – rather as broad and dynamic cultural entities instead of fixed and limited units. The nation becomes “a discursive terrain within which competing notions of individual and collective selves are negotiated” (Dzenovska, 2005: 174). The central object of this negotiation is the national identity.

In the early stages of nationalism, identity was a key achievement for the nation-state by creating hymns, public holidays, monuments and other symbols of national unity (Grew, 1986) – in some readings coined as historical efforts in nation branding (Olins, 2002a). Nowadays national identity seems powerful in certain other dimensions. Globalization cannot offer substitutes for uncertainties and questions of belonging (Giddens, 2001); and supranational organizations like the EU have, as outlined before, so far failed to create a common sense of European identity (Smith, 1992; European Commission, 2003).

Identity is being formed as part of the reflexive action taken by individuals in a world of multiple social and political possibilities and discrepancies (Castells, 1997; Cherni, 2001; Moreno, 2002). It is important to distinguish individual and collective identity. Whereas the (post-) modern individual may well cope with dual or multiple identities and accept contradictions for example between ethnic, national and religious identities, the collective identity, amplified by mass media, appears rather “pervasive and persistent” (Smith, 1992: 59). The challenge for the modern individual having to choose among a variety of lifestyles and identity patterns is amplified by the lack of cultural authority or value found in the multitude. This is where individualism finds its limits and a

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1 Olins (2002a) interpretes the nation-building cases after intense revolutionary caesuras such as France after 1789 or Turkey after 1923 as early examples of nation branding.
new reading of post-modernity for marketplace cultures after a period of severe social dissolution gains momentum:

“The individual who has finally managed to liberate them from archaic or modern social links is embarking on a reverse movement to recompose their social universe on the basis of an emotional free choice. [...] Post-modernity can therefore be said [...] not to crown the triumph of individualism but the beginning of its end with the emergence of a reverse movement of a desperate search for the social link” (Cova, 1997: 300).

Such a social link or community for the Self can be provided by entities such as nations. Our national identity helps us to position ourselves in the world – we know who we are and redefine and locate ourselves in rediscovering our national culture (Smith, 1991).

The nation is the field of identification that can offer the greatest range of historicization of the individual self (Berger/Luckmann, 1966). It relates to a heroic past as collateral for a glorious future serving the individual to “surmount the finality of death and ensure a measure of personal immortality” (Smith, 1991: 160-161).

Furthermore, national identity is the realization of the ideal of fraternity (Smith, 1991: 162). “Identity is derived from confirming our solidarity with people who are like us” (Riches, 2004: 643). National identity resembles the relationship between family and community, celebrated in the form of rituals and ceremonies, which highly appeal to the aesthetic senses like beauty, comfort or pathos.

National identity to this day represents a fundamental and inclusive collective identity. In this context, the role of nation branding and public diplomacy will be fruitfully analyzed as a tool to enhance national identification. Links between national identity and the construct of nation brand image will be indicated later when analyzing image concepts in marketing and the interplay of brand identity and brand image at the nation brand level.

**3.2 The common ground: soft power of nations**

For an international relations context, the concepts of public diplomacy and nation branding have a common ground in the differentiation of nations’ hard and soft power, which evolved in social sciences rather recently in the analysis of post-Cold War phenomena (Gilboa, 2008) and is gradually being adopted by International Relations theory (Bilgin/Eliş, 2008).

Joseph Nye, arguably founder (Nye, 1990) and clearly the most prominent proponent of this theory, discerns traditional forms of power based on economic or military clout – the power of coercion which Nye labels hard power – and a nation’s soft power dimensions based on information, preferences, attractiveness and “the best story” (Nye, 2004: 3).

The following associations with the two clusters of national power can be listed:
Hard Power
- Coercion, deterrence, inducement
- Tangible, 'real'
- Economic, military
- External, control
- Information, threats
- Government
- Direct (controllable by the government)
- Intentional
- Absolute

Soft Power
- Attraction, persuasion, ideology
- Intangible, perception, image, symbols
- Cultural, values, policies
- Self-control, co-optation
- Credibility, prestige
- Society
- Indirect (not controllable)
- Not intentional (by-product)
- Relative, context-based

Table 3-1: Hard power and soft power (Noya, 2006c: 54; Gilboa, 2008: 61; Fan, 2008: 151)

Obviously, a nation’s power will consist of more than merely its resources or possessions. Soft power stems from culture, values, history, institutions or behavior, and is shaped by factors beyond the governmental scope of influence (Smith, 2007).

Technological evolution is certainly an important context for this loss of control, but also for the increasing relevance of soft power in the political analysis in general. Virtual communities and networks are able to organize across borders and play larger roles in international relations. Accordingly, governments in the information age find themselves in a competition with transnational corporations and nongovernmental organizations to attract loyalty and citizens into coalitions (Nye, 2004).

Evidently, it is also the post Cold War democratization of social systems around the world based on civic participation in the public sphere that pairs with rapid advances in information accessibility and increasingly interconnected markets to transform the nature and conduct of international relations towards the growing relevance of soft power (Wang, 2004).

Hocking (2005) maintains a complimentary link and permeable strip lines between hard and soft power. Economic power, for example, usually regarded as a hard power component, becomes a sticky soft power when outside societies take a favorable economic system or superior products/brands from a certain country-of-origin as role-models. Similarly, Noya (2006c) argues that military power can also turn into soft power for a nation for example during disaster relief operations after Tsunami or hurricane incidents.

Soft power has two distinct qualities:
- “The capacity to attract and seduce (persuasion): from outside to the actor, projecting inward
- The capacity to establish preferences (ideology): from within, projecting outward” (Noya, 2006c: 54).

As in (marketing) communications theory to be discussed later, the notion of an inside and an outside and to a certain degree also of a sender and a receiver has also been built into the soft power model. The appeal of soft power
clearly depends on both the intention of the actor and the standpoint of the reactor. As will be outlined in more detail, soft power – resting on attraction – lies not only in the hand of he who possesses it, but to large degrees in the way the party on the receiving end of soft power responds to it (Fan, 2008: 154).

Consequently, public opinion in international affairs is an influential measure that is tracked and presented frequently. Of course, as discussed earlier, measures of public opinions do not reflect thoroughly informed views on issues, but they shape a climate of opinion that is influential on the political decision making system (Wang, 2004: 10).

In this context, “favorable image and reputation around the world, achieved through attraction and persuasion” (Gilboa, 2008: 56) as central parts of a country’s soft power are suggested to “have become more important than territory, access, and raw materials, traditionally acquired through military and economic measures” (ibid.). Currently they are certainly an essential asset for a country’s foreign policy agenda.

### 3.3 Marketing terms: image, identity and reputation

Both image and reputation are mental constructs reflecting the perception of an entity. Their relevance mainly springs from the human need to simplify decisions by creating symbolic representations in a knowledge network of meanings (Ger, 1991). With increasing complexity in the world of information, goods and services, people want to rely on general impressions in times of uncertainty while forming preferences. So, their decisions rest less upon physical or objective benefits, but rather relate to symbolic associations and intangible attributes of an object.

In the marketing and communication domains, from where the two constructs mainly originated, image and reputation redefined the marketplace logic in a way that was similar to the way countries’ soft powers changed the landscape of international relations. Consumption based on symbolic meaning of objects as an additional and complementary dimension to consumption based on functional meaning enriched the market perspective of a rational economy by the one of a symbolic economy (Askegaard/Firat, 1996).

Although image and reputation are often regarded as virtually synonymous (Bromley, 1993; Anholt, 2007a), the more recent literature also provides some noteworthy distinctions.

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2 For example, institutions like PEW, Globescan or Gallup among others provide information about the global public mood.
Image is probably one of the most important constructs in marketing. It has been researched for more than 50 years. With some significant terminological confusion throughout this research history (Stern/Zinkhan/Jaju, 2001; Dobni/Zinkhan, 1990), the following definition reflects the current mainstream:

"Brand image is on the receiver’s side. Image research focuses on the way in which certain groups perceive a product, a brand, a politician, a company or a country. The image refers to the way in which these groups decode all of the signals emanating from the products, services and communication covered by the brand. Identity is on the sender’s side. The purpose, in this case, is to specify the brand’s meaning, aim and self-image. In terms of brand management, identity precedes image" (Kapferer, 1997: 94).

The sender side is referred to as the producer of the brand identity, differentiated from brand image; the latter is not really in the sphere of control or influence by a sender like a company or an institution: “Only a public can ‘create’ an image in that it consciously or unconsciously selects the thoughts and impressions on which that image is based. [...] The company cannot create the image. It can create the elements of the identity for the company (and all the identity for the brand)” (Bernstein, 1984: 56).

Figure 3-1: Identity and Image (Kapferer, 1997: 95)

As we will see later, the design potential of an identity, assumed above and in classical marketing theory text books from luminaries like Philip Kotler, is also rather limited and debatable in the current contexts (Bianchini/Ghilardi, 2007). Also the general distinction of sender vs. will be criticized later on.

Compared to image and identity, the marketing conceptualization of “corporate reputation is still relatively new as an academic subject. It is becoming a paradigm in its own right, a coherent way of looking at organizations and

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3 Most authors identify the birth of brand image research in the field of marketing with the definitive article “The Product and the Brand” by Gardner/Levy in 1955. In this article, image is identified as the concept which best summarizes the different approaches that are beyond the core of the product. Levy redirected the question and introduced "new whys for buys" (Levy, 1959: 118) by the differentiation of symbolic and functional orientation of customers.

4 As we will analyse later especially for the case of a nation brand like Turkey, the self-image as part of the identity building is quite relevant.
business performance, but it is still dogged by its origins in a number of separate disciplines” (Chun, 2005: 91).

While image is (debatably) mostly modeled as a more or less active transmission of an institutional identity to an individual receiver, the reputation construct refers to “a collective system of subjective beliefs among members of a social group” (Bromley, 1993: 15). Other than image, reputation reflects a meta-discourse of social propagation; reputations are of compositional nature and stem from multiple different images (Fombrun, 1996). Reputation “encompasses [...] the others’ expressed beliefs or opinions about the character of the person or organization” (Wang, 2004: 7).

As such, reputations as “accumulated historical meaning” (Chun, 2005: 96) also represent a time dimension, while images are rather temporary snapshots. “Image here differs from reputation in that, whereas the former concerns the public’s latest belief about an organization, reputation presents a value judgment about the organization’s qualities built up over a period and focusing on what it does and how it behaves” (ibid.). Reputation is considered a more robust construct with respect to the company’s history and communicational efforts” (Eberl/Schwaiger, 2005).

In such a reading, reputation becomes an umbrella concept for the internal identity and a transmitted image of an entity. The observed reputation serves as a feedback to a desired image and finally reflects in the identity, which is the company’s conception of itself and its main characteristics (Schwalbach, 2001: 3).

![Figure 3-2: Interdependence of Reputation, Image and Identity (Schwalbach, 2001: 3)](image)

Hence, identity, the desired identity and image are three key elements of a corporate reputation; gap analyses evaluate to what degree an entity manages to be accurately represented in the public eye (Chun, 2005: 97).
Images are mostly of descriptive nature, whilst reputations are clearly evaluative: “Images can run the gamut from being accurate to false; while reputation is reflected on the continuum between good and bad” (Wang, 2004: 7).

Both constructs provide interesting explanatory perspectives on Turkey’s EU accession process. Given the novelty and youth of the concept of reputation in marketing and especially political marketing contexts, some terminological confusion needs to be tolerated, especially outside the marketing domain.

Nation branding and public diplomacy as innovative approaches to foreign policy stay abreast of the growing relevance of national image and national reputation in international power relations.

3.4 Nation Branding

It was during the late second half of the 20th century, and mainly caused by the observation of globalization phenomena, that branding became a relevant concept for nations:

“Globalization means that countries compete with each other for the attention, respect and trust of investors, tourists, consumers, donors, immigrants, the media, and the governments of other nations; so a powerful and positive nation brand provides a crucial competitive advantage.” (Anholt/GMI, 2005c: 1).

Capital, labor and technology have become globally mobile; consequently, goods and services can be produced almost everywhere. Many areas of competition between places arise.

The realization of competitive relations between nations, especially in economic terms, is certainly not a new insight. However, it was the rise of the marketing school of thought that brought the analogy with branding into the realm of foreign policy.

3.4.1 Broadening the marketing concept

After the early 1970s the spectrum of marketing widened to include non-business organizations, individuals, and ideas. Kotler and Levy (1973) are mostly credited with having first discussed the transferability of marketing theory, which was previously limited to business perspectives. Kotler (1973:
90) introduced his generic understanding of marketing as “a logic available to all organizations facing problems of market response” mainly in the light of upcoming theories of Social Marketing. The generic concept broadened marketing in two significant ways: “By extending it from the private sector into the non-commercial and public sector and by broadening exchange from only economic exchanges to any kind of exchanges. [...] Marketing therefore includes all organizations and their relationships with any public” (O’Cass, 1996: 39).

Structures and processes of marketing in the non-commercial world developed significantly in the past 30 years. Marketing has become a mainstream orientation of public sector management and is applied both strategically as part of a management concept and tactically for the delivery of public policy. In a radical and broad formulation, marketing became a generic concept applicable for all organizations and their relations to the relevant publics while exchanging values – including tangibles and intangibles such as symbolic values (Csaba, 2005: 129). In a sense, marketing has become inevitable. Kotler and Levy foresaw this development in their famous quote: “The choice facing those who manage non-business organizations is not whether to market or not market, for no organization can avoid marketing. The choice is whether to do it well or poorly” (Kotler/Levy, 1973: 42).

The implications for marketing nations in their global contexts are at hand: “if countries want to compete in the international arena, they must (using standard marketing terminology) differentiate and strategically target certain world markets” (Şamli, 1999: 84).

3.4.2 Development of Place Branding
Later in the 1990s, place marketing was increasingly enriched with the concept of place branding. In times of growing product parity, substitutability and competition between places, branding provides an attractive approach of achieving a unique positioning.

Having been a rather insignificant topic in marketing and reduced to the issues of labeling and packaging within product politics in earlier stages (Csaba, 2005: 128), branding theory has found enhanced awareness during the last two decades of the 20th century. Leading marketing textbook authors like Keller (2003a) or Kotler (2003) today see branding as a core activity and brands at the center of marketing.

Like marketing in general, branding theory also underwent a significant extension and raised interest in business surroundings outside the traditional areas of product and service marketing:

“Branding is everywhere. We have moved from its origins, in the branding of throw-away goods such as soap powders and soft drinks, to branding political policies and lifestyle choices. This is partly the result of the increasing influence, sophistication, and reach of the media, and partly a testament to the fact that branding works and that is does so because it is grounded in some innately human ways of making sense of the world” (Grant, 2002: 81).
Ubiquity of brands has lead to the understanding that we live in rich brandscapes (Biel, 1993: 67). From the general brandscape of availability consumers choose a personal brandscape for their lives. Research approaches have treated the relevance of brands for the individual ‘identity project’ and linked it to important psychological constructs of familiarity and reassurance.

Predominantly as an effect of globalization, the understanding and management of places as brands arouse:

“Branding is, potentially, a new paradigm for how places should be run in the future. A globalised world is a marketplace where country has to compete with country – and region with region, city with city – for its share of attention, of reputation, of spend, of goodwill, of trust” (Anholt, 2005a: 119).

Growing parity among places in terms of products, destinations, technologies or cultural particularities evokes the need for self-justification and distinction for places just as it had for product brands in commercial marketing (Csaba, 2005: 141).

Van Ham lists some main arguments why branding is necessary and beneficial for countries (van Ham, 2002: 251):

- product differentiation
- emotional bonds ensuring loyalty
- substitute for ideologies and political programs that lost their relevance
- combination of emotion, lifestyle and relationships allowing premium pricing

In the last decade the topic of nation brands has gained broader significance in academia and in practice, beyond the circles of experts. In different science disciplines, but mainly in economics and management, it has even become a fashionable issue. Papadopoulos and Heslop (2002) already identified over 750 major publications in this area up to 2002, and it must be assumed that the amount has increased manifold since.

A couple of aspects have been predominant in the discussion. The ‘country-of-origin’-label and the promotion of a tourist destination historically occupied the greatest share in place branding. In recent years, some new facets have been added to the broad scope and facilitated a more integrated understanding of nation brands:

“Clearly, there is far more to a powerful nation brand image than simply boosting branded exports around the world – if we pursue the thought to its logical conclusion, a country’s brand image can profoundly shape its economic, cultural and political destiny” (Anholt, 2002c: 44).

Usually, these different scopes of nation branding activities are distinguished in the literature (Csaba, 2005: 142-143):

- Promotion of tourism
- Promotion of exports and enhancing product country image (PCI)
- Promotion of culture and national heritage
- Attraction of investment, business and development
• Attraction of people (as residents, workforce, students or future citizens)
• Promotion of politics and governance
• Mobilization of internal support by building national identity
• Promotion of external reputation and political influence

Applying brand management methodology to nations necessarily implies consideration of questions such as ‘who you are’ and ‘how you are seen in the world’. It is for such questions the broadening of the marketing concepts into non-commercial areas proves to be very helpful:

“In the modern age, it also seems natural that governments should turn to the world of commerce for guidance in this area, since creating wide-scale changes in opinion and behaviour through persuasion rather than coercion, through attraction rather than compulsion, is seen to be the essence of branding and marketing” (Anholt, 2006: 275).

The (nation) brand becomes a promising strategy to display and utilize a nation’s soft power (Wetzel, 2006: 145). Accordingly the constructs of “image and reputation are becoming essential parts of the state’s strategic equity” (van Ham, 2004: 17) and are regarded as non-negligible categories of policy making. This need to understand and reach publics with politics links nation branding to its sister concept (Melissen, 2005c) public diplomacy.

3.5 Public Diplomacy

Many states’ preoccupation with their image and numerous country-rebranding attempts lead to deliberations on how to include such parameters systematically into the conduct of foreign policy. The evolution of the concept of public diplomacy stays abreast of these.

In a first definitional perspective public diplomacy is said to comprise “all of the activities by state and non-state actors that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country’s soft power” (Gonesh/Melissen, 2005: 7).

Public diplomacy rests on the premise that “the image and reputation of a country are public goods which can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for individual transactions” (Hocking, 2005: 31) and therefore became integral part of policy making in the contexts discussed before.

A definition like the following well represents the mainstream understanding of public diplomacy in the literature.

“Public diplomacy (…) means directing the flow of diplomatic information via media of mass communication and non-mediated channels to the foreign countries’ mass audience in order to create a positive image of the county and its society and in consequence to make the achievement of international policy goals easier” (Ociepka/Rynieszksa, 2005: 1).

Previous tasks of diplomatic work tend to lose relevance in the course of this development. As Paschke (2001) outlines, for example, most EU consultations take place directly between the governments, and the embassies do not have
to perform these services any longer. Instead, new tasks arise for the diplomatic corps in the era of public diplomacy: “Today, however, embassies face new, additional challenges, particularly in the realm of public diplomacy, i.e. explaining and putting across to the wider public in partner countries what Germany is trying to achieve in the European integration process, as well as promoting Germany as an attractive place in which to invest and do business” (Paschke, 2001: 1).

The traditional European heritage of diplomacy faces a considerable caesura. Diplomatic relations as international exchanges between governments have their roots in the representative negotiation on behalf of a sovereign during times of war and date back more than 2,000 years. Cardinal Richelieu created the first foreign ministry in France 1626, and modern European states developed a system of reciprocal exchanges of embassies and legations that spread as a role model to the rest of the world by the end of the 19th century (Kennan, 1997; Roberts, 2006).

The Havana conventions 1927 codified the diplomatic handling and strictly limited contacts of embassy personnel with ordinary citizens of the receiving states. Over the past 60 years, the conduct of diplomacy has undergone significant changes.

The priority among representation, communication, recognition, and negotiation, diplomacy’s “constitutive dimensions” (Gregory, 2008: 284), alters dramatically with social space no longer exclusively mapped in terms of territories, but also in interconnections beyond foreign services (ibid.).

3.5.1 Becoming fashionable: public diplomacy on the rise

The concept of propaganda, extensively employed already during WW I (referred to as “the press agent’s war”, Kunczik, 2005), became an integral part of warfare before and during WW II. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), for example, started to air in languages other than the own, press attaché positions were founded in US-American embassies and – within the newly founded Foreign Information Service (FIS) – the USA also established the organization “Voice of America” to reach the people of many countries via shortwave radio in 1942 (Roberts, 2006: 56-57).

It is generally accepted that the term public diplomacy was firstly coined by Edmund Gullion, dean of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 1965, when the United States Information Agency (USIA, founded 1953) was looking for a new term for propaganda (Cull, 2005). It was during the Reagan administration that the USA founded a first office for public diplomacy, but, as Wang (2004) notes, ironically this task became more relevant only after the end of the cold war with increased interaction between nations through market integration and the democratization of most social systems.

Historically, Noya sees a “pincer movement formed by citizens’ enhanced grasp of international issues and the increasing turmoil in international relations” (Noya, 2006b: 12) as a reason for statesmen becoming more receptive
to foreign public opinion and governments starting to pay more attention to their country’s image abroad after 1990.

The most recent historic turning point was finally 9/11/2001; In the years since then, public diplomacy, before mostly employed in relation to the USA\(^5\), has reached the global media awareness and entered public consciousness (Melissen, 2005a; Cull, 2005; Fiske de Gouveia, 2006). A genuine European debate developed after the turn of the 21\(^{st}\) century with rethinking foreign services, for example, in Germany (Paschke, 2001) or the UK (Leonard, 2002b).

In a global media analysis it was found that only comparably less-developed areas of the world like Sub-Saharan Africa or parts of South America were not yet participating in this discourse (Brown, 2007a). Pointing to this shortage, some researchers underline that it is exactly those underprivileged and usually overseen countries for which intensified public diplomacy efforts would improve the chances of being realized and identified on a global scale (Anholt, 2007a).

### 3.5.2 Closer to Main Street

The challenges move diplomacy “away from the exclusive CD world and closer to the main street” (Melissen, 2006c: 6). In this new stage of diplomatic representation, foreign publics matter to the practitioners in the embassies to an extent that was not thinkable only 25 years ago (Melissen, 2005a: 19). Issues that used to lie at the periphery such as public relations now move to the center of diplomatic work (Paschke, 2006): “The art of politics changes from old-style diplomacy to the art of brand building and reputation management” (van Ham, 2004: 17). Gonesh/Melissen (2005: 4) label this movement the “societization of diplomacy”.

The need and motivation for governments to turn to more a public-directed foreign policy is shaped by the following general context (Anholt, 2007a; Busch-Janser/Florian, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Hocking, 2005)

- The spread of democracy after the Cold War intensified the call for transparency of governments and mass-participation in politics.
- Increasing sensitivity to ethical and ecological issues demands more trust-building activities by the policymakers.
- The publics’ awareness for international affairs has increased, facilitated by growth in international travel and media coverage.
- Tasks with a transnational or cross-border character such as environmental protection or the fight against terrorism have become political top-priorities.
- A better informed and more curious audience drives the growing power of international media.

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\(^5\) Against this mainstream opinion in the literature Melissen (2006c) holds that a European school of Public Diplomacy developed mostly simultaneously. Classical role models are for example Germany’s Politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit from the very start of the Federal Republic 1949.
• The CNN-effect describes the internationalization of news media and global simultaneous availability of information ("24/7-effect").
• Evolving communication technologies, especially the Internet, connect the globe and its communities.
• NGOs utilizing this potential become powerful players in international relations.
• The globally linked economic and financial system has become part of daily public consciousness.
• The decline of Hollywood's cultural hegemony has left a vacuum with a new global cultural demand and positioning space for countries.

Yet, in times of abundant availability of information and multiple modes of transnational cooperation, foreign publics are not an easy target group for official institutions to reach out to. Governments are definitely not the only sources of information, and modern technology leads to significant mobilization power (Melissen, 2006b: 11). Plus, “despite open borders, foreign travel, television and Internet many nations remain pretty much strangers to each other and clichés and prejudices still abound” (Paschke, 2006: 1). New diplomatic repertoires as well as the personal skills of foreign policy professionals are necessary to tackle such a difficult communicative environment.

A collaborative model of diplomacy evolves, with Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) operating in relationships not only horizontally between the MFA and other governmental institutions such as line ministries, but also vertically between NGOs and civil society organizations (Melissen, 2006b: 6). Knowing the public audience in foreign countries, finding the right positioning of a message and moving beyond intellectual forms of communication are important new challenges for this diplomatic work (Leonard, 2002a).

With such a collaborative understanding of diplomacy certain questions of credibility and control arise (Wang, 2006). Governmental institutions – suspect of propaganda – can not remain the single sources of information and be credible at the same time. The primacy of the nation state in international relations is challenged by sub-national (local governments, civic organizations) or transnational actors (international NGOs, corporations) with whom nation-states learn to share powers (Wang, 2006: 35). Claims of central control over foreign policy and communication messages by governmental institutions clearly become hollow in this regard.

3.5.3 Scholarly study of public diplomacy
Given this background and outlook, the development of the scholarly discipline of public diplomacy is noticeable.

With a few exceptions among US institutions (esp. the USIA) hosting public diplomacy research programs during the Cold War (Cowan/Cull, 2008), an academic home for public diplomacy has not been provided before and is still not in sight. The field was named and mostly occupied by practitioners, while the academic work on public diplomacy mainly stemmed from the areas of
public opinion research, cultural anthropology, social psychology, and media and political communication studies (Gregory, 2008).

Due to this multidisciplinary nature, paradigms for the case of public diplomacy turned out to be premature, which the quite laborious distinction of nation branding and public diplomacy above clearly showed. The analytical boundaries are not clearly defined (Gregory, 2008).

For a unique scholarly field to be established several minimal requirements have to be met. It must be clearly distinguished from other fields; it should define several subfields sharing theories, models, and methodologies; and it must win both internal and external recognition (Losee, 2001). For public diplomacy, one challenge consists in harmonizing rivaling paradigms (see Chapter 3.5.4). All disciplines need to contribute in a collaborative effort. In the short research history of public diplomacy it was observed by Gilboa (2008) that experts and practitioners in public diplomacy have often ignored relevant knowledge in communication and PR, while communication and PR scholars and practitioners have often ignored the relevant literature in public diplomacy. Apparently there is lots of space to be occupied in the foreign policy arena, but it needs a common theory development to achieve this (Gilboa, 2008: 75).

The future will show if this academic field that is both multidisciplinary and relevant to the public sphere can be further developed while maintaining the academic standards of the separate disciplines in which it is based (Gregory, 2008). The scholarly discipline will certainly be essential if students are to be interested and for practitioners to appreciate and pick up the scholarship (ibid: 287). With the Center on Public Diplomacy co-founded by the Annenberg School for Communication and the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California a first hub was successfully put in place in 2003. Equally the Clingendael’s Diplomatic Studies Programme at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations has turned out to be a quite productive center of knowledge and scholarship in the recent past.

3.5.4 From Selling to Listening: Public diplomacy paradigms
A principle distinction between two rival paradigms in public diplomacy to which Hocking (2005) refers to the hierarchical and the network-based approach. While the former stresses the centrality of intergovernmental relations and top-down aligned bureaucratic systems resting on a realist model of public diplomacy as propaganda, the latter approach focuses on non-hierarchical cooperation and multidirectional flows of information.

These paradigmatic shifts also resemble a broadening in the theoretical perspective and the involved academic disciplines. The recent developments, for example in the USA, underscore this expansion where public diplomacy, for a long-time based on an America-centered framework with the USA as the hub and foreign stakeholders as spokes – owed mainly to political and international relations theory – need now to shift towards a stronger community-
orientated paradigm fed from communications and public relations theory (Kruckeberg/Vujnovic, 2005).

“America’s public diplomacy must recognize that the United States’ global constituents are ‘publics’, not ‘markets’, and that an effective public diplomacy model must be one that is not propaganda or market-orientated advocacy, but one that is based on a two-way symmetrical communication and community-building.” (Kruckeberg/Vujnovic, 2005: 296).

The communications theory added questions of symmetrical relations between stakeholders and two-way exchanges on issues of international communication. The distinction of asymmetrical/symmetrical and one-way/two-way communication as four prototypes of Public Relations (PR) goes back to the work of James Grunig’s Excellence Study in the early 1990s for the International Association of Business Communicators (IABC) (Grunig, 2001). The archetypes found in the history of PR are as follows (Grunig, 1992: 16-17).

- The Press Agentry/Publicity model (asymmetrical, one-way) aims at manipulation/persuasion and is mostly referred to as propaganda.
- The Public Information model (symmetrical, one-way) refers to the dissemination of information among equals without a feedback channel.
- The Two-Way Asymmetric PR incorporates feedback, yet focuses on short-term attitude change and persuasion without major concessions.
- The Two-Way Symmetric PR emphasizes negotiation and a willingness to make compromises based on the open exchange of information.

Symmetry accrues when neither the interest of a company nor the concern of the publics is dominant in the course of a negotiation; both parties meet in a win-win zone (Grunig, 2001: 26). As a normative role model in Grunig’s eyes PR strives towards a ‘mixed-motive model’ in which for strategic reasons from time to time asymmetrical tactics are employed, embedded however in a general view of symmetrical relationships. This notwithstanding, the two-way approach to communication has become the common ground of PR theories by the end of the 20th century.

With the inclusion of communication theory into international relations, as indicated earlier, the conduct of public diplomacy changes towards a two-way understanding of its purposes and methods: “Arguments for greater use of the network model focus on the recognition that modern public diplomacy is a two-way street” (Fisher, 2006: 18).

And also the normative goal of symmetrical hierarchies between communication parties promises to be fertile for public diplomacy purposes:

“While it is possible to have a network in which there exist dominant participants, symmetrical relationships in which all participants are valued beyond their ability to transmit a pre-determined message, have the potential to multiply the impact of an initiative. This interdependence clearly carries certain risks, but also engages participants groups with an initiative to a greater extent than traditional or hierarchically conceived influence multipliers” (Fisher, 2006: 19).

In this ideal contemporary understanding, public diplomacy is portrayed as a dialogic communication based on Habermas’ ideal speech situation (Wang,
2006) with the goal of a self-feeding system of transnational civil society communication structures. It is anticipated that “by maintaining an on-going international dialogue, public diplomacy can assure continued linkages between [...] countries, even when government-to-government relations are disrupted” (Kruckeberg/Vujnovic, 2005: 302-303). The condition of bilateral interest is required, and thus a certain involvement of (foreign or domestic) publics in actively seeking knowledge or understanding is necessary: “With a largely inactive public, it would be foolhardy to pursue any meaningful dialogic communication” (Wang, 2006: 39).

As Gregory (2008: 283) nicely put it, it is not information, but attention that becomes the scarce resource contemporary public diplomacy needs to battle for.

3.5.5 Management of public diplomacy

As paradigms shift, the managerial maneuvering space for public diplomacy changes and the number of players increase. The world is already a world full of abundant information – so how can countries stand out or hide (Gonesh/Melissen, 2005)?

Governmental agencies can attempt to create platforms that are attractive for multiple stakeholder groups, and invite and coordinate these actors (Leonard, 2002b). This perspective is not only directed outward; public diplomacy according to numerous authors begins with an internal perspective, which is projected to the outside: “public diplomacy serves as a window into a society and as a window out. The sense of national identity of citizens, and also how they feel about their country, helps projecting a country’s identity abroad” (Melissen, 2006c: 2). This implies also that co-existing national and regional or diaspora identities might complicate public diplomacy efforts further.

An interesting question pertains to the institutional implementation of public diplomacy. Only few countries, with UK, Canada and USA considered being pioneers, have set up specific departments, with Germany, Spain and Denmark trailing behind (Melissen 2006c). Even if for many practitioners putting public diplomacy into operation is still a rather peripheral concern, Leonard (2002b) expects public diplomacy to enrich the embassy work as a fourth strand alongside political, commercial and consular work.

In consideration of these challenges it is debatable if and to what degree public diplomacy activities could or should be outsourced to private service providers such as PR companies or branding and advertising consultancies (Pigman/Deos, 2008). Fiske de Gouveia (2006) foresees this trend for smaller countries that cannot afford to build up capacities on their own. Rosen/Wolf (2005) also point out the potential creative gain promised by external support. Melissen (2006c) and Schlageter (2006) maintain that the lead still has to be in the MFA. Anholt (2007a), also in Teslik (2007c), cautions against the lip service advertising agencies often pay to their poorly informed politicians, and sell at the level of logos and slogans instead of substantial strategies. Such consultancy thwarts
the long-term strategic approaches of public diplomacy and reinforces the notion that branding is superficial, short-termed and produces only vague effectiveness (Anholt, 2007a: 23).

In general, Anholt (2007a) regards brand management and public diplomacy as new perspectives on regular national activities such as planning, policy-making and development: “managing the national image is a core responsibility of national government” (Anholt, 2007a: 73). This task should therefore not be performed outside the policy framework. Implementing management structures is more than anything else a training task to be organized. As Sucharipa (2002) put it: the diplomats are becoming the managers of globalization. The learning and development implications for the diplomats are considerable.

In organizational regards, a more systematic use of the public arena demands significant changes from MFAs to become ministries of transparency, accountability and integrity as foundations of public trust (Gonesh/Melissen, 2005).

3.5.6 Public diplomacy institutions
It must be underscored however that, apart from organizational issues, the conduct of public diplomacy can’t be left to the government alone; it needs a carefully managed coalition of business, civil society and government (Anholt, 2007a). As with the broadening of public diplomacy from the governmental, hierarchical paradigm towards the collaborative network paradigm the spectrum of involved agents and institutions is subject to change.

Traditional institutions for public diplomacy are of course embassies and consulates under the authority of a country’s ministry of foreign affairs (MFA). In addition, cultural institutes or centers to promote the national heritage and language abroad such as the British Council, Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, American centers and libraries, the Institute Français, China’s Confucius Institute, or the German Goethe Institute are mostly funded and run under MFAs’ control. Moreover, external radio stations like BBC World Service, Deutsche Welle, Radio France Internationale, Radio Netherlands Worldwide or Voice of America airing globally have been effective public-driven messengers of cultural diplomacy and soft power (Leonard, 2002b). Finally, educational institutions abroad with US-American, German or French high-schools or universities are well-established forms of traditional hierarchical public diplomacy.

However, actors of public diplomacy are also increasingly found outside the nation-state’s domain: the business community, educational and academic organizations, think tanks and NGOs or political parties cooperate across borders. Leonard (2002b) therefore also suggests considering brand diplomacy, party diplomacy or NGO diplomacy, and – with increasing cross-border mobility of people – also to talk of diaspora diplomacy as living links between societies. Networking among political parties, cooperations of business sectors or academics, exchanges between religious organizations, sport clubs or schools/universities, cross-national sporting events, youth movements or in-
dependent international media and journalist collaboration are typical examples of civil society-driven forms of public diplomacy (Riordan, 2005).

### 3.5.7 Media of public diplomacy

The mediatization of foreign policy was historically one major driver for the ongoing evolution the public diplomacy concept. The emerging spectrum towards what is referred to as ‘social media’ presently adds interesting nuances to the collaborative network model of public diplomacy.

Media traditionally take on four different functions for foreign policy: the provide legitimation, they determine the agenda, they provide the interpretive frame (framing), and they define criteria for the evaluation of actors in international relations (priming) (Busch-Janser/Florian, 2008).

In the early years of public diplomacy, when the two-way philosophy of communication was practically irrelevant, the arsenal of U.S. information agency in the Kennedy years consisted mostly of the traditional country promotion inventory such as brochures, movies, films, libraries and American centers and radio stations like “Voice Of America” (Bardos, 2001). An advertising understanding of public diplomacy with paid media or PR initiatives dominated the scope of activities.

Public diplomacy’s more recent attempts to adjust to the information age is often referred to as New Public Diplomacy (NPD) and accounts for the changes in the mediascape, the rise of a global culture (also reflexively leading to protect diversity) and global intrusive media systems (Gilboa, 2008).

Noya (2006b) thinks contemporary public diplomacy is clearly more than media multiplication of foreign policy, but largely incorporates the politics themselves:

> "It must be emphasized that public diplomacy does not operate only at the most visible media level, via campaigns in major mass media, but that it acts at all levels. Public diplomacy is attention to the public on a day-to-day basis, at a film screening at an embassy, but also in academic exchange programmes or language classes at cultural institutes, which create networks of people who share an interest in another country. Public diplomacy acts in all level of foreign policy, so that it is macro, but not less than micro and meso." (Noya, 2006b: 15).

An interesting new effect on public diplomacy’s mediatization can be expected from the collaborative evolution of the internet usually referred to as web 2.0. The CNN-effect referred to earlier makes way for the “YouTube effect” with citizen journalism/the blogosphere becoming a new power of public diplomacy:

> "Since the early 1990s, electoral frauds that might have remained hidden were exposed, democratic uprisings energized, famines contained, and wars started or stopped, thanks to the CNN effect. But the YouTube effect will be even more intense. Although the BBC, CNN, and other international news operations employ thousands of professional journalists, they will never be as omnipresent as millions of people carrying a cell phone that can record video. Thanks to their ubiquity, the world was able to witness a shooting on a 19,000-foot mountain pass. This phenomenon is am-
plified by a double echo-chamber: One is produced when content first posted on the Web is re-aired by mainstream TV networks. The second occurs when television moments, even the most fleeting, gain a permanent presence thank to bloggers or activist who redistribute them through Web sites like YouTube" (Naim, 2007: 1-2).

It is anticipated that this new media evolution will again significantly alter the conduct of public diplomacy and challenge even more the modern diplomats’ ability to connect to publics. On the one hand the global information space is heavily contested and the share of attention is continuously declining, but also on the other hand these developments still boost more transparency: “No conversation is private any longer, no media is domestic, and the audience is always global”(Anholt, 2007a: 52).

3.6 Modeling public diplomacy

Over the short history of public diplomacy research, some groundwork models like the Basic Cold War model, the Domestic PR model or the Nonstate Transnational model have been developed (Gilboa, 2008: 59-60). These models tend to accentuate certain characteristics in specific public diplomacy areas. For the purpose of this study however it is intended to develop a comprehensive self-contained analytical framework aiming to evaluate Turkey’s conduct and potential, as is suggested for political analysis beyond mere case descriptions (Gilboa, 2008: 59).

3.6.1 Parameters of the public diplomacy model

Public diplomacy, as with political communication in general, takes place in a triangular relationship between politics, media and publics, which are in fact mutually influential forces. As opposed to domestic political communications, in public diplomacy contexts a foreign player (government, NGOs, media) enters the playground. This player might try to change the media agenda to impact the public agenda, which would finally influence the policy agenda of the national government (Huebecker, 2004).

Within this setting, public diplomacy can achieve a hierarchy of objectives (Leonard, 2002b: 50):

- Increase familiarity (making people think about the nation and updating their images of it).
- Increase appreciation (creating positive perceptions of the nation and getting others to see issues from its perspective).
- Engage people (encouraging people to see the nation as an attractive destination for tourism or study, to buy its products and to subscribe to its values).
- Influence people's behavior (getting companies to invest, encouraging public support for the nation’s positions, and convincing politicians to turn to it as an ally).

This hierarchy contains the basic variables of a (nation) brand image framework: awareness (level of knowledge), perception (image dimensions), en-
gagement (experiences of the nation) and behavior (intentions to act towards the nation) and is reminiscent of the traditional AIDA model in marketing. The AIDA acronym is one of the classic persuasion hierarchy models in consumer behavior theory giving the steps Awareness, Interest, Desire and Action for interaction with products or entities ranging from first contact to trial or purchase. The different stages are assumed to build on each other. Appreciation presupposes knowledge and engagement conditions actions to be taken.

3.6.2 Analytical framework
A consolidated model of public diplomacy summarizing the present stage of theory development is suggested to comprise the four different dimensions of time, channel, purpose and domain.

Leonard (2002a; 2002b) and Gonesh/Melissen (2005) propose to differentiate three time-dimensions of public diplomacy:

- Day-to-day issues such as crisis management, which are often reactive to incidents happening out of the scope of political and communicative control. However, tactics such as news management or short-term specific advocacy campaigns are also proposed to be sorted into this category.
- A midterm time horizon is ascribed to strategic communications, meaning mainly campaigns giving important national narratives designed to raise the profile of the country. The necessary campaign management capabilities (ensuring the consistency of stories and arguments, reality checks) are not always accredited to governments.
- Relationship Building is the most long term time dimension of public diplomacy. Developing lasting ties with key individuals and mobilizing sustainable advocacy among peers are typical goals in this perspective. Bigler (2005) argues that these ties are ultimate goals of public diplomacy – clearly beyond traditional marketing communication patterns.

Busch-Janser/Florian’s (2008) model of public diplomacy is channel-related. They differentiate public diplomacy as lobbying, as public relations and as nation branding.

- Public diplomacy as lobbying often has the goal of influencing political legislation processes by traditional lobbying. The target groups are small and specified, and the process has clear-cut start and end points.
- Public diplomacy as public relations aims at broader target groups and also embraces economic and cultural topics. Depending on the particular goals, information (one-way) or exchange (two-way) can be in focus – while the latter would resemble the ideal of sustainable, cooperative public diplomacy.
- Public diplomacy as nation branding refers to the self-perception of a country and includes the nation’s companies and citizens into the communication process. Nation branding’s primary goal is to produce a positive image of the own country abroad (see Chapter 3.7).
Wang’s (2006) model of public diplomacy differentiates different purposes or objectives of public diplomacy in a horizontal structure: “In general, public diplomacy communication encompasses three broad objectives:

- promoting a country’s national goals and policies;
- communicating about a nation’s ideas and ideals, beliefs and values;
- and building common understanding and relationships” (Wang, 2006: 37).

Connections to the two models presented earlier show through.

Finally, as seen before for nation branding, there are multiple areas or domains involved in public diplomacy. Leonard (2002b: 10) summarizes with the distinction of

- Political/Military
- Economic, and
- Societal/Cultural

purposes and domains of public diplomacy. The nation brand hexagon by Anholt (2007a) investigated earlier, which distinguishes governance (=> political/military), tourism, exports and investment/immigration (=> economic), and people and culture & heritage (societal/cultural), can be regarded as a more detailed version of Leonard’s model.

All four dimensions and their subcategories can be commingled into an aggregated synopsis of public diplomacy dimensions. Public diplomacy activities by countries could be entered into this matrix, analyzed in the light of every dimension and sorted into in the respective subcategories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time/Domain</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Channel/Formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political/Military</td>
<td>National policies and goals</td>
<td>Public diplomacy as lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>National ideals and values</td>
<td>Public Diplomacy as Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal/Cultural</td>
<td>Common understanding and mutual cooperation</td>
<td>Public Diplomacy as Nation Branding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-4: Aggregated model of public diplomacy (by author, based on Leonard 2002a/b; Gonesh/Melissen, 2005; Busch-Janser/Florian, 2008; Wang, 2006 and Anholt, 2007a).
3.7 Public diplomacy and nation branding

One challenging and partly unsettled question in this evolving field concerns the relationship of nation branding and public diplomacy. Both are obviously quite similar symptoms of the transformation of international relations and diplomatic practice in a changing environment of complex networks (Melissen, 2004) and are probably sister concepts (Melissen, 2005c).

Regardless of this proximity some noticeable reservations remain especially on the side of diplomacy practitioners. While the conservative majority of diplomats by and by learn to accept public diplomacy as part of their profession, they "still see country branding as a corporate-sector Fremdkörper that cannot be transplanted to the conduct of international relations" (Melissen, 2004: 27). They resist limiting themselves to an allegedly superficial country promotion approach in dealing with foreign publics by the "application of new techniques of marketing, advertising, media management or spin doctoring to the conduct of international relations" (Melissen, 2006c: 5).

While branding is said to be engaged mainly in the projection of an identity and one-way messaging, public diplomacy is associated with dialogical relationship building (Melissen, 2006a: 11). Furthermore, other than the ambitious holistic branding approach, public diplomacy seems to be more aware of its limitations: "For diplomats the world is no market, and practitioners of diplomacy are constantly reminded of the fact that diplomatic communication is only a flimsy part of dense transnational communication processes. (...) Public diplomacy is by no means the decisive factor in determining foreign perceptions" (Melissen, 2006a: 11).

There are voices indicating that the branding approach to nations was sold too enthusiastically and only rarely kept its promises: "The truth is that there are many more disillusioned foreign ministries and governments than success stories of branding" (Melissen, 2006c: 4). In the light of such incidents, indeed "branding and public diplomacy remain strange bedfellows" and "pass one another like ships in the night" (Melissen, 2004: 26-27).

Now, as indicated earlier and to be discussed in more detail later, there are also other paradigmatic interpretations of the branding concept aimed at understanding brands much less as a selling tool and much more as a method or research construct (Hayden, 2007a), and which see branding as a managerial ‘encapsulation’ of the fundamental common purpose of an organization (Teslik, 2007c).

Both public diplomacy and nation branding deal with the corporate story of a country, its values, history, narratives, legends and the shared experiences of the society, as their starting points. Past, present and future should be connected in a way that creates an expression of what a nation’s society has managed to achieve (Gonesh/Melissen, 2005). And if international relations are increasingly a market for identification, then branding strategies are the
logical evolutions for foreign policy (Hayden, 2007a). As such, “place branding should be embedded in a sophisticated understanding of modern diplomacy, a broad framework for dealing with foreign publics and the development of adequate instruments for diplomacy aimed at non-official audiences” (Melissen, 2004: 27). And of the different ways how nations could present themselves to the world, public diplomacy is identified to have the most in common with brand management in the commercial realm (Anholt, 2007a: 12).

In consequence, both concepts are suggested to mingle into one more or less consistent innovative approach to foreign policy: “Who you are, how you are seen, and what you do, are all questions which are intimately and perhaps inextricably linked, which is why no state can hope to achieve this aims in the modern world without a mature and sophisticated fusion of PD and nation branding” (Anholt, 2006e: 275).

The particulars of this ‘theory merger’ will be discussed in more detail concluding this thesis. For the time being, both Schwan (2007b) and Schlageter (2006) are followed in that they see both concepts as unconditionally intertwined.

Quite remarkably in this context, the only academic journal in this field formally launched as “Place Branding” in 2005 was renamed to “Place Branding and Public Diplomacy” in 2007.

Some authors argue that public diplomacy is a subset of nation branding that focuses on the political brand dimensions of a nation (Fan, 2008). Others however, like Busch-Janser/Florian (2008) – as outlined above – regard nation branding as an elementary channel of public diplomacy. Suffering from a substantial lack of theory in the discussion of these phenomena (Gilboa, 2008), a dominant reading about the relationship of nation branding and public diplomacy has yet not emerged in the literature.

Since this research focuses on the political dimension of Turkey’s nation brand, as proposed in the model developed before, for the analysis of the case of Turkey, nation branding is considered a relevant channel or tool (Cowan/Cull, 2008) within the public diplomacy program of a country. The nation branding logic will be employed as the playground for potential messaging by Turkey in a strategic perspective.

Blended theories from international relations research and established concepts from marketing both frame the research design for the explorative study on Turkey, in which the practical applicability of this scholarly background and the framework developed in Chapter 3.6 is tested.
4 Research design: exploration of Turkey’s potential

How can the emerging streams of public diplomacy and nation branding outlined before be employed to compensate for Turkey’s poor international image and reputation, and contribute to a successful EU application? This guiding question bearing in mind, Turkey’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats while applying to the EU will be analyzed.

In the following the choice of the research approach will be explained and reasoned, important methodological decisions will be outlined and the practice of data collection and data analysis will be introduced.

The case of Turkey will help to provide some more in-depth insights into the detailed settings and mechanisms of a nation brand in political contexts and with regard to the public diplomacy potentials. In general the case method should be applied in such a way that a specific understanding of the individual contexts is supplied, providing the ground for subsequent wider inference. The first task of a case analysis consists of a deep description of all relevant aspects and facts, as shown in the previous chapters. The following data analysis comprises the steps of data collection, categorical aggregation, identification of patterns and some generalizations from the findings, as suggested by Creswell (1998).

4.1 Research questions

The following guiding questions mark the scope of the research into Turkey’s EU accession in more detail:

- Could public diplomacy and nation brand management help Turkey on the way into the EU?
- In how far is Turkey’s EU accession process a communication issue?
- How could Turkey’s public diplomacy be ideally drafted and organized?
- What have been historical and what are contemporary challenges to Turkey’s nation brand?
- What would the management of Public Diplomacy in Turkey look like?
- What would be potential strategies and messages for Turkey’s public diplomacy?
- What would be critical conditions for Turkey’s public diplomacy in order to be successful?

The following research design was developed and applied to answer these guiding questions.

4.2 Explorative approach

This research project is in many regards surrounded by novel contexts. As shown before, a general theory of nation brand image and public diplomacy is just evolving. The literature has mostly no theoretical depth, but rather practical value. Apart from the academic underdevelopment of the general re-
The dominant goal of this research project is therefore to apply nation brand management theory and public diplomacy theory to the case of Turkey’s EU accession and investigate the managerial implications. Such an approach was not found in the literature before, and also at the practical end public diplomacy action in Turkey turned out to be in an infant state by the time the purpose of this research was developed.

The novelty as well as the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the topic not only justified the extensive situation and literature analysis performed earlier, but also called for largely exploratory work in the case study with a corresponding qualitative research design in order to understand and discover this area of Turkey’s EU accession process better.

4.3 Sampling decisions

General units of analysis were the involved nations in the EU and Turkey itself. Within this universe, specific interest was on the one hand directed towards finding out about Turkey’s needs to relate to the public, and on the other hand devoted to learning about potential strategies to cope with Turkey’s perception.

Which sub-units of analysis could generate successful learning about the publics of these chosen countries and the resulting implications? The alternatives were to either asking the publics directly or inquiring about them. Both approaches were considered. Asking them directly would require enormous resources of a multi-country survey, especially if done in a manner that would allow for decent statistical inference. In line with research theory according to which “expert opinion can often be useful as a source of objective information that might be more difficult to collect by other techniques (Simon, 2003: 209), the approach to have especially knowledgeable informants refer to the
publics and consider strategies was picked for feasibility reasons and with re-
gard to the exploratory nature of this study.

4.3.1 Sampling unit experts
Research theory defines experts as “people who have spent much of their
time working with a particular subject and who have gathered much general
information that has been filtered through their minds and stored in their
memories” (Simon, 2003: 208). For the case of Turkey’s EU accession, this
implied to find informants who deal with the topic either practically on the po-
litical end, or who can provide an informed judgment based on their profes-
sional expertise related to their marketing, business, communication/media or
politics backgrounds. The sampling had to cover a multifaceted field of knowl-
edge to account for the different aspects of the issue.

The choice of the experts followed competence-related, perspective-related
and experience-related dimensions.

![Figure 4-1: Sampling dimensions experts](image)

As demonstrated in the framework developed earlier (Chapter 3.6.2) public
diplomacy comprises political, economic/marketing and societal/cultural do-
main. For the competence-related sampling dimension, it was therefore in-
tended to distribute political actors, experts and economic consultants as well
as brand experts such as political communication/advertisers or marketing
professionals among the sample.
Also, to pay heed to the societal domain, media representatives such as
knowledgeable correspondents were chosen to take on the role of rich infor-
mants. Furthermore, granting the symmetrical/ bottom-up character of most
current public diplomacy conceptions, and also to consolidate the cul-
tural/societal point-of-view on Turkey, expatriates from EU countries having
settled in Turkey with a business/research were selected in the sample. Fi-
nally, foreign countries’ diplomats in Turkey with links to public diplomacy issues were considered to bridge over all domains.

Related to the perspective dimension, the sampling decision intended to account for a preferably multi-layered picture of Turkey’s challenges in Europe viewed from the inside and from a distance. For the perspective from outside six prototypical nations from the EU (The Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Spain, Sweden and Slovenia) were chosen (see below for the sampling logic behind the country choice). The embassy personnel, the media representatives and the expatriates mentioned above were recruited from these countries.

The literature review furthermore suggested paying attention to the internal perspective of public diplomacy and nation branding. To juxtapose inside and outside perspectives on this issue a relevant number of Turkey’s experts in the respective domains politics, economy/marketing and societal/media was also represented.

Thirdly, there was an experience dimension considered in the sampling. Earlier practical attempts to develop a nation branding strategy or public diplomacy model for Turkey are represented in the data. Furthermore, in the light of the emerging public diplomacy theory and the indicated paradigmatic shifts, both governmental and non-governmental initiatives were differentiated.

4.3.2 Sampling unit countries
As indicated, contemporary trends and drifts within the EU will also show up in the sample. Currently “the three dominant axes in the EU large versus small states, poor versus rich and federalists versus intergovernmentalists” (Independent Commission, 2004: 3) shape the dynamics in the Union and therefore the enlargement processes. Media discourses suggested furthermore a general North-(Middle)-South divide throughout the EU (Altınbahasak-Ebrem, 2004) and also differences in the EU’s perception, depending on the duration of the respective country’s membership.

For the specific case of Turkey, in line with the literature and the public opinion data analyzed earlier (see Chapter 2.1), the presence of Turkish immigrants in EU countries, trade and tourism relations between the countries and the dominant religion in the country promised to provide some explanatory power and were differentiated in the sampling grid.

A sample of six countries out of all 25 (27) EU countries was taken. This sample size seemed feasible, but at the same time allowed for enough variation to potentially detect common patterns of explanation missing so far (see Chapters 2.1.2 and 2.1.4). The questions discussed above were operationalized by the following nine criteria: size\(^1\), wealth\(^2\), EURO-acceptance\(^3\), geographical

\(^1\) Measured in number of inhabitants, above 35 Mio=“large”, below 35 Mio=“small”, source: EUROSTAT
region, main religious orientation, duration of the nation’s EU membership, share of population with Turkish migration background, and trade involvement with Turkey. The sample of Netherlands, Germany, UK, Spain, Sweden and Slovenia showed decent distribution across the chosen criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Wealth</th>
<th>Euro</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>EU membership</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Turkish population</th>
<th>Trade TR</th>
<th>Tourism to TR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cath.</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Prot.</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Cath.</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-1: Sampling of EU countries

4.4 Access to informants

Access to the informants was reached through both systematic inquiry and snowball effects. In the systematic part, informants from the domains were researched who could refer to the mainstream discourses (typical and normal) in their home countries (Cresswell, 1998). Entering the field with the help of the embassies in Ankara turned out quite helpful.

The snowball sampling effect occurred when some special information-rich informants were recommended. Two very helpful key informants served as main gatekeepers to the different domains in Turkey and the EU countries. They not only drew the researcher’s attention to important sources, but also often helped to connect.

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2 In GDP per capita, according to the EUROSTAT index of EU 25=100 (above 100 =“rich” or below 100 =“poor”)
3 Since no adequate means to comparably assess the “intergovernmentalist vs. federalist”-distinction are available, EURO membership (which was mostly the result of referendum in the EU member states) is taken as rough indicator of the general EU perspective in the nations.
4 Differentiated in North, (Scandinavia, Great Britain, Ireland and the Baltic States), Central (Continental Europe north of the Alps) and South (Mediterranean countries or countries with similar latitudes).
5 Indicated by more than 50% of the population sharing one dominant religion, source: CIA factbook.
6 The six founding members of EU in 1957 were referred to as “old”, successive accessions in the enlargement rounds before the opening to former East Block countries as “middle”, and “new” refers to the 10 member states entering in 2004.
7 Percentage of country’s population with Turkish nationality or first generation EU naturalized population with Turkish roots, with >0,5% indicating large Turkish population and < 0,5% indicating small Turkish population, sources: EUROSTAT, ZfT
8 Related to the country’s rank in Turkey’s foreign trade (imports and exports) balance, “high” = Top 5; “middle” = 6-20; “low”= below 20; source: DIE
9 Expressed by the rank of the country in the number of tourists visiting Turkey; “high” = Top 5; “middle” = 6-20; “low”= below 20; source: DIE
10 Dr. Thomas Bagger, head of PR and communication at the German embassy in Ankara until 2006, helped greatly to reach experts of the EU countries in Turkey and in Europe, and the general secretary at the Turkish Association of Advertising Agencies in Istanbul, Ayşegül Molu, linked to important Turkish informants. In addition, media observation provided valuable inputs for choosing knowledgeable informants.
The following sample of informants was finally accessed. The goal was to represent at least four experts of every dimension/competence in the sample\(^{11}\). Short portraits of the experts are found in the appendix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ambassadors/ Embassy staff</th>
<th>Political Experts</th>
<th>Branding Experts</th>
<th>Media Correspondents</th>
<th>Expatriates</th>
<th>Turkish Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asp</td>
<td>Kramer</td>
<td>Anderson</td>
<td>Ankar</td>
<td>Verhoeven</td>
<td>Boyner (NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karre</td>
<td>Polenz van Ham</td>
<td>Olins Ural</td>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>Özbağılı</td>
<td>Kıniklioğlu (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De la Pena</td>
<td>Leoprechting</td>
<td>Stauss</td>
<td>Nieuwober</td>
<td>Özcèlik</td>
<td>Molu (NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grasselli</td>
<td>Parker</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pope</td>
<td>Yücaoğlu</td>
<td>Özcèlik (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCormick</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Schlötzter</td>
<td>Achouri</td>
<td>Yücaoğlu (NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Haaften</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zaman</td>
<td>Kosca</td>
<td>Zapsu (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Petelinker</td>
<td>Sungar (G)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-2: Sample of informants by sampling dimension

The distribution of informants across the selected six prototypical EU countries was with the condition of having at least three informants per country from at least two relevant competence domains\(^{12}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polit.</td>
<td>van Haften van Ham</td>
<td>Polenz Kramer</td>
<td>Mc Cor-</td>
<td>De la</td>
<td>Asp</td>
<td>Grasseli</td>
<td>Zapsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mick</td>
<td>Pena</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ/ Mkt</td>
<td>Leoprechting</td>
<td>Anderson</td>
<td>Ligero-</td>
<td>Kärre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strauss</td>
<td>Olins</td>
<td>Cofrade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socie-</td>
<td>Verhoeven</td>
<td>Özbağılı</td>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>Achouri</td>
<td>Kosca</td>
<td>Ural</td>
<td>Pope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tal</td>
<td>Nieuwober</td>
<td>Schlötzter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Petelinker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-3: Sample of informants by country

The informants were all reached via e-mail, often after some initial phone calls. In the e-mail a short exposition of the research project and the involved institutions was given as well as a brief description of the researcher’s background. Letters of recommendation were attached. Targeting mostly quite occupied professionals, setting a date and a venue for the interviews turned out to be the most challenging part.

As not uncommon for interviews with professionals (Legard/Keegan/Ward, 2003: 166), ideal time conditions for in-depth interviews as postulated in the literature (McCracken, 1998) could not be provided. The time-slots of the interviews ranged between 20 and 90 minutes. Especially for the very short talks (mostly with politicians or high-ranked informants from the economic domain) a prioritization within the topic guide and often sacrifice of deep iterative probing was unavoidable. Rearrangements of the interviews were mostly impossible, since it was generally already quite a task to arrange a first

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\(^{11}\) The perspective dimension “inside” is indicated by Italics.

\(^{12}\) Spain, Sweden and Slovenia did not have any media correspondent in Turkey by the time of data collection, therefore two journalists with an international audience were added. Spain has only two informants.
date. However, the professional experience of most informants often compensated for missing opportunities to probe deeper and was ultimately a fair trade-off.

4.5 Critical assessment of the research design

The two-step sampling sequence of choosing expert informants from specific countries can be considered heterogeneous and homogeneous at the same time. Heterogeneity, aiming at representing some main trends across the EU, was pursued by selecting the countries along the main axes of difference within the EU. The choice of knowledgeable experts from the field, in contrast, was rather homogeneous; all informants were required to possess an exceptionally high knowledge of Turkey and/or public diplomacy or nation branding expertise. In this, the sampling quite closely resembled the claim to develop theory with some application and testing.

Authenticity of expert informants served as one criterion of reliability. Since generally all of them were highly involved with the research question, authentic data and positive influences towards aspects like trustworthiness and other validity questions could be assumed (Wallendorf/Belk, 1989).

Triangulation across different domains such as social, political, economic and media accounted for the trustworthiness of the research in terms of credibility. The prolonged visit to the field by the researcher, engaging with the issue in its broader context (media observation both in Turkey and in some EU-countries provided some supplemental datasets) for more than three years, additionally contributed to the integrity of the information (Wallendorf/Belk, 1989).

The external validity of this study in terms of generalizing to and across populations was of course limited per se by the research design, as is mostly the case with qualitative approaches. Naturally, also this study’s suitability to be replicated is restricted because of the character of an expert-opinion study (Simon, 2003: 211).

Reactivity by the informants was regarded as a potential threat to the construct validity (Shadish/Cook/Campbell, 2002); it was presumed to potentially occur resulting from a foreigner dealing with more or less national affairs of Turkey. Especially in times when recurring waves of nationalism catch hold of this nation, discussing Turkey’s reputation in the EU the presence of a foreigner could have been suspected to lead to over- or underreporting according to the informant’s position. The EU encounters some prejudices from the Turkish public and the area of politics, being blamed for overruling the country and cutting off national sovereignty (see Chapter 2.1). Taking on a neutral, observing role and avoiding any clear-cut positions in debates was a decidedly appropriate behaviour. In any case, the expert status of the informants and their experience with foreigners turned out to minimize this validity threat.
Language problems were considered as another validity-related limitation. The researchers’ knowledge of Turkish was not sufficient to use the language in any meaningful way within this research project. Interviews had to be conducted in English and German. By this limitation, of course also the choice of informants was restricted. In the Turkish business world, in foreign policy and in the Expatriate community, however, proficient English turned out to be widespread and gave a sufficient population from which to sample.

On the other hand, the fact that a foreign researcher looked at Turkey bore many advantages. Not only did the situation provide a comfortable outsider position and thus ensured an approximation to some ‘natural’ objectivity, it also opened many doors and led presumably to a substantial advantage compared to the situation a Turkish researcher might have experienced.

Finally, internal validity was endangered by the topicality of the subject. Analyzing a current issue, which is evolving daily, always bears the potential to produce biases simply by events influencing the comparability of measurements in time. For this research project therefore the announcement to open EU accession talks with Turkey in December 17, 2004 and the confirmation on October 3, 2005 served as essential conditions and cornerstones; they ensured stable political contexts at least with respect to strategic issues for the time of the research project. Current issues kept popping up throughout the entire process of data collection, but had no major influence since the perspective focused on the long-term horizon of the 10-15 year negotiation period.

Considering potential ethical challenges from the fact that political opinions were uttered during the data collection, informed consent was established by fully displaying the scope and intention of the research. Experts were not promised anonymity, since in many cases it is also their name and their position that gave value to the information. However, all experts were informed about the usage of the information and declared their approval for recording, transcription and analysis of the interviews.

4.6 Interview design and analysis

The data-collection was conducted by semi-structured interviews following a guideline derived from the literature and the quantitative data analysis (see Chapter 2.1 and 2.2), and resembling the theoretical framework developed earlier (see Chapter 3.6.2). The topic guide contained a sequencing of three different sections, which was intended to ensure motivation and tension throughout the interview. Each section ideally lasted at most 20 minutes, so that the interview could be finish within 60 minutes at the most while still having a comfortable ‘time buffer’.

Due to the special time constraints of the informants mentioned above, the guideline also included some prioritization. With limited time slots, most important aspects and sections were covered first and some deeper elaborations and probing were omitted. The funnelling design progressed from general to
more specific and nicely framed the most intense discussion with unthreatening entries and easy exits (Arthur/Nazroo, 2003).

**4.6.1 Flow of the interview and topic guide**

In the first section, a short overview of the research was given to ease the setting of the interview, but also to outline the framework of expectation in order to reaffirm the “interview contract” (Legard/Keegan/Ward, 2003: 146-147). At the same time, issues concerning confidentiality and recording were discussed. As a topic introduction, the relationships between the informant’s home country and Turkey (for the outside perspective) or the EU and Turkey (for the inside perspective) were summarized. Then the substantial inquiries into Turkey’s image/reputation in the EU and in the specific country were made.

Section two was designed to elicit potential consequences of Turkey’s image/reputation on the EU accession process. The questions dealt with the impact of Turkey’s image/reputation on the course of the negotiations and on voting behavior in domestic elections or in a possible referendum on Turkey’s EU membership. This section was meant to further sharpen the awareness of the main problem discussed in this thesis.

From these abstract analyses, in the final section the participants were put into a creative role. They were called upon to sketch practical potential means or instruments that could be employed to positively influence Turkey’s image/reputation abroad. The task to put together a slogan or choose a key visual promoting Turkey’s EU accession was a playful opportunity to weight the issues under discussion (Arthur/Nazroo, 2003). Embedding this task, the implications of managing Turkey’s nation brand and the different dimensions of public diplomacy in their applicability for Turkey were discussed.

After the interview, apart from profound thanks for the participation, some views on the contribution of the interview were provided as important aspects while moving away from the interview (Legard/Keegan/Ward, 2003). In addition, some queries towards the interviewer, which were not answered during the interview itself, were taken care of.

An extensive topic guide including the wordings of important questions (and their rewording in case of misunderstandings) was prepared and improved continuously throughout the interviewing period. The following scheme summarizes the sequence of the topics:

Section 1: Situation and involvement
- Introduction of research focus
- Personal situation: involvement in Turkey and home country
- Discussion of relationship between countries and Turkey’s reputation

Section 2: Conditions of Turkey’s EU accession process
- Public opinion and potential referenda voting
- Importance/impact of political images/reputations
4.6.2 Interview conduction and data analysis

The topic guide was pre-tested with a Turkish journalist and with a German expatriate to ensure the issues were understood and the technicalities of the interview worked for both professional and non-professionals and also insiders and outsiders of the brand Turkey. Also, an assessment of the duration of the interview was accomplished to be able to negotiate with the time-constrained informants (Marshall/Rossman, 1989).

The interviews were conducted between late 2005 and early 2008 in Turkey and in some European countries. As expected with these sorts of informants, accessibility and scheduling turned out to be a challenge. Yet, as indicated, both the status as a foreigner of the interviewer for some Turkish informants and the significant support by the two key gatekeepers helped to accomplish 36 in-depth interviews, which provides an extensive valid and reliable dataset for the further analysis.

All interviews were digitally recorded and fully transcribed. Additionally, field notes of the interviews were kept as supplementary data sources in line with recommendations from the literature (McCracken, 1998; Marshall/Rossman, 1989). Where required, the transcripts of the interviews were sent back to the informants asking for authorization.

The analysis of the data followed the most common recommendations for qualitative research in social sciences (Janesick, 2004; McCracken, 1998; Creswell, 1998; Coffey/Atkinson, 1996).

In a first general overview, all transcripts and field notes were read carefully to obtain a sense of the overall data. Misunderstandings and errors in the transcriptions were corrected. Questions relating to the content were solved by confirming the respective statements with the informants where possible.

To reduce the data, categories and codes for the further analysis were developed. The coding process occurred in three steps.

First, in an open coding phase the main themes emerging from the data were identified by labelling the important sections in the transcripts and later harmonising the codes over all interviews. Independent of the interview's language, the coding occurred in English.

Secondly, axial coding organized the connections of the main themes among each other and with the concepts in the literature. The codes for every tran-
scribed interview were sorted into one of the following 10 categories covering the most insightful patterns as suggested by the data:

- Perspectives on Turkey’s EU accession
- Explanatory approaches for Turkey’s image content and stereotypes
- The model: public diplomacy for Turkey
- Turkey’s communication history
- Management issues
- Messages/Strategies of Turkey’s nation brand
- Message coordination
- Balancing style and tonality: premises for Turkey’s communication
- Contents to penetrate: Turkey’s inventory of imagery
- Critical conditions: Obstacles and threats

To prepare the write-up, selective coding was employed to generate the most relevant aspects for the findings’ summary. The aspects suggesting the best explanatory values for the research questions were selected. At the same time the most appropriate direct quotes were picked from the data. The chosen German quotes were translated to English by the author. Finally the findings were contrasted with results of previous research projects in the context of this thesis.

A summary of findings is provided in the next chapter.
5 Main findings: public diplomacy for Turkey’s EU accession

In the following, the informants’ perspectives in the different categories of the framework introduced before in Chapter 3.6.2 are analyzed with regard to the guiding question how public diplomacy and nation branding would be able to contribute to Turkey’s EU accession process. The displayed opinions and positions are furthermore aligned with relevant findings in the current literature.

The first section airs the general potential of these concepts for Turkey. Then, the channels, time horizons and purposes of Turkey’s public diplomacy are analyzed, succeeded by a discussion of the managerial and organizational conditions for nation branding and public diplomacy in Turkey. Finally, the different domains of Turkey’s public diplomacy as strategies for the external and internal nation brand dimensions are evaluated.

5.1 Escaping the image trap

The informants reemphasize the extent of Turkey’s image and reputation problems in EU-Europe, which were outlined and discussed before in Chapter 2. While doing so, they also give various reasons for the situation. To cope with these challenges, the need and the possible benefit of intensified public diplomacy effort by Turkey is almost unanimously realized. Critical conditions will be reflected on afterwards.

5.1.1 Information deficit as starting point

Most informants agreed that “there is a lot of ignorance and lack of knowledge about Turkey in Europe” (De La Pena). In fact, statistics are quoted to show that “more than half of the people just didn't know Turkey. Blank. So the lack of information, lack of true information [is the] number one thing to attack” (Erkut Yücaoğlu)¹.

This information deficit allows the confusion of different groups: “I think that a lot of people in Europe and perhaps in France in particular tend to mix Turks, Arabs, they put everything in the same basket and a lot of people still think that you speak Arabic in Turkey. (…) They certainly wouldn't have much of a concept of how sophisticated Turkey can be” (Nicole Pope).

As the AIDA formula for public diplomacy suggests (Chapter 3.6.1), the information deficit is the foundation for other reservations or concerns towards Turkey: “It starts with a perception knowledge gap and then it moves onto the engagement gap, because if Turkey's seen as a rather frightening strange place, there you are not going to become involved with it” (Richard Anderson). The absence of engagement results in future ignorance of significant changes: “The British public probably doesn't follow political developments in Turkey. Maybe only 1 or 2 % know what happens here” (Stephen McCormick). This shortage is finally regarded as groundwork for Turkey’s negative

¹ All names without further information given refer to direct quotes by the expert informants.
image (Chapter 2): “Turkey has a bad image but it’s mostly due to misinformation or lack of information” (Ümit Boyner).

A recent survey in Austria by the Brussels-, Berlin- and Istanbul-based think tank European Stability Initiative (ESI, 2008) strongly suggests that very little information (be it in the form of research and empirical studies, history school books or workshops and seminars) grounds both the political elites’ and the public turning-away from Turkey’s membership bid. In fact, “there is almost certainly a strong link between the opposition to Turkey’s accession on the one hand and, on the other, weak knowledge of the country, including its expatriate population in Europe and its historic participation in ‘European institutions’” (Twigg/Schaefer/Austin/Parker, 2005: 30).

A quite obvious conclusion therefore seems to reduce this information gap: “our European friends, they really don’t know much about our culture, about our history, really not much about Turkey. We should inform them first” (Mehmet Ural).

A similar argument was raised by Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini speaking at a Turkey Forum in late 2008: “Many of the EU states have not yet completely grasped the contribution Turkey’s membership would make. For this to be understood, Turkey needs to develop a potent communication strategy. EU countries know Turkey to be the same country it was 20 years ago. They don't know about today's Turkey. Such a strategy can break prejudices directed at Turkey. This strategy should also target the Turkish people. This can help prevent the public cooling off from the EU” (Keneş, 2008b: 1).

In the literature however, this inference is not shared univocally: “Although a lack of knowledge is behind much of Turkey’s tainted image abroad, this does not necessarily mean that more information will improve attitudes. People are attached to their prejudices and national stereotypes” (Barysch, 2006a: 3).

In Europe, as the analysis of the Nation Brand Index demonstrated, Turkey is not a “blank canvas”, as Anholt (Anholt/GMI, 2005a: 3) was quoted earlier, looking at the global scale: “Turkey is not a white piece. Turkey is a gray piece. That's the problem if you ask me. White piece means there is no perception” (Ayşegül Molu).

As we will investigate in more detail later, Turkey actually does mean something to most parts of Europe, although only a very reduced perception (“eng dimensionale Wahrnehmungswelt” (Heinz Kramer)) dominates the picture; likewise, “characteristics of Turkish people are in a very much distorted or shaped by some stereotypes, or have no clue in most European voters' minds” (Ümit Boyner) and “the Western face of Turkey is very little known in Western Europe” (Willemijn van Haaften).

An interesting question in this context is whether Turkey’s reputation is potentially outdated, which would mean that people have not heard anything inter-
esting and new after the last things they heard about Turkey (Anholt, 2007a: 63). If yes, updating such knowledge would be a potential strategy. Failing that, Turkey’s reputation might be up-to-date and still negative. The analysis of the different nation brand dimensions will elucidate this question further.

As a general instruction, Anholt (2007a) cautions against filling information gaps with information. In ages of abundant information, it can be assumed that the missing pieces of information could be found somewhere. Most probably people are just not inclined to look for the missing pieces. “People need to be stimulated to learn about places; they cannot be taught about them” (Anholt, 2007a: 65).

5.1.2 The need to reach the publics

Many informants consent to the need for Turkey to focus on the public in Europe. As underlined before, Turkey’s EU accession will be impossible, if the negative climate is not changed: “Wenn die jetzige öffentliche Grundstimung in 10 Jahren noch da ist, gibt es keinen Beitritt, weil ich nicht sehe, dass irgendeine europäische Regierung oder die Mehrheit der europäischen Regierungen bereit wären, gegen den Widerstand ihrer Öffentlichkeit das durchzudrücken.” [If the current tone persists for the next 10 years, there will be no accession, because I don’t see any European government or the majority of the European governments being prepared to push this through against their publics’ resistance] (Heinz Kramer). Consequently, the focus needs to be set on Europe’s public: “our aim is to impact the public. The people who’ve never been to Turkey, people who will never come to Turkey maybe. So it’s really man on the street” (Ümit Boyner).

A number of suggestions by the experts touch upon Turkey’s need to campaign targeting Europe’s public. “Turkey needs a very good media strategy. Now they needed it before to bring forward the good things that it has to offer in a different manner than they have been able to do in earlier times. There is still those certain negative perception about Turkey in Europe that shouldn’t be there” (Christer Asp).

It is important for Turkey to assume an active role in order to balance the PR activities by other actors: “Für die Türkei PR Arbeit in Deutschland, negative PR Arbeit haben Kurdenvereine gemacht” [For Turkey, Kurdish associations did negative PR work in Germany] (Christiane Schlötzer). Nation brand theory reminds us “that many nations are in the process of branding themselves. A nation that does not engage in proactive branding runs the risk of being positioned anyway by its competitors to the competitors’s advantage - making it even more difficult for that nation to control its (...) destiny” (Gilmore, 2002a: 283).

It is recommended to go with professional assistance from the advertising world: “The advice we as an office could give Mr. Erdoğan would be to spend some money on hiring Saatchi & Saatchi” (Willemijn van Haaften). The more recent improvements in Turkey’s situation make communication efforts – as
challenging as they remain – more promising than before: “I think we got a better foundation and I think the opportunity quite frankly for better external PR is now but there is a hell of a lot work to do” (Richard Anderson).

In addition, numerous voices from international politics mention communication efforts to be helpful. Hansjoerg Kretschmer, former head of European Union (EU) Commission Delegation in Turkey until late 2006, left no doubt on this need: “The government urgently needs a communication strategy. It is hard to succeed in E.U. membership bid without public support” (Anadolu News Agency, 2006: 1). During a visit to Ankara, Bulgarian Minister of European affairs Gergana Grancharova struck as similar chord: “It is very important to take into consideration the public opinion in the accession process, (...) try and approach the feelings and the fears of the public opinion. (...) Turkey needs to continue with the reform process and it needs to communicate, communicate, communicate” (TDN, 2007j: 1).

5.1.3 Chances for images to change
Among the informants from the EU countries, there is some optimism that Turkey’s image could in fact change for the better: “Das Image der Türkei kann sich ändern. Ich glaube es ist bereits im Ändern begriffen” [Turkey’s image can change. I believe it is already changing] (Christiane Schlötzer).

However, the challenge should not be underestimated. In the Netherlands or Germany the stubborn negative image will need to be considered: “Efforts should be given to change this image. So to build up a new image you have to distract the existing built image firstly. That’s quite an effort. It could be easier to build up an image from the early beginning. But this is not possible in these countries” (John Verhoeven).

But it looks as if it could be worth the effort. Reaching the publics might not only help in the endgame referendum scenario sketched before, but also, potentially even more importantly, a positive connection could serve as a catalyst of the accession process itself: “If we can manage to have a positive image during the process in those difficult countries, in quotations, then we might have less problems during the process” (Murat Sungar). It pays to work on reputation management along the way, since “a positive image not only makes accession simpler and faster; it also affects to some degree whether the country will benefit from accession” (Anholt, 2007a: 119).

One informant therefore envisions that a continuous campaign of good news and approximation has the chance to trickle into the minds of European publics and make Turkey more and more a conscious member of the European Union. The process of negotiation itself will be not too prominent:

“The people in Europe will get used to the idea that Turkey is moving closer and closer in a low key process. (...) That is in the positive direction when it comes to reforms and the way the different institutions respond to these reforms, I think the people in Europe will start to get used to the idea that Turkey is not only negotiating but if you ask in a number of countries when Sweden negotiated before; at the time, you ask population some people thought when we’re way into the negotiations that
Sweden and Norway and Finland were already members. Because people got used to the idea that this process is going on” (Christer Asp).

In this optimistic reading, the opposition against Turkey’s membership is expected to slowly diminish: “When it comes to the mind of the voter now I’m fairly convinced that people in general in Europe even in countries where you today find a lot of resistance that resistance will be go down slowly and evaporate not entirely but I think to a much larger extent than today” (Christer Asp).

5.2 The channels of public diplomacy for Turkey

With this general perspective in mind, in line with the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3.5, in the following a framework of how Turkey could actually perform a public diplomacy initiative in the context of the EU accession is developed. Which tactics and channels to bring the messages across are available and eligible for Turkey’s public diplomacy purposes?

5.2.1 Public Relations beyond promotional advertising

As seen above, a first channel considered by some experts are promotional campaigns dedicated to send better images to Europe’s people. The use of this channel is regarded to be an official task: “The advertising should really come from the government” (Ümit Boyner).

However, as adumbrated earlier, promotional advertising is not regarded as promising for Turkey’s public diplomacy purposes: “I think advertising campaign: that's really not gonna be an efficient use of funds” (Richard Anderson). Such activities are also regarded to be selective and not credible: “Promotions has a connotation of talking about just the positive aspects all the time” (Ümit Boyner). It is therefore suggested not to focus on “advertorial space on papers. We don't believe that has any effect in changing public opinion” (Ümit Boyner). Publicity at any price is supposedly not what Turkey should be after: “I'm a bit skeptical about publicity campaigns. I don't know if it would really work (…). I mean if I picture myself five years ago seeing a big ad or publicity going a holiday in Turkey, it didn't change my view about Turkey, I mean I had the same stereotypes” (Dirk Nieuwboer).

These statements correspond with central recommendations from the literature. The value of advertising information to the consumer tends to be very low (Anholt, 2007a: 66). Advertising is categorized as a typical one-way channel of exchange and “it would be worthwhile to consider modes of communicating the 'big ideas' of public diplomacy different from the monologue” (Rosen/Wolf, 2005: 13). Altınbaşak-Ebrem showed that the main information sources in which Turkey is exposed to the audiences are printed media, television and family/friends/word-of-mouth; accordingly, mostly seasonal advertisements should potentially play a minor role (Altınbaşak-Ebrem, 2004: 210).
Some informants favor a public relations-based approach to the European publics instead, utilizing news media as multiplications: “I think what we need to organize is a long term, external PR campaign” (Richard Anderson). Also the non-governmental organization of Turkish businessmen and industrialists (TÜSIAD) prefers this direction for Turkey: “What we intend to do is appeal to editorialts. Not to advertising. Not supplements. (...) we’re going to spend money on projects and PR activities” (Ümit Boyner). And furthermore the MFA regards PR as an important cornerstone of Turkey’s public diplomacy: “we are determined to act in a proper way, in a perhaps more scientific way, if I may use that word in a more knowledgeable way, how to conduct public relations in different countries, formulated, tailored for different purposes in different countries” (Murat Sungar).

Spokespeople from Turkey could play an important role when connecting to foreign media. Künklioğlu (2007a) suggests that Turkish intellectuals will have to meddle with EU affairs, get into the ring and participate in EU debates. He proposes creating a pool of Turkish intellectuals to write columns on the EU process and have a strategy developed on how to publish these articles in the press of the target countries.

In the course of this strategy, it is furthermore recommended to invite media professionals to see Turkey with their own eyes: “Bring foreign policy journalists, journalists from European and American, from European countries and the United States to Turkey, on study tours that would allow them to get a better grasp of the country and also the issues and also, you know, structure it in a way that they can meet people according to their personal interest, why they are in Turkey” (Suat Künklioğlu).

PR becomes an essential part of diplomatic work: “getting together with the press people around a certain message should become a regular item on the agenda of the ambassador. And it will sort of become some sort of performance criteria for them as well” (Murat Özcëlk).

Sustainable positive effects of good press relations are expected: “More and more will be known about Turkey, more will be written about Turkish efforts to try to adjust to the kind of rules and norms that we follow in Europe” (Christer Asp).

5.2.2 Barriers within domestic media systems
Beyond raising awareness, however, media relations are assumed to have only a limited effect on attitudes, since press coverage can only amplify or mitigate existing ideas: “Einstellungen werden ja durch Medien meistens nur bestärkt und nicht geändert. Das ist ja das irgendwie Fatale für uns Journalisten, dass wir immer denken wir könnten jemand vielleicht ein bisschen beeinflussen. Es ist äußerst schwierig” [Attitudes are mostly only confirmed and not changed by media. This is somewhat fatal for us journalists that we keep thinking we could influence someone to a small degree. It is extremely difficult] (Christiane Schlötzer).
Also in the European media themselves there are considerable barriers for good news from Turkey getting through: “Alle unsere Türkeikorrespondenten (...) haben die Schwierigkeit, im Grunde genommen gute positive Geschichten in der Redaktion los zu werden” [All Turkey correspondents have difficulties in getting basically good, positive stories across to editors] (Heinz Kramer).

The editorial boards mostly expect articles meeting their expectations: “As a journalist you see that it’s very often difficult to even convince editors that you want to write about the Istanbul Modern (...) when you want to write about a more positive or a different aspect of Turkey it’s very often difficult because people still expect that any article on Turkey will have to mention human rights violations” (Nicole Pope).

This trend does not only hold for print media: “Das geht auch in die bildgebenden Medien rein. Die sprechen eher an und springen eher an auf News, die sozusagen in diesem Schema ablaufen. Alles, was sozusagen aus diesem vorgeformten Schema der Heimatredaktionen rausfällt, ist fürchterlich schwer” [This also pertains visual media. They are rather responsive to news that follows this schema. Everything that is beyond this pre-cast schema of the domestic editors is very difficult] (Heinz Kramer). The actual media coverage from Turkey in the EU countries seems often to build up on existing visual stereotypes: “a report on Turkey, or BBC world, have a look at the imagery around that report. You would think you were in Tehran. They never ever show the modern, aspiring, youthful Turkey. Always the reporter is sat at the back in the back drop of quite poor geçekondu2s, bakkals3, and it’s consistent” (Richard Anderson).

A reason for such persistence seems that many topics that shaped Turkey’s image in the 1990s are still around as unsolved issues: “für die es jetzt immer noch Anknüpfungspunkte gibt und die es von daher nicht sozusagen notwendig macht, hier über Änderung des eigenen Wahrnehmungsverhaltens nachzudenken, weil ich immer noch wieder mal so, jetzt ist ja wieder PKK im Gange und das Militär. Intellektuelle Faulheit oder, wenn Sie so wollen, déformation professionnelle. So kann man das höflich ausdrücken” [...there are still links that prevent considering changing the own perception behavior, because it keeps happening that there is again the PKK and the military. Intellectual laziness or déformation professionnelle, to put it mildly] (Heinz Kramer).

The result is an incomplete and biased image of Turkey revealed through the media: “If there is an article in the Economist magazine about Turkey, talking about how Turkish construction sector is thriving, the only picture they use is black-veiled women. There are all these minarets or all these stereotypical. I mean it is not to say that Turkey doesn’t have minarets, that Turkey doesn’t have veiled women. But it’s not the whole picture” (Richard Anderson).

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2 Turkish for slums (literally translated ‘houses built over night’)
3 Turkish for kiosks
This trend in coverage also reinforces stereotypes in the societies: “Much of the European media, meanwhile, is happy to trade in stereotypes, thus reinforcing public prejudices” (Barysch, 2007a: 1).

If positive aspects would find more coverage, Turkey’s perception could benefit: “Viele Dinge, wo wir unmittelbar, auch jetzt außen- und sicherheitspolitisch profitieren, werden, aus welcher Sicht auch immer, der Türkei nicht gut geschrieben und wenn das anders wäre, wäre sicherlich ein Stück weit andere Wahrnehmung” [Many things from which we would profit in many regards in terms of foreign or security politics are not credited to Turkey, and if this would be different, in a way there would certainly be a different perception] (Ruprecht Polenz).

This change of coverage can not be expected from the tabloids: “People read that one publication, the Sun. They would celebrate Turkey for its few good points which is beaches, and all the rest of it, overwhelmingly reject Turkey because it's actually a Muslim country, a Muslim kind of poor, failing country. They see nothing of personal benefit to them. And they would see Turkey alongside all these let's call them eastern European refugees, that are invading England and causing a lot of noise and trouble on the street and the rest of it” (Richard Anderson).

At least in the Netherlands, a positive effect could be expected for certain audiences from the quality newspapers: “The higher income brackets would also access much more balanced newspapers, magazines etc. which would provide different images of Turkey” (Willemijn van Haaften). In Germany however, with regard to Turkey most of them raise suspicion for not being free of ideology and contributing to a negative image of Turkey: “durch, sagen wir mal, sehr auch grundsätzliche und teilweise auch, aus meiner Sicht, nicht nur sachlich, sondern auch, sagen wir mal, ja man darf schon sagen ideologisch geprägte Artikel, gerade auch in überregionalen Qualitätszeitungen, hat sich das Bild verändert” […by, let’s say, also very fundamental and partly, from my point of view, not only matter-of-factly-correct, but also, one may say, ideologically framed articles especially in nation-wide quality papers, the image has changed] (Ruprecht Polenz).

Apart from treating the mostly considerate correspondents in Turkey, intensively working with the editors of European media and revealing an understanding of modern Turkey could be a helpful measure to improve the country’s reputation in the gate-keeping domestic media in Europe: “Have (…) members of media visit Turkey on a sort of one-on-one basis. And design custom made programs for them depending on their interests” (Ümit Boyner).

The level of individualization and sophistication of these programs could be quite impressive:

“For instance Le Figaro wants to come to Turkey and they're mostly interested on what is going on in the cultural scene. So we have a program for them. That's going to have all museums around Turkey. Also introduction to various Turkish artists in
various fields. That's the type of project we will be doing. There's another French magazine that's purely interested in how Turkish b2b businesses or new technologies are being used and we'll do an issue on that. In Germany also we're doing a different program. The theme, the message is the integration of Turks in Germany and we are actually using the local media there. And also using the Turks who have invested in German business and created employment and they're also contributing to the social life in their respective regions, so we're doing that regionally. (...) if any reporter says I am going to write about how Turkey is or Turkish civil society is doing something about violence against women, we will put them in touch with civil organizations that work about the issue” (Ümit Boyner).

Such programs would definitely set quality benchmarks in Turkey’s public diplomacy and exceed the measures taken so far.

5.2.3 Exceeding press relations: multilateral relations management

Given the barriers in European media systems, Turkey’s challenge clearly goes beyond mere press relations and refers to a more genuine understanding of public relations: “Sie müssen ganz klare Vorstellungen davon haben, wen Sie gewinnen wollen, wie Sie das erreichen wollen, wie Sie Netzwerke aufbauen. Also, das ist nicht Pressearbeit, das ist Öffentlichkeitsarbeit.” [You have to have clear ideas who you want to win, how you want to achieve this, how you will build networks. This is not press-work, this is public relations] (Ruprecht Polenz)

The press-work sketched before provides groundwork, but will probably not suffice to cover all current trends in public diplomacy practice. Jan Melissen, one of the most profiled researchers and experts on public diplomacy, confirms this stance: “The new public diplomacy moves away from – to put it crudely – peddling information to foreigners and keeping the foreign press at bay, towards engaging with foreign audiences” (Melissen, 2005c: 14).

Accordingly, for Turkey it is suggested to broaden the spectrum of the network beyond journalists: “I think we will prioritize to talk to targeted elites and decision makers in Europe (...) think tanks, NGOs, decision makers, journalists, columnists or (op ed) editors that would be, those would be the first targets” (Suat Kınlıoğlu).

Germany’s MFA public diplomacy expert Rainer Eugen Schlageter champions a similar standpoint: “Today's public diplomacy has to go beyond traditional 'one-way-street' information work: It should be a dialogue and a steady discussion with the goal to establish a long-term relationship (...) in particular with the leadership from all fields of society” (Schlageter, 2006: 23). In effect therefore “a lot of good public diplomacy is about issues that cannot be found in the headlines of international newspapers” (Melissen, 2006c: 3).

The relationships with different stakeholders are promising for the multiplication of a common understanding: “the Turkish government could work with EU elites (Eurocrats, national politicians, academics, journalists) to educate
European citizens about the shared values between Turkey and the EU” (Ruiz-Jiménez, 2008: 2).

The last standpoints reveal an important tendency with regard to Turkey’s situation. The relationship management of public diplomacy in these concepts mainly refers to key opinion leaders and multipliers or high-level advocates. The general public comes second: “What we have in mind, is not particularly aimed at mass media and large public opinion” (Suat Kıniklioğlu).

Despite the negative opinion found among the publics, addressing them directly does not seem to be a priority for Turkey’s public diplomacy, which still believes in the power of influencer’s influence. One reason might have budgetary motivations. “Because that is a large and expensive undertaking” (Suat Kıniklioğlu), reaching the general public is getting out of focus for Turkey’s strategic communication agenda.

Consequentially, changing the country’s image is not the only priority for Turkey’s public diplomacy, “but it’s more about creating understanding to European elites that have an impact on Turkey’s EU membership business (...) it’s more of an awareness-raising activity” (Suat Kıniklioğlu). As discussed before, it is questionable whether awareness will suffice in the light of Turkey’s challenges.

5.2.4 Lobbying and multiplication
In such a rather elitist perspective of public diplomacy, a classical lobbying approach also becomes an important pillar of Turkey’s public diplomacy model: “Insofern käme es natürlich bei einer Strategie um die öffentliche Meinung auch darauf an, in den gesellschaftlichen Kommunikationselitenv Verbündete zu finden” [Accordingly a strategy about public opinion would come down to finding allies among the societies’ communication elites] (Ruprecht Polenz).

For example, in business relations such relationship building promises to be quite effective: “Lobbying for Turkey outside of Turkey, especially in EU process in Brussels, in European commission in parliament as well as through our counterparts in Europe, in France, like BDI in Germany, like CBI in England, so in terms of talking about what business in Turkey feels about how Turkey should be developing socially and politically” (Ümit Boyner).

In practise, these lobbying contacts by multiplication could indirectly effect positive backing for Turkey among the population: “Das wäre mal ein Netzwerk und aus dieser Zusammenarbeit könnte erwachsen, dass man mit den Betrieben bespricht, also wenn du Daimler Chrysler das eigene Interesse hast, dass die Türkei EU Mitglied wird, dann kommuniziere doch bitte deiner Belegschaft, das sind ja immerhin paar hunderttausend Leute in Deutschland, wo die Vorteile liegen” [This would be such a network, and the cooperation could lead to discussions within the companies, like when you as Daimler Chrysler are interested in Turkey becoming a EU member, then please com-
municate the advantages to your workforce, which amounts to some hundred thousand people after all] (Ruprecht Polenz).

In the end it will be very important to activate advocates speaking out for Turkey in the EU countries: “Wichtig ist, glaube ich, dass in den Ländern (...) dort respektierte Institutionen, Personen, Organisationen als Anwälte der Türkei auftreten. Also, wer in dem Land Vertrauen hat, muss dieses Vertrauen auf die Türkei transferieren” [To my mind it is important that respected institutions, individuals, organizations appear as spokespeople for Turkey in their countries. Somebody who is trusted in that country must transfer this trust onto Turkey] (Ruprecht Polenz).

Attention has also to be paid to rival lobbying activities. The Kurdish diaspora, for example, is regarded as such a challenger: “there is a very strong Kurdish lobby which is talking about Kurdistan all the time. So that is a confusing factor in some French intelligentsia” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). And also in the Turkish-Armenian relationship a critical lobby is quite active: “There is a very strong Armenian lobby, which has been very vocal. I think in terms of numbers they're not actually that strong but they are very influential. And they really have managed to convince the political establishment in general that their cause is just and so there's always an Armenian aspect of things” (Nicole Pope). Attempts to integrate or counterbalance these lobbies seem to be important in this context.

Despite the populist accent of public diplomacy, it is certainly also politicians of other countries beyond the diplomatic sphere who are important opinion leaders and need to be addressed in order to make informed decisions: “I think what is very important is reaching the politicians (...) many of the politicians I meet, some of the delegations who have come here to Turkey in last years, many of the people say ‘it's the first time I've been here’, so yes they are uninformed” (Dirk Nieuwboer).

The example of Sweden accessing the EU 1992 – as with Turkey, taking place against significant resistance in older EU countries – is an interesting role model. Rigorous lobbying and reaching out to politicians played an important role back then:

“We started what we called a traveling circus. Concentrating on the countries which were most negative and we went to those countries again and again met with the administration as well as politicians and we tried to explain what Sweden is all about, what we stand for, we tried to look at the issues where we found a common ground with these countries, just in order to break down this resistance or suspicion towards Sweden as a newcomer in European Union” (Christer Asp).

However, despite all kinds of indirect lobbying approaches, “in the end you have to reach the public opinion. You have to reach the man in the street. Because if he and she responds to their leaders in some form” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). Therefore a balanced picture distributed by multipliers is equally important as direct forms of outreach.
Therefore, a public diplomacy organization for Turkey will have to cover all channels from lobbying to direct public outreach. This effort will require a mentality shift in Turkey’s politics: “Public diplomacy, regional expertise, analysis and think tank work are usually disregarded and shunned to a secondary level” (Kimiklioğlu, 2005c: 1). A short review of Turkey’s public diplomacy and nation branding history will illustrate this statement further.

5.3 Missing PR genes: Turkey’s public diplomacy history

A former US ambassador to Ankara was once quoted that Turkey truly lacks PR genes (Kimiklioğlu, 2006). This metaphor, in the meantime also repeatedly employed by former Foreign Minister and current President Abdullah Gül, illustrates in a catchy way that projecting a positive perspective of the own nation so far was not an activity Turkey was considerably good at: “We are a nation who really doesn’t know too much about public relations. And still there is gap in that regard. So this is a chance which will also rectify some of the mistakes that we have done in the past, in the area of public relations” (Murat Sungar). The Economist underscored this perception recently: “Prickly, proud and fiercely nationalistic, the Turks are decidedly bad at public relations” (Anon./Economist, 2005c: 29). And Suat Kimiklioğlu diagnosed a “perennial lack of employing public diplomacy as a foreign policy tool” (Kimiklioğlu, 2005c: 1) in Turkey.

5.3.1 Historical lacks of competence and understanding

The Turkish governments so far seemed to lack the knowledge and ability to pursue state-of-the-art information and communication measures to other publics: “the state was the main vehicle in Turkey. It clearly never had the capacity to do any kind of marketing or PR, in fact whenever it tried it usually backfired. Because they simply didn’t know how to address people” (Nicole Pope). Richard Anderson also detects this knowledge gap behind Turkey’s inactivity: “Turkey’s doing nothing to move that side, to move the face of the brand forwards, do nothing really. What efforts it does actually backfire on Turkey”.

A systematic presswork by Turkey was virtually nonexistent: “Es gab lange Zeit überhaupt keine PR Arbeit. (...) frühere Regierungen haben Korrespondenten höchstens wahrgenommen, indem sie sie kritisiert haben, beschimpft haben, aber sonst nicht” [For a long time there was no PR work at all. Earlier administrations have noticed correspondents only insofar that they were criticized and insulted, but nothing more] (Christiane Schlötzer).

One reason for these problems was and partly is the competence gap and the poor qualification of the people in charge of promotional or PR activities, which is not adequate for the challenge of professionally showcasing Turkey to the world: “It’s given to friends of friends within governmental officers, that generally seemed to be very low quality, low caliber individuals that have no idea how to market or even understand what Turkey as a brand is. And then we go abroad and make terrible mistakes” (Richard Anderson). Concerns over
competence is also expressed regarding the awareness of reputation problems and the prioritization of attacks on such challenges: “They don't know how (...) I think it's an issue of competence. It's an issue of being unaware of certain realities, or more importance given to local politics” (Ümit Boyner).

Besides the lack of competence, historically the relevance of more actively influencing Turkey’s appearance was simply not understood in the Turkish Republic: “I think there is a lack of consciousness of how important this is. I mean when you look at the Turkish culture, it's not just this government. When you look at our republic's history we always have a problem of expressing ourselves. Or putting out the correct picture” (Ümit Boyner).

Moreover, there is a tendency in Turkey to scapegoat the outside for the negative reputation. This discourse seems to harm additionally Turkey’s efforts to set up own initiatives, since it is claimed that the counterforce would be stronger anyhow: “There are delusions, they don't know or no matter how much we tell them they'll always be against us, sort of blaming” (Ümit Boyner). Yet the insight grows in Turkey that “we should accept that we do our best to feed these misunderstandings” (Idiz, 2006: 3).

Finally, a cultural handicap resulting from the Turkish pride is presumed to cause Turkey’s lack of self-projection: “I guess as Turks we feel like people, they should know about us, why don't they know about us, sort of; whereas it's something about the democratic culture too. That evolves, I think you realize that you're more accountable for what you do and what you say. And that's a very new thing in our culture” (Ümit Boyner).

De Witt (2007a) pinpoints this mentality to behave mostly reactive and fatalistically as Turkey’s ‘inşallah-message’4 to the world (ibid: 1). This mentality has led to communication work such that “Turkey has rather reacted to certain impressions in Europe about Turkey, instead of being proactive trying to change the perspective and bring forward the positive things in Turkey” (Christer Asp). Generally, a proactive presentation of the country abroad has not been performed in the past: “Turkey (...) never really marked itself effectively abroad. It's taken a very defensive view itself” (Richard Anderson).

5.3.2 Overcoming the poor performance in the public space
The result of the defensive communication behavior was a poor presence of Turkey in the European media space: “Früher hat man ja die Türkei in europäischen Medien gar nicht, also nicht von der offiziellen Seite her gesehen” [In the past, Turkey was not seen at all in the European media, at least not from the official side] (Brigitte Özbali).

Since reputation tends to be rather inert and rest in the public mind for a while, those politically responsible in this regard usually inherit historical burdens from their antecessors and have to account for past actions or inaction: “Governments are [...] largely at the mercy of their international reputation,

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4 Insallah is an Arabic figure of speech, also used in Turkish, meaning “so God wills”.
and to a great extent the passive beneficiaries or victims of generations of their predecessors’ wisdom or foolishness” (Anholt, 2007a: 273).

Looking at the country’s previous performance in this regard, the general judgment by the experts is quite unanimous and forthright: “the way Turkey is known or grasped by the public opinion in Europe was an issue at hand (...) we believe this has not been done sufficiently or at all” (Ümit Boyner).

Some anecdotes are recalled in the literature illustrating Turkey’s missing PR genes. When Turkey was not granted accession candidate status during the Luxemburg Summit 1997, the prime minister at that time, Mesut Yılmaz, through intemperate language managed to turn the setback into a howling defeat. He accused Chancellor Kohl of treating enlargement as a revival of Nazi quest for Lebensraum in Poland (Finkel, 2007b). Similarly insensitive, right after signing the negotiation agreement with EU on Dec 17, 2004, in January Turkey declared 2005 the Year of Africa (Finkel, 2007b).

Among Turkish journalists, lamentations in this regard now and then take on a desperate tone: “Why can’t we present Turkey more favorably to our interlocutors? ’Why can’t we tell the world about the beauties we have?’ ’Why are Turks nowhere to be seen in the field of public diplomacy?’ ’Why does the world not understand us Turks and why does it not want to?’ ’Why is Turkey always bound to be mentioned in connection with negative images it doesn’t deserve?’” (Keneş, 2007: 1).

After EU accession process gained momentum, some improvements seem to become visible. Most experts agreed that vis à vis the EU membership goal, “information has to be developed and propagated more than it has been in the past” (De la Pena).

In terms of press relations, some corrections already took place: “Die AKParti hat sich da deutlich verbessert. (…) Die machen eine aktive Pressearbeit, also eigentlich modern aktiv und nicht schlecht. (…) Die nehmen überhaupt wahr, dass es Korrespondenten gibt” [The AKParti has clearly improved. They perform active press work, modern and not bad (...) They at least realize that there are correspondents] (Christine Schloetzer).

Apparentlly, the first effects of the improved work are starting to show through. According to a survey by the Brussels-based NGO TR Plus – Centre for Turkey in Europe, conducted in October 2007 (TR Plus, 2007) of 100 European journalists, Turkey has managed to extend its main EU messages much better to the journalists than they did before. These findings coincide with observations made recently by the Turkish Republic Directorate of Press and Information (Kılıç, 2008a), who also tracked a recent improvement in the media coverage. The message sounds as simple as it is clear: “It may be seen that improved communication can succeed in eliminating prejudices. Europe’s perception depends on how Turkey wants to present herself” (TR Plus, 2007: 2).
5.3.3 Campaigns pro Turkey
Different campaign approaches have been pursued to support Turkey’s international reputation in the past years. In the following five interesting examples will be highlighted, two non-governmental campaigns with political and EU accession-related implications, two governmental-controlled communication programs focusing specific promotional contents of Turkey, and one more or less joint program between the government and non-governmental institutions.

5.3.3.1 Tourism promotion for Turkey
Tourism promotion is the eldest field of activity for Turkey’s nation brand. Over the past years, a number of different campaigns targeting European markets were observed. The following list of slogans

Fun/Emotion
- Türkçe – macht einfach Spass (GER) (starting 2008) [simply fun]
- Türkçe – ein tolles Gefühl (GER, 2006 & 2007) [a great feeling]

Enjoy life
- Genieße das Leben... in der Türkei (GER, 2000-2001) [enjoy life ... in Turkey]
- Jouis de la vie... en Turquie (CH, 2000) [Enjoy your life... in Turkey]

Perfect Time
- Time to discover – Turkey welcomes you (UK, 2005)
- Immer die richtige Zeit – Türkei – unser Lächeln erwartet Sie (GER/AT/CH, 2005) [always the right time – our smile is expecting you]
- Toujours l’heure exacte...Turquie – Un accueil de rêve (FR/CH/BE, 2005) [always the perfect time – reception of a dream]

Dreams come true
- Kein Traum kann schöner sein (GER/AT/CH, 2002-2004) [no dream could be more beautiful]
- La Turquie – Un accueil de rêve (FR, 2004) [reception of a dream]
- Lebe Deine Träume. Türkei (GER/AT/CH), 2001 [live your dreams]
- Türküe – lebe Deine Träume (GER, 2001) [live your dreams]
- La Turquie – Vis ton rêve! (CH/FR, 2001) [Live your dream]

Mediterranean
- The Mediterranean and more (UK, 2006)
- La Mediterranée et bien plus encore...Turquie – Un accueil de rêve (FR, 2006) [The Mediterranean and a good lot more - reception of a dream]
- Türküe – Mittelmeer und Mehr (GER/AT/CH; 2005-2006) [The Mediterranean and much more]
- De Middellandse Zee en veel meer – Turkije en gedroomt ontha (BE, 2002-2006) [The Mediterranean and much more]

Sun, Sea and more
- Türküe – Sonne, Sand, Meer und mehr (GER, 1992) [Sun, sand, sea and more]

Rhythm
- Entrez dans le rythme... la Turquie vous entraîne (FR, 2000-2006) [Enter into the rhythm – Turkey sweeps you away]
- Go with the rhythm – Enjoy Turkey (UK, 2000-2004)
- Laat u meeslepen door het ritme... geniet van Turkije (BE/NL, 2001-2003) [Let yourself be swept away in this rhythm – enjoy Turkey]
- Segui il ritmo... goditi la Turchia (IT, 2002) [follow the rhythm – enjoy Turkey]

5 Source: www.adzyklopedia.de; for some prototypical advertising motifs see the appendix.
• Siga o ritmo... divirta se na Turquia (PT, 2000) [follow the rhythm – enjoy yourself in Turkey]
• Ve al ritmo – disfruta Turquía (ES, 2000-2006) [come to the rhythm – enjoy Turkey]
• Följ rytm... njut av Turkiet (SWE, 2001) [follow the rhythm –rejoice in Turkey]
Welcome
• Turkije – verwelkomt U (NL, 2005-2006) [Turkey welcomes you]
• Türkei – Willkommen bei Freunden (GER/CH, 1993-1999) [welcome to friends]
Smile
• Türkei – unser Lächeln erwartet Sie (GER/AT/CH, 2004) [our smile is expecting you]
• Onze glimlach verwelkomt U (BE, 2004) [our smile welcomes you]
Multitude
• Türkei – Erlebe die Vielfalt (GER/CH, 2000) [experience multiplicity]

The key messages employed in the past 10 years were Turkey’s Mediterranean beauty (sun, sand, sea), lifestyle (rhythm) and hospitality (welcome gestures, the smile), as well as the cultural bridge between history and present (perfect time, dreams come true). The 2000 campaign in Germany pinpointed the difficulty: experience multiplicity. As we will see in more detail, Turkey faces the challenge of focusing on a few central thoughts from a practically limitless scope of alternative messages.

The inventory of imagery found in advertisements of the past 10 years underscores the multitude Turkey can choose from when promoting itself as a tourism destination. The richest and most employed motifs were landscapes, outdoor activities at the beach and historical sites, while in the younger past the use of modern sites (especially the positioning of Istanbul as a modern European metropolis) and popular outdoor activities like rafting, sailing, skiing and predominantly Golf have further broadened the already broad spectrum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modern sites and imagery</th>
<th>Historical sites</th>
<th>Landscape</th>
<th>Cultural Activities</th>
<th>Outdoor Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosphorus bridges</td>
<td>Ephesus</td>
<td>Beach scenes (sand beaches Olüdeniz)</td>
<td>Folklore (Dervish Dancing)</td>
<td>Golf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosphorus bars</td>
<td>Troy</td>
<td>Capadocia</td>
<td>Classical music</td>
<td>Diving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azra Akin (Turkish Miss World 2002)</td>
<td>Pergamon</td>
<td>Kaş beaches</td>
<td>Wine</td>
<td>Rafting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping opportunities (malls)</td>
<td>Tholmessos</td>
<td>Marmaris Mediterranean landscape</td>
<td>Pottery and ceramics</td>
<td>Skiing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir clocktower</td>
<td>İsaç Pasa Sarayi</td>
<td>Mt Nemrut</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Sailing boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>Taurus Mountain</td>
<td>Hamam relaxation</td>
<td>Active sailing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aspendos Amphitheater</td>
<td>Kekova Island</td>
<td>Museums with antiques</td>
<td>Swimming in the sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Istanbul: Galata Tower, Aya Sofya, Topkapı, Kız Kulezi</td>
<td>Coasts (rocky, wooded)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Horse riding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pamukkale and Hierapolis</td>
<td>Palmtrees</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paragliding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santa Claus’ Turkish origin</td>
<td>Ecosystem (turtles)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Windsurfing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-1: Iconography of Turkey’s tourism promotion

The dominant personage in the motifs used to be young Western couples or families with children. In the more recent campaigns after 2004, also senior
citizens, partying (single) women and male golf players add to a quite opaque list of protagonists.\(^6\)

- Young couples
- Families with children
- Small children in the sand
- Party people (women)
- Senior citizens
- Topless women
- Outdoor activists
- Single women
- Male golf player

A look at the different techniques used in print advertising is of particular interest. Almost all advertisements use some kind of split in the layout to incorporate two or more contrasting and yet complimentary key visuals. Especially popular is the blending of past and present in the form of juxtaposing cultural heritage sites like antiques with contemporary beach activities. Similarly also modern folklore such as the Dervish dance meditation is held against and linked to outdoor activities like hiking.

The campaign flight in 2006 and 2007 had a montage of different thumbnails including food, culture/entertainment or city trips almost in the style of insider tips surrounding an activity (e.g. sailing, hiking, beaching, or sightseeing) performed by an obviously happy visitor. In the most recent campaign, a person or a group of persons (a golf player, a woman enjoying a massage, a family) are blended into wide-angle shot landscape portraits.

In terms of professional campaign execution, these efforts are criticized quite radically: “if you look at the external advertising campaign to promote tourism in Turkey. It’s absolutely rubbish. It’s obviously been produced by third-rate advertising agencies and then the question is who is organizing this? (…) All of this is complete waste of money. And we’re wasting a lot of money doing this” (Richard Anderson).

Beyond such quality issues, there is a general strategic problem in these kinds of tourist advertisements: they will most likely not contribute to other facets of a nation brand beyond the mere promotion of destinations; and more: in the ‘sun&beach’ competition it seems almost impossible to differentiate one country from similar geographies, as nation brand consultant Wally Olins expressed in an interview: “Turizm ilanlarınız, herkesinki gibi: "Güneş, deniz, kum. Türkiye'ye gelin ve harika zaman geçirin. Türkiye'nin adını çıkarıp aynı ilana Tayland'dan tutun, Portekiz'e kadar onlarca farklı ülkeyi de koyabilirsiniz... Bunlar tamamen zaman kaybı!” [The tourist campaigns are the same as everywhere: "Sun, sea, sand. Come to Turkey and have a great time." You can take the name Turkey out and add Thailand, Portugal and other countries and all of this is a waste of time.] (Şahinbaş, 2007).

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\(^6\) Personage typology employed in Turkey’s tourism advertisings to Europe between 2000 and 2008, source: www.adzyklopediade
Interesting questions to be tackled in the future therefore circle around how Turkey could better differentiate from comparable destinations with tourism promotion advertising and – at the same time – contribute positively to the larger context of public diplomacy for Turkey in the EU by changing the perceptions of European citizens.

5.3.3.2 Investment promotion
In 2007, Turkey’s prime ministry’s Investment Support and Promotion Agency (TYDT/ISPAT) launched a massive campaign to promote Turkey as an investment case to foreign business prospects in Germany and the USA. Ads like the ones below, placed in papers like Financial Times or Manager Magazine, were designed to arise some curiosity about Turkey’s main performance indicators and route potential investors to the website www.invest.gov.tr. The style of the advertisements follows one of the first place branding campaigns ever: ‘I♥NY’ designed by Milton Glaser during the late 1970s. In the copy text, a management testimonial gives his account of how the investment in Turkey paid off for his respective company. Also, a range of facts and figures on Turkey’s workforce and on more recent quite successful Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) history are given.

The agency reports directly to the prime minister and is designed to present investment opportunities to the global business community and assist potential investors in all their administrative processes or private needs. It reaches out to ten countries directly (Russia, UK, USA, China, India, Israel, Italy, France, Germany, and Japan) and also addresses the Gulf region.
The discussion of how such FDI activities can also contribute to public diplomacy purposes will be looked at later.

5.3.3.3 The TÜ®KIYE-Project

A project called TÜ®KIYE, backed by most significant NGOs in Turkey in the areas of industry and commerce, advertising/marketing and tourism, and initiated by the State Planning Organization (DPT) by later minister of culture and tourism Erkan Mumcu in 1999/2000, developed in a concerted approach a framework for the nation brand Turkey between 2002-2003 (TÜ®KIYE, 2003).

The project was supported by external nation/place branding authorities and employed more than 200 voluntary experts from most different general fields in and special search group conferences. This initiative set up a branding strategy and defined core values for the brand Turkey [Marka Özü]. The participants managed to dissect the nation brand Turkey carefully into its basic components; they subdivided the brand into the eight components (TÜ®KIYE, 2003: 23): Tourism, Istanbul, Foreign Trade, Foreign Investments, Culture and Art, Popular Culture, Fashion/Folklore, European Integration. For all of these areas, a current and a target state was worked out.

7 Among the project partners: TOBB, TÜSİAD, TÜRSAB, TÜRSAV, TIM, REKLAMVERENLER DENERGİ; TV YAYINCILARI DENERGİ, REKLAMLAR DENERGİ, ULUSLARARASI REKLAMLILK DENERGİ, TURIZM YATIRIMCILARI DENERGİ, HALKLA İLİŞKILER DENERGİ and ARAŞTIRMACILAR DENERGİ. Former TÜSİAD president Erkut Yücaoğlu headed the execution of the project. The Prime Minister’s chief consultant of communications, Prof. Nabi Avçi, supported the project.

8 Including, for example, Noel Toolan, the former mastermind behind the rebranding project of Ireland
This TÜ®KIYE brand framework built up on contemporary branding models from marketing, differentiating certain qualities and properties of a brand such as:

- Brand Equity
- Reason Why
- Unique Selling Proposition (USP)
- Target Groups
- Competition
- Brand Promise

By winter 2003 however, this nation brand initiative was abandoned by the Erdoğan government without officially stating an explicit reason. There is some obscurity as to what exactly motivated the administration to not follow-up at all on the TÜ®KIYE framework.

One explanation is that the government simply lacked competence to continue this project by overtaking a responsible managerial position: “This was presented to the prime minister and they liked it. But they didn’t know how to go about creating this institutional framework. (…) And we were insisting that there must be such an institute. We couldn’t otherwise continue project like this unless there was an ownership of the idea. This is why it stopped” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

Other experts claim mainly budgetary constraints prevented any realization of the framework produced by TÜ®KIYE: “They couldn’t get funds from the government. I think that’s where you need huge amount of funds for any activity in this direction. You can’t talk about couple of million dollars or anything. We’re talking about huge amount. I don’t know how much but perhaps couple of billion, in ten years time” (Murat Sungar).

At the end it might just have gone to the dogs in a political turmoil between different parties, when Erkan Mumcu left office as minister of tourism and by
2005 he also left the AKP to become one of the sharpest rivals of the government.

Beyond a detailed managerial framework on how to attack Turkey’s nation brand in the end no practical results of this project ever became visible and coordinated nation brand planning has not been touched upon afterwards.

5.3.3.4 The TÜSİAD Initiative

One of the most influential NGOs in Turkey, Turkey’s Industrialists’ and Business Men’s Association (TÜSİAD), which is the country’s main industrialist lobby and represents ca. 60% of Turkey’s production and services (ABIG, 2005), aroused some attention in fall 2005 when announcing its own campaign stressing the country’s economic progress. The 10-year campaign was said to be designed to transform Turkey’s image in Europe by convincing people to look beyond old stereotypes (Bilefski, 2005). The project is led by one of Turkey’s leading businesswomen, Ümit Boyner and was, according to her, funded with a starting budget of € 3 Mio for the first two years. Boyner is quoted by Boland (2005: 1) on the purpose of the campaign: “I don’t think we Turks think enough about how public opinion is so important”.

The campaign, independent from the government, was designed to underline the richness of the country in terms of art, business and civil society (including women’s issues) (Boland, 2005). The main idea was to present “Turkey as an industrial country” (Ümit Boyner), assuming that talking about an industrial country implies modernity and development. Turkey should be seen not only as a bogeyman, but equipped with a labor force in a strong private sector and a young dynamic population (Kart, 2005: 1).

In the course of this campaign, TÜSİAD won the support of UNICE, the European employers’ federation, and also started direct efforts to influence KOLs across the EU. Turkish business leaders had direct contact with EU Commission president Barroso or German chancellor Merkel. They were of course hoping that such lobbying could help to influence attitudes in the Commission and European Parliament.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, between 3-5 October 2006, TÜSİAD organized different activities in a “Turkey@EuropeWeek” in three capitals of Europe. As one major component of the ambitious communications program, TÜSİAD hosted a series of political, business and cultural events in Brussels, Paris and Berlin to present a high culture facet of Turkey, which was so far not widely recognized or appreciated in Europe.
In April 2008, TÜSİAD sponsored a supplement to the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, in which German politicians and business people like Walter Scheel, Edzard Reuter, Dr. Arend Oetker Franz Müntefering declared their support for Turkey’s EU process. The project was titled “Initiative moderne Türkei” [Initiative modern Turkey] and employed the slogan “Traditionell europäisch. Die Türkei” [Traditionally European. Turkey]. The cover page was designed like a tag cloud and collected numerous associations with Turkey providing the surrounding structure for the main theme of this brochure: “Warum die Türkei zu Europa gehört” [Why Turkey belongs to Europe].

According to Kınıklioğlu (2006), the TÜSİAD project does extremely useful work for the communication issue, but a country’s communication strategy in the end necessarily should be within the responsibility of the government.
5.3.3.5 The joint attempt of ABIG
Focusing on making Turkey an accession candidate in 2004/2005, in September 2003, under the auspices of Turkey’s MFA, ABIG (Avrupa Birliği İletişim Grubu⁹) was founded as a public-private partnership. Representatives by the government, TÜSİAD, TOBB (Turkey’s nationwide Union of Chambers to which all Turkish companies belong) and IKV (Turkey’s Economic Development Foundation, founded in the 1960s to support Turkey’s business ambitions in Brussels) were asked to jointly evaluate Turkey’s EU-related communications strategy. Public money funded the projects, which were executed by civil society organizations.

This structure implemented 30 projects by the end of 2004, among them numerous press releases, publications, invitations of media representatives, websites, footage films and events like the cultural festivals şimdi/now in the European capitals (Doğan, 2005a: 35).

However, in December 2004 after the declaration of the EU accession candidate status to Turkey, the government lost interest and the funding practically ran dry (Ülgen, 2006b). In the eyes of Turkey’s administration, the ABIG structure was regarded as an ad-hoc initiative that reached its goal by the beginning of accession talks (Doğan, 2005a). Therefore, although the administrative structure itself subsisted, no substantial efforts were taken by ABIG afterwards.

The purpose of this institution was monothematic and concentrated on politics: “Its focus is not economic like TUSIAD’s. Its focus is political. (...)The branding issue is not taken as a model in that institution” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). Turkey’s business people became more and more frustrated given such a fo-

⁹ Translation: European Union Communication Group
Numerous clashes between TÜSİAD and governmental information policies (Anon./Briefing, 2006a) left serious doubts if the integration of the NGO-sector into this first allegedly cooperative Turkish communication agent was successful.

With the delegation of former ABIG director Ahmet Sezer to become new president Abdullah Gül’s spokesmen in summer 2007 (Birand, 2006c) and the nomination of Sezer’s ABIG successor Şevki Mütevellioğlu to the protocol desk of the MFA in spring 2008 (TDN, 2008g), this institution finally waned: “ABIG is not really functional at the time” (Suat Kınıklioğlu).

5.3.3.6 Evaluation of previous Turkish public diplomacy efforts

In the perspective of strategic brand management, the coordination of activities from the governmental sphere and the initiatives by organizations outside the political/diplomatic domain so far has not been done very successfully. Tourism promotion, for example, situated at the Ministry for Tourism and Culture, is not related to investment promotion by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and ABIG has no organizational ties to the General Directorate for Press and Information BYEG, which is attached to the Prime Minister’s office. In terms of concerted actions related to the nation brand strategy, “you have various institutes in the government, with their own budgets doing this. But nobody is really yet considering the total branding coordination” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

A summary seems justified that– despite all the presented insight that such actions might have significant impact on Turkey’s EU accession success – Turkey has not yet achieved visible and sustainable results in public diplomacy and nation brand efforts so far. In a conference on Turkey’s EU accession in 2006, “most participants agreed that so far Turkey’s PR efforts have had no positive impact” (Barysch, 2006a: 3). Or to put it in the clear words of the informant Ümit Boyner: “What happened so far. I mean lot of talking, no action”. The well-publicized columnist Mehmet Ali Birand underlines that already a lot of time was wasted and that the extent of the challenge to turn around European public opinion should not be underestimated: “The authorities who are supposed to promote the EU in Turkey and promote Turkey in the EU – ranging from the prime minister to all the ministers – did not conceal in their private and public remarks that they were late, that action had to be taken immediately. They said it bravely, but months have passed since then and they have never managed to press the button” (Birand, 2006c: 1).

Looking back at the previous communication approaches to Europe, a broad array of potential messages and messengers for Turkey was found. With regard to the poor nation brand image and the organizational clashes both discussed above, it seems evident that Turkey in principal has “plenty of good stories to tell, which, be it for reasons of poor brand management or audience prejudice, are simply not getting through” (Anholt/GMI, 2005b: 8). A closer look at different management models for Turkey’s public diplomacy shall elucidate this argument further.
5.4 Public diplomacy management: coordinating brand Turkey

As found in the previous analysis, the question of how to manage public diplomacy given the considerable number of governmental and non-governmental actors in Turkey is of particular interest. Analyzing the nature of Turkish Republic’s (TR) leadership culture and established state structures appears to be promising in this regard. Based on this analysis, questions of institutionalization and implementation of Turkey’s public diplomacy will be discussed.

5.4.1 A need for coordination?
Most experts agree that coordination mechanisms between different actors will be of added value for all. As underlined before, modern public diplomacy clearly goes beyond communication of government policies; it is assumed that countries get the biggest reputation gain if all sectors cooperate (Anholt 2007a: 13). For Turkey, “there is no doubt there needs to be more coordination between the different units within the state structure that communicate about Turkey, on Turkey, of issues” (Suat Kınıklıoğlu).

Approximately 33 institutions were counted in Turkey that in one form or the other provide information from Turkey to domestic or international audiences (Kınıklıoğlu, 2006: 1). “The ministry of tourism has its promotion programs. Ministry of tourism and culture, the culture side cooperates with the foreign ministry for cultural events, cultural promotion. And then you have ABIG, as the EU focused communication. Then you have the treasury and you have the ministry of trade doing promotion basically on Turkey's foreign investment and export potential, partnership deals and all that. So you have various institutes in the government, with their own budgets doing this” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

The analysis of previous communication activities for Turkey clearly underscores however that the most relevant agents work in isolation from other activities, with the exception of the TÜ®KIYE project, albeit which was never realized, and a very short period of exchange within the ABIG structure in 2004. “Coordination among the official units of the foreign policy establishment is far from harmonious. There is an astonishing lack of coordination and incredible institutional jealousy among the players” (Kınıklıoğlu, 2005c: 1).

The risks of bad communication efforts lie at hand:
“You have the tourism board saying how wonderful the country looks and how welcoming your people are. You have the investment-promotion agency saying almost the opposite, that it's super modern and full of cars and roads and railways. And you have the cultural institute telling everybody how wonderful the film industry is. And you have the government doing public diplomacy, and perhaps occasionally attacking its neighbors. They're all giving off completely different messages about the country” (Teslik, 2007b: 3).

Anholt (2007a: 2-3) coined the metaphor of different public diplomacy organizations in a country behaving like crabs in the basket – pursuing their own business interest and communicating their own vision of the country inde-
dependent of the others, resulting in a muddled, complex and partly contradictory image. The intention is mainly about selling a short-term project and not about developing the country.

The call goes for an identifiable institution that will coordinate Turkey’s public diplomacy: “What we need is a professional public diplomacy institution that will formulate, package and communicate Turkey’s image, policies and objectives to a large and diversified audience abroad” (Kinklioğlu, 2005a: 2).

5.4.2 Institutional coordination

The informants favor a central institution for Turkey: “What Turkey needs actually at the center governmental level is a much more organized, if you like external PR. (...) A corporate brand development department that is well-organized, internationally, well-versed, and can take Turkey’s story and package it properly and communicate that to the outside world” (Richard Anderson). Important questions are how to set up the coordination, how to fund and position such an institution and how binding the ties between the actors should be: “There is definitely the need for a coordination mechanism. Whether that coordination should be a loose one, whether it should be a more structured one, if you get into more structured ones, then you have legal constraints” (Murat Özelik).

The goal to better align the agents in Turkey seems ambitious: “you would like to actually have better control on certain funds, which have got to do with foreign audiences. Would that ministry really wish to give up that authority?” (Murat Özelik). This behavior lies in the nature of public administration: “It is typical bureaucracy thinking, you know, about not giving, it will be a tough fight, who would be responsible for what” (Suat Kinklioğlu).

This challenge is not exclusive for Turkey, but similar to most countries: “There’s every single country in the world that I’ve had anything to do with (...) Government departments don’t collaborate with each other, rival each other in budgets, nobody’s in charge, the relationship with each other is always jealous and full of suspicion and they don’t cooperate with the private sector and so on and so forth” (Wally Olins).

5.4.2.1 Governmental institutions

Several existing institutions within the Turkish governmental structure seem to qualify to host the coordination of the country’s different public diplomacy efforts.

A first suggestion to take the coordination lead in Turkey is the MFA which might be qualified based on the good reputation it has among other ministries: “From the Turkish character you know that if a ministry like the Foreign ministry takes the lead on certain things, the other people listen to it, not necessarily hear it. (...) They would hear maybe 20% more than the other ministries” (Murat Özelik).
In Germany, for example, this model is pursued with the Foreign Office as initiator and coordinator at home and in the embassies/consuls abroad, while other ministries, intermediary organizations, cultural institutions (e.g. the Goethe Institut), foundations, business organizations (Chambers of commerce) implement the programs operatively (Schlageter, 2006). Major topics are defined by consensus between the participating groups. Likewise, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) set up a Public Diplomacy Board and a Public Diplomacy partner group.

As outlined before, regarding the extent consular affairs have gained importance throughout the past years the Turkish MFA would qualify for such a role. Caused by increasing tourism, but also the role embassies played in disaster scenarios, the consular scope of work has widened and strengthened the nexus between diplomacy and society (Heijmans/Melissen, 2007). Given the relevance of Turkey’s diaspora abroad, the MFA, with the consulates, plays an important role in this public reputation management challenge.

An attempt was made to establish a public diplomacy system within Turkey’s MFA in 2006/2007. A conference was held in Ankara in the beginning of 2006 with international experts on public diplomacy presenting role models to Turkey. In his opening speech, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül acknowledged: “Diplomacy is one of the oldest and most esteemed professions. It is, however, undergoing profound changes. For a number of reasons, including great advances in information technology, foreign policy is no longer executed solely by means of traditional diplomacy. We need to employ public diplomacy more than ever in the execution of our foreign policy objectives. For that, we would need to readjust our internal structuring, and revamp the coordination among governmental and nongovernmental institutions” (Gül, 2006: 4).

In the meantime, this project has not produced significant results beyond raising awareness within Turkey’s MFA; the investments made seemed to have gone up in smoke: “there have been some efforts to improve public diplomacy, there have been some courses for diplomats and some workshops and I think they are bringing in some speakers from abroad that speak to diplomats, but (…) I don’t think there is a department established within the MFA” (Suat Kıklıoğlu). According to Murat Özcelik, responsible for this public diplomacy initiative in 2006 and partly 2007, one inhibition is conjectured to be within the ministry: “the real troubles, problems is that the top management in this ministry is not aware of what this whole thing entails. They think that it is a matter of organizing conferences” (Murat Özcelik).

Some criticism was also raised that Turkey’s MFA, with its strong state-centered character, has a hard time to accept the legitimacy of players from outside: “our foreign policy establishment has not been able to rid itself of the

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10 Members are: BBC World Service (observer), British Council, Department of Culture Media and Sport, Department for Education and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Northern Ireland Civil Service, Office of Science & Innovation, Scottish Executive, UK Sport, UK Trade & Investment, UKvisas, Visit-Britain, Visit London, Welsh Assembly (www.fco.gov.uk).
dangerous self-perception that the MFA is and should be the exclusive actor in the field. The ministry has difficulty in coming to terms with the fact that modern foreign policy is conducted by a number of actors, including nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, analysts, the media and academics“ (Kıniklioğlu, 2005c: 1).

A second interesting institution to be considered is Turkey’s Directorate General of Press and Information, which was founded back in 1920 and is situated at the Prime Minister’s office (official description: The Prime Ministerial Press Publication Information General Directorate). The duties include:

- contributing to the promotion of state policies in the conveying of information,
- providing accurate and timely information to the public and relevant state agencies,
- ensuring government activities and services are effectively conveyed to the domestic and international community,
- maintaining and organizing ties with foreign media agencies and outlets (Kılıç, 2008a).

The Directorate is organized in three departments: The News Department, a Press Publication Department and an Information Department. Also there are local Directorates in seven Turkish provinces and undersecretaries and attachés in 23 different countries (Kılıç, 2008a).

In terms of the Public Relations and the news management understanding of public diplomacy, this institution is very important. Also relationship management with foreign journalists is within this office’s scope of work (Kılıç, 2008a). In Germany, a similar institution was included into the public diplomacy oversight by the MFA: “So you have the similar Basin Yayin Genel Mudurluğu, Press and Information Directive General, which has been also integrated to the foreign side of it, the foreign press side of it” (Murat Özelilik). However in Turkey, so far there has been significant reservation to pull this institution closer or even integrate it into a joint public diplomacy coordination effort: “If you say well, press and information directorate, I am planning to integrate you, they will kill you” (Murat Özelilik). However, in the other direction, reaching out to other institutions, no significant efforts have been made. In fact, structures like ABIG took on parts of the media relations role that usually Turkey’s Directorate General of Press and Information would play. The General Director Salih Melek agreed that his institution has rather been late in taking steps against unfavorable public opinion abroad and conceded difficulties in his area of responsibility to deal with questions of international reputation management (Kılıç, 2008a).

Thirdly, the ministry of culture and tourism needs to be considered as an important governmental institution for Turkey’s public diplomacy aims. This field has been dominant in Turkey’s nation branding activities so far: “The Turkish government has been active in promoting Turkey in terms of a tourism destination, and they have been relatively successful” (Ümit Boyner).
Equipped with a budget clearly in the three-digit million Euros range, they are probably the most visible producers of promotional messages on Turkey. In their strategic planning draft until 2013 with the vision of Turkey 2023 in mind (which would mark the 100th anniversary of the Republic and is therefore a main planning target), several measures that were part of the public diplomacy modeling displayed earlier are considered. The ministry calls for an effective use of PR tools, it advocates the adoption of modern communication channels and promotes the use of multiplying opportunities with clientele. In an integrative approach: “branding efforts shall be pursued at destinations in line with the ultimate objective of a country brand” (Ministry of Culture & Tourism, 2007: 24). In this context the ministry explicitly calls for tight cooperation between official and private institutions.

Turkey’s problems and challenges in the area of national reputation are clearly perceived by this institution:

“The acts of terrorism, adverse publications and press articles disseminated in the international community on such areas as democracy, human rights etc. and the outbreak and continuation of armed conflicts and political instabilities at the next door to Turkey, due to her challenged geographical position have all contributed to a ruining impact on Turkey’s general image among the international travellers. In the next few years, new projects and programs shall be devised to tackle the constraints and eradicate the demise caused by these unfavourable impacts, involving the launch of a variety of promotional campaigns dedicated to sending a better image of the country in people’s minds” (Ministry of Culture & Tourism, 2007: 29).

The need to integrate tourism promotion into the larger context of public diplomacy for Turkey in the EU is obvious: “a million people, tourists coming to a country, we need to find ways and I think in that respect there might be some value in cooperating with the ministry of tourism, we need to find ways and themes and ideas that would translate into favorable public opinion where, especially the kind of people that visit Turkey and go back” (Suat Kıniklioğlu).

So far, however, no substantial efforts have been made to closer align the range of tourism messaging with other communication or relationship building activities for Turkey’s nation brand.

Then, Turkey’s Investment Support and Promotion Agency (ISPAT), equipped with a YTL 30 Mio budget (approx € 17 Mio), of which one-third is spent on promotional activities (Özer, 2008), organisationally attached to the Prime Minister’s office, should be considered within the set-up of an integrated public diplomacy organization for Turkey.

Finally, set up for the EU accession process and headed by Turkey’s chief negotiator, the Secretariat General for EU Affairs (ABGS) in theory should play a prominent role in pulling together the EU communication activities. However, although it is the main institution that coordinates preparations for EU membership, the ABGS has only about 40 experts employed and furthermore faces
budget problems (Yanatma, 2009b). Currently therefore, only limited dedicated public diplomacy efforts should be expected from this institution.

With regard to the public diplomacy model developed in Chapter 3.6.2, the investigation of Turkey’s activities and institutions showed that most of the related domains, channels and purposes are covered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time/Domain</th>
<th>Reactive (hours and days)</th>
<th>Proactive (weeks and months)</th>
<th>Relationship building (years)</th>
<th>Time/Channel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political/Military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public diplomacy as lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Diplomacy as Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal/Cultural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Diplomacy as Nation Branding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Whereas many of TÜSIAD’s activities relate mostly to a PR-understanding of public diplomacy, the promotional campaigns by Turkey’s Ministry of Tourism and Culture clearly also display a more holistic nation branding understanding of public diplomacy.
- The ‘news management’ approach by Turkey’s Directorate of Press and Information is mostly done with reactive time horizons and fulfils the purpose of exposing national policies and goals, while Turkey’s investment promotion moreover has a proactive character when underlining some of Turkey’s important national values and assets.
- Finally, TÜSIAD’s lobbying approach clearly focuses on relationship-building activities in the economic domain, likewise ABIG’s şimdi-now campaign worked for a better common understanding and mutual cooperation in the societal/cultural domain.

What became evident, however, was that all current and past activities more or less operated in isolation from the others with autonomous budgets and reporting lines solely within the issuing institutions: “The problem is, Turkish government works in a vertical way, when you work in a vertical way, you cannot have any sort of horizontal lines to create the umbrella brand. They have separate budgets, they have separate business plans and there is no in-
stitution or agency like in some cases, you see like in Ireland and in other ex-
amples” (Aşşegül Molu).

In general, theory advises governments to contribute to the following aspects when dealing with their national reputation (Anholt/GMI, 2007a: 7):

- They monitor and try to understand their international reputation and make – on a scientific basis – deductions for sectors and countries.
- In cooperation with business sector and civil society they agree on a realistic and inspiring national strategy and narrative.
- Governments ensure that the country remains innovative and productive in terms of products, services, policies and so on to prove the strategy/narrative right and keep the country in the relevant mindset.

Communication could add on to that, if linked to truthful engagement and increased visibility.

At the present stage, Turkey seems to lack a well-defined role for the governmental institutions within the country’s public diplomacy efforts.

5.4.2.2 Independent coordination

Given this background, numerous experts called for a central institution situated out of the governmental sphere of influence to perform the public diplomacy coordination task: “Turkey needs an independent public diplomacy institution” (Kıniklioğlu, 2005c: 2). Anholt (2007a: 13) points out that modern public diplomacy goes beyond communication of government policies, and that “national governments are simply not in control of all of the forces that shape their country’s image, and neither is any other single body within the nation” (Anholt, 2007a: 274).

A first suggestion is to set up a board with representatives from different fields consulting the government: “We were thinking (...) of having a commis-
sion of wise men composed of, coming from different social backgrounds like important businessmen, maybe an academician and so forth. I call it wise men, these are the people, knowledgeable people, sophisticated people, who would perhaps be better to judge than a cultural minister of this government or prime minister or whoever” (Murat Sungar).

Such a committee would not only supply technical and organizational advice, but also help to set clear objectives: “I would have a (...) cross-section of Turkish economic, political, cultural, media, religious and foreign policy circles (...) and I would really try to listen to these people and basically I would try to know why Turkey wants to become part of the EU. And try to find out what the contribution Turkey thinks it can make to the European integration proc-
ess and then I would, basically not in 12 months, but start really let’s say a five-year plan to communicate” (Peter van Ham).

Independence is highlighted as an important quality of this council: “This body should be independent in their thinking and should be sophisticated and knowledgeable enough. Technique knowledge is also important (...) to really
come to a decision. And they should not be [subject to] interference” (Murat Sungar).

Despite all longing for independence, still “there should be somebody, a conductor. It's an orchestra but the flutes are playing differently and the violins. So someone has to put them in harmony” (Murat Sungar).

The orchestra metaphor is also used by Henrikson (2006). Public diplomacy managers should attempt to coordinate messages, topics and contents by many different agents into a coherent, and yet not too simplistic picture. Metaphorically speaking they must invite the different issue melodies and instruments to participate in one orchestra based on partnership and mutuality (Henrikson, 2006).

The chief negotiator for Turkey’s EU accession, Ali Babacan, was considered to be a candidate for this position: “I don't know whether Mr. Babacan will have the authority to put all these together. In theory he should be the guy who will make a decision. (....) He probably will wish to have an authority there but again this should be more independent (....). They should come up with it in such a way that Babacan probably will not be able to say anything.” (Murat Sungar). With Babacan also becoming Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2007, the institutional conflicts between the MFA and other ministries discussed before regain relevance.

Furthermore, the work of this council could be considered to be quite practical: “they should come up this is the thing that we will put on the billboard, this is the message that we have to give to the world. To Germany, to France, different perhaps, and England different” (Murat Sungar).

It was debated however, whether decisions at such a creative level should also be reproduced at the political decision making level. To distinguish between strategic advisory and execution of the planning, the TÜKITYE framework foresaw two different bodies:

“We also suggested a structure. We said the people from various NGO’s, from ministries, from prime ministry, from universities and from the business sectors, they’ll come together in a counsel. That counsel will have a separate body of strategic experts so that counsel will be a lose platform, will have its own body, and within that body we shall have assigned professionals working specifically for Turkey, BRAND TURKEY, and they are directly reporting to the Prime Ministry. Not to any private sector, institution. Not to any of the ministries. But they solely work for the Prime Ministry. It was more like a brand management team, created for the prime ministry. And a general counsel approving the outcomes of that brand management. And that counsel together with the state will pay for the work of the brand management” (Aységül Molu).

Role models for such a two-body structure were found in South Africa and Ireland. The operative department adjunct to the prime ministry would also be in charge of reactive communication tasks: “have a strong, solid working 7*24 department, make better stories for your successes and tackle with your crisis” (Aységül Molu).
5.4.2.3 Turkey’s Public Diplomacy Agency

A similar structure was discussed and planned to be implemented in Turkey during 2008. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan was quoted in April that there were plans to establish a Public Diplomacy Agency (PDA) to undertake the public relations operations parallel to Turkish foreign policy (Balcı, 2008a). According to Babacan, the government was supposed to finalize the agency’s legal framework before the summer break 2008.

This PDA’s duties were described as “advocating Turkey’s foreign policy views, theses and targets not through classical diplomatic means, but through a wide variety of instruments including publications, seminar, television programs, movie productions and think tanks” (Balcı, 2008a: 1).

The informant Suat Kınıkloğlu, member of the Turkish Parliament’s Foreign Relation’s Committee since 2007 and former Turkey Director of the NGO German Marshall Fund, has been publicly outspoken in favor of such an institution for a long time, and now serves as especially information-rich source, since he is claimed to be responsible for setting up this structure.

As suggested by Ayşegül Molu and the TÜ®KIYE project (see above), there will be a twofold structure of an advisory council on the one hand and the agency executing the strategies: “that there would be (…) an Advisory Council that would be made up of people of different backgrounds, youth, women, business men, MFA people, you know. Of different backgrounds, probably journalists, and that would provide input sort of on a strategic level. And also people, you know, who have, who are in touch and have dealings with Europeans and Americans that could provide proper input to what kind of communication strategy issues or themes should be accentuated” (Suat Kınıkloğlu).

The bulk of the work however will be done in the agency itself: “The council provides informed opinion and strategic advice to the organization, to the agency and then we could act upon it. But (…) the committee is not the central part of it, it’s more of an advisory role. The (rest) will be really professional people” (Suat Kınıkloğlu). In a nutshell, “the advisory council will work as a sort of semi-external feedback instrument” (Suat Kınıkloğlu), providing feedback on a monthly basis.

A role model for the agency to be created is the Investment Support and Promotion Agency of Turkey (TYDT/ISPAT) that is responsible for the campaign “invest in Turkey” analyzed earlier. A comparable structure is aimed at: “a public establishment with the flexibility of a private company” (Balcı, 2008a: 1). MFA Ali Babacan indicated that such an agency’s philosophy and Turkey’s usual civil service mentality would not go together (Balcı, 2008a). Suat Kınıkloğlu explains: “the Turkish bureaucracy is horrendous and getting things done through bureaucracy is difficult here. So we felt that a communication strategy and communicating needs flexibility, quick decision making and implementation through more smaller, concentrated groups. Unfortunately, our bureaucracy is not known for being quick or effective”.

123
For the agency it is intended to “hire professional people, (...) people who can process project stuff and will work and people who have experience in this thing, but it's not going to be a larger office as probably six, seven people (...) in Ankara” (Suat Kinkılıçoğlu).

Independence of the administrative contexts is an important goal for this structure: “we felt that the communication strategy business can be done mostly outside of the state bureaucracy. (...) It will be a private office, it will be, it’s an NGO and its status is an association, so it will not be under government control or authority, because we don’t feel that would work here” (Suat Kinkılıçoğlu). The independence from governmental day-to-day business is important to account for the strategic quality, as all modern public diplomacy drafts call for: “The point is, it's getting people to produce a coherent strategy in which they all believe and getting somebody to be in charge of it and drive it over a long period of time, say ten years. Governments don’t think in those terms” (Wally Olins). Consequently, the funding for Turkey’s Public Diplomacy Agency will have different sources and will not exclusively rely on public money: “there would be some government funds, but there would also be private funds” (Suat Kinkılıçoğlu).

This mixed fund model is important, otherwise the independence would be threatened from the start: “we have this saying, the one who pays the money have the instrument to tune, something to that effect” (Murat Sungar). Exclusive governmental financing would potentially raise suspicion in Turkey.

Furthermore, looking to audiences, the question of credibility of a governmental institution being the primary performer of public diplomacy activities is pressing:

“One of the salient issues facing public diplomatic communication is the messenger problem. Public diplomacy has been generally conceived and institutionalized as part of a nation’s foreign affairs apparatus; and foreign affairs, along with national security and military affairs, are conventionally within the sovereign rule of the nation-state.[...] Yet, with worldwide proliferation of media technologies and facile and affordable information access, the credibility and efficacy of the national government, as the primary communicator, are now often suspect.” (Wang, 2006: 33)

Sub-national governmental units or civic organizations are expected to encounter fewer such antagonisms from foreign and domestic audiences (Wang, 2006. 40). In line with this argument, Turkey’s Public Diplomacy Agency should be designed as a networking agency between NGOs and think tanks: “The agency needs not to do everything on its own. It will cooperate with different establishments, like think tanks and foundations, and will try to influence public perceptions about Turkey through them” (Balci, 2008a: 1). As such it continues the philosophy ABIG introduced in the pre-accession period (see Chapter 5.3.3.5): “this new approach would be replacing ABIG” (Suat Kinkılıçoğlu).

In an earlier article, Kinkılıçoğlu (2006: 1) described the optimal arrangement for such an agency “that it would answer only to the prime minister and has
overriding authority on Turkey’s external communications. This institution should, of course, be in cooperation with relevant ministries but must be independent in its internal work and should have adequate autonomy to do its work properly”.

In this ideal conception, the agency would also provide guidelines and content to Turkey’s official channels, like TRT (Turkish Television), the Anatolia News Agency (Turkey’s official news agency) and the Directorate General for Press and Information, as well as align closely with Minister Babacan, the Secretariat General for EU Affairs and the MFA (Kıniklioğlu, 2006: 2).

When discussing a relaunch of the preceding ABIG structure in 2006, mind games devoid of practical use were feared: “what is important will be the implementation. If a new, non-functioning bureaucracy is created, that would be a pity. And the two most basic factors are authorization and money” (Suat Kınıklıoğlu).

It should be interesting to observe how such a structure, partly overruling other existing institutions, will be accepted in Turkey: “I expect there will be resistance by other state-, by places that would not be too happy to be coordinated by something that's outside of the state” (Suat Kınıklıoğlu).

In 2006, Kınıklıoğlu identified a strong political will as a necessary prerequisite for any public diplomacy organization (Kınıklıoğlu, 2006: 2). For the most recent draft of the Public Diplomacy Agency, this support is being identified to facilitate the coordination of positioning: “We have the backing of important Turkish leadership and I hope that that would materialize, that these places will come in line” (Suat Kınıklıoğlu).

Despite the current political backing, there is the anticipation that a Turkish bureaucratic reflex will try to win back the administrative sovereignty in these issues: “once our work will become more publicly visible, there will probably be tension by the bureaucracy to put it into a state, you know, under state control” (Suat Kınıklıoğlu).

This tension points at a potentially substantial conflict resulting from a putative hierarchical and authoritarian nature of the Turkish Republic being exposed to modern public diplomacy concepts that is very interesting to see.

5.4.3 Coordination and Kemalism
As introduced in chapter 3.5, going back to Brian Hocking public diplomacy theory differentiates a hierarchical and a network-based approach (Fisher, 2006). In the context of Turkey’s state-centered leadership philosophy this distinction becomes quite relevant.

Turkey resembles a "strong institutional culture, ingrained in a strong state-centered understanding that views the official aspects of the business as the 'only' aspects of business" (Kınıklıoğlu, 2005c: 1). In general experts observe a “top-down flow of communication in Turkish politics, which lacks encour-
agement on the meso-level and civil organization to be part of a communica-
tion platform” (de Witt, 2007b: 1).

5.4.3.1 Etatism and network-models
The historic reason for this state-centrism is rooted in the Turkish national
movement under Atatürk’s leadership, drafting the Kemalist principles of Re-
publican governance: “I think it was OK in the 1920s but later on, to have a
sort of dogmatic state, with a state ideology, that was the wrong thing. Our
education system, all our approach, Turks are just learning to become ana-
lytical people. Because our education system is, it was a dogmatic state ideol-
ogy. It’s too narrow” (Ümit Boyner). Correspondingly, international cultural
studies have identified Turkey as a society with high scores for authoritarian
values (Hofstede, 2001: 93) and as a place where culture imposes strong be-
havioral norms (ibid: 16).

In the field of economic activities for example the principle of Etatism means
that the state is to regulate the country’s general economic activities and to
engage in areas where private enterprise was not willing to do so. Similarly
the state has to intervene when private enterprises were proven to be inad-
quate, or if the national interest requires it (Tezel, 2005). Over the history of
the Turkish Republic until the late 1970s, due to the application of the prin-
ciple of Etatism the state emerged not only as the principal source of economic
activity, but also as the owner of the major industries of the country, a situa-
tion Turkey has been struggling hard to change by intensive privatization
since the days of the Özal administration in the 1980s and early 1990s (Ucan,
2003).

Until today, these Kemalist traditions of central planning and regulation have
a strong impact on the political system in Turkey. “In Turkey, it’s very, you
know, it’s a post-autocratic system, (...) very much hierarchical. I mean, of
course Istanbul is booming economy and things run a little bit differently, but
in the rest of Turkey I have the sense that top-down hierarchical approach
would definitely have been much more effective than anything else” (Peter
van Ham). The need to involve the state structures is also seen in the busi-
ness world: “The biggest matter, if you want have a brand Turkey, state is a
very important part of it. Especially in a country like Turkey” (Ayşegül Molu).

The need for a strong political backing discussed before can be related to
Turkey’s hierarchical state system: “it’s not necessarily in authoritarian sys-
tems that it’s essential to have very high-level political authority supporting
this, but I think especially in the case of Turkey, it’s important, because first
it’s always necessary, I think, personally. But second the structure and the
mentality of people in power is very much conducive to make this kind of
strategy effective” (Peter van Ham).

Some experts see these state-dominated structures to be principally harmful
for the prospects of Turkey’s reputation abroad: “Because there is quite
clearly a nationalistic and authoritarian element within Turkey which is very
powerful, I don’t think the long-term prospect for the Turkish national brand in terms of its popularity in Europe is going to be very bright” (Wally Olins).

However, there may be challenges for which Turkey’s Etatism principle could be advantageous: “it is easier to make an argument for the hierarchical approach as this conceives the primary objective of PD as the dissemination of a particular perspective” (Fisher, 2006: 22). If on the other hand the goal for Turkey “is to change behavior within the target audience, a more effective argument can be made for an engagement with groups through a network” (ibid.).

5.4.3.2 Networking with the NGO-sector
Hence, for Turkey’s seeking of favorable public opinion, a network-orientated public diplomacy paradigm seems superior to the established hierarchical approach: “image creation and management is a key resource and one where non-state actors may have an advantage, helping to explain why the more traditional, hierarchical concept of strategic public diplomacy often fails to achieve its goals” (Hocking, 2005: 41). As Wang (2006) pinpointed, the burden of winning the hearts and minds of foreign publics can no longer solely fall on the national government.

Regarding Turkey’s challenges, the credibility argument also supports a network structure engaging NGOs: “NGOs have become central players in the image stakes because their own ‘brand’ as forces for good, unencumbered by the trappings of sovereignty and untainted by realpolitik, appears to give them a moral edge over governments and big business” (Hocking, 2005: 39).

These quotes relate to a general debate in Turkey whether the NGOs are efficiently employed for the country’s EU accession process: “A lively civil society is one of Turkey’s biggest assets. The country’s business federations, think-tanks and women’s lobbies shape Turkey’s image abroad. They can help Turkey to get ready for EU entry and influence the wider reform process (Barysch, 2007b: 7). Turkey’s government has acknowledged it had to align closer with these important agents of change (Kanli, 2007) and especially for the constitutional reform process and the infamous penal code 301 this collaboration was promised.

To achieve this, a new quality of discourse and interaction between state and non-state actors has to be established in Turkey: “part of the conceptual shift towards a network based model requires interaction and engagement in a non-hierarchical manner which develops initiatives that are potentially beneficial to all participants” (Fisher, 2006: 19).

Building of mutual trust and relationship management among the different groups are considered to be good measures to pass existing barriers: “We are trying to establish firstly good relations with several institutions and others. It has got to be face to face relations. It has got to take some time so that when you bring something on the table to discuss, they have to have trust in...
you, in the sense that you are doing, not to increase the power of the minis-
try, but rather doing something for Turkey” (Murat Özcelik).

Some optimism that Turkey will be able to overcome the hierarchy paradigm in public diplomacy contexts is fuelled by a new generation of politicians with experience outside the state system: “Certain parts of Turkey that are chang-
ing, I mean, our government, you know, there are these very much people who have come from professional backgrounds, have done stuff in the private sector or outside of government. And if you look at the choices of ministers and how our prime minister is doing a number of things, you'll see that some-
times, many times one gets out of the, sort of hierarchical structured bu-
reaucracy type of work” (Suat Kinklioğlu).

Similarly, it was recently announced that serious attempts to increase the par-
ticipation of civil society in the parliamentary decision-making processes would be launched in Turkey (Anon./TDN, 2008j).

It seems decisive that these positive signs will be embraced in the private sec-
tor in Turkey also for public diplomacy purposes.

5.4.3.3 NGO participation in public diplomacy
In certain parts of the private sector (e.g. the influential TÜSIAD) the willing-
ness to exchange with the government is not particularly pronounced: “we
don't really want to cooperate with the government on projects, because we're a civil initiative and we'd like to keep the government out. We don't
want to become partisan in one sense” (Ümit Boyner).

Despite the optimism reported above, for the public sector the collaboration with nongovernmental structures in Turkey means quite a challenge due to large systemic differences: “With the private sector, it is tougher. Because quite often you see that they actually believe that they are doing everything much better than any other public sector” (Murat Özcelik).

The reasons for these differences are shown in different overall objectives: “We might have a different world view than they do. It depends why you want European Union. Do you want European Union because you want higher democratic standards? Or is it because you think it's going to make the coun-
try richer or is it because it's the salvation for your political party?” (Ümit Boy-
ner).

Another reason might be in the area of competence. If we take, for example, TÜSIAD’s press service steered by the Brussels office, a private organization seems to be speedier than the government in this essential building block of public diplomacy: “We’re not saying we’re the only authority here but (...) we have a very good press relations and we are a reference (...) So there is a reputation of TÜSIAD as a reference, as the voice of Turkish civil initiatives. So we'll capitalize on that.” (Ümit Boyner).
Despite these primary limits to cooperation, there is some willingness to delegate certain tasks of public diplomacy between NGOs and the government in Turkey better given the competence: “There are many projects that come to our hands that we’re willing to take to the government. We believe that we can set a good example on how this program should be run and we feel we’re making headway there” (Ümit Boyner).

Such a practice of sharing would also be appreciated by governmental sides: “we should include some other institutions, including TÜSİAD and everyone, get first hand information from them as regards what they did, where they reached in those studies, what they are aiming at, whether they are happy with that, what is lacking” (Murat Özcelik).

For example, in the area of relationship management with journalists or key influencers, another important cornerstone of public diplomacy, a closer demarcation of responsibilities between governmental and non-governmental sides could be very fruitful: “we want to bring the questions with the people who have the answers. That’s our job. That is not being done. Those questions should be handled. And the government should handle them. The government should pave the way for most civil initiatives to answer such questions” (Ümit Boyner).

In terms of close organizational collaboration, however, skepticism prevails: “Some professionals think that you cannot mechanically or artificially coordinate Turkey’s image. Because Turkey is big. Because Turkey has got so many facets” (Ayşegül Molu). Likewise TÜSİAD is rather pessimistic that cooperation within common frameworks can lead to one goal for such complex entities like Turkey:

“It would be great if there was a concerted effort on some level but it’s very easy to fall into the trap of trying to count the trees and not see the jungle. If you spend so much time on the framework, then you’re losing so much time because if you have so many people engaged into this effort, right now they’re trying to bring all civil initiatives under one umbrella. TOBB says I will be the umbrella. They say IKV should be the umbrella. As TÜSİAD we don’t believe it’s realistic. Everybody can have an effort and we can help each other. But to actually have an umbrella and others come into play and we don’t believe it would work well” (Ümit Boyner).

The questions on if and how to align an umbrella strategy for different agents and messengers within a public diplomacy organization will be revisited in more detail later.

Given these skeptical voices about the state of cooperation, there seems no alternative to the independence of the Public Diplomacy Agency to be created from the governmental structures. They openly invite all sorts of actors in the public diplomacy domain to participate: “We might be doing stuff on ourselves or we might be asking individuals, NGOs, think tanks and whatnot to implement some of the stuff, so it might be, it could be a combination of things. And if people come up with good ideas and projects come to us, we might be funding them” (Suat Kınıkloğlu).
In theory, the list of important non-governmental agents to collaborate with is quite extensive (Riordan, 2005):

- universities and individual academics
- high schools/colleges
- journalists
- political parties
- citizen groups
- business associations and individual companies
- youth movements
- sport clubs.

Giving a more or less catalyst role to the government vis-à-vis this range of players seems realistic. The future development should therefore be observed closely in how far the PDA structure finds acceptance among these different players in public diplomacy in Turkey.

What became obvious in the discussion is that by international standards of public diplomacy Turkey’s state institutions trail behind in competence and budget not only other European benchmark countries, but also domestic institutions like TÜSİAD which currently seem much better equipped than governmental organizations: “I don’t think that we’re capable of doing nation branding or something that TÜSİAD has started” (Murat Özelik).

The undeniably urgent and extensive need for the improvement and optimization of processes in Turkey’s governmental institutions for the sake of improving the country’s overall public diplomacy performance will therefore be discussed in the next passage.

5.5 Learning, development and handling of public diplomacy

Comparing the degree of collaboration between different agents in the field of public diplomacy other nations have a sizeable competitive edge over Turkey: “Public diplomacy, regional expertise, analysis and think tank work are usually disregarded and shunned to a secondary level. This state of affairs of our foreign policy pursuit resembles a football game in which the Turkish team has seven players whereas its opponents play with a full team of 11 players” (Kıniklioğlu, 2005c: 1).

Notwithstanding the insight generated above, that the MFA’s role in Turkey’s public diplomacy needs to be complemented by other governmental and non-governmental actors, the following thoughts will mostly focus on the existing diplomatic personal of Turkey’s MFA; this institution seems to illustrate the necessary mental, know-how-related and organizational changes needed.

The official institutions of Turkey’s foreign policy have not been productive in the sense of current public diplomacy demands: “die türkische Regierung mit ihren Konsulaten, die extrem nationalistisch oft agiert haben, z. B. in der Sache Armenierfrage, also die sich immer äußern so, dass man sagt, das ist
Turkey faces a need for training and practice especially of the diplomatic staff in order to close the gap to other nations and profit from public diplomacy efforts on the way to the EU accession. As discussed earlier, a new self-conception of the profession arises: “the role of the diplomat […] is redefined as that of facilitator in the creation and management of these networks” (Hocking, 2005: 41). Accordingly, diplomacy will no longer be in the center of activity, but mostly at the periphery of the system; furthermore, the staff needs to understand that public diplomacy is to a large degree not controllable to the extent diplomats usually wish it to be (Melissen, 2006b).

5.5.1 Training Turkey’s diplomats

Given these desiderata, implementing public diplomacy means a substantial cultural shift in foreign policy institutions: “the biggest challenge is to the culture and priorities of diplomatic institutions themselves. Public diplomacy can no longer be seen as an add-on to the rest of diplomacy - it must be seen as a central activity that is played out across many dimensions and with many partners” (Leonard, 2002a: 56).

Especially with regard to the traditional hierarchical diplomatic school in the Turkish MFA, it will be largely a mentality shift that is required first: “We have the human resources to firstly grasp this mindset, to understand the mindset and then move in that direction in a more liberal way” (Murat Özcelik).

For the education of embassy staff the turn towards public diplomacy has massive implications (Leonard, 2000; Wang, 2004; Gonesh/Melissen, 2005; Melissen, 2006b; Melissen, 2006c; Johnson, 2006; Paschke, 2006):

- Diplomats have to be trained to understand journalism practice, connect to the media, respond under pressure and treat media as their allies.
- They need to build up and foster their own professional communication network.
- In terms of theory, some communication models, behavioral science principles, communication and media law should be known.
- Communication with non-official organizations and individuals will have to be learned.
- Understanding public opinion, its research techniques and its dynamics as well as displaying some familiarity with popular and high culture are essential for public diplomacy professionals.
- Modern diplomats will need to be educated in communicative crisis management and in how to react to negative lobbying.
- Usually reactive work has to be enhanced by a proactive planning and anticipating of issues and events.
• This implies an active reaching out to all sections of an informed public beyond the selected few and the building networks with numerous social institutions.
• The training needs to include how to make use of the internet and how to organize feedbacks and dialogues (“e-consultation” with (younger) audiences directly).
• Likewise, a new generation of diplomats needs to be prepared for meetings with teachers and educational institutions to provide information and teaching material.
• Finally, public diplomacy personnel need to be trained to evaluate measures and give an account of the funds employed.

Eventually, the profile of a diplomat will alter substantially: “What is required is a pretty radical change in working habits and indeed in diplomatic culture. It would be a formidable understatement to stay that the old dog merely has to learn a new trick” (Melissen, 2006c: 3).

As indicated, the familiarization with the media world and other relevant public spheres will be important to tackle: “diplomats must transform themselves from reporters and lobbyists who react to issues into shapers of public debates around the world” (Leonard, 2002a: 50). In short, diplomats will need to learn to see media as their friends (Gonesh/Melissen, 2005).

Other than before when traditional PR work was almost exclusively conducted by the press and public affairs departments and attachés, now the task applies to almost all professional staff of an embassy: “whatever in their area of responsibility is, they must continuously ask themselves the question: how can I ‘sell’ my topic under the auspices of Public Diplomacy?” (Paschke, 2006: 2)

Such training for the media world will be quite an effort for Turkey: “And all these require time and energy (…) we have got to make time, organizing this department and its relations with the press” (Murat Özcelik). Turkey’s diplomats face a fundamental challenge regarding both qualification and mentality: “The structure of Turkish diplomacy does not encourage diplomats to make contact with the foreign media” (Karabat, 2007c: 2).

Given the low level of public diplomacy competence acquired so far in Turkey and potential budgetary or capacity constraints, rolling out the training will require careful planning and prioritization: “I do not think that we are capable of doing it en masse, including all the embassies or something. We have got to set some priorities. Maybe select pilot places and start this thing out” (Murat Özcelik).

The experiences in the consulates could play a key role in the public diplomacy education: “Public diplomacy and consular relations have something in common: in these two fields of diplomatic work people are beginning to look like consumers and in public diplomacy as much as in consular affairs the MFA
is actually delivering a product. In both fields of activity the MFA is also con- 
fronted with issues of image and reputation: public diplomacy is about the 
management of the country’s image and consular affairs may directly affect 
the image of the MFA itself” (Melissen, 2006b: 7). The traditional split be-
tween high-end diplomacy and low-end services seems obsolete and outdated 
(Melissen, 2006a). 
Unfortunately however, the solidarity among Turkish diplomats is not very 
pronounced: “It’s very tough, especially if you are doing things for your own 
colleagues, and especially if they are diplomats. They would love to criticize 
things” (Murat Özcelik).

Besides the curriculum, obviously questions how to implement public diplo-
macy structures in Turkey’s governmental structures are also relevant.

5.5.2 Implementing public diplomacy services in Turkey

To learn more about organization and implementation, Turkey should gener-
ally plan to exchange with other Foreign Ministries, for example the German 
MFA: “We said we have to see what you’re doing. He said OK, why don’t you 
send someone from your department to sort of work at the ministries, rele-
vant department, for about six weeks or so that you see what we are doing, 
what we are trying to do. It will definitely give us a much clearer picture as to 
what the department is doing, the organizational structure” (Murat Özcelik).

The actual conduct of public diplomacy for Turkey could be a mixture be-
tween central strategic planning and local adoption: “We will set a few objec-
tives, set a strategy, set the tactical moves in very close cooperation with the 
embassies, with the missions. So that each mission, while they will have their 
manoeuvring space in terms of setting the objectives on the basis of the 
strategy and deciding on the activities, we will try to push them in a direction” 
(Murat Özcelik).

This intended division of labor between the central and regional planning of 
public diplomacy is in line with the recommendations in the literature; it is 
underlined that there has to be a strict training and a significant commitment 
by the MFA, since no mission abroad can be expected to make the necessary 
changes without central governmental support (Melissen, 2006b).

Related to this, both in theory and practice it is intensively discussed if and to 
what degree external service providers could and should be employed in this 
system to help facilitate and advance the change processes described above.

The trend to privatize by outsourcing some of the tasks to PR companies or 
branding consultancies has become an indicator how much public diplomacy 
has become a business (Fiske de Gouveia, 2006).

The literature sees both pros and cons in outsourcing. It is mainly the creative 
inspiration that is assumed to be found rather outside of public institutions: 
“The tasks of public diplomacy and the obstacles confronting them are so 
challenging that the enterprise should seek to enlist creative talent and solicit
new ideas from the private sector through outsourcing of major elements of the public diplomacy mission” (Rosen/Wolf, 2005: 13).

Also Anholt (2007a: 22; and in Teslik, 2007c) sees both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the consultancies are often too superficial and governments are not experienced enough to deal with advertising people who promise too much. On the other hand, the professionalism by experienced consultants gives poorer countries especially an appearance at the world stage which they might not be able to achieve otherwise.

It has to be borne in mind that a consultancy is often only paying lip-service to a poorly informed politician who envisions not much more than his four-year elective horizon and therefore tends to makes snap decisions (like a nice logo or an advertisement) without strategic wisdom and imagination (Anholt, 2007a: 23). As discussed earlier, brand management and public diplomacy by some authors are seen as a new perspective on regular activities of politics such as planning, policy-making and development (Anholt, 2007a: 73). Therefore, in most current conceptions there cannot be a private substitute for having a dedicated governmental department (Melissen, 2006b; Schlageter, 2006), and implementing strategic management structures is an important training task. “The measurement and management of national image and reputation cannot be ‘outsourced’ to agencies and consultants or indeed to any third parties. It should form an integral part of the policy-making and governance style and practice of government, the private sector and ultimately of civil society” (Anholt, 2006d: 1).

Turkey so far has not systematically tried to compensate its internal knowledge gaps by employing external support. Some authorities like Neil Toelran, the mastermind behind the brand Ireland, who has consulted the TÜ®KIYE initiative, or Jan Melissen, Professor from the Clingendael Institute on Diplomacy, who supported Turkey’s MFA’s first steps towards a public diplomacy institutionalization in 2006, who were recruited on short project’s bases, have been rare examples. Other important authorities like Simon Anholt, Wally Olins, or Peter van Ham, who are well-employed by numerous European countries, have so far not been hired by Turkey.

During a 2006 workshop on Turkey’s EU accession process, there was skepticism articulated to relying on prominent advisors in Turkey: “Experts warned that the management of a ‘national brand’ was too important to be outsourced to PR consultants” (Barysch, 2006a: 3).

Within the new Public Diplomacy Agency (PDA) however, using more outside help is intended: “We haven’t employed anyone yet, but there are plans to employ people, once we get going” (Suat Kınlıoğlu). Campaigns developed by professional advertising agencies such as in the case of TÜSİAD are – if feasible – also considered: “If the funding permits us, I would certainly be interested in employing people who could do things that TÜSİAD is doing, com-
pliment what they are doing or actually go about much larger and aggressive things such as public media campaign” (Suat Kinklikoğlu).

With this structure of the PDA it looks as if Turkey has found a compromise between centralizing public diplomacy under the auspices of relevant governmental stakeholders, and yet declaring the institution independent enough to be an open moderator of public and private initiatives.

Still, as Oehlkers (2006: 14) put it, it is a lot easier to talk about public diplomacy than putting it into action. Ethical considerations will need to be aligned with managerial pragmatics. Turkey’s organizational and procedural implementation of public diplomacy will yet have to stand the test of time, especially during the EU accession process.

5.5.3 Researching and evaluating Turkey’s perception
An important condition in implementing public diplomacy and making procedures effective is to consider research and evaluation structures as frameworks to guide the analysis of public diplomacy (Wang, 2004: 16). Turkey needs to make sure that this is not based on unfounded perceptions but on accurate measurements, this being the first step towards strategically and organizationally dealing with its negative reputation (Anholt, 2007a: 64): “Without knowing the perceptions, you can not set objectives” (Murat Özcelik). Otherwise, as Simon Anholt (2007a: 72) elucidates, a lack of objectivity threatens to bias the strategic groundwork of the task, and pride or ideology might overshadow the true needs of a country.

A number of informants articulated that there is a significant knowledge gap for Turkey in this regard: “Probably first we have to do a research, this is what we have superficial observations. So I will try to understand then what is the real problem” (Mehmet Ural). Besides the publicly available data such as Eurobarometer and Anholt’s Nation Brand Index presented before, Turkey does not seem to have a detailed understanding of its perception in the individual EU countries: “But we cannot find any complete or continuous research in Turkey, done by the public sector. So, all we say is bits and pieces we gather from various research, which we cannot add on top of each other. So the nature of the research is different from each other” (Ayşegül Molu).

It seems problematic in this regard that Turkey’s government apparently has not acted on this research challenge, but considered the amount of information sufficient: “The government also claimed that they know all the dimensions of the perception. So they are not curious about testing or measuring the perceptions. You can find some research here and there, on specific topics like tourism, or how Turkey has been perceived as a business partner and things like that. They think they know. But they have no data. That’s the position. You cannot reach any solid data in Turkey regarding the image of Turkey” (Ayşegül Molu).
Turkey’s lack in measuring and evaluating its reputation abroad is in line with the mainstream of current public diplomacy development: “scholars and practitioners have often equated public diplomacy with ‘soft power’ and measured results solely by public opinion polls and media coverage” (Gilboa, 2008: 56). Relying on public opinion on certain political scenarios however will not suffice: “we need to achieve a better understanding of a differentiated foreign public rather than assuming that the foreign public is a monolithic whole, as it is often represented by global public opinion polls” (Wang, 2004: 16). The analysis of the Eurobarometer before (Chapter 2.1) showed that it gives indications for certain directions but fails to convey deeper strategic insights into the perceptions. As discussed there, the application of perception-related consumer behavior theories such as image or reputation can increase the understanding of the dynamics of public opinion (Omura/Talarzyk, 1985: 95): “you have got to survey and see what the people of that countries actually think about Turkey (...) We need to know the real perceptions” (Murat Özcelik).

Research should contribute to a comprehensive picture of the situation: “in order for public diplomacy to be strategic, it must incorporate knowledge of attitudes, cultural tendencies, and media-use patterns, and organizational behavior to shape and target communication to achieve the maximum impact” (Wang, 2004: 13).

For the Public Diplomacy Agency to be founded the knowledge gap resulting from currently inconsistent patchwork pieces of studies was acknowledged and accepted as a task: “There is not enough research done into it. There have been some places like ESI11 and some others in some places that have made public research output on specific countries or cases, but there needs to be more research. And I think one of the things that we will be doing is we will be asking people to do that research. Especially the Eastern Europeans, I think, have been very much neglected. I don't think Turks have a clue how Eastern Europeans perceive Turkey, why that is that way” (Suat Kiniklioğlu).

Hence, a research approach for Turkey should ideally cover all European countries. So far the efforts, for example by TÜSİAD12, have concentrated on the countries identified as most crucial for Turkey: “Turkish research tends to focus on countries that are problematic such as France, Germany, but doesn't look into countries like Britain, Spain, Portugal or Greece or Italy where there is more favorable opinion and I think one shouldn't count that such favorable opinion will sustain indefinitely and see what the trends are in these countries and take appropriate measures to make sure that that favorable opinion stays that way” (Suat Kiniklioğlu). A similar call came from the Association of Turk-

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11 The European Stability Initiative, a Brussels, Berlin and Istanbul-based think tank, has published research on the Turkey-debate in Germany (ESI, 2006) and Austria (ESI, 2008).
12 Turkish industrialists and businessmen association TÜSİAD in 2005 ran research to learn about Turkey’s strong and weak points and the best media in the – according to their planning – most important countries in Europe (Germany, France, Austria, Netherlands and Scandinavian countries) by sending questionnaires to expatriates of foreign companies living in Turkey.
ish Travel Agencies to run customized surveys in every country in order to reach the language of that country and try to improve the image when running out public diplomacy measures (Arsu, 2006).

In general, as with the theory development, public diplomacy evaluation is still in its infancy (Gonesh/Melissen, 2005) and the methods are continuously under debate. Occasional surveys and focus groups are regarded as rather inadequate to keep consistent track of the developments (Fiske de Gouveia, 2006: 9); and some preference is developing for index structures with clear reference points facilitating comparability over time (Anholt, 2007a). Also newer trends such as monitoring the blogosphere have a great potential: “New technologies offer exciting opportunities in this field - particularly the mining of open-source Internet material for opinion. If one accepts that the Internet represents a constantly updated reservoir of the Zeitgeist – the changing opinions of hundreds of million people expressed on weblogs, message boards and chatrooms – then if only analysts could access that opinion efficiently they ought to be able to keep track of national reputation (...) on a daily, not yearly basis” (Fiske de Gouveia, 2006: 9).

In sum, the optimal public diplomacy structure would systematize the listening, research and the analysis and ensure reporting lines for the results and implications into the highest levels of policy making (Cull, 2008: 48). For the public diplomacy organization, hence clearly a training issue is at hand. As aforementioned, tracking opinion and understanding perception of publics or elites are essential methods for public diplomacy that need to be mastered by the diplomats, especially with regard to reading and interpreting the data. Ambassadors need to pay attention to it and make it part of their work routine (Bigler, 2005).

In the end, measuring is also an indicator for effective use of public funds: “it is not acceptable for governments to be sending taxpayers’ and donors’ money on an exercise that can’t be measured, tracked or made accountable” (Anholt, 2007a: 43).

Measuring and evaluation are clearly also flipsides of potential strategies disseminated by Turkey in the field of public diplomacy, which are considered in the following section.

5.6 Public diplomacy strategies for Turkey’s brand dimensions

In the following, the arsenal of potential public diplomacy strategies that Turkey could employ facing the EU accession ambitions is considered.

Anholt’s nation brand hexagon, introduced earlier (Chapter 2.2), consisting of the dimensions

- Tourism
- Exports
- Investment and Immigration
- Governance
Culture and Heritage, and
People

is taken as the guiding structure in analyzing the different domains of Turkey’s public diplomacy, as discussed in Chapter 3.6. The following synopsis of the interviewed experts’ strategic recommendations will show that the picture Turkey wants or should reveal is far from harmonious, but will also point at quite interesting unused potential for public diplomacy purposes.

5.6.1 Destination branding: Tourism as a two-edged sword

One of the most obvious areas to strategically exploit for Turkey’s public diplomacy purposes is tourism, as seen when looking at the range of tourism promotion campaigns analyzed earlier (Chapter 5.3.3.1.).

In marketing communication theory terms (see AIDA, Chapter 3.6.1) tourists to Turkey have already taken the awareness and interest hurdle: “eine Gruppe, die hat sich nun schon mal für die Türkei interessiert, man könnte denen bei Betreten des Landes irgendwie eine interessante Information geben. (...) es ist erst mal eine Ressource im Kopf.” [...] a group that is already interested in Turkey, one could hand out some piece of interesting information to them when entering the country. It is firstly a mental resource] (Ruprecht Polenz).

What a tourist, who purposefully chooses a specific country for holidays, takes away should in theory clearly exceed the mere travelling experience. Already 1979, a WTO study underlined that “nobody is likely to visit a country for tourism if for one reason or another s/he dislikes it. Conversely, a tourist discovery may lead to a knowledge of other aspects, of an economic, political or cultural nature, of that country” (Sönmez/Sirakaya, 2002: 188).

5.6.1.1 Positive impact of tourism

For Turkey this situation looks quite promising at first sight: 23 Mio. tourists visited Turkey in 2007 (Can, 2008). Looking at the numbers of 2005 and 2006, for which detailed statistics are provided, approx. 14 Mio of the foreign visitors to Turkey stem from the 27 EU countries (www.turkstat.gov.tr). Germany (around 4 Mio), the UK (1,7 Mio), Bulgaria (1,4 Mio), the Netherlands (1,1 Mio) and France (0,7 Mio) lead the ranking of European visitors’ countries of origin13.

Hence, some informants expect positive effects from the tourism experience: “Most people have very positive opinions of Turkey when they’d been around as a tourist that could change attitudes towards Turkey. Turkey is a particularly successful tourist country and that could begin to change attitudes towards Turkey” (Wally Olins).

13 It has to be noted though that of the citizens with Turkish Origin living in the EU countries in 2002 on average 34% have taken on the citizenship of their country of residence – therefore as much as approx 2 Mio of these EU visitors to Turkey might as well be naturalized Turks connecting with their country of origin (Centre for Studies on Turkey, 2003: 7-8).
Visiting a country works as a moment of truth when perceptions change: “In the moment when they see it with their own eyes, feel, taste, smell, I think a human being needs the individual personal outlook. When he/she only reads about it, there could be sympathy, but it doesn’t change the feelings, I believe” (Christiane Schlötzer).

It is recommended to capitalize on these impressive numbers of visitors and turn them into advocates of Turkey’s EU accession: “we need to find ways and themes and ideas that would translate into favorable public opinion, especially with the kind of people that visit Turkey and go back” (Suat Kiniklioğlu). In the eyes of some experts, this insight directly translates into some kind of nation brand campaigning similar to the one analyzed before: “In terms of PR (…) tourism is probably key. (…) They just need to keep up that kind of promotion of the country, its treasures, its beaches, its hospitality, all the good things it has to offer to tourists. Cheap vacations, family vacations, they need to keep doing more of that” (Gareth Jones).

Spain as historic role models showed the way how tourism helps overall country reputation: “Turkey is becoming quickly the most popular holiday spot for ordinary people in Europe. I mean, it’s cheap, it’s nice, it’s sunny, it’s pleasant, and so forth, so just like Spain has used tourism to change its image from Franco’s authoritarianism to what it is now, it’s possible. Because people are actually seeing the country” (Peter van Ham).

5.6.1.2 Cultural alienation by mass tourism
For the case of Turkey however, there are some profound doubts if the typical tourism experience as of today could contribute to change Turkey’s image: “I am afraid that especially package tourism does not deliver insights into the country. I believe that no real understanding of the country can develop, except that he/she reports it was a nice experience because the accommodation was good and clean, the food was good, the service was good, and that a positive attitude was built up, but I think that this does not principally connect to the general attitude towards Turkey” (Rainhardt von Leoprechting).

The kind of mass tourism currently dominating Turkey does not differentiate the place from other similar destinations: “Der Massentürkurlauber macht dort genauso Urlaub, wie er das vielleicht sonst in Spanien oder an der Adria gemacht hat. Er verlässt eigentlich den Strand, die dahinterliegende Gastro-
nomie vielleicht einmal für einen Tagesausflug, aber ansonsten will er Sonne
und Wasser und interessiert sich auch nur begrenzt für das Land“ [The mass
tourist to Turkey spends his vacation there all the same like he did that in
Spain or at the Adriatic Sea before. He leaves the beach and the adjacent ca-
tering area possibly once for a day-trip, but otherwise he longs for sun and
sea and display’s only limited interest for the country] (Ruprecht Polenz).

In fact, this kind of tourism impression with the dominant associations of
cy cheap beach holidays could also be counterproductive and even substantiate
existing negative sentiments, especially in less affluent strata of European so-
cieties:

“There is an increasing image of Turkey as a country where people go on cheap holi-
days. And that image is a very peculiar one because on the one hand it’s very posi-
tive; it attracts Dutch tourists in lower income brackets because they get package
deals with the flight and a five-star hotel. And so therefore they get access to luxury
that in Holland they can never afford. And in that sense it’s very positive. It also
sometimes reinforces the negativity because this part of the Dutch population has the
strongest negative image of Turkey. And they seek to reinforce this image or not
consciously but unconsciously by one morning in their week holiday, going out on a
trip to the countryside out of their big five-star hotel somewhere near Antalya or
Alanya, and then accessing the Turkish countryside where they get their already ex-
isting picture of poverty, backwardness, any head cover is also associated with Is-
lamic extremism, so they get that picture reinforced. Then they return to their nice 5-
star hotel and they go back again to the Netherlands (...). They will say Turkey is a
much nicer country to go on holiday to than we first thought because people in the
hotel were very nice, the hotel itself was very nice, the food was very good, was very
generous. But we also saw the real Turkey outside of the hotel and that’s the agricul-
tural backward, Islamic, real Turkey” (Willemijn van Haaften).

This observation corresponds to Mastnak’s theory of cultural alienation caused
by mass tourism. In countries like Turkey, tourists enter a world of illusion
when entering the resorts, “a well-done combination of the mysterious Orient
and the life-style of the Mediterranean” (Mastnak, 2000: 252). A lack of desire
to really penetrate the underlying culture is met by a setting that mostly pre-
vents authentic trans-cultural contact. The risk of creating “significant anthro-
pological discrepancies” (ibid: 253) on both sides is quite high: “Natives will
label visitors as ignorant objects who willingly accept being cheated (...).
Tourists may pay to experience an artificial world not unlike that provided by
Disneyland: fascinating fantasy. The interdependent influence of profit-
making ‘hosts’ and illusion grabbing ‘invader-tourists’ contribute to organized
trans-cultural misunderstanding” (ibid.).

5.6.1.3 Turkey’s full picture
One important strategy for Turkey to escape this self-feeding negative alien-
ation would be to broaden the tourism perspective on the country beyond the
mass-market association of Turkey’s Aegean or Mediterranean coasts. Some
typologies of European tourists do already display a different travel behavior
in Turkey: “The higher income brackets (...) would also be the people who
would come to Istanbul on a weekend trip rather than in a large 5-star hotel
in Anatolia” (Willemijn van Haaften).
Istanbul plays a somewhat special role in Turkey’s public diplomacy’s strategic context. As we will investigate in more detail later, when discussing the cultural dimensions of Turkey, the city is extraordinarily popular at the moment and an outstanding brand signal on its own. However, a realistic picture of Turkey to be displayed to the world’s public would also have to go above and beyond Istanbul: “but also it’s Turkey’s not only Istanbul. We have to be honest, we have to show them what we have here, I mean rural parts” (Mehmet Ural).

It also depends on what the tourists take away from Istanbul: “das Interessante ist ja, die Leute, die in Istanbul sind, sind eben nicht in Levent, sondern kucken sich die Aya Sofya an” [...the interesting thing is, the people being in Istanbul are precisely not in Levent, but look at Aya Sofya] (Heinz Kramer). Do they visit the skyscrapers of booming business districts, or do they stay within the mass tourism hubs where Turkey’s classic and Ottoman heritage is on display?

Despite those constraints of mass tourism, in general the direct experience of visiting is supposed to contribute to a better individual perception of Turkey: “So being in Turkey and sitting on a Turkish galette gives them entirely superficial and possibly incorrect view of Turkey, but nevertheless it’s a positive view of Turkey. I’m not suggesting it is a profound experience. All I’m saying is that such an experience would make people more likely to be favorably inclined towards Turkey than otherwise” (Wally Olins).

5.6.1.4 Achievements of direct experiences

Almost all informants underline that a different and almost always more positive perception of Turkey could be achieved by a direct experience of the country and its people: “There is a big difference between someone who has been to Turkey, who has seen Istanbul, who’s seen some parts of Turkey. And the person who’s just watching Turkey from television in Germany” (Ümit Boyner). Similarly Anholt (2006f: 187) put it: “tourism plays a vital role [...] in encouraging what marketers might call ‘product trial’.

Knowing Turkey in effect seems to draw the country closer to Europe and to dissociate it from the Arabian stereotype: “If you ask a person who doesn’t know Turkey in Spain, they will tell you, they will compare Turkey with an Arabic country for sure. But if you ask a person in Spain who has been here on holiday, this person will tell you that Turkey’s a very nice country and the people are very friendly and in general tell you good things about Turkey” (Jose Ligero-Cofrade). It is essentially the rather unknown Western trait that is overseen in Europe: “The Turkey that you see when you’re inside Turkey does not at all correspond with the Turkey that you think you know when you’re in Western Europe. So that’s the first order discrepancy because (...) Turkey is a lot more western when you arrive here, when you get to know the country a little bit than you would have thought it to be when you know Turks in Western Europe” (Willemijn van Haften).
This effect is also experienced by journalists visiting Turkey, according to the Directorate General of Press and Information in Turkey. Journalists being in Turkey for the first time are quoted that once they return “their ideas about Turkey have changed” (Kılıç, 2008a: 1). The Directorate also observed that coverage about Turkey usually takes a more positive light after a journalist’s visit (ibid.)

There are interesting discussions in the literature that back these findings above. Kunczik (2005: 3) highlights that travel, expressing the degree of personal experience of foreign cultures, will be of extraordinary importance to image building, while Smith also mentions the correction of opinions formed earlier on: “Personal experience with another country, gained through visiting or having contact with its citizens, can mitigate individual's opinions formed on other bases” (Smith, 2007: 115).

Some optimistic outlooks therefore regard a trip to Turkey as an effective cure for Turkey’s image problems: “There is also the reality of those Europeans, regardless of the country, who visit Turkey, for cultural reasons, for tourism purposes, or whatever, these persons go back with a positive impression to the point that, what we say is enough for them to get over their biases or negative perceptions. One week in Turkey” (Erkut Yüçaoğlu).

5.6.1.5 Image vs. reputation: Turkey’s tourism paradox

However, the numbers, for example of the Eurobarometer opinion polls presented before, tell another story. Despite the impressive tourism record in the past years doubling the number of visitors from the EU 15 countries between 2000 and 2005, the negative opinions about Turkey’s EU membership grew from 48% to 55% in the (then) 15 countries and even worsened to 61% in 2006.14

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Table 5-1: Tourism to Turkey vs. Eurobarometer Opinions (sources: www.turkstat.gov.tr and European Commission 2000-2006)

Apparently, the tourism experience in Turkey has also not yet conveyed into the EU opinion formation on Turkey’s potential membership. This is in line with the findings of Alınbaşak-Ebrem according to whom previous visits have no significant effect on the opinion about Turkey’s EU accession (Alınbaşak-Ebrem, 2004: 233).

14 In terms of tourism, 2006 was exceptional, since the country was not only impacted by Islamic terrorism in London, but also competed against Germany’s world cup (Arsu, 2006). In 2007, the numbers exceeded the 2005 numbers clearly again (23 Mio overall international visitors vs. 21 Mio in 2005, Can, 2008).
And also for the nation brand status, visiting does not pay off: “Even in tourism, the area where most people must surely have positive associations with Turkey, the message is failing to get through” (Anholt, 2006f: 187). A look at more data illustrates this puzzle further: 23,3 Mio international arriving visitors rank Turkey globally on position 9 in terms of incoming tourists according to the United Nations World Tourism Organization in 2007 (Can, 2008). In GfK/Anholt’s 2008 Nation Brand Index, however, in the ranking of the tourism domain brand Turkey ends up 31st, behind Belgium and Peru, while e.g. Egypt, Brazil or Mexico, all trailing Turkey in the number of arriving visitors, rank 10, 12 and 17 respectively (GfK, 2008: 20). GfK and Anholt comment on the tourism brand dimension that the “strength of a country’s tourism brand often relates to actual international tourist arrivals or dollars, although not always” (ibid.: 19). Turkey is one of the most obvious cases that there are definitely significant exceptions to that rule: paradoxically, a great performance in tourism in terms of arrivals seems to have practically no effect for the nation brand status.

Two obvious explanations lay at hand to explain this paradox: either the tourism experience in Turkey was not as good as assumed, or the positive-impact effect described by the experts before needs to be questioned for the time being. While the former explanation is difficult to keep up vis à vis the good numbers, the latter approach seems to carry some value.

With returning customer rates over 50% (e.g. among German tourists) coming back to Turkey after a first visit (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007; Hibbeler, 2008), the experience in Turkey could be assumed to be satisfactory. When trying to explain the deviance, one suggestion interprets the good tourism experience as a protective shield against an even more negative opinion towards Turkey’s EU accession otherwise: “support for potential Turkish EU membership will be even lower, if people wouldn’t have any sort of positive association with the country. Because people (...) realize they’ve only seen a tiny bit of sliver, but they are positive” (Peter van Ham).

Beyond this protection, tourism experience evidently “can’t counterbalance the negative parts of Turkish image” (Peter van Ham). The tourism impression cannot overrule impressions caused by other Turkish facets: “Da ist sowieso ein differenzierteres Türkeibild da, aber der Tourismus hat aus meiner Sicht noch keinen nennenswerten Korrektureinfluss auf dieses Bild” [There is a differentiated image of Turkey anyhow, but tourism has to my mind no noteworthy corrective influence on this image] (Ruprecht Polenz).

But what exactly does tourism impact then? “Nun gibt es natürlich die Frage, was Tourismus sozusagen an Perzeption bewirkt, es bricht weniger Stereotypen auf” [Now there is certainly the question what tourism can effect in terms of perception; it less breaks open stereotypes] (Heinz Kramer). According to this explanation, tourism is able to cut through the layers of individual perception temporarily, but seems not to manage to influence more collective and sustainable levels of judgments like stereotypes.
This distinction serves as a good example for the juxtaposition of the concepts of image and reputation explained earlier (Chapter 3.3). “Das kriegen Sie nicht breitenwirksam rüber. Ich meine da haben Sie wirklich so eine, wenn man so will, eine Diskrepanz. Ich kann im Freundeskreis erzählen oder auch ich treffe Leute, die sagen: ‘Mensch ich war jetzt das erste mal Rundreise und alles so – also ganz toll, ganz anders, als ich mir das gedacht hatte’. Schön, das mag er noch 5 anderen Leuten erzählen und dann steht übermorgen wieder Schlechtes in der Morgenpost – Rumms!” [This is difficult to get across to large audiences. There is such a discrepancy. I could recall in my circle of friends or I meet people who say: 'gosh, I did a tour and everything was super and clearly different from what I pictured it'. Well, he might tell that to five other people more, and then the day after tomorrow again something negative is the morning paper – boom!] (Heinz Kramer). The personal story, the image perceived individually, has not enough impact and influence to equalize the negative media discourse that shapes the collective reputation.

The power of word-of-mouth, currently intensively discussed in marketing environments, seems not to be as effective for country purposes as it is for brands: “Mein persönlicher Eindruck ist, dass diese Mund zu Mund Propaganda in Bezug auf Markenprodukte besser funktioniert als in Bezug auf Länderimages. Ich weiß nicht, woran es liegt, aber da scheint eine größere Persistenz zu sein” [My personal impression is that word-of-mouth related to brand products works better than for nation images. I don’t know the reason, but there seems to be a greater persistence] (Heinz Kramer).

### 5.6.1.6 Integrating tourism advocacy for Turkey

The literature suggests that both the tourism experiences themselves and their advertisements should not focus extensively on areas that might be of only minor importance to the rest of the country or even exclude the rest and pretend to be different (Anholt, 2007a).

The interviews identified ‘illusionist resorts’ with only little connection to the rest of the country as the dominant European tourist association with Turkey. A useful strategy for Turkey would be hence to broaden the tourism scope to underscore other message bundles more in line with the rest of the country. Also, as discussed earlier, there should be increased coordination between country promotion areas like tourism or investment paying off to a common strategy, so that different messages do not rival each other.

Besides the fact that it usually has the loudest voice in branding the nation, as it also mostly has the biggest budgets and greatest experience in marketing (Anholt, 2007a: 26), tourism promotion has the advantage above other forms of country communication that it has the ‘permission’ to address publics directly; tourists are used to and expect to be wooed (Anholt, 2007a: 87). Tourism promotion is good opportunity to introduce a country: “they can tell people what the place looks like, what sort of people live there, what sort of things those people do and make, the climate, the food, the culture and the
history of the country” (Anholt, 2007a: 88). These stories will most probably also affect other perception areas of a nation brand like investments – a CEO will also have a mental postcard of a country – or encourage customers to try products from Turkey (Anholt, 2007a: 90).

It seems therefore essential to extend the planning horizon of Turkey’s public diplomacy and open it to embracing the tourism advertising: “We haven’t thought of the Ministry of Tourism particularly, but there might be some value in getting at least one member from the Ministry of Tourism, that would probably provide some of that, their sort of institutional aspect into the discussion of the committee” (Suat Kıniklioğlu). The benefits in terms of budget savings or in an overall more consistent nation brand appeal for Turkey could be considerable.

In the other direction, real achievements for example in the cultural or economical sphere need to be webbed into the tourism experience to increase the potential for positive advocacy for Turkey in Europe after a vacation: “if Turkey would develop economically so that when these Dutch tourists leave their five-star hotel, they would not be taken to extremely poor villages but to slightly richer villages that may also contribute to that, to the image of Turkey” (Willemijn van Haaften).

The findings of Simon Anholt’s Nation Brand Index provide statistical evidence for this idea. There is a significant correlation between positive experiences while visiting a country and a positive feeling towards other dimensions of a nation brand like people, culture or government. The pinpointed hypothesis goes as follows: “any positive experience of a country, its people or its productions tends to create a positive bias towards some or all aspects of the country” (Anholt, 2007a: 48). A good nation brand has to present itself from much more than only one sector, so Turkey will have to do more than tourism.

Tourism itself also contributes to the nation’s balance of payment. With more than 20 bln US$ annual turnover (Arsu, 2006), tourism is one of the most relevant dynamos in Turkey’s booming economy, a second area of Turkey’s nation brand with strategic relevance.

5.6.2 Spreading the word of boom: Turkey’s economy

Many experts hold that for sustainable improvement of Turkey’s reputation, “the driving force is going to be economy (…) and economic performance would be a high point in the agenda” (De la Pena).

The Turkish economic performance since 2002 has been quite impressive. Largely with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who, after the last crisis in 2001 lent 15bn US$ to Turkey and demanded far-reaching structural reforms in change, the country has made substantial progress.

The inflation rate has reached single digits for the first time in generations (Tudor, 2004: 6), while annual growth rates of approx. 7% since 2004 with
25 consecutive quarters of growth, unrivaled in Turkey's history (Maden, 2008; Strittmatter, 2008d) have Turkey established as the 6th fastest growing economy worldwide between 2002 and 2005 (Anon./Zaman, 2006a); by 2006, the public budget deficit fell below 3%, while unemployment dropped below 10% (Lange, 2005; Strittmatter, 2008d). Although Turkey’s GDP per capita remains low compared to EU’s average (US$ 8,740 in 2007 (Strittmatter, 2008d)), in purchase power parity and in growth Turkey is in line with new entrants into the EU.

In terms of sheer volume, Turkey has risen to become Europe’s 6th largest economy and is ranked 17th globally (Maden, 2008).

Two important pillars of this economic growth with regard to successful nation branding and with impact on public diplomacy are a country’s exports and the ability to attract foreign direct investments.

5.6.2.1 Exports as Turkey’s unknown modernity
According to Anholt’s (2007a: 25) analysis, export brands can speak as loudly as tourism campaigns, when the country of origin is explicit. For Turkey however, a low profile for branded exports was found in the analysis in Chapter 2.2.

The informants confirm this finding: “It’s good quality but when they look on the tag, ‘Made in Turkey’, I guess they would think that “A-ha, I didn’t know that Turkey made good, this kind of good textile products” (Adam Achouri).

The classic export products from Turkey are clothes/textiles, ceramics and food (Artok, 2002). The example of Mavi Jeans, which have become an important brand in the US (Lange, 2005), shows that these categories not always refer to only raw goods. In fact, farming only accounts for 11% and services for 55% of the Turkish GDP (Lange, 2005).
But Turkey has also become a significant site for the production of home electronics, household goods and cars/buses. Turkish brands like Temsa and Belair for example have become leading figures in the French-speaking markets (Esmen, 2008b). The brand Arçelik/Beko has become a Top 5 player in Europe in the home appliances domain (Lange, 2005). Seven percent of the white-goods market in Europe is controlled by this label of Turkey’s biggest conglomerate, the Koç Group (Anon./Economist, 2005c: 32). Turkey has also taken hold of the European TV set production: “‘made in Turkey’ ist mittlerweile nicht nur Billiganbieter, im Gegenteil, und wir sind inzwischen schon Nummer 1 in Europa für TVs” [‘Made in Turkey’ is not a low-cost supplier, on the contrary, an we have become number one for TVs in Europe in the meantime] (Cüneyd Zapsu). E.g., German heritage consumer electronics brand Grundig is owned by the Turkish Koç holding since 2008 (Astheimer, 2008).

Together with the general economic upturn, a remarkable growth in Turkish exports from US$ 36 billion in 2002 to US$ 73,4 billion in 2005 (Yılmaz, 2006) was recorded. “It’s becoming quite a significant manufacturing country. Turkish television sets all over Europe, there’re Turkish coolers now coming into Europe. It’s becoming a significant, it isn’t as important yet as BRIC, Brazil, Russia, India, China, but it’s quite important” (Wally Olins).

Despite this success, Turkey’s nation brand still fails to benefit from this new quality of export products: “Also, irgendwie schafft es die Türkei nicht (…), ihre Produkte als türkisch hinzustellen” [Somehow Turkey does not manage to present its products as Turkish] (Brigitte Özbalı). Anholt (2006f: 186) seconds: “none of the Turkish brands have yet achieved enough fame in Europe, North America or the Asia-Pacific region to have improved the reputation of their country of origin”.

Products could be quite effective ambassadors, because they earn money and don’t usually don’t produce costs (Anholt, 2007a). However, companies producing in Turkey might tend to downplay this origin, since there is the danger of reducing the product brand’s appeal (Jaffe/Nebenzahl, 2001). This fear however does not account for the fact that product brand attitudes referring to the country-of-origin seem to change quicker than thought before: “Fifteen years ago, who would have believed that Europeans could be happily consuming Tsingtao beer and Lenovo computers from China or Proton cars from Malaysia” (Anholt, 2007a: 96).

Likewise it can be expected that “Turkish products will slowly have a higher profile” (Nicole Pope) and contribute to Turkey’s reputation. Turkey could start to consider this ‘surprise factor’ better for its export products. Instead of paying lip service to the Europeans that expect fabrics or pottery from Turkey, creative services like fashion designers, winery or architects (Esmen, 2008a), and sophisticated high-tech production such as TV sets or computers could have noticeable results on Turkey’s perception abroad: “promoting your successful companies that are having achievements internationally, you know hot design, popular, cultural group in many ways, some of the younger groups
also they’re starting now to have increasing commercial involvement route” (Richard Anderson).

According to the branding expert Wally Olins, a dependable and safe airline can also contribute positively to your nation brand (Şahinbaş, 2007). By more than doubling passengers and planes between 2002 and 2008, Turkish Airlines, also partly privatized in the meantime and becoming a member of the prestigious airline alliance Star Alliance, has contributed positively to Turkey’s economic news making (Flottau, 2008).

Turkey has earned the reputation of a place with reliable but comparably inexpensive labor, and the fact that well-known companies like MAN or Mercedes Benz outsourced large production sites for commercial vehicles there might also nurture the notion that Turks are able to produce world-class products.

5.6.2.2 The rising star: Turkey’s investment case

The boom in strategic foreign investments is the second pillar of Turkey’s nation brand story in the economic domain. With inflation successfully fought, Turkey has recently invited more foreign capital than ever before.

Between 1990 and 2000 Turkey’s foreign direct investments dramatically stagnated at the level of US$ 1 bn annually while China, for example, expanded from US$ 3,5 bn to US$ 103 bn in the same period of time (Schlötzer, 2004a: 30). But the current economic reform progress is also reflected in a new intensity of foreign direct investments flowing into Turkey, with €8,3 bn in 2005, €15,6bn in 2006 and €16,3 bn in 2007 catapulting Turkey into the league of Spain or Italy. Being currently ranked 22 in most attractive FDI destinations by UNCTAD (Domanic, 2007b), Turkey has set the goal of becoming one of the globally Top 5 most attractive countries in this regard (Özmenek, 2007b) and was rated the rising star for FDI in 2008 by the International Institute of Finance (IIF) (Anon./Zaman, 2007l). “Turkey is the India of Europe, with huge population, fantastic GDP growth, favorable economic fundamentals” (PwC/ULI, 2008: 31).

Evidently, the European Customs Union of 1996 and EU accession scenario after 2004 have started to pay off. EU countries account for 60% of the total FDI stock in Turkey, and of 15.000 foreign companies investing in Turkey 8.300 come from EU countries (Barysch/Hermann, 2007).

To the experts’ mind here is one key asset for Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy: “That to me is the main positive trait of what Turkey is, its willingness to promote entrepreneurs no matter where they come from, no matter what background, so I think it has a tremendous entrepreneurial spirit” (Richard Anderson).

15 source: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org)
Turkey might compensate some critical weaknesses of EU-Europe’s economy especially with regard to the demographic changes: “if we can make and pursue the stable economic situation I think it’s going to be an important market for Europe with its workforce, younger generations” (Murat Sungar).

In terms of growth, Turkey is already outperforming most of the European member states. Some hope arises that the economic development will produce a momentum for Turkey’s reputation: “Rapid economic growth can change Turkey’s image by diminishing fears of instability and migration. Individuals in the EU would start to see Turkey as an asset for the European economy rather than the current climate which embodies the notion of placing the begging bowl out for EU transfer” (Guérot, 2004: 99). The trade partners and investors could be important amplifiers of good news: “through the business world too, when foreign companies start coming in (...) I think the perception is beginning to change already” (Erkan Arikan).

And Turkey could support this perception by more actively displaying the positive developments: “You show these incredible buildings that people would never expect to see in Istanbul. You show the environments that these people are working in. You show the modern factories, for example Vestel is producing these televisions in” (Richard Anderson).

As an interesting creative approach to investment promotion, in summer 2008 Turkey’s Investment Support and Promotion Agency (ISPAT) set up a campaign together with the international logistics and express transport company DHL; packages and parcels sent out of Turkey by DHL will carry stickers saying “Investors love Turkey, Turkey loves investors”, trucks in international transportation will be branded accordingly and finally later on DHL will sponsor tours for foreign journalists (Özer, 2008).

The informants of this thesis reveal some optimism that these messages will eventually trickle down into the Europe’s public mind. Likewise, Altınbaşak-Ebrem’s model (Chapter 2.3) showed that the ones who would rate the economy of Turkey better would generally be more supportive about Turkey’s entry to the EU (Altınbaşak-Ebrem, 2005: 235). It was also hypothesized that Turkey’s minor improvements in the Nation Brand Index between 2005 and 2007 (see Chapter 2.2.1) could be due to Turkey’s more recent gain in financial and economic reputation. In a study on a financial valuation of the nation brands using seven economic performance measures, eight infrastructure and efficiency measures and six consumer perception measures, Turkey lead the score board with the greatest gains in 2006, improving its brand value in financial terms by 62% (Anholt/GMI, 2007a: 8-9).

5.6.2.3 Positive news won’t get through
Looking again at the Eurobarometer public opinion data however, the good news produced by Turkey’s economy are not reflected in the public opinion towards Turkey’s EU membership.
Despite the quite positive developments of important economic indicators such as the gross domestic product (GDP) growing by more than 40%, the exports almost tripling and Turkey’s FDI reaching historical peaks (see below), as with tourism, the unfavorable opinion against Turkey’s EU accession in the Eurobarometer data constantly increased.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (Mio YTL)</th>
<th>Exports (Mio US$)</th>
<th>FDI in (US$ bn)</th>
<th>EB Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>72 436</td>
<td>27 775</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>68 309</td>
<td>31 334</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>72 520</td>
<td>36 059</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>76 338</td>
<td>47 252</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>83 486</td>
<td>63 167</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>90 500</td>
<td>73 476</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>96 738</td>
<td>85 534</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-2: Turkey’s GDP, Exports and FDI vs. Eurobarometer Opinions (sources: www.turkstat.gov.tr, OECD, European Commission 2000-2006)

Two hypotheses follow, either the good news can not get through to the European public or it is not relevant enough to outdo negative sentiment towards Turkey’s EU membership.

As discussed before, at a first glance, Turkey’s state of economy has a considerable relevance to Europe’s public. When asked to evaluate the most important conditions of Turkey’s membership, improvements in the economy trail second behind human rights in 2006.

Figure 5-9: Conditions for Turkey’s EU accession (source: European Commission (EB 66), 2006: 225)

One reason why the economic good news is not reflected in Europe’s public opinion might be that the connection between positive domestic economic
developments and the likely reduction in the risk of another Turkish labor mig-
ratin has not been established: “In the eye of the general public these is-

A second conjecture is that Turkey’s good economic news has simply not reached the broad public agenda: “I don't think most Europeans are really aware how big the boom is and what it means” (Suat Kınıkloğlu). Similarly, Jacques Lafitte, founder of Avisa Partners, an EU Public Affairs Consultancy firm was quoted during a conference on Turkey’s EU accession in November 2008: “Try to tell Europeans that Turkey is a successful country on the economic side, which it is. People do not know about it” (Oğuz, 2008: 1). This assumption also holds largely for the political sphere and underlines the need to spread the word: “European parliamentarians – I am not speaking about the people on the street – do no know that the economic development in Turkey. We cannot wait for them to realize this; we have to act proactively and tell them our own story” (Balci, 2008b: 4).

Evidently, Turkey’s economic development has mainly been realized in the business domain and is more or less an insider discourse in a closed circle: “Da ist sicherlich eine kleine, aber was Meinungsbildung angeht nicht ganz unwichtige Gruppe, unsere Wirtschaftsakteure, die einfach sagen, da ist eine Menge Vorteil drin. Wir machen schon jetzt gute Geschäfte, aber richtig kon-
solidieren und noch besser wäre das mit einer Mitgliedschaft” [There is cer-
tainly a small, but with regard to opinion formation not quite dispensable
group, our economic actors, who simply say, there are many advantages. We
already do a good business, but we should consolidate fully, and this would
work even better with membership] (Heinz Kramer).

Turkish industrialists have similar experiences: “I think now there is a very healthy perception of Turkey and its industrial dimension. And therefore the entrepreneurs, the people, the business people there is a lot of positive feel-
ings about Turkey and Turks” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

TÜSİAD’s communication approach shown before (Chapter 5.3.3.4) involving German business spokespeople like Edzard Reuter, Norbert Walter, Roland Berger or Arend Oetker as advocate for Turkey’s EU membership seems con-
sistent given this insight.

Promoting positive business could also qualify as a force against other sources of prejudice: “Because by promoting that, business success, then this whole thing, you know xenophobia about Muslims and all the rest of it by definition will start to go lower down the agenda. Because we are choosing to turn the
volume up in relevant areas. So by definition that would recede” (Richard Anderson).

The reason why such a promotion by the European business circles is not done systematically might stem from competing interest conflicts: The positive economic evaluation is sometimes conflicting with general political mainstreaming of economic actors: “And here for example is a duality because German business supports Turkey. But German business also supports the conservatives” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

A third explanation for Europe not embracing Turkey’s impressive economic could be that this trend might not solely be seen as a positive development: ”In France, you should be very careful about talking Turkey’s potential as a business country, as an economic power. Because the French are already afraid that they’re losing their grip on, you know grandeur. So you know it might not be very wise to keep promoting that” (Ümit Boyner).

It is the general dynamism that leads elsewhere even to an apprehension of inferiority: “Wenn man hört wie viel Prozent Wirtschaftswachstum die Türkei hat und dass das jetzt seit ein paar Jahren so geht, nach einer wirklich extre- men Krise, da gibt es so ein unglaubliches Staunen, aber es gibt auch so ein Neidgefühl glaub ich. Die Dynamik beeindruckt einerseits, aber macht auch, glaube ich, Angst in einem Land, was so undynamisch ist wie Deutschland” [When one hears how many percent of economic growth there have been in Turkey and that this has been like that for a few years, after a really extreme crisis, there is this infidel amazement, but also some notion of jealousy. On the one hand the dynamism is quite impressive, but on the other hand also causes fear in a country that is as undynamic as Germany] (Christiane Schlötzer).

The caution might not only be based on the fear of being outstripped, but not unrealistically also envision the dislocation of jobs: “Viele deutsche Firmen (...) kooperieren schon länger und investieren ziemlich viel jetzt. Das beeindruckt, schafft aber gleichzeitig Ängste, weil man denkt, ja dann gehen die in die Türkei. Da ist es billiger, da produzieren sie billiger ihre Autoteile, also das ist zweischneidig. Wirtschaftlicher Erfolg macht ja auch gleich neidisch” [Many German companies have been cooperating for a while and invest heavily. This impresses, but at the same time causes fears, because one thinks, well now they go to Turkey. Cheaper to produce car parts, this is double-edged. Economic success causes jealousy] (Christiane Schlötzer).

And finally there is a fourth explanation why Turkey’s economic development does not shine through in European public’s assessment of Turkey’s EU membership; the economic dimension is just not as salient as other nation brand dimensions when forming an opinion in favor or against the accession. Using the data from the Eurobarometer 2006, Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca (2007) are able to prove that views on Turkey are multidimensional and that citizens use different arguments for their positions. According to this research, the likeli-
hood of supporting or opposing Turkey's membership depends on whether citizens adopt a perspective that is based on costs and benefits (utilitarian), identity-based (resting on views whether or not Turkey is part of Europe (identity-based) or founded in the conviction of a rights-based EU emphasizing democracy and human rights (post-national). Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca find that support for Turkey's membership mostly rests on post-national arguments, and opposition to Turkey's accession is mainly linked to identity-related arguments.

For the discussion of the role economic news can play, it was found that instrumental reasons in terms of costs or benefits play a less relevant role in the decision making: “Turkey's future membership in the EU, we conclude, will thus not be won or lost at the public opinion level on the material plane” (Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca, 2007: II). The economic argument (and the connected question of migration) will, despite its assumed relevance by many experts, probably be not decisive for the Euroepan public when positioning in favour or against Turkey.

This finding does not at all imply to neglect economic assets of Turkey's nation brand, but calls for the awareness to embed these arguments in a broader value-context: “Detailed impact assessments and prospective studies about the likely costs and benefits of Turkish membership are of course an essential tool for policy-makers to prepare both parties (the EU and Turkey) for accession. Still, as membership will not solely be settled on cost/benefit grounds, policy-makers should pay more attention to the way the debate about EU values is framed” (Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca, 2007: 24).

A closer analysis of the political/governmental dimensions of nation branding in the next section will investigate whether the other relevant post-national and identity-related arguments in favour of Turkey's EU membership could be favorably presented in these settings.

Business audiences will be attentive to the way the country offers investment opportunities, how the country’s top companies perform, or how the talent of the country can be employed, but also of course how the political context and Turkey’s leadership develop.

5.6.3 Good governance speaks louder than words

Trivial at first sight but quite interesting to look at in more detail is the strategic communicative potential deriving from Turkey’s government with regard to the EU accession. The actions taken by Turkey are considered to speak louder than words: “We’re now enjoying this single party government and greater economic, major indicators stability. So that’s a good foundation for promoting Turkey abroad” (Richard Anderson).

In the literature it is maintained that “all countries, at some level, get the reputation they deserve - either by things they have done, or by things they failed to do - and it is astonishingly naive to imagine that the deeply rooted beliefs of entire populations can possibly be affected by advertising or public
relation campaigns unless these campaigns truthfully reflect a real change in the country itself” (Anholt/GMI, 2006b: 5). In marketing terms, with regard to nation images “both the problem and the solution always have far more to do with the product than with the packaging” (ibid).

5.6.3.1 Stable on track
For Turkey therefore the facts of positive reforms should speak for themselves: “I think the best thing to do is continue with the changes that are already being made. (...) I think the only way is for Turkey to show that it's reliable, trustworthy, stable country” (Dirk Nieuwboer). The visible adoption of European core topics in particular could contribute positively: “show the truly open country, willing to make reforms, to accept the European ideas and philosophy, regarding human rights” (Jose Ligero-Cofrade). There should be no compromising on Turkey's commitment to the accession process: “It should send a message that it meets all the criteria to join the EU, that it's ready to adopt the acquis communautaire, that it's met the Copenhagen political criteria, that it's stable, democratic country. It (...) buys into the ideals of Europe, that's the message it should send” (Stephen McCormick).

Some reforms already undertaken during the past AKP-legislation might not have found adequate coverage: “sie könnten auf diesem Kurs fortfahren und deutlich machen, dass sie also das hier in diesem Land, (...) die haben ja 150 Gesetze verändert. Das muss man, finde ich, noch mehr in die europäische Öffentlichkeit bringen” [they could continue this path and reveal that in this country they changed 150 laws. That has to be brought more to the European public] (Brigitte Özbali). In the political domain it is generally assumed that the media coverage more or less expresses the news value of governmental activities: “it's not that the general public is stupid or ignorant, or that the media has somehow failed to tell the truth about the place: it's usually that the county simply isn’t doing enough new things to capture anyone's attention or prove that the place has a relevance to the lives of the people it is trying to talk to. New and interesting things are the only things that get adequately reported in the media, because they are the only things that people are always interested in” (Anholt, 2007a: 35).

When producing and presenting relevant news, Turkey should adopt a moderate tone making clear that the process of Europeanization is intrinsically motivated: “Selbstsicherheit, aber demokratisch, also nicht dieses ganze überbordende Selbstbewusstsein, weil das schreckt eher ab, also nicht so: 'Wir sind sowieso die Größten', sondern irgendwie selbstbewusst, aber auch so die eigenen Fehler sehen, dass man sagt: 'Wir machen das zu unserem eigenen Projekt, die Demokratisierung und Entwicklung’” [Self-assuredness, but democratically, not this exuberant assertiveness, because this rather warns off, but somehow self-confident, also aware of the own faults, saying ‘we make democratization and development our own project’] (Christiane Schlötzer).
Demonstrating stability would be a clear message that could convince the European publics to gain a reliable partner on their side: “Die Türkei muss für sich als stabile Säule der Demokratie werben. Ein Land, dass wirklich die Fahne der Demokratie aufrecht erhält, natürlich auch was die Menschenrechte angeht. Das auch durchaus offensiver angehen und wirklich sagen, dass wir alle eine sehr, sehr großen Nutzen davon haben, dieses Land weiterhin zu stabilisieren und es auf unserer Seite zu haben als es auf der anderen Seite zu haben, auf der potentiell anderen Seite und das wird vielen, vielen Menschen in dieser Simplizität auch einleuchten” [Turkey must promote itself as a stable pillar of democracy. A country that really waves the flag of democracy, needless to say, when it comes to human rights also. Be more proactive and underscore that we all will profit enormously to further stabilize this country and have it on our side rather than on the other side, and this will make sense to many people in this simplicity] (Frank Stauss).

The message of stability and reliability should be endured especially to counteract Europe’s volatility in political and public opinion vis à vis Turkey: “Das ist vielleicht die schwierigste, glaubwürdig rüber zu bringen, zu sagen, ihr könnt ja stimmgangmäßig rumschwanken wie ihr wollt, wir halten am Ziel fest und das zeigen wir auch durch Politik. Einfach die Europäer damit immer wieder zu konfrontieren und zu sagen: ’Ihr seid diejenigen, die eigentlich von der Vereinbarung abweichen, wir machen weiter’ (...) Das wäre die Grundbotschaft und die müsste man sowohl gegenüber den Regierungen und dann über Medien auch versuchen gegenüber der Öffentlichkeit” [This might be most difficult to credibly get across to say you might seesaw as much as you want, but we will commit to our objective and demonstrate that through politics. Simply to confront the Europeans with that over and over again and say ‘you are the ones that change the rules, we keep up’. This would be the basic message that should be maintained towards the governments and then also across the media towards the public] (Heinz Kramer).

5.6.3.2 Improve the weak sides
Despite some initial success, there are still critical issues for improvement affecting Turkey’s reputation in the EU. “They have to address the (...) key issues (...), it is impossible to take Turkey any further until you find a suitable response to. (...) people will always raise the Kurdish issue, human rights, the Armenian issue, and so on, so you have to find a satisfactory answer or something that will sound convincing and credible. Not the sort of official language that too often is what Turkey provides. (...) That's not a just a question of image, that's a questions of really solving these issues. And I think they are solvable, all of them” (Nicole Pope). Altinbaşak-Ebrem (2004: 236) identified economic/financial problems, human rights and the Kurdish issue as the main political issues to be resolved on the way to Europe.

As discussed before, “places must earn their reputation, not construct it”. (Anholt, 2007a: 39). The way Turkey has handled the Kurdish issue over years is a good example of how the country holds responsibility for the missed opportunities to paint a better picture: “The fact that the cause of the
Kurds is a just one, the methods you use then the type of organization that the PKK was not, I don't think this was always seen. I mean largely because of Turkey's mistakes. Turkey with its heavy handed oppression of civilians and so on, it's just completely pushing people in the other camps, in terms of public opinion. So I think that Turkey has itself to blame to a large extent” (Nicole Pope).

Looking to the future, Turkey has to find ways to solve some of its well-publicized and high profile issues: “if you are capable of creating a situation in which the most obvious inequalities are dealt with, in other words you, you did things that stopped people complaining violently about human rights, then you can start moving things” (Wally Olins).

The German politician Ruprecht Polenz, quoting a voter he talked to on Turkey’s EU accession, provides another example: “wenn die Türkei das mit den Armeniern in Ordnung brächte (...) wäre ja dann auch ein Zeichen dafür, dass sie doch jetzt vom europäischen Denken was mitbekommen hätten” [...if Turkey sorted the thing with the Armenians out it would be a sign that they had started to think like Europeans] (Ruprecht Polenz). In fact, president Abdullah Gül's start of a dialogue was explicitly praised by EU's progress report on Turkey published in November 2008 (Gültaslı, 2008d).

Similarly, Suat Kınıklioğlu summarized after the successful re-election of AK-Parti government in 2007 that “the Turks also need to move quickly with concrete steps to further open this country and make it a transparent and functioning democracy” (2007b: 1). Devising successful politics in some critical areas apparently qualifies as important proof points to the EU.

5.6.3.3 Split personalities: Politicians’ public behavior
An important part of modern political communication is the mediated leadership personality. In general, the AKP government is considered to have earned some respect in Europe: “I think Tayyip has done an excellent job, in terms of presenting Turkey as a more considered voice in Europe” (Richard Anderson).

In the eyes of some informants however, the Turkish Prime Minister’s temper contributes to negative perceptions: “Erdoğan is pretty bad on this. I think generally he’s a good prime minister. I think he’s the best Prime Minister Turkey’s had in a long time. But he’s also fairly autocratic and when he gets upset about something he says the first thing that comes to his mind. And unfortunately that’s often something very very stupid. So he causes a lot of damage. And he’s very narrow-minded on some things” (Nicole Pope). The British historian Perry Anderson supports this view in a recent analysis: “The weaknesses in Erdoğan’s public image lie elsewhere. Choleric and umbrageous, he is vulnerable to ridicule in the press, suing journalists by the dozen for unfavourable coverage of himself or his family, which has done well out of the AKP’s years in power” (Anderson, 2008: 15).
Erdoğan and other Turkish politicians will have to acknowledge that targeting Turks or Western Europeans with political communications at present means addressing two quite different audiences:

“I would advise him probably to be very careful and try a much more, have a much more careful approach in both in his conversations with Western European politicians and in what gives his messages to his own public opinion. Because there was a tendency which is very understandable because the way a leader is seen in a country like Turkey is very much different from the way a leader is seen in a country like Holland or probably Scandinavian countries the same. In the eye of Dutch politicians and in the eye of Dutch public opinion, he should really refrain from making what you may call a bit bluntly these very Mediterranean, agitated ‘I’m a leader, therefore I’m strong guy’ kind of speeches. Because that doesn't go down very well with both politicians and public opinion. And the colder north-western areas of Europe” (Willemijn vaan Haften).

Given the permeability of international media systems neither way will be an exclusive solution and any message given to Turkish or European audiences will be most probably reflected at the other end: “die Sprache, die sie sprechen, die politische Formensprache sozusagen, die ist immer noch sehr türkisch, aber du kannst auch nicht sagen sie sollen das alles ändern, weil sie sprechen ja zu ihrem Publikum. Aber da gibt es natürlich viele Dinge, die nicht sehr europäisch wirken, also wie Konflikte behandelt werden” [The language they speak, sort of the political iconography, is still quite Turkish, but you can't say either they should change all of that, because they address their audience. But there are certainly many things that don't appear European, like how conflicts are handled] (Christiane Schlötzer).

Presenting to European audiences however, a considerable level of empathy is needed for Turkish politicians: “We need to know how a Frenchman thinks in order to anticipate upon their sort of susceptibility their problems (...) Fingerspitzengefühl. Kind of awareness of what is acceptable in a let's say German or Dutch context. But that is also, of course, a weakness, because, you know, empathy is extremely important if you have to, if you want to be successful in Europe” (Peter van Ham).

Increasingly Erdoğan is also criticized for his sometimes aggressive public behavior and his apparent deficit in accepting criticism (Kramer, 2007b). The Davos walkout discussed in Chapter 2.3.1 has been an interesting case in that regard. Erdoğan rarely smiles, is often not consensus-orientated and often appears quite angry in public (de Witt, 2007b). Not only in European eyes, he seems badly advised and is clearly not a master of communication (Güngör, 2008b; de Witt, 2007b). And this could have consequences for Turkey’s overall reputation: “obviously in Turkey, in Erdoğan’s circle there is nobody really sort of strong enough or clever enough or informed enough to raise the alarm bells. And that doesn’t make me particularly optimistic about Turkish (...) branding strategy” (Peter van Ham).

On the other hand, the quite unique outward interpretation of the office of Turkish president by Abdullah Gül needs to be taken into account. He is said to contribute quite positively to Turkey’s emerging soft power, especially by
capitalizing effectively on the very good relationships to other heads of state he has built up while serving as Turkey’s foreign minister (Yilmaz, 2009).

5.6.3.4 Pride meets truth

Historically, Turkey has displayed considerable weaknesses to deal openly, transparently and truthfully with existing or alleged problems or mistakes; the ability to acknowledge own deficits appeared limited by the Turkish pride: “man muss offener mit Defiziten umgehen, an deren Überwindung man arbeitet, d.h. die türkische Tendenz, das ist unter AKP besser geworden, aber auch noch nicht ganz oder nicht hinreichend überwunden, zu sagen, diese Probleme, von denen ihr immer redet, die sind eigentlich nicht da” [deficits to be overcome have to be treated more openly, i.e. the Turkish tendency, which has improved under AKP but is yet not fully or sufficiently surmounted, to deny problems that are brought up as if they were nonexistent] (Heinz Kramer).

Facing the EU application process, Turkey should consider a new mode of political communication. This implies opening up and engaging in discussions that might not be actively pursued by Turkey: “Sich auf diese kritischen Anmerkungen zu den islamitischen Inhalten, zur Rolle der Frau, zu Freiheitsrechten usw., sich wirklich einlassen und sich dieser Diskussion nicht zu entziehen in dem Sinne, Ihr kratzt damit an unserer Ehre” [To let oneself in for critical remarks concerning Islamic issues, the role of women, civil liberties etc., and not to withdraw from the discussion in the sense of our pride is being hurt] (Rainhardt von Leoprechting). Grabbe underwrites that “the way the Turks respond will strongly affect EU perceptions of their country. They need to meet criticism not with prickliness and nationalistic rhetoric, but with moderation and coolness” (Grabbe, 2004: 16).

The inability to accept criticism has a negative impact on Turkey’s reputation: “When anyone has made a critical comment about Turkey, rather than digesting that intelligently, and responding at the right time, it becomes amazingly defensive, and aggressive and goes into an attack mode. And it does it very, very quickly and it generally says the wrong things that stimulate even greater kind of questioning and antipathy towards Turkey” (Richard Anderson). Turkey has to display improvements in this area by openly acknowledging weaknesses: “Also nicht immer im Sinne des ungerechtfertigt Angegriffenen reagieren, sondern, durchaus offensiv auf das europäische Feststellen von Defiziten reagieren” [not to always react like a unjustifiably attacked, but to respond offensively to the European pinpointing to deficits] (Heinz Kramer).

Honoring competing ideas is an essential quality of the European Union: “Wenn man Teil der Europäischen Union und der damit verbundenen Kultur sein will, dann muss man bereit sein, sich auf den Wettstreit der Überzeugung einzulassen und da versuchen wir, den türkischen Partnern eben deutlich zu machen, es ist keine Verletzung Eurer Ehre, Eurer Werte, sondern es ist eben unser Grundverständnis” [If one wants to be part of the European Union and
its related culture, one also has to be open to competing convictions, and therefore we try to reveal to our Turkish partners that it does not hurt their pride or values, but it is just our basic understanding] (Rainhardt von Leprechting).

An open style of politics in EU contexts also means finding ways to accept the cultural value of compromises: “for us, to compromise is a different context than for them. I mean, for them compromise is shame. For Turks, to compromise means, per definition, that you haven’t succeeded. Which is of course in the EU context a really problematic issue, because you come to be compromising all the time” (Peter van Ham). The lack of compromise in Turkish politics was also explicitly mentioned by EU’s progress report on Turkey published in November 2008 (Çamlıbel, 2008b).

Openness furthermore implies not pretending things are fine which are not. A country should be positioned not only by its strengths, but also by its weaknesses (de Mesa, 2007). This certainly has to do with honesty: “We should be honest as well to see that Turkey is not necessarily the Turkey that we are trying to portray abroad as well” (Murat Özcelik). All issues put forward should be correct: “Wahrheitsgetreu, ist ganz wichtig, es darf nicht irgendwie beschönigt sein, wahrheitsgetreu über Schwierigkeiten, wie sie bewältigt werden. (...) auch da gilt, wie bei der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit immer, man muss sicherlich nicht alles sagen, aber das, was man macht, muss stimmen” [Truthfulness is very important, nothing should be euphemized, truthfulness about difficulties and how they are overcome. As always in public relations here it is true that not everything has to be said but what is said must be true] (Ruprecht Polenz).

Public diplomacy and a country’s actual foreign policy should not contradict each other; otherwise any public diplomacy strategy would be doomed to failure (Melissen, 2006c). The US’ fruitless efforts to improve the country’s image especially in the Middle East by numerous public diplomacy initiatives shows that public diplomacy can never mask policy failures (Wolf/Rosen, 2004; Walters, 2007).

Truthfulness implies in practical terms being ‘holistic’ about Turkey, that is, showing the whole and not only parts: “There are two Turkeys, one the west Istanbul and Izmir, and the East. And those who know Turkey always say that look what are we going to do with the Eastern part of Turkey. (...) Turkey should be a packaged deal, you can't say I want the East or the West” (Murat Sungar).

Being transparent and admitting weaknesses could mobilize sympathy and solidarity in the target communities; a credible public commitment to work on changes also qualifies as an important message itself: “nicht so tun, als wäre das eigentlich alles Zuckerschlecken oder so, sondern ich würde schon sagen, was alles verlangt war, ich würde die Leute teilhaben lassen an den Anstren- gungen, die Dinge zu meistern, so dass dann auch so ein natürlicher Reflex
eher angesprochen werden kann, also jetzt hat sich jemand so angestrengt und jetzt soll er das dann auch haben können, für was er nun auch kontinuierlich so gearbeitet hat” [don’t act as if this was nothing but a walk in the park, but I would say openly what all is demanded, let the people participate in the efforts to master the challenges, so that a natural reflex could be addressed, now that they have strived so hard they should get what they worked for] (Ruprecht Polenz).

5.6.3.5 Perception and reality in public diplomacy
The aspects discussed make very clear that public diplomacy is practically without use if there is no connection to policy making: “Public diplomacy, unlike ‘spin’ or propaganda, succeeds when it accurately reflects and advocates a government’s policies and amplifies a nation’s soft power” (Smith, 2007: 115). For effective (brand) management, successful public diplomacy needs to have connected structures to the policy making process and to have influence on all important national stakeholders (Anholt, 2007a: 14).

For public diplomacy in the context of Turkey’s accession process action and image will interplay: “this is an issue of both perception and reality, this is an issue not just of image (...) There need to be some quite powerful reality changes, if Turkey is going to make itself truly a candidate for European Union” (Wally Olins). Solving some of the most difficult issues provides the necessary groundwork for any improvement in the areas of image and reputation: “sie hat natürlich zu Grunde liegende Sachprobleme und die muss sie lösen und in dem Moment, wo sie da mit Lösungen aufwartet, kann sie dann auch das Image verbessern” […there are of course fundamental issues Turkey has to solve, and in the very moment comes up with fixes, it can also improve the image] (Ruprecht Polenz).

Anholt (2007a: 31) developed the following hierarchy of influences to illustrate how perceptions of nations are shaped:
1. by the things that are done in the country, and the way they’re done
2. by the things that are made in the country, and the way they’re made
3. by the way other people talk about the country
4. by the way the country talks about itself.
Branding in some common understanding suggests that step 4 could make up for the steps 1-3. However, a nation’s reputation is not built through communication and consequently cannot be changed through communication either. Talking about itself should follow actions, and actions speak louder than words. Finally, the better a country does, the more likely is that others will do the talking and spread the word. In public diplomacy contexts, perception and reality are constantly intertwined (Anholt, 2007a: 34).

In case of successful reform policies, good news from Turkey is expected to find adequate publicity in Europe when the stories are picked up and multiplied by third parties: “when we move into the accession negotiations we become more and more aware of the fact that Turkey is sliding into the European Union. More and more will be known about Turkey, more will be written
about Turkish efforts to try to adjust to the kind of rules and norms that we follow in Europe” (Christer Asp). This support from EU-Europe is crucial: “It is not solely our duty to promote Turkey. We cannot do it on our own” (Ayşegül Molu).

It is consequently both Turkish and EU politicians’ task “to create a 'positive story' about Turkey and tell it at every opportunity. What Turkey and the EU need to do is to highlight the positive aspects of the ‘new Turkey’: its political reforms that are bringing it closer to the European mainstream; its dynamic economy and increasingly close business links with the EU; its vibrant culture, including food, music and sports; and attractiveness for holiday-makers” (Barysch, 2006a: 3).

5.6.3.6 Relate to foreign domestic debates
Finally, with Europe’s domestic affairs a political context should be considered which is very difficult for Turkey to influence. There are numerous exogenous factors in the EU and the individual countries that Turkey might plan to treat with lobbying concepts, but which seem generally out of its scope: “it’s not just about Turkey. But also there's the whole aspect of what Europe will be 10 or 15 years time” (Nicole Pope).

As a lobbying task Turkey has to try to take precautions against a situation where it becomes “armed with a negative image when politicians or certain groups see Turkey as a threat, economically, or culturally, religious reasons” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). As seen in Chapter 2.4, many issues seem to depend on the national circumstances: “das sind dann so Faktoren, die aus sehr spezifisch nationalen, politischen Konjunkturlagen in der einen oder anderen Art und Weise dazu führen, dass entweder die Debatte sich überhaupt verschärft, dass sie überhaupt aufkommt, dass sie polarisiert wird, während es in anderen Ländern sehr viel ruhiger, sehr viel sachlicher zugeht” [...these are factors stemming from very specific national political conditions where by some means or other a debate arises and gets worse and polarizes, while in other countries it is much calmer and matter-of-fact] (Heinz Kramer).

In some countries it seems rewarding to bring up the issue of Turkey’s EU accession in domestic election campaigns: “But more and more its becoming material for local politics in Germany, in France, in Austria, and so all of a sudden European politicians started to use this image of Turkey created rightly or wrongly in some cases as a means to get votes from their people. I don’t like Turks or I don’t want Turks in some countries can get about 5-10% of votes” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). It is obvious that the question of Turkey’s EU membership in certain EU countries can be well connected to interior politics and debates on immigration and integration (Grosse Hüttmann, 2005).

Of course economic development could be a factor for the domestic debates: "Die Bedeutung oder die Wirkungsmächtigkeit dieser Diskussion hängt für mich mehr oder weniger direkt von der Entwicklung der sozioökonomischen Situation in den EU-Staaten ab” [The relevance and sphere of influence of this
discussion to me more or less directly depends on the development of the socio-economic situation in the EU countries] (Heinz Kramer). A substantial positive economic development in Europe could make Turkey’s accession much less of an issue: “wir wissen nicht wie Europa in 10 Jahren ist. Vielleicht wird es wieder einen großen Aufschwung geben in Europa, dann wird sich die Frage überhaupt nicht stellen” [...] we don’t know what Europe will be like in 10 years time. Potentially we will have another great boom in Europe, and the question might not arise] (Christiane Schlötzer).

And of course Islamic terrorism is such an exogenous factor Turkey can not influence which still might rub off on it: “If an Islamic terrorist blows himself up in London, unfortunately Turkey’s affected, it has nothing whatsoever with Turkey” (Nicole Pope). The lost sense of security and safety in Europe blurs also Turkey’s perception: “es gibt bisher keine Regierung, die darauf eine wirklich befriedigende Antwort gefunden hat im Sinne der Wiederherstellung der Sicherheit. Das ist ja das, was die Masse sich wünscht. In dieser Situation kommt dann ungünstigerweise verstärkt über den Faktor 9/11 dann sozusagen die Suche nach dem Sündenbock und da vermischt sich jetzt wunderbar Globalisierung, das ist alles, was nicht wir sind mit dann noch der konkreten Definition des anderen über die Muslime, d.h. konkret die Türken” [there is no government that has found a really satisfactory answer in the sense of restoring safety, as desired by the majority. In this situation, unfortunately amplified by 9/11, a scapegoat is looked for, and there globalization nicely mingles, that is, everything but us, and the other is concretely defined as Muslim, specifically Turks] (Heinz Kramer).

In general, in the opinion of some informants Turkey’s EU bid suffers from the Western societies having reached their limits of tolerating diversity: “What kind of limits are there to multiculturalism in West-European societies? Not necessarily from an elite point of view, but from society’s point of view. I mean, you know, you can be very sophisticated and postmodern (…) but there is a limit in our societies obviously which seems to be reached at least temporarily” (Peter van Ham). If held, the referenda now threatening Turkey’s entrance into the EU would have similarly affected previous accessions: “If people would have voted on Romanian and Bulgarian membership, a lot of people would have voted no as well, so it’s nothing necessarily about religion. It's about limit of the diversity in our societies” (Peter van Ham).

As indicated above, it will be very difficult to counteract such political and social currents from Turkey’s side: “When you see what's happening in most European countries, these backlashes against immigrants, suspicion about Islam and there’s a lot of things that count against Turkey that have nothing to do with Turkey itself. And these are factors that are difficult to affect, to really change and have an impact on” (Nicole Pope).

Even if Turkey were to resign from the membership application, many of the European domestic issues brought up above would not be solved: “By just blocking Turkey's membership you're not blocking Turks going to Europe. But
the more Europe will feel that by accepting some minority communities I think it's going to be much more competitive societies. I think our presence will help” (Murat Sungar). As will be analyzed in more detail later, by positively highlighting Turkish migration Turkey could derive some public diplomacy value from these domestic debates.

Looking at previous accessions could furthermore weaken the labor migration argument that is often connected to questions of saturated societies or the economic burdens of Turkey's EU accession: “the history of EU enlargement should be recounted; the anticipated mass migrations from large and relatively poor countries, such as Spain and Poland, never materialized because employment opportunities and incomes increased as they entered the EU, creating reasons for their citizens to stay at home” (Ruiz-Jiménez, 2008: 4).

Turkey is advised to attempt to keep the EU accession agenda as straight as possible and try to prevent new conditions entering the picture solely for domestic policy reasons: “Because the process is designed in such a way to create lots of problems for Turkey. And this is how they can sell it to their own public, to their governments: 'Don't worry about the Turks, we have put this and that in the negotiation framework so it's going to be very difficult for Turkey to move in the process'. So that kind of talk, that kind of view probably will decrease if we can manage to sell the product, in different markets” (Murat Sungar).

According to Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca (2007), just highlighting the benefits and arguing at an instrumental level might not impress those against Turkey's accession. The post-national mindsets have turned out to be to be most supportive for Turkey; “a strategy to ‘Europeanise' the national debates on Turkey’s membership might thus be crucial” (Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca, 2007: 23). Given all skepticism regarding a common public European sphere, if a supranational discourse on the future of the EU beyond domestic concerns could be accomplished and if spokespeople in favor of Turkey could be made heard across the borders, this is assumed to be helpful for Turkey (ibid.).

Turkey finally needs a clear-cut cultural profile for its “competitive identity” (Anholt, 2007a) that allows for positive projections crediting the nation brand account. An anecdotal case from everyday life in the UK illustrates this need: “It's become a tradition after the pub on Friday or Saturday night, you go for a kebab. It's seen as Turkish, or Greek or Cypriot. I don't think many people make a distinction” (Stephen McCormick). As outlined in the theory framework (Chapter 3.6), it becomes evident that cultural/societal aspects are also important strategic aspects of Turkey's profile besides the economic and political domains.

5.6.4 Worlds apart? Turkey's cultural spheres

In the cultural domain, Turkey could choose from an embarrassment of riches with regard to a public diplomacy strategy targeting EU-Europe. The cultural wealth comprises ages from the ancient world to the present, mingles differ-
ent religions and lifestyles, and oscillates mentally between the poles of East and West. Given the salience of debates questioning Turkey’s general cultural fit with EU-Europe (Gerhards, 2004; Gerhards/Hölscher, 2006), it seems one of Turkey’s most ambitious public diplomacy challenges to balance and moderate between these worlds apart.

5.6.4.1 Chances and burdens of history

As was described in Chapter 2.3, over the past centuries since the medieval ages the image of the Turk in Europe has been quite volatile, but towards modernity a clearly negative stereotype has been attached to Turkish Ottoman history. Some experts claim that this historical image is a burden for Turkey to the very day: “sometimes, especially the people in Europe, they only talk about the historical perceptions, they see us as enemies, they see us as the "other", they address all the negatives towards us, they see us threatening, that kind of military, historical, wars and everything. The Turks threatening Europe kind of historical images” (Ayşegül Molu).

European people’s perceptions of Turkey might be coded “maybe because of what they read about Turks in their history books when they were kids” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). School education obviously still plays a role in maintaining this conflict-ridden perspective: “Die Schulausbildung, die im Geschichtsunterricht doch überwiegend den Fokus auf die Kontroversen zwischen Abendland und Morgenland, wenn man das mal so untechnisch ausdrücken soll, legt” [School education, which – if this can be said in such a non-technical way – focuses largely on controversies between occident and orient] (Ruprecht Polenz).

This substance leads to a persistent memetic layer of reservations towards Turkey: “da wirken (...) tradierte Vorstellungen. (…) das geht zurück bis, würde ich sagen, subkutan in die Kreuzzugszeit und sehr stark Türken vor Wien, Bedrohung des Abendlandes, ja, irgend etwas, was man modern heute mit Huntington’s clash of civilizations bezeichnen würde, aber nicht erst nach nine eleven oder sonst was, sondern im Grunde schon Jahrhunderte alt ist. (...) dieses Bild des anderen, Barbarischen oder wie immer es sich dann geprägt hat, ist eigentlich immer noch da” [there are conceptions at work that have been passed on for a long time, this goes back at root to the age of crusades and particularly to the Siege of Vienna, menace to the occident, something that today would be referred to as Huntington’s clash of civilizations, but not only after 9/11, but basically centuries old. The image of the other, Barbarian or whatever was coined, is actually still there] (Heinz Kramer).

One expert even claims the “fear of Turks had been genetically coded” (Cüneyd Zapsu). At least a general historical consciousness seems culturally influenced: “One of the problems is that we are very sort of post-historical in our mindset, I mean, but underneath I think in Europeans there is a kind of a gene which sort of unconsciously remembers the history” (Peter van Ham).

Non-historic opinion formation on Turkey seems difficult: “You must sort of have a very optimistic post-modern world outlook that is sort of compatible
now and we don't care about this. And I think this is a very tricky issue for Turkey” (Peter van Ham).

In Slovenia however, despite massive historical concerns, such a position is more or less mainstream: “Jeder Slowene kennt die Türken auch aus der Geschichte, aber das ist schon seit, das ist schon vom 16. Jahrhundert und heutzutage ist das mehr literarisch interessant. Aber das ist dann dieses Bild von türkischen Kriegern, die gefallen sind und die Kinder geschleppt, aber für heute das spielt, ich meine, keine wichtige Rolle mehr” [Every Slovene knows the Turks from history, but this is 16th century and nowadays moreover of literary value. There is the image of Turkish warriors that were killed in action and who kidnapped children, but for today I think this is irrelevant] (Andrei Grasseli). And also even in Austria, the historical consciousness of Turkey is in decay: “Although some Austrians still refer to the historical memory of Ottoman armies laying siege to Vienna, most seem to have more contemporary concerns” (Barysch, 2007a: 4).

A relevant strategy to counterbalance the negative burden could be to put different spotlights on history: “Man unterschlägt, dass es neben den Türken vor Wien und den Kreuzzügen auch lange Phasen, gerade ab dem 17., 18. Jahrhundert gibt, wo die Türkei im europäischen Bündnissystem mal mit jenem, mal mit dem paktiert und es keineswegs so war, dass etwa alle anderen europäischen Mächte immer gegen das osmanische Reich gestanden hätten” [it is not often mentioned that besides the Siege of Vienna and crusades there are long periods, particularly after the 17th/18th century, when Turkey within the European system of alliances made deals with the former or the latter, and it is by no means true that all other European powers had always stood against the Ottoman Empire] (Ruprecht Polenz).

The value of tolerance is a typical example of a historic virtue of the Ottoman ages: “It is a reality for instance the Ottoman Empire, most of its existence was (…) very tolerant in religious terms” (De la Pena). Reminders are visible until today: “In Turkey, many civilizations, many ethnic groups, many religions they lived together. (…) In Ortaköy you can see mosque, synagogue and church together. So, we always live together so maybe that's the…it's coming again, the clash of civilizations or the multicultural, we had this experience I guess. This could be maybe our contribution” (Mehmet Ural). The presentation of Istanbul as a symbolic place for religious tolerance is a valuable opportunity in this regard.

Also in more recent history, openness and tolerance were exercised in Turkey when they were spurned in other parts of the world: “Was auch viele nicht wissen, es haben in der Nazizeit viele deutsche Wissenschaftler und vom dritten Reich Verfolgte in der Türkei Asyl gefunden” [What is also unknown to many is that during Nazi period many German scientists and victims of persecution were granted asylum in Turkey] (Ruprecht Polenz). The “Ernst Reuter

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16 Istanbul neighborhood
initiative” to improve Turko-German relationships, created the Foreign Ministers Abdullah Gül (and his successor Ali Babacan) and Frank-Walter Steinmeier, recalls Ernst Reuter’s exile in Ankara between 1933-1945 and foresees numerous civil society dialogue activities (TDN, 2007i, Ernst-Reuter-Initiative, 2006).

Turkey could also better capitalize on the ancient history: “For the more literate, for the more sort of discerning people back home, I think reminding them that Turkey’s part of classical civilization, has a wealth of Roman and Greek ruins, amphitheaters, and temples and many of these famous places biblical and classical places like Ephesus and you know some of the seven wonders of the world are actually in Turkey, not in Greece or Italy” (Gareth Jones). There is also the strategic potential of underscoring Anatolia’s past as the ‘cradle of Europe’: “We should show them the roots of culture, which are in Anatolia, the roots of European culture are also here. So we have to show them we are coming from the same roots” (Mehmet Ural).

It is Early Christianity in Turkish history that links to another dominant issue of Turkey’s perception that will need to be addressed in any public diplomacy strategy, the role of religion.

5.6.4.2 The special role of religion
Most obviously, Turkey’s dominant Muslim religion plays a central role in the way the country is looked at in EU-Europe: “when it comes to Turkey, because the main objection is I think, yes religion” (Amberin Zaman). With the issue of the Muslim belief, the historic image of the Turks culminates: “And most of that divisive factor was the fact that Turks were (…) threatening Muslims” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

Hence religion-related fear becomes a central motive to reject Turkey: “maybe the religion is the biggest issue to be afraid of, because of the whole Islamic terrorism, the fundamentalist terrorism that happened in the past five years, does not give the Islamic religion a very good image” (Erkan Arikan). For public diplomacy strategies with regard to the EU accession, “religion doesn’t necessarily help” and makes Turkey a special case compared to previous negotiations: “if all the Poles were Muslims, I’m sure we would have more doubts” (Peter van Ham).

The demarcation against the Islamic world is regarded as one meaningful common historical identity of Europe: “I mean, Europe, if you see how it’s been built, not necessarily institutionally and politically, but certainly emotionally it’s against Islam: fighting in Spain (…), Poitiers, Vienna, we all basically have learned it, but afterwards we’ve forgotten it. But there is a kind of understanding that what is European is basically set off against Russia and Islam” (Peter van Ham).

A recent study by the World Economic Forum confirms van Ham’s conjecture by detecting Islamophobia as a well-distributed pattern in Europe: “clear ma-
iorities in all European countries surveyed (...) see greater interaction between the West and the Muslim world as a threat. This reflects a growing fear among Europeans – driven in part by rising immigration from predominantly Muslim regions – of a perceived ‘Islamic threat’ to their cultural identities” (Mogahed/Younis, 2008: 139-140). In all Non-European countries under study the assumed benefits clearly exceeded the threats caused by interaction.

Figure 5-10: Evaluation of the interaction between Muslim and Western World (source: Mogahed/Younis, 2008: 140)

The coexistence of Christian and Muslim religions in Europe is apparently an issue that has the potential to ultimately block Turkey’s accession: “The people think there are problems with immigrants, (...) there is this discussion what should we do, what, how should we integrate the Muslim population (...). If in ten years, there is not a solution to the Muslim question in Holland, I think Turkey can do whatever it wants to do” (Dirk Nieuwoer). Debates about religious symbolism can add to that picture, like in France “there’s really this very militant secularism that feels very threatened by the headscarf. (...) In the UK you see, you get to the customs office at the Heathrow airport and the woman might be of a Pakistani origin and have a uniform that includes a headscarf. (...) Secularism is so much part of the French identity” (Nicole Pope). It was shown in Chapter 2.1 that Europeans who regarded immigration as a bad thing would also more likely oppose Turkey’s EU membership, with a considerably strong correlation in France, Germany and the Netherlands.
A recent PEW survey (PEW, 2008) showed that the unfavorable views of Muslims are further on the rise in Europe; countries like Spain, before comparably balanced in their views of Muslims, now lead in negativity.

Figure 5-11: Negative views of Muslims (PEW, 2008: 2)

This issue seems to be one of the most difficult to attack for Turkey: “When you see what’s happening in most European countries, this backlash against immigrants, suspicion about Islam and there’s a lot of things that count against Turkey that have nothing to do with Turkey itself. And these are factors that are difficult to affect, to really change and have an impact on” (Nicole Pope).

In a public diplomacy perspective, what Turkey needs is to strategically dissociate its EU membership bid from such general discourses of domestic politics in Europe: “In this regard, EU elites have an important role to play. They can help disentangle the question of Turkey’s accession from the fear of Muslim immigration, which would help Turkey’s accession prospects. The language of the debate on Turkey’s accession should focus on Turks, not Muslims” (Ruiz-Jiménez, 2008: 3).

In fact the stereotyping lead to an uncontrollable blending of nationalities and ethnics under one umbrella; for example “in the Netherlands, there for a very long time the picture of Turks and Moroccans would all be mixed together, people would not be able to distinguish. In the public eye, they would all be the same. These Muslim, these poor uneducated illiterate Muslim immigrants” (Willemijn van Haaften). Only more recently, through good practice, cases of fairly integrated so-called Euro-Turks in the Netherlands or Germany, Turkish immigrants have slowly managed to dissolve from the general Muslim mainstream (Erdenir, 2006). A clearly profiled and contemporary nation brand Turkey would have some benefits in this regard.
In an international perspective beyond immigration aspects, in the encounter of Turkey and the EU it is assumed that “the difference is not only being Muslim against Christian but a very religious, fervently religious country vis-à-vis a post-religious continent” (De la Pena). In Turkey, despite the country’s secular constitution in the informants’ observation religion has a significant social outreach: “70% of minimum of the population, 70-80% of Turkey is religious. Maybe not radical, fundamentalist, but very religious” (Jose Ligero-Confrade).

Whereas in many EU-European countries, religion has lost the previous prevalence: “the UK is not a particularly religious place anymore, it’s very very secular” (Stephen McCormick); also, religion is not a public issue and has become solely a private matter: “Es gibt unterbewusst auch noch eine Abwehrreaktion gegenüber der Türkei, über die eigentlich kaum jemand spricht, die aber nach meinem Dafürhalten auch da ist. (...) Unbewusst sieht das so aus, wir sind hier in Europa, vor allem in Deutschland, in einer Gesellschaft außerordentlich stark säkularisiert. Religion findet zwar statt, aber die Menschen sagen, also wenn das jemand privat machen will, warum nicht? Es stört uns nicht, aber eine große gesellschaftliche Bedeutung oder gar politische hat es nicht und ich persönlich nehme es auch nicht so furchtbar ernst” [There is a subconscious defensive reaction towards Turkey that is only rarely talked about. Subconsciously we in Europe, especially in Germany, live in an extraordinary secularized society. Religion does take place, but people say if someone wants to do that privately, why not. It does not disturb us, but is neither has any greater social or even political meaning and I personally don’t take it too serious either] (Ruprecht Polenz).

It is expected that “if Turkey joins the EU, the mentality will change. But it will take time” (Jose Ligero-Confrade) and that in reality “the vast majority of Turks practice their religion in much the same matter-of-fact way as do Christians in Western Europe” (Anon./Economist, 2005a: 5). On the other hand, research on church attendance in England showed there are more visitors to mosques than churches on a weekly basis (Erdenir, 2006: 4).

The data of Bertelsmann Foundation 2008 Religion Monitor (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007) does not provide enough evidence for the experts’ opinions presented above. Comparing the centrality religion has in the different societies, Turkey is comparable to the EU countries Poland and Italy. Europe has different degrees of religious intensity.
For public diplomacy purposes a strategic potential for Turkey could be trying to improve Europe’s understanding of the Islam and contribute to the inter-religious dialogue. A lack of knowledge about this religion in Europe is one of the reasons for the fear caused by Islam: “Der Islam ist was Dunkles, was Unbekanntes, was Bedrohliches. Unkenntnis ist natürlich ein großer Faktor” [Islam is something dark, something unknown, something threatening. Ignorance is certainly a huge factor] (Christiane Schlötzer).

Both Turkey and the EU need to take part in this information exercise: “the unspoken role of religion within the EU must be openly discussed at some point as a way to educate EU and Turkish citizens about religious tolerance. This discussion should be promoted by all parties, including Turkey, the EU Commission” (Ruiz-Jiménez, 2008: 4). With pre-accession negotiation underway since 2007, it will be important to observe how the approximation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a Muslim majority (43% of the population) towards the EU will impact the discourse of the role of religions in Europe.

The impressive success of the UN-backed “Alliance of Civilizations” project initiated by Turkey and Spain serves as an interesting example how Christian and Muslim cultures can cooperate and could achieve significant relevance for Turkey’s future public diplomacy strategy (Domanic, 2007b: 80; ) and serves as a role model for a new understanding of diplomacy in general (Çobanoğlu, 2009).

Turkish Islamic communities in Western Europe seem to play a prominent role in inter-religious understanding. Turkey runs a program of religious embassy, which demands some improvements: “During my trips to European cities I saw that well-educated religious attachés are able to do an immense job by means of lobbying for Turkey. Unfortunately these are not organized efforts. If we can work with the DITIB or other Turkish networks, we can overcome
this religion-related prejudice” (Suat Kınıklioğlu, interviewed by Balcı, 2008a: 3). A current focus is put on the reform of the training religious officers receive before they are sent abroad by Turkey’s Religious Affairs Directorate. While it is intended to recruit the future imams, preachers and muftis in the long-run directly among the European Muslim communities, in the current setting Turkish citizens are trained intensively in the language of the destined host country besides receiving an equivalent of a Ph.D. in theology (Balci, 2008c; Özerkan, 2009).

The Turkish diaspora in EU-Europe will be an important part of the nation brand dimension ‘people’ to be discussed later in more detail. Beforehand, the options of cultural public diplomacy for Turkey beyond the dimensions of history and religion will be considered, since they could largely contribute to a clearer profile for Turkey in order to stand out of the global Muslim mainstream.

5.6.4.3 Not for sale: cultural promotion abroad
In a consistent public diplomacy strategy for the purpose of the EU application it is regarded as quite necessary to put Turkey’s modernity on display besides the historical connotations: “if you do a tourism work, so it’s nice to show your historical heritage but when it comes to living together, people they want to know who you are at the moment” (Mehmet Ural). The richness of Turkey’s contemporary culture should support this notion of modernity: “die müssen versuchen, sich als eine moderne Nation vorzustellen und auch im Sinne der Kultur. Nicht nur Folklore und das, aber so auch mit Kultur, die ein Zeichen europäischer Gesinnung ist im Lande” [They must try to present themselves as a modern nation, and also in the sense of culture. Not only folklore, but also with culture that signifies the European disposition in this country] (Andrej Grasseli).

As Anholt (2007a: 97) points out, in the consumers’ eyes culture is normally ‘not for sale’, that is, a cultural context brings along a surplus in credibility and authenticity in communicating with the public. Like a metaphor for a country’s personality, culture could provide a human touch to otherwise rational images. Culture is a more eloquent and authentic communicator of a nation than, for example, export brands, but is comparably slower in achieving visibility: “Exportartikel der Türkei ist eigentlich ihre modernere Kultur, auch ihre Multikulturalität” [modern culture is actually export product of Turkey, also its multiculturalism] (Christiane Schlötzer). Given the current perception however, “much more extended cultural reach is necessary” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). Similarly, the advice of EU parliamentarian Cem Özdemir is that “Turkey should improve its image in Europe and establish institutions to promote Turkish culture and art” (Anon./TDN, 2008i: 1).

To promote Turkish literature, Turkey begun an initiative called TEDA in 2005, which is essentially a project to improve the dissemination of Turkish culture through translation, publication or promotion of cultural, artistic and literary work outside of Turkey. More than 130 pieces including fiction, compilations
of poetry or non-fictional literature, have so far been translated into Spanish, Italian, German, French or English, amongst them authors like Nazım Hikmet or Aziz Nesin, but also the 2006 Nobel laureate, Orhan Pamuk and some writings of Atatürk. The Robert-Bosch-Stiftung launched “The Turkish Library” in 2005 to introduce German-speaking readers to the cultural and intellectual dimensions of modern Turkey by presenting milestones of Turkish literature from 1900 to the present with 20 volumes translated so far.

Also interesting in this context is the intensive international Turkish language promotion that took place in the past five to ten years. A significant spread of Turkish schools mainly across the Eastern European, African and Middle Eastern countries, largely driven by the Gülen movement, can be observed as well as a noticeable rise in Turkish language students across these regions.

On the occasion of the 6th Turkish language Olympics, the event’s board member Orhan Keskin was quoted: “Children from several European countries are participating in the event and a generation of Europeans is getting rid of their prejudice about Turkey. If we take into account that Turkey’s membership will be subject to referendums in some of these countries, we may say that the Olympics are making what classical diplomacy cannot do with its tools. Of course we are at the beginning of a very long road. Prejudices formed over 600 years cannot be undone in a mere six years” (Balci, 2008d: 2).

Besides literature, movies and music are considered important cornerstones for Turkey’s nation brand: “Die Türkei transportiert schon durch Filme, Musik, vor allem durch Filme und Musik, die auch in Deutschland laufen, ein neues Image” [Turkey gets a new image across especially through movies and music that are also shown and played in Germany] (Christiane Schlötzer).

Turkey’s past experiences with movies about the country underscores that the power of negative cultural promotion is also immense: “the single worst picture, that the worst thing that would have happened Turkey was that film (...) Midnight Express, it was devastating I think to the Turkish image. I’ve never seen a film provoke that kind of a lasting impression of a country.” (Christer Asp). The 1978 film ‘Midnight Express’, directed by Oliver Stone, leveled severe criticism at the Turkish judiciary system and the conditions in its prisons. The play was adapted from a book by William Hayes, written after he managed to escape from Imrali prison in Istanbul in 1975 where he was locked up for several years for a drug offence. This movie left indelible images of the Turks, especially in North American and European people’s minds (Boland, 2005; Kotler/Haider/Rein, 1993b: 139). In 2004, both the author and the director expressed their regrets how Turkey suffered from over-generalization caused by his movie. The message was not ‘don’t go to Turkey’, but clearly ‘don’t try to smuggle drugs’. The entire nation was blamed while only the

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18 by September 2008, see www.tuerkische-bibliothek.de (retrieved 09/17/2008)
conditions in prisons were aimed at (Flinn, 2004; Anon./TDN, 2007e). Down to the present day the effects are palpable: “in the history of cinema, has any film done more to blacken a nation’s reputation among travelers than Midnight Express”? A quarter of a century after its release, people still cite it as a reason for steering clear of Turkey” (Daloğlu, 2006: 1). When finally shown on Turkish television in the mid 1990s, the movie “caused a terrible disappointment (…) Still today, Turks can hardly understand such an outburst of hatred against them” (Fontaine, 2004b: 5).

Setting a positive counterpart and promoting Turkey’s modern cultural values by a successful movie production is a strategy that is therefore often mentioned by the experts: “I actually have a very very strong personal view on what Turkey could do to dramatically position itself positively abroad. And that is to go to Universal studios, one of the big American studios. Commission them to make a film, on one of the greatest state person of the last century, I mean Ataturk makes Winston Churchill look like a picnic. (…) Look at what Gandhi did for India as a film. I think that that is something that should be done. And immediately it would change, uplift perceptions of Turkey as much as unfortunately Midnight Express damaged Turkey’s perception abroad tremendously” (Richard Anderson).

Turkey has given the go-ahead on offering another type of story: in a government sponsored movie that will promote the real story of Behic Erkin, the Turkish Ambassador to Paris who saved the lives of some 18,200 Jews and arranged their voyage to Turkey in 1940, a good Turkish story expected to enhance Turkey’s image across the globe (Güvenc, 2007). In the 2023 planning of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2007) movies are mentioned as a target measure to be employed in the future.

Moreover, popular cultural events are potential flagships for Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy. Preparing for the start of the accession in 2004 and 2005, a couple of highlights took place revealing different facets of Turkey: “There’s been also cultural events that have begun to make a difference, you know there was a big thing in Berlin […], and there was an exhibition in Brussels, one in London, and these things I think that slowly slowly make people realize that there’s more to Turkey than just the Anatolian peasant that you see in the streets of Berlin, or Paris” (Nicole Pope).

Apart the şimdi/now-festivals discussed before, the exhibition “Turks” in London was regarded as an interesting platform for public diplomacy purposes. The exhibition was called “Turks: A Journey of a Thousand Years, 600-1600” and took place in spring 2005 in the Royal Academy of Arts. “We had in London this big exhibition, the Turks, which was generally well received. I don’t think it really made a great impact on how people perceive Turkey and issues like whether Turkey should join the EU, I don’t think it had any impact at all on that. At least it was an attempt to try and …it was an attempt above all to raise Turkey’s profile” (Gareth Jones).
The exhibition coincided with a program of all things Turkish in London – from film, music and dance to food, fashion and literature, for example, music nights on Friday evenings, dining offers by London’s leading Turkish restaurant, workshops on Turkish tile painting, visits to the London Central Mosque and competitions to win trips to Istanbul19.

![Turks Exhibition London 2005](www.turks.org.uk)

The success of such events also apparently depends on the host country: Moving the Turks-exhibition to France in late 2005 failed due to the low interest of French public in Turkey’s artistic masterpieces (Dombey, 2005). A new attempt to reach out to the French public could be the Turkish season in France, which is supposed to introduce Turkish culture and establish a link with exhibitions, concerts and other activities promoting Turkey in Paris and five other cities. The Turkish season will last from July 2009 until March 2010 and take place in return of the French Spring activities in Turkey in 2006 and are carried forward by the French business community (Aydın, 2008). These activities were debated intensively, since Sarkozy planned and managed to move them away from the European Parliament Elections (Yinanç, 2007).

In general however, it was repeatedly recommended to significantly raise the frequency of such cultural events in order to have relevant impact: “there should be at least one event a month in Europe, in some capital, and I think this can have a big snowball effect to create a new image about, or a corrected image about today's Turkey” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

Turkey being the Guest of Honor of the Frankfurt Book Fair 2008 provided such a valuable opportunity for Turkey, not only to present Turkish literature and the TEDA project in a high profile context, but also to universally demon-

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19 See [www.turks.org.uk](http://www.turks.org.uk) (retrieved on 08/12/2008)
strate Turkey’s cultural integration with Europe. By the beginning of 2008, a National Executive Committee covering the subcommittees of Publication, Authors, Cinema, Visual Arts, Conventions and Meetings, and Performing Arts and Music was put together by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism to display the range of Turkey’s cultural capital\textsuperscript{20}. According to Turkish Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertuğrul Günay, who spent more than € 5 Mio for this initiative, “there may not be another opportunity for a presentation of this scope for another 50 years or so.” (Kılıç, 2008b: 1). Turkey’s colorful presence during the Book Fair was applauded as a new Turkish opening (Steinfeld, 2008: 11; Schlötzer, 2008c: 4) and was also broadly appreciated in Turkey itself (Strittmatter, 2008c).

In addition to being Guest of Honor of the Frankfurt Book Fair, Turkey was the partner country of the Popkomm in Berlin in October 2008, one of the world’s most important music and entertainment business meeting places, and presented the modern face of Turkish pop music (Popp, 2008). Furthermore, the Bonn Biennial themed “Bosphorus” as the main topic in June 2008, making Germany a central hub for Turkish cultural promotion activities and tempting to proclaim ‘Turkey’s rise to a European cultural nation’ (Schlötzer, 2008b: 13).

A spectacular Ephesos exhibition in Vienna between October 2008 and January 2009 was expected to be a next important landmark by Turkey on Europe’s cultural map (Kılıç, 2008b).

Finally, plans have been started to set up a network of Turkish cultural institutions like the the Institute Français, China’s Confucius Institute, or the German Goethe Institute under the label Yunus Emre Institutes (Anon./Yeni Şafak, 2006; Schlötzer, 2008c).

Another important strategy to be considered within the cultural domain would be to host attractive events with a broad European reach in Turkey.

5.6.4.4 Positive events in Turkey

Especially for countries living largely from tourism, culture, situated “next-door to tourism” (Anholt, 2007a: 101), can make a country’s image more satisfying and complete, because it connects the interest into the place itself with an interest with the life at this place (ibid.). Events with a certain magnetism give people a reason for going to a country in the first place and it is hoped that they produce an experience good enough to be communicated from person to person later on. The Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2007) mentions international events as a target measure to make more use of in the future.

Hosting sports events could for example fulfill this expectation: “The European Champions League final in Turkey, I think that was great for Turkey abroad. Because if you look at all the press reports, this is interesting, read

\textsuperscript{20} see www.fbf2008turkey.com (retrieved 09/19/2008)
the press reports, they were expecting a lot of trouble. (...) And it turned into one of the greatest football celebrations in recent European history. That was great for Turkey. (...) you’ve 30,000 going back to England, promoting Turkey” (Richard Anderson).

The Formula 1 race taking place in Istanbul annually since 2005 also positively contributes to Turkey’s reputation: “Because Turkey is part of an elite group of countries, they are capable of staging Formula 1. And when you put that within the context, England might lose its right to stage a Formula 1 race because of poor track and parking facilities. That could be quite positively shocking for England to say how could Turkey achieve that?” (Richard Anderson). 2011 might however be the last F1 Grand Prix also hosted in Istanbul, as the racing schedule will eventually get reorganized (Maden, 2009).

The ultimate sports event to host for Turkey’s public diplomacy purposes would therefore be the Olympic Games: “And then you try to go for the Olympics 2020” (Richard Anderson). Anholt (2007a: 108-110) illustrates the effect of staging Olympic Games: more than 70% of the Nation Brand Index panelists today associate places like Barcelona or Sydney with the Olympic Games held there 1992 and 2000 respectively. Istanbul’s mayor Muammer Güleryu was quoted in the context of the Olympic torch relay 2008 passing over the Bosphorus: “We will work with determination to host the 2020 Olympic Games in our city. I hope the Olympic flame will be carried to the rest of the world from Istanbul in 2020” (Anon./Zaman, 2008e: 1). Having hosted the Summer Universiade in Izmir, the world student games, in 2005 and being chosen to stage the Winter Universiade 2011 in Erzurum seem interesting landmarks in this context (Balcı, 2008e).

Spectacular events could also be risky for Turkey, since the fulfillment might fall short; nonetheless the recommendation is to go for such opportunities: “the dilemma that we also have to recognize here that, yes we can go for these big hits, it can be a very risky route (...) that could get badly reported (...) I think you have to take some risks to get profile” (Richard Anderson). Previous applications such as Istanbul bidding for the Olympics 2008 or Izmir’s candidacy to host the EXPO in 2015 (losing the final round against Milan) failed, but especially the latter process showed that if Turkey can present a good application21, there seems to be a good chance of coming closer to this goal.

In the cultural sphere, the Eurovision song contest 2004 taking place in Istanbul or the Istanbul Biennial, a contemporary art exhibition celebrating the 20th anniversary in 2007 were interesting platforms for Turkey (Idiz, 2006). Important cultural events would therefore be another area besides sports to strategically develop places. In the Nation Brand Index, at similar levels with previ-

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21 which Turkey failed to do in 2001 when applying for the Olympics 2008: “the attempt to get Olympics 2008 (...) We should never have done that. Because coming to such a bad loss was negative for Turkey” (Richard Anderson).
ous Olympic cities, Rio de Janeiro is associated with Carnival, and Milan’s awareness for its fashion shows still is close to 50% (Anholt, 2007a: 110).

Istanbul’s nomination as Europe’s cultural capital for 2010 seems to be an important milestone in this regard. Yet it also reveals that Turkey’s event-related public diplomacy almost exclusively focuses on this metropolis.

5.6.4.5 Istanbul: Europe’s cultural capital vs. the rest of Turkey
In March 2006, alongside Essen in Germany and Pécs in Hungary, representing the countries outside of the EU, Istanbul was nominated as Europe’s capital of culture 2010 – outpacing Ukraine’s Kiev as the strongest competitor (Anon./Briefing, 2006d). This decision by the EU council resonates with the contemporary Istanbul hype: “Diese im Moment starke Istanbulgeilheit, also dieses ‘alle wollen nach Istanbul’, alle finden plötzlich das ist eine der schicksten Städte der Welt, also da hat sich schon was geändert” [This current Istanbul-cool, this ‘everyone wants to go there’, everybody thinks this is one of the hippest cities of the world, this has changed] (Christiane Schlötzer).

Anticipating this boom, the international magazine Newsweek titled that Istanbul was “Europe’s hippest city” in summer 2005 (Matthews/Foroohar, 2005). “Istanbul has a powerful brand name, definitely. With its own profile, background” (De la Pena). As a core brand value, Istanbul represents tolerance, as mentioned before: “Istanbul ist eigentlich so ein Idealbild des Zusammenlebens” [Istanbul is actually an ideal of cohabitation] (Frank Stauss).

With its plurality and trendiness, Istanbul counteracts expectations of Turkey: “People generally are surprised when they go to Istanbul and they see how very modern, how very western some parts of the city are, districts of Levent, the business district, the skyscrapers you know, you have these very modern very sophisticated shopping malls, tower blocks, businesses, offices” (Gareth Jones).

Istanbul’s cool has started manifesting economically: the city ranked 2nd in an influential annual European real estate trend study conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and the Urban Land Institute (ULI) titled ‘Emerging Trends in Real Estate Europe 2008’ (PwC/ULI, 2008).

The metropolis has become the emblem of a modern Turkey in the media: “Istanbul offers so much in terms of, it’s the cultural center, it’s the financial center, it’s where all the entertainment is, everything is in Istanbul. So Istanbul by the nature of capturing certain global events and all that is already on the way to do that. And I think press has captured it” (Erkut Yücaoğğlu). In April 2008, an Istanbul Center was opened in Brussels to promote Turkish culture in Europe and support the activities of the European Capital of Culture campaign around the themes of ‘Art’, ‘Knowledge’ and ‘Thought’ by staging exhibitions, hosting panel discussions and connecting experts (Demir, 2008; Doğan, 2008b). The center was awarded "Regional Representation of the Y-
ear” by the European Union’s prestigious news magazine ‘European Agenda’ in December 2008 (Çamlıbel, 2008c).

But such Istanbul-centrism is certainly also dangerous for Turkey from a nation brand standpoint. Istanbul is clearly different from the common stereotype of a Turkish city: “Istanbul is wonderful place, it’s a great cosmopolitan and so forth, it’s not like East Anatolia where people just, you know, have images of totally retarded and backward cultures” (Peter van Ham). As such, “Istanbul is only partly representative of Turkey. It is a part of Turkey, an important part of Turkey, it shows the way ahead for the rest of Turkey but it doesn't represent the whole of Turkey of course” (De la Pena).

There is a great cultural potential in the East of Turkey, which should also be underscored in the message: “The cultural side is that there are tremendous potentialities in the east part of Turkey also. (...) all these parts will be potential cultural places to visit” (Murat Sungar).

In fact, lots of the branding of Istanbul as one of the most amazing cities in the world, as noted by Wally Olins (Şahinbaş, 2007), does not help the branding of Turkey at all. “Pundits believe that had it been only Istanbul rather than Turkey that applied for full membership in the European Union, the city would have been wholeheartedly accepted a long time ago” (Demir, 2008: 1). Turkey will have to generate messages above and beyond Istanbul.

In terms of its public diplomacy strategy therefore Turkey will have to be careful to also find publicity for the various other cultural facets of the nation. In line with the need for transparency and honesty, less splendid or cosmopolitan places should find coverage, whilst still holding Istanbul as a role model of a modern Turkey.

Such a balanced portrait would finally encompass the people-dimension of Turkey, clearly one of the most controversial but also a very promising asset of the country.

5.6.5 Here and there: Turkey’s people
As the analysis of the Nation Brand Index (Chapter 2.2) unearthed, in general Turkish people are known and appreciated for their hospitality; looking at their attributes in more detail, however, especially in the European countries, they are also perceived rather negatively as dishonest or unreliable people.

It is apparent that positioning Turkish people will become an important section of Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy: “You do that by putting this personal touch into it. Not only facts and figures like Turkey is the largest producer of TVs in Europe (...). You wanna say something about that also but also personify that with Turks. So the people aspect came out as a very strong component. (...) there is a need for more people stories out in the public opinion, channels” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).
As will be analyzed in the following, “there are many stories (...) that should be used, which personify the Turk and what the Turks are doing and what Turkey means to Europe in the future” (Erkut Yücaoğlu); the broad array of stories ranges from here to there and passes the borders of Turkey.

5.6.5.1 Learning by coming

From a distance, “people would regard the people of this country as being quite very different to us and to other West Europeans at least. You know, culture, they're quite different, quite distinct as this Islam is very much part of the image” (Gareth Jones). In the general mainstream, Turks are judged mainly on their otherness. Europeans “judge the Turkish people just because they are others, they have another religion or they are not in the middle of Europe” (Erkan Arikan).

But in personal introspection, some assumed differences often seem not to be really meaningful anymore: “the first time I came, I was very surprised, I had thought that Turkey was a very conservative place, covered hair people would be everywhere. And then I started to look on the bright side of it and compared Turkey with Sweden. And to be honest, they are not different, there are not many differences” (Adam Achouri). Turks and Turkey turn out quite different from the stereotypes: “Turkey is very different to that. When one comes and experiences it, experiences open, generally friendly, welcoming aspect of Turkey” (Richard Anderson).

This is why tourism and cultural awareness beyond the main hubs, as explained before in Chapter 5.6.1, seem so crucial for Turkey’s strategic public diplomacy: “Seeing poor people in their village is a very different experience as opposed to reading about them with all the negative connotations (...) If just go to the Turkish village and find out how hospitable these people are will prove that they’re OK. They’re happy to some extent. By no means they are a threat to Europe’s wealth or jobs and that observation is a good thing to start with” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). As underscored before, hence the tourism experience has to be representative and as authentic as possible.

According to Turkey’s Directorate General of Press and Information, similarly most often journalists express “how impressed they are with the warmth of Turkish people, and with the sense of hospitality” (Kılıç, 2008a: 3). These impressions are also often reflected in the news produced on Turkey, according to the Directorate (Kılıç, 2008a). It becomes apparent that “Turkey has a much more dominant group of society than people in Western Europe think, which is much more Western, which fits into Western society” (Willemijn van Haaften).

Therefore, foreigners’ first-hand experience of people in Turkey, be it in tourism contexts or through professional contacts, is vital and insightful: “anyone that comes and lives, works in Turkey can see that enormous latent potential within this country” (Richard Anderson). Coming to Turkey changes the perspective: “Die Mitbürger oder auch die Unternehmen, die in der Türkei sind,
erleben natürlich die Türkei anders, als eben dynamisch, offen, anspruchsvoll, leistungsbereit. Da ist ein ganz anderes Bild der Türkei. [The fellow citizens or the companies that are in Turkey, experience Turkey different, precisely as dynamic, open, ambitious, motivated. This is an entirely different image] (Rainhardt von Leoprechting).

The literature largely backs this finding: “The act of interpersonal communication is something people have immediate, emotional experience with, and this makes for quick and easy understanding of a less familiar and more uncertain context. People tend to perceive nations as people (to the regret of many theorists of international relations) and so it is an easy step to the anthropomorphization of international relationships and international communication” (Oehlkers, 2006: 11).

But then there is also a second knowledge based on experiences of Turks, which seems not rooted in a distant and uninformed judgment, but stems from more or less first-hand experiences which apparently cannot contribute to a positive portrayal of Turks: certainly also the contacts with immigrants of Turkish origin influence the perception of Turkish people in Western Europe.

5.6.5.2 Same, same, but different: Turkish diaspora

Regarding Turkey’s EU application it is obvious that “the way Turkey is perceived is very much conditioned by the (...) five million or six million in total Turkish citizens who live in Europe” (Suat Kiniklioğlu). This Turkish diaspora should be highly relevant for Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy: “The greatest challenge for Turkey in Europe is that everywhere, in France, in Germany, in the Netherlands, in Denmark, in many other countries, the perception issue is too much dominated by the immigration-integration issue” (Suat Kiniklioğlu).

Europeans without previous personal contact imagine Turkey to be like typical Turkish immigrants’ neighborhoods they believe to know: “Ich glaube in Deutschland werden sie sehr stark von den Türken in Deutschland geprägt. (...) Sie denken die Türkei ist eher wie Kreuzberg, ein großes Kreuzberg” [I guess in Germany people are strongly shaped by the Turks in Germany. They think the Turkey is rather like Kreuzberg, a large Kreuzberg] (Christiane Schlötzer). The two worlds condition each other, a negative perception by Turkey is met and amplified by a negative perception of Turkish migrants: “they measure Turkey by the Turkish population, which exists in the Netherlands. And mixed with lot of negative publicity about Turkey itself” (Willemijn van Haften).

In the eyes of the experts, these assumptions are underlined by the distribution of negative perception of Turkey across Europe: “When you look to the Turkish image in Europe you see that it is most negative in the countries where you have sizeable Turkish population” (Murat Sungar). Although the

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22 district of Berlin with a large Turkish diaspora
analysis of the Eurobarometer data earlier did not provide sufficient evidence for this correlation to hold, there are several countries such as Austria or Germany where Sungar’s conclusion has some evidence. Moreover, “the Nation Brand Index shows that Turkey's image tends to be worse in those countries where it has the largest expatriate populations” (Anholt, 2006d: 1).

As has been intensively discussed for more than 30 years in multiple perspectives, with hard-fought terminologies like integration or assimilation, the questions of how Turkish migrants and their host societies connect are essential for this nation brand dimension: “das Bild der Türkei ist belastet durch die in Teilen misslungene Integration der türkischen Mitbürger in Deutschland, d.h. durch diese Erfahrung sieht man die Türkei (...) eben ein Stück noch kritischer” [Turkey’s image is burdened by the partly failed integration of Turkish fellow citizens in Germany; it is by this experience that Turkey is regarded somewhat more critically] (Reiner von Leoprechting).

As well known, the first generation of guest workers to Europe had severe education problems and deficits in knowledge about democracy or Western political constitutions, which clearly limited them – in nation branding terms – to serve as good brand ambassadors for Turkey (Straube, 2000). The recruiting countries did not consider the topic of integration for a long while: “In the 60’s you dumped the workers over there, without extending any help to them? Then they start to live in the ghettos” (Murat Özcelik). While the European countries could be criticized for their initial naïveté, by now both Turkey and the host countries assume responsibility (Straube, 2000).

While these historical developments cannot be investigated in more detail in the context of this thesis, what seems important with regard to Turkey’s strategic public diplomacy options is that the reciprocal relationship between the negative perception of the Turkish diaspora in Europe and the perception of Turkey itself might become a vicious circle. In Germany it is currently observed that the 2nd/3rd generation of citizens with Turkish origin who achieved a social elevation in terms of excellent education, often leave the country for Turkey or the USA, since they feel underrated and permanently confronted by negative stereotypes in Germany (Sontheimer, 2008), with the consequence that such needed role models can not contribute positively to correcting the negative image of Turkish diaspora in showcasing successful integration.

A difficult balance of identities has to be navigated. In their host (or often, if naturalized, new home) countries the Turks are, regardless of their citizenship often deemed foreigners, but also in Turkey they are not viewed as fellow citizens anymore either but referred to as ‘Almanclılar’ [Straube, 2000]: “And today to what extent the Turkish people in Europe represent Turkey at large is a different story” (Murat Özcelik).

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23 Could be translated as: ‘Germans by profession’
The problems of integration and the resulting images of Turkish people in Europe are also seen in Turkey: "Turk workers create a perception that they are kind of downward, in Turkey we say icedonuk, introvert people. They were introvert people they cannot get used to new life conditions. They cannot open. They are not open-minded. They live as they were in their own villages" (Ayşegül Molu).

Given the original background in Eastern Anatolia of many recruited guest workers in the 1960s and early 1970s, this behavior is partly explainable: "da ein Grossteil von ihnen aus dem Osten des Landes, also auch aus dem Teil des Landes kommen, der eher der schwächer entwickelte ist, hätten die, so sag ich das immer, wahrscheinlich auch schon Anpassungsprobleme gehabt, wenn sie statt nach Gelsenkirchen, Köln, Münster oder Berlin, nach Istanbul oder Ankara gegangen wären. Well, in den Dörfern, aus denen Sie kommen, gab es keine Verkehrsampel. Gibt’s vielleicht heute auch nicht" [Since a large part of them come from the country’s East, that is the part of the country which is rather less developed, they would have had problems adjusting if they – instead of Gelsenkirchen, Köln, Münster or Berlin – went to Istanbul or Ankara. Because in the villages they come from there were no traffic lights. And there still might not today] (Ruprecht Polenz). Turkey’s enormous diversity and the considerable gaps in development between the Western and Eastern part of the country are well represented in the people dimension of the nation brand.

As indicated, Turkey’s population nowadays does not identify with the image of the diaspora Turks in Europe: “there’s no doubt that the image of our people in Europe is very separate from what we feel is what Turkey represents” (Suat Kiniklioglu). Research showed that Euro-Turks have adopted a significantly different value system from their peers in Turkey (Kaya, 2007).

On the other hand, for public diplomacy purposes such a split will cause further problems when trying to bring perception and reality or image and identity into a congruent picture. Narrowing this gap by reaching out to the Turkish diaspora could be one strategic option.

5.6.5.3 Closing the gap by diaspora diplomacy

In the eyes of many experts, Turkey will have to come up with strategies how to link to the diaspora better and employ them positively for the EU accession process. One possible route could interpret the Turkish diaspora as ambassadors: "Die Türkei muss [...] versuchen, in einen Dialog mit den Menschen zu kommen, aber auch da gilt dann der Grundsatz, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit beginnt zu Hause. Sie muss mit den Möglichkeiten, die sie hier hat, ihre Millionen Botschafter, über die sie verfügt, anders nutzen" [Turkey must try to establish a dialogue with the people, but also here the principle holds that Public Relations start at home. Turkey must make different use of its opportunities here, its millions of ambassadors] (Ruprecht Polenz).

The negative correlation between a large expatriate community and a poor image of Turkey in the EU countries “is exactly the opposite of what it ought
to be. (...) Turkey in particular needs to make better use of its diaspora” (An- 
holt, 2006d: 1).

It seems obvious for Turkey to find new ways to address this community: “dass sie in Deutschland ganz andere Werbung machen müssten und sehr in- 
tensiv mit den türkischen Vereinen arbeiten müssten, damit die sich so-
zusagen öffnen” [That they have to do completely different advertising in 
Germany and very intensively work with the Turkish associations so that they 
would open up] (Christiane Schlötzer), a strategy Turkey has largely ne- 
glected so far (Karabat, 2007c).

A key issue from Turkey’s public diplomacy standpoint is of course the call to 
better integrate: “they've got to find a way to get Turks in Europe to behave 
like Europeans; when I go to Berlin, I see a Turkey that I don't see here (...) 
And working together with the German authorities, too. These people have to 
learn to integrate” (Amberin Zaman).

Turkey’s government should play an active role in this: “Sie müssten intensiv, 
was jetzt Erdoğan getan hat, aber halt nur mit Worten zur Integration auffor- 
dern in Deutschland” [they must intensively, like Erdoğan now did, find words to call for integration in Germany] (Christiane Schlötzer).

For Turkey’s political leadership this call is a challenging walk on a tightrope. 
Prime Minister Erdogan got into some turbulence when addressing the Turkish 
diaspora directly in Cologne, Germany in February 2008. With regard to the 
substantial nationalism in Turkey he was apparently unable call upon the exp- 
patriates to relinquish Turkish identity; on the other hand he had to acknowl- 
edge the strong need for the Turkish diaspora to better integrate into their 
host societies. The result was a fierce debate around the concepts of assimila-
tion and integration both in Turkey and the host societies. 
In public diplomacy terms, for many Western experts Erdogan’s statements 
were regarded as a mistake: “doing exactly the opposite of what Erdogan has 
done a couple weeks back in Cologne. (...) raise a lot of suspicions to the loyalty and allegiance of these Turks. (...) So this is exactly the opposite of goodbranding in sense of raising a lot of question marks rather than giving trust and so forth, and that's something which is not a missed opportunity but it's really a big mistake which will resonate, I think, for a couple of years. A big disaster” (Peter van Ham).

A successful integration would be a significant opportunity for Turkey with re- 
gard to the EU accession: “If the Dutch Turkish population would continue to 
emancipate itself into integrating to Dutch society that would also definitely 
add in a very positive way to the image of Turkey in the country” (Willemijn 
van Haaften). This could work as an example of harmonious coexistence in 
Europe and become a prototype for Turkey’s integration into the EU.

It has to be kept in mind however that positive cases of Turkish integration 
into Western societies are clearly less visible than negative cases: “Die gelun-
Successful integration is not so much recognizable, that is, you don’t see one side that has worked versus the other side which has not worked, but you only see what has not worked. Because the ones you can not identify anymore would not carry a sign saying ’I was a Turk’ (Ruprecht Polenz).

Some interesting role models where diasporas work positively for their country of origin without giving up their cultural roots the are discussed in the literature: “A country’s émigrés can be a great asset: for example, people’s perceptions of dynamic Ireland or colourful Brazil are closely linked to the Irish and Brazilians living abroad.” (Barysch, 2007a: 4). And also the approx. 250,000 Turks in the USA (Yavuz, 2007) enjoy a much better reputation than Turkish expatriates in Europe. According to the informant Cüneyd Zapsu, this is largely due to the fact that mainly academics from Turkey settled in the USA with obviously less problems to adjust in terms of language or culture.

A promising positioning could stem from successful diaspora economies: “there is second, third generation, fourth generation presence in Germany and as this is happening, what they are trying to do, they are becoming more and more entrepreneur, they create jobs for Germany, and adding value to the German economy” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

Ümit Boyner explained during a speech on the occasion of the Turkey Week hosted by Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD) in Berlin in October 2006 (see 5.3.3.4) that more than 64,000 Turkish origin entrepreneurs exist in German business world of today. According to the Center for Studies on Turkey (ZfT) in Essen/Germany, by 2015 Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany are expected to have created 720,000 jobs (Boyner, 2006: 3).

Furthermore, there is significant public diplomacy potential in positively differentiating from a mainstream discourse on integration by highlighting a visible positive identity based on the cultural heritage. The evaluation of immigration by the receiving societies is also a relativistic approach, comparing the groups. A research project in the Netherlands found “distinctive outcomes for the Turkish Dutch population versus the Moroccan population. Because of the much more positive image of the Turkish group when compared to the Moroccan group. If there weren’t Moroccans the Turks would be left in the ditch yeah. But it's also a relative thing, I mean as long as there are Moroccans which come even below the Turks so to speak then for the Turkish part of population, that's a good thing. (…) the negative attention inside the Netherlands is shifting slightly towards the Moroccans rather than towards the Turks” (Willemijn van Haaften). A similar situation is observed in France, with the need for Turkish diaspora to positively differentiate from other Muslim immigrants: “France has only four hundred thousand Turks, not one negative story about Turks. There is relative quiet. The problems of the French are
with their own African colonies but that is being portrayed as Turks are the same thing” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

From a public diplomacy point of view, strengthening a positive economic and cultural association with Turkish people in EU-Europe seems desirable. Not surprisingly, negative discourses seem to draw more attention than positive ones. This finding also relates to the media, which could play an important role for the diaspora diplomacy in different directions.

5.6.5.4 Media outreach and diaspora diplomacy
Both the local/national and the international media could be better employed to support strategies to improve the outreach to Turkey’s diaspora and stimulate the discourse of integration in the EU societies.

First, the media from Turkey distributed in the EU countries are potentially important channels to connect to the diaspora. If Germany is again taken as an example, over 90% of the Turks living there have access to Turkish TV channels and the daily circulation of eight daily Turkish newspapers published in Germany reaches 300,000 (Özerkan, 2007a).

These Turkish media in Europe could be vehicles to activate the diaspora for Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy: “Man könnte natürlich über das türkische Fernsehen, das ja von den hier lebenden Türken auch ganz stark genutzt wird, erstens für Sprachkursaktionen, was weiß ich, werben, immer wieder, immer wieder mit Beispielen und, und, und. Das geschieht noch nicht. Also, bei TRT INT wäre das überhaupt kein Problem und man könnte natürlich auch versuchen, jetzt sozusagen im positiven Sinne zu kucken, was müssen wir eigentlich machen, um die hier lebenden türkisch stämmigen Menschen zu Bot- schaftern im positiven Sinne zu machen” [Since Turkish TV is most intensively watched by the Turks living here, it could be used for language training promotion, showcase examples again and again. This is not happening. For TRT INT this would not be a problem at all, and one could try, now in the positive sense to look what has to be done to make the people of Turkish origin living here ambassadors in a positive sense] (Ruprecht Polenz).

Turkish public television is criticized for not using such opportunities: “Ich habe Gespräche geführt in der Türkei mit dem staatlichen türkischen Fernsehen, das ist bis heute nicht als Aufgabe gesehen, obwohl natürlich das die beste Einflussmöglichkeit wäre” [I talked to public Turkish television in Turkey, which until today sees it as outside of it’s province, although this would of course be the best influence capability] (Ruprecht Polenz). In October 2008, a strategic plan has been released by the Turkish government to adress the concerns of Turks living abroad appointing a specific role to Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) to help Turkish migrants adapt to the communities in which they live (Anon./TDN, 2008k).

However the domestic media in the EU countries also do not contribute positively by highlighting positive stories of integration or the benefits of immigra-
tion. “Dass ein nationaler (...) Fernsehsender etwa es sich auch zur Aufgabe setzt, positive Beiträge zur Integration der hier lebenden, dauerhaft hier lebenden Immigranten zu tun. Da sind natürlich auch die Türken die größte Gruppe und das ist ein Auftrag quer durch das ganze Programm. (...) Moderator oder Moderatorin mit Migrationshintergrund, ein bisschen zu Rollen für solche Menschen in Vorabendserien, in Krimis, (...) dass sie selbstverständlich dazu gehören mit all den Stärken und Schwächen” [A national TV station makes it its business to positively contribute to the integration of permanently residing immigrants. The Turks are of course the largest group, and this could be a task throughout the entire program. An anchorman or an anchorwoman with migration background, some parts in early evening programs, whodunits, so that they come with the territory with all strengths and weaknesses] (Ruprecht Polenz).

A nice example for European media helping to spread information was given by 3Sat, a joint culture-orientated public TV station of Switzerland, Austria and Germany, in November 2008 by dedicating an entire Saturday to programs on different facets and aspects of Turkey all around the clock.

Steinbach/Cremers (2006) observed the clearly one-sided media imagery of Germany’s Turkish community: “In den Medien – so die Beobachtungen der Autoren in den letzten Monaten – werden türkische Migranten überwiegend im Zusammenhang mit Themen wie Zwangsheirat und Ehrenmord, Gewalt unter Jugendgangs und Schulversagen präsentiert. Türkische Frauen werden beispielsweise nicht als Anwältinnen und Ärztinnen wahrgenommen, sondern oftmals nur als Importbräute dargestellt” [According to the authors’ observation in the media Turkish migrants are to a large extent presented in conjunction with topics like forced marriages and honor killings, violence among youth gangs and academic failure. Turkish women for example are not perceived as lawyers or medical doctors, but are featured often merely as imported brides] (Steinbach/Cremers, 2006: 2). Likewise Suat Kınıkנשים misses “success stories of women in German society like university professors”.

Connecting to Turkish people’s entrepreneurship, one expert suggests intensively featuring the Turkish diaspora’s contribution to the economic welfare of their country of residence: “regional media will be engaged in the sense of covering at least one hundred stories of Turks in Germany. And those Turks will have created enterprises, and that have created employment for Germans. And added value for the German economy” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). The narratives to tell are manifold and could go like this: “This is a success story. And this man is employing a lot of Germans. High quality people, and it’s successful, he has visits booked up for the next seven to ten years. I can tell you many stories like that. But I think the German public needs to hear that. And from the German press” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

The media receive some criticism for not delivering enough stories. The way Turks are “covered by European journalists is deliberately alarmist, sometimes simplistic, and not always impartial” (Manco, 2000: 29). To a certain degree
the media seem to contribute to the negative reputation Turkish people have: “the image of Turkey and the Turks that is disseminated by the European press is still too often negative, sometimes unjustly so. This situation has a certain influence on the way people perceive immigrants from Turkey” (Manco, 2000: 30).

The German sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer was able to prove an interesting relationship between the exposure to immigrants and the attitude developed in the receiving countries. The higher the portion of foreigners in certain areas, the fewer stereotypes prevail (Steinbach/Cremers, 2006: 3). These findings from the 1990s lead one to conclude that “public opinion about Turkish immigrants is thus built on negative prejudices that have no objective ties with the daily lives of these immigrants and their offspring” (Manco, 2000: 30). In consequence, it is often not the personal direct experience, but the mediated “deprecating caricature” (ibid.) that provides the basis for the Turks’ reputation.

In order to potentially outweigh the negative impression left behind by Turkish expatriates abroad, presenting visibly outstanding exponents of a changing Turkey should be considered.

5.6.5.5 Testimonials of change
Turkey has some quite interesting personalities who not only represent a modern and Western Turkey, but also stand for rather unexpected achievements or values.

As pointed out before, businessmen and businesswomen could play such a role. Entrepreneurial success in Europe is important to underline the point that Turks create jobs and don’t steal them (Sağmal, 2004). Successful business people in Turkey could be prominent endorsers of the booming economy: “All those signals revolve around that central theme of promoting this successful and youthful enterprise culture, so within that also are the business executives that again symbolize that, for example, he doesn’t have such a high profile but Bülent Eczacıbaşı,24 for example, I think is an excellent symbol to take to the outside world, say this is in the area of pharmaceutical development which is a very specialized area, success story in Turkey, Eczacıbaşı, those kind of things. So use those kind of personal symbols as well. As I said through PR articles and interviews” (Richard Anderson). Successful businesswomen would not only incorporate economic performance, but also symbolize achievements in the area of gender equality: “The fact that you have Güler Sabancı25 for instance as one of the most powerful women in Europe (...) must have an impact somehow” (Nicole Pope).

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24 Bülent Eczacıbaşı is chairman of the prosperous Eczacıbaşı Holding, which mainly operates in pharmaceuticals. He is also the driver behind the museum Istanbul Modern, a remarkable collection of modern art.
25 Güler Sabancı is the chair-person family-controlled Sabancı Holding, the second-biggest industrial and financial conglomerate of Turkey. She recently announced that within the next
In general, the testimony of women could be a strong strategy to counteract expectations and stereotypes: “aber für das einfache Image würde ich, glaube ich, total auf Frauen setzen, weil das eines der größten Vorurteile gegen die Türkei ist, dass Frauen hier praktisch permanent unterdrückt, geschlagen und zwangsverheiratet und mit Ehrenmorden umgebracht würden” [For the simple image I would totally focus on women, because this is one of the strongest prejudices against Turkey that women are permantly suppressed, beaten up, forced into marriages and slayed in honor killings] (Christiane Schlötzer). While some of these problems can of course not be denied, there are also enormous positive dynamics currently at work: “the women's movement, (…) usually the situation of women is perceived as very bad and it is in many ways. But there is more movement there than in any other sector of civil society” (Nicole Pope). Progress is visible in all areas of the country: “this to me is a huge change in Turkish society and so this is something that should really be shown. Because there were organizations from all over the country. In the south east, you also have a number of women's organizations now, fighting on a honor crimes, fighting violence, trying to develop, you know, entrepreneur skills, and things like that among women. So this is really something that is important to me” (Nicole Pope).

The women movement in Turkey with its tangible success is unrepresented in the public eye: “What happened in the last 10 years in the women’s movement have become quite influential, basically for instance the criminal law, the one that just got enacted, the pressure from women's groups were so strong that they had to reshape it. I mean these are facts that should be known. Also, the role of women in Turkish business, the role of women in Turkish justice, in universities, politics is another area unfortunately we don't have enough women presence” (Ümit Boyner).

Within Turkey's strategic public diplomacy considerations, the women movement gives quite valuable testimony of change: “Women in Turkey came out as a very strong component” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). The important role of culture that was discussed before also holds for the people dimension. Positive endorsers of a changing Turkey or the Turkish diaspora should be displayed: “one thing that we have in mind is finding role models like the Fatih Akim and Turkish soccer players in German football leagues” (Suat Kiniklioğlu). These topics probably resonate positively in Europe, “because at the head of the list of things which affect the EU masses directly are football and art” (Doğan, 2005b: 1). Turkey’s football team’s successful role in the 2008 EURO can be expected to have contributed positively in this regard. Successful film directors such as Yılmaz Güney, Serif Gören,

five years women in the Sabancı leadership will outnumber male colleagues, a remarkable process not only for Turkey, but also at a global scale (Anon./Der Spiegel, 2008).
Nuri Bilge Ceylan or Yeşim Ustaoğlu\textsuperscript{26}, and prominent Turkish pop singers such as Tarkan or Murat Boz\textsuperscript{27} distributing to many European markets are other interesting role models: “We need hundreds of ambassadors like Tar-kan” (Esmen, 2008b: 2).

Similarly, the case of religious tolerance could be effectively personified: “Tur-KEY should realize the fact that Istanbul’s Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate is the best representative of Turkey in the EU. The Ecumenical Patriarch is a TurkISH citizen and a passionate advocate of Turkey’s membership in the EU” (Anon./TDN, 2008d).

Evidently, Turkey could find good personal celebrity testimony in practically all dimensions of the nation brand and utilize them for public diplomacy pur-poses.

Another noticeable asset for Turkey’s strategic positioning can certainly be found in the fact that Turkey in demographic terms is quite a young country.

\textbf{5.6.5.6 Fortune and fear of demographics}
An atmosphere of innovation and young spirit that is mainly conveyed by the young section of the society can be linked to the economic prosperity of Tur-Key discussed earlier (Chapter 5.6.2): “Where we have to start is with the kind of youthful vibrance that exists in Turkey, this kind of new generation entrepre neurial corporate spirit. More and more Turks go abroad to study and get their degrees and come back engaging in commerce” (Richard Anderson).

As is commonly known, in a long-term perspective the demographic develop-ment is clearly on Turkey’s side vis à vis EU Europe. With one fifth of the population (2007 = 12 million) in the age-group between 15 and 24 Turkey on average is younger than in any other European country (Özerkan, 2008h; Schlötzer, 2004c).

It is often recommended that active use of this asset is made: “One task (…) is to convince sceptics in Germany and France that accession will not mean mass immigration of relatively poor and unskilled Turks into Western Europe. Instead (…) a ‘qualified and targeted’ migrating workforce could reverse a demographic imbalance and help ‘pay for older Europeans' pensions’” (Macintyre, 2007: 1).

While this argument might resonate for the people dimension of Turkey’s na-tion brand dimension, it also has to be handled with some caution. The demographic argument turns out to be a double-edged sword: “if you talk

\textsuperscript{26}YGüney/Gören received Cannes’ Palme d'Or for “Yol” in 1982, Ceylan won Cannes 2008 for “Three Monkeys”, and Ustaoğlu won the price at San Sebastián 2008 for “Pandora’s box”.

\textsuperscript{27}With his single “Simarık” (1999), Tarkan – born and raised in Germany – was the first Turk-ISH artist to sell 500,000 albums in France (Esmen, 2008b). He had Top 5 chart positions in Europe and received the World Music Award in 1999. Murat Boz is regarded as one of Tar-kan’s successors (Popp, 2008).
about, young new fresh blood and so forth, (...) Turkey will be 90 million at
the time they have potentially the possibility to join, being the biggest country
in Europe, immediately having the biggest voting power and so forth” (Peter
van Ham). Demographics also feeds some fears related to Turkey’s potential
EU membership: “Was ich in manchen Publikationen auch in der Türkei so se-
he und wir sind vital und das alternde Europa und die stellen das natürlich als
Vorteil da, was es objektiv ist. Es ist in der Wahrnehmung gerade, ja, davor
haben wir ja gerade Angst” [What I see in some publications also in Turkey
like 'we are vital and the aging Europe' which is objectively presented as an
advantage. Well, the perception is that this might be exactly what we are
afraid of] (Ruprecht Polenz). In addition, a 2008 UNDP report on Turkey’s
youth underlined that by 2040 Turkey’s population will face similar aging
problems Western societies experience already (Özerkan, 2008h).

In essence there is a thin line between the positive and the negative implica-
tions Turkey’s demographic potential regarding Europe’s aging societies and
its use for public diplomacy purposes. A general improvement in relationships
between different societies by providing regular contact points however could
help to broaden some narrow views.

5.6.5.7 People relationship management: civil society dialogues
Both the analysis of Turkish people in Turkey and in the European diaspora
showed that the mutual direct experiences of societies are essential instru-
ments in a public diplomacy strategy: “Changing Turkey’s image in a positive
way depends on direct meeting. Every person is an image. The image in your
mind changes when you come here and meet the people. The second phase
of this is to organize mutual seminars and to work together” (IBB, 2005: 2).
Direct interaction is regarded as most effective to overcome fear and preju-
dices: “I think one way is maybe to do some campaigns from people to peo-
ple. [...] I guess people understand themselves more easily if they can inter-
act [...] This is the best way to understand that because they’re interested
people, the people, mostly just other people like the politicians or govern-
ments” (Mehmet Ural).

This opportunity is also understood in the EU: “The European Commission
recognized that in the case of Turkey, a dialogue aiming at improving mutual
knowledge and encouraging a debate on perceptions regarding society and
political issues on both sides is particularly necessary” (Jurgens, 2007b: 2). In
July 2006 therefore a 25 Mio € program titled “EU-Turkey Civil Society Dia-
logue” was brought underway by the EU delegation to Ankara. The program,
working both ways in Turkey and EU, aims to provide better understanding
and knowledge of Turkey within the EU including Turkish history and culture,
“thus allowing for a better awareness of the opportunities and challenges of
future enlargement; as well as to ensuring a better knowledge and under-
standing of the EU within Turkey, including the values on which it is founded,
its functioning and its policies” (Jurgens, 2007b: 2).
For Turkey these programs are regarded as quite important to build up a third pillar of integration and cooperation besides government and business domains: “it's also at all levels of civil society, and now that there's a lot more being done in Turkey, there's also going to be lot more contacts with all the groups in whether they're women's groups, unions, and all kinds of things. But obviously it requires a conscious effort on the part of the Turks to try” (Nicole Pope).

The range of cooperation goes from exchange programs and networking or sporting links to inter-religious dialogues, connections between local communities and professional organizations (Riordan, 2005). In civil society dialogue programs the cultural and people dimension of nation branding meet. The Turkey Institute28 founded in the Netherlands 2007, targeting the Dutch population and balancing the view on Turkey (for example, by presenting speakers from Turkey on various topics such as political developments, Turkey’s economic position in the world market, or relations between Turkey and its neighboring countries (Dişli, 2008)), as well as the aforementioned Turkish-German Ernst Reuter Initiative for Intercultural Dialogue and Understanding or the more research-driven German-based Centre for Turkish studies (ZfT), are notable examples of institutionalized efforts in the EU countries.

Some greater potential is seen in academic collaboration: “I would focus on inter-university cooperation, because young people, they don't bother about all these things. At least not as much as have people in my generation. They want to make their future and they are right and they can be creative and they can be communicative and they want to travel” (John Verhoeven). Several interesting academic projects have aroused publicity in the past, among them the London School of Economics’ founding of a Modern Turkish Studies Chair (Benmayor, 2006), the plans for an Italian-Turkish University in Istanbul or more recently the creation of a German-Turkish University also in Istanbul (Schlötzer, 2008a). Certainly, young generations should be focused by such programs as potential decision makers on Turkey’s fate in coming years (Esmen, 2008b).

The spread of EU research centers across Turkey’s universities seems also valuable to improve the understanding of EU institutions by Turkish students and enforce mutual relationships, interaction and dialogue (Özerkan, 2008g). Town twinning programs have proven quite successful in the past. According to a Wikipedia list on town twinning29, so far only Alanya, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir have collected a significant number of partner cities in Europe. Increasingly however, especially the bridge building from the Turkish diaspora in Europe to their home communities in Turkey has become popular (Anon./TDN, 2008h).

Another exemplary program is “Germany Meets Turkey - A Forum for Young Leaders”, which is organized by the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (ICD) and

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28 see www.turkijeinstituut.nl (retrieved 05/12/2008)
the Robert Bosch Stiftung in cooperation with the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC); the program exchanges young leaders between 28 and 38 years of age between the countries and initiates intense networking among future elites 30.

While in the European Union countries there are already numerous experiences of civil society dialogue programs, in Turkey there is a need to moderate a transformation process internally to raise awareness and interest into EU-related topics. The discussion of Turkey’s identity and inner constitution in the next chapter will therefore be an important condition for the openness to engage in dialogue and relationships.

5.7 Public diplomacy inside: Turkey’s identity and EU accession

A last necessary perspective on Turkey’s nation brand with regard to the EU accession is to look to the inside and understand Turkish peoples’ understanding of and commitment to Europe.

As mentioned earlier, in the ages of public diplomacy foreign policy begins at home (Fiske de Gouveia, 2006: 8). For all of the strategies discussed before therefore holds: “Whatever we do outside of Turkey will be reflected here. I think it’s important that because of the issues we’re addressing I think it’s important for the Turkish public to know what European Union means for us” (Ümit Boyner).

5.7.1 Dropping support

Any public diplomacy strategy for Turkey hence starts considering public opinion at home: “As you get deeper and deeper into the negotiation eventually you have the perception that those people are bureaucrats in Brussels, they now have the say about a lot of things and they are going to decide over our lives. And we will have very little to say about that. And so if you look at the public opinion during accession negotiations, you’ll probably see that there is not a single case the opinion of the people are in favor of the accession” (Christer Asp).

The data on Turkish public opinion of both the Eurobarometer (with support for the EU bid witnessing a drop from 75% to 68% between 2005 and 2006 and to 61% in 200831) and the Transatlantic Trends, according to which the estimation that Turkey’s EU membership was almost reduced by half between 2004 and 2007, concedes this point to the experts.

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30 see www.germanymeets turkey.org (retrieved 06/14/2008)
31 Eurobarometer, 2006a; Eurobarometer, 2008 (Turkey’s data was not collected before 2005).
A survey conducted among 1,776 Turkish university students about their outlooks on Turkey's EU accession (Anon./TDN, 2005c) showed also significant skepticism. Only 38% think the European dream will come true for Turkey. They bewail double standards imposed on Turkey by the EU in comparison to earlier new member's accession process; at the same time they also critically discuss the European-ness of Turkey.

In a meta-study Pusch (2004) analyzed a broad range of Turkish or EU-European surveys and opinion polls conducted in Turkey since 1993 and found the following interesting positions related to Turkey's EU membership.

- Compared to other international data, global or European dimensions are only weakly articulated in the Turkish self-image. According to the 2003 Eurobarometer, 52% of the Turkish population sees themselves as only Turks, 41% as Turks and European, 3% as Europeans and Turks, and 3% as only Europeans (Pusch, 2004: 118).
- Before 2004, the data over 10 years showed a high approval for membership across most surveys. The numbers were even better than for most other candidate countries and consistently amount to over 50% across all strata (Pusch, 2004: 122).
- At the first sight disturbing, the greatest approval rate for EU membership were found in both groups with the highest and the lowest socioeconomic status (Pusch, 2004: 122). The apparent discrepancy can be explained by looking at the different motives. Very high EU approval was found in the Kurdish population in the rural South-East, hoping for a massive improvement of human rights, and also in the well-educated, wealthy urban milieu, supposedly the most Western-minded social group.
• Knowledge about the EU is quite low in Turkey compared to all other member and candidate states\textsuperscript{32}. It can be inferred therefore that the majority of Turkey’s population is highly positively minded about EU without exact knowledge of the details. Pusch (2004: 128) concludes that the euphoria is not unconditional and predicts a lower approval rate with more information around\textsuperscript{33}.

5.7.2 Decision-making at home
Earlier accessions dealt with similar challenges: „Der EU Beitritt verlangt ja von einem Beitrittskandidaten enorme Anstrengungen. Wir haben das in Mittel-Ost-Europa gesehen. In Polen hat sich dann eine Anti- Europapartei gegründet. Die ist bis auf 30% gekommen“ [The EU accession demands enormous efforts from the candidate countries. We have seen than in Middle and Eastern Europe. In Poland an anti-Europe Party was founded, that made it up to 30%] (Ruprecht Polenz). Pavel Telicka, the Czech’s Republic former chief EU negotiator, was quoted that 80% of the accession negotiations take place in your own country, 15% in the EU member states and only 5% in Brussels (Jørgensen, 2007: 18).

The accession demands some considerable sacrifices from the Turkish citizens: “you really have to educate Turks that in order to be part of the process, they have to also water down some of their, you know, long held cherished values. This is something which is no shame, but it's part of what it's all about” (Peter van Ham). The Turkish dilemma seems to be that some prominent actions would help to gain European hearts, but would lose the Turks.

The fiercely debated issues of acknowledging the Armenian genocide or loosening territorial claims over Northern Cyprus are such examples (Barysch, 2007b): “The only time the opposition to EU has become strong is when Europe talks about Cyprus all the time, Europe talks about Armenians. Then people say what is this? Are we talking about a rational process or something else” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

In Turkey occasionally the existence of parallel agendas to the EU accession, consisting of an official agenda and countless side-issues that keep popping up and condition the process further, is bemoaned. These additional conditions seem obviously especially hard to get across: “Probably about 25-30% of the Turks will tell the governments of Turkey to say (...) no, finished. We are ready to go with the rational process, but anything that comes outside of this domain, it’s purely foreign politics, it’s purely world order. And we’re not going to allow Turkey to leave its unitary state formation. And you will see that crowd being very strong” (Erkut Yücaoğlu).

\textsuperscript{32} Remarkably these differences were shown also for members of the Turkish parliament (Pusch, 2004; quoting a research project by McLaren and Müftüler-Baç in 2003).

\textsuperscript{33} This prognosis gained some significance looking at the decline in the approval rate between 2004 and 2007 quoted earlier; in a way, Turkey’s population got to know EU better after the opening of the accession negotiation through the countless public turns the debate took.
It is this hidden agenda that motivates Anholt to compare joining a supranational community with commercial brand extension procedures: “the European Union, for example, is a powerful and highly respected composite brand – and indeed, for the time being, a remarkably consistent and homogeneous one too – so, just like a large corporation considering the acquisition of a smaller firm, a key question in everybody’s mind (…) is to what extent the new brand will enhance (or detract from) the existing one” (Anholt, 2007a: 118-119).

One expert consequently foresees a rather pessimistic scenario for Turkey’s accession because there might be just too many sacrifices:

“I personally think that the Turks themselves will become fed up of this. Because this is Europe. It’s a painful, long-winding process which is usually (…) not the nicest one, (…) and if you are Estonia or the Czech Republic, you have no choice, you don't want to go back to Soviet Russia’s sphere of interests. But Turks see themselves as an independent bowl of culture, of economic development, of security and so forth, and to some extent it's true, I mean, if you are in their situation and their strategic environment, you do have totally different notions of the use of military force, what security is all about and so forth, so I personally think that this is the most likely route that they will themselves, after a couple of years, perhaps sooner, get fed up with this” (Peter van Ham).

To avoid this scenario becoming reality, an internal communication strategy with government and NGOs cooperating seems overdue: “We cannot proceed with our membership negotiations with public sentiment dominated by misinformation and misperception. No one can convince them of the need or the importance of the reforms. In other words, the country will not be able to carry out the negotiations under current conditions. (...) Every institution and group that supports Turkey’s relations with the EU should take action to initiate an information campaign” (Birand, 2005b: 1).

5.7.3 Communicate to the inside

Previous accession procedures illustrate the need to set up communication processes directed at Turkey’s population: “when we started to negotiate we realized in Sweden that we didn't have a media strategy or an information strategy internally, because when you start to negotiate the EU wants you to change a number of things that are very dear to you. Things you didn't realize they would ask you to change and that would be extremely sensitive in the public opinion. Today you see a number of difficult issues on the agenda like Cyprus, well known to everybody, but there will be other small things that will be extremely difficult and for the public opinion so the government needs to foresee these difficulties, they need to have a strategy internally towards the Turkish population” (Christer Asp).

The call for action cannot be ignored: “There is not room for populism in the EU project. The government has to make the EU project the Turkish people’s project. And that needs communication, that’s what we can't see” (Ümit Boyner, quoted in Kart, 2005: 2). The communication should target at self-awareness among Turkey’s people: “Our public needs to realize the advan-
tages of membership in the EU and the advantages of the process itself” (Suat Kınıkloğlu, quoted in Balci, 2008b: 2).

Given the specific Turkish state of democratization, awareness however will have to be paired with a certain direction demanding governmental advocacy: “As a truly democratic culture is not deeply engrained in Turkey, the citizens of this country have the tendency of excluding from their lives any concept which they don’t like. (...) The government has to encourage citizens to take part in the EU project, so it can keep the citizens on the government’s side when the issue is the EU” (Ümit Boyner, quoted in Kart, 2005: 2).

This task is understood to be within the scope of the Public Diplomacy Agency to be founded in Turkey by 2008: “We will also communicate domestically to our own people, because I think it’s not only a challenge now to communicate to Europeans or others, but it’s now, it’s important to communicate with Turks again that the EU drive is worth going so that we have a problem here domestically, too. We need to re-energize Turkish public opinion on this” (Suat Kınıkloğlu).

The principle routines appear quite clear; outside public diplomacy needs to be resembled to the inside: “So I think it’s an educational process for all of us. (...) Actually ABIG is, there is a TV ad, AB televizyonu, there is a project like that, that is basically focused on educating the Turkish people. But benefits. And also what the European Union project means for us” (Ümit Boyner).

But not only the benefits and messages from the Turkish government have to be brought into the discourse. The tiring of Turkish public opinion is also caused by a loss of credibility and confidence in the EU for not keeping promises and creating further obstacles (Özerkan, 2008e); clearly Europe needs a rebranding also in Turkey (Noya, 2006b; Leonard, 2004). The fact that the EU spent only € 1 Mio per year on communicating Europe in Turkey (Barysch, 2006b) is noteworthy in this regard as well as Bozkurt’s (2008) observation that Turks have great difficulties in understanding, for example, EU’s funding system. In sum, the “EU’s representative in Turkey needs to do better job in its PR campaign” (Bozkurt, 2008: 1).

Nonetheless, some of the efforts by the EU in Turkey, for example, by the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, are noticeable. The publication “EU Turkey Review”, the EU information centers in Istanbul and Ankara, the Information and Communication program, as announced by EU Vice President of the Commission Wallstroem in 2007 (Kart, 2007), or the civil society dialogue programs discussed before are of particular interest. In addition, the intensive public diplomacy efforts by the head of the European Commission delegation to Turkey were positively received (Yinanç, 2008b).

The magazine “Kriter” (http://www.kriterdergisi.com), a monthly focusing on Turkey-EU relations, is another interesting approach to bringing EU and Turkey closer to each other as is the internet platform ABHaber (EU News, http://www.abhaber.eu), an independent, non-profit organization founded by a group of journalists and scholars in Belgium. The network intends to offer
an alternative information source on EU and Turkish affairs through an independent, objective network, meeting the information requirements of a wide community of people influencing this process (decision-makers, professionals, NGOs, the media.).

Turkey has also joined the Media Network ‘EurAktiv.com’ and launched the Turkish portal www.euractiv.com.tr in October 2007, a news network about EU negotiations and political debates targeting influential audiences of business, government and civil society actors established before in Central and Eastern Europe and France. The portal is set up in strategic partnership with two of Turkey’s top newspapers, Hürriyet and Referans Gazetasi.

As it was shown earlier, Turkey has lost some of the momentum that accompanied its EU application enthusiasm before achieving candidate status: “We are swimming against the current. But it also sets upon us the burden of communication. Today it is not enough to create good policies only; you should create communication policies as well. If we can mobilize the role models of the society – the actors, football players, politicians and popular characters – to endorse the EU process, we can recreate the excitement of 2003-2004” (Balcı, 2008b: 3).

5.7.4 Public ambassadors: Consistency inside out
Obviously, a strong and outspoken backing for EU accession by Turkey’s population would serve one of the most important purposes in public diplomacy: “When the entire population is galvanized into becoming the mouthpiece of a country’s values and qualities, then you have an advertising medium that is actually equal to the enormous task of communicating something so complex to so many” (Anholt, 2007a: 105). One informant coined the term people-to-people (P2P) diplomacy for this very effective use of advertising free-of-charge: “Using the population to spread the word gives you 100 per cent global coverage. This (...) is the real power of P2P diplomacy” (Mehmet Ural).

Turkey’s citizens need to be employed: “engage the ordinary citizens of Turkey in it. Teaching them only to be a Happy Turks is not sufficient. Teach them that they are part of a world called Earth. Was it not Atatürk who said: Peace at home, peace in the world? Therefore: Conversation and dialogue are the magic words. Which starts by its citizens” (de Witt, 2007c: 5).

This kind of public ambassadorship might be the ultimate role model public diplomacy can give: “In an increasingly connected world the importance of institutions in the public diplomacy process will diminish while the importance of citizens as diplomats and key influencers will increase” (Wetzel, 2006: 149). The fulfillment of this ideal in forms of political organization seems quite a high stake, but a principle that seems worth maintaining: “The many-to-many quality of the network may seem to be impossible complex to manage. From an ethical standpoint, however, that might be precisely the point” (Oehlkers, 2006: 14). This aspect links back to democracy and soft power as
main conditions for sustainable public diplomacy: “In a democratic state and in current developments this can only be achieved with the soft power of attraction” (Wetzel, 2006: 149).

Anholt (2007a: 107) elucidates the role education can play in the long-run to achieve this goal of people-to-people diplomacy. Raising descendants who are outspokenly proud of their home and place of origin might not only help stop population loss, but generate valuable internal advocacy for the country, paired with a welcoming attitude to other nations. “As people are representatives for a country, a strong national identity, a strong link to the community and a strong feeling of ownership of the nation brand will potentially influence behavior” (Wetzel, 2006: 149).

For the case of Turkey, the nationalistic sentiments not only in Turkey, but also in the Turkish diaspora give an idea of the nation brand ambassadorship Turks are ready to give. However this testimony has so far not worked successfully for Turkey, but too often also rather against. In terms of brand management, Turkey’s representation misses consistency delivered from the inside to the outside. Anholt (2007a: 6) calls this criterion the clarity of the brand purpose, similar to a corporate culture/corporate identity in the commercial realm. An external idea of an entity has no value as long as it isn’t shared by the insiders. The case of the first Blair administration’s campaign “Cool Britannia” in the late 1990s is quite insightful in that regard. Attempting to gain an international reputation as a nation marked by modern design and art, the initiative largely failed because the Britons did not catch on to that phrase at all; on the contrary, they more or less boycotted the imposition of this national identity (Schwan, 2007b).

Defining a consistent public diplomacy strategy for Turkey will need to start at the inside and is automatically linked to national identity: “It is highly likely that we will be engaging in an intense domestic debate on how our public diplomacy efforts should be conducted. That is inevitable but also necessary as we are still in the process of defining our modern identity” (Kıniklioğlu, 2005a: 1).

5.7.5 Fighting identities

National identity is an important building block for the nation brand within the public diplomacy strategy. Laurenson (2002) believes that national identity can be elevated to the status of a nation brand, since it resembles the beliefs citizens of a nation developed about themselves in the course of the interaction with the rest of the world. The intermeshing of outside and inside perspective enhances the strength of the national identity. “Eventually, if you’re big enough and have been around for long enough, that national identity will gain international recognition. This in turn can reflect back on the people, helping to further evolve their own beliefs about their national identity. This has been the case for nations like Italy – style, Switzerland – precision, or in
An important social effect of national identity on the shape of nation brands can be observed. The process of nation branding is largely about a collective self-analysis (Frost, 2004b). For a strong competitive identity, a country needs clear domestic agreement on national identity and societal goals (Anholt (2007a: 28): “A nation brand is a national identity that has been proactively distilled, interpreted, internalised and projected internationally in order to gain international recognition” (Laurenson, 2002: 2). Public diplomacy therefore means negotiation among a nation’s citizens: “the sense of national identity of citizens, and also how they feel about their country, helps projecting a country’s identity abroad” (Melissen, 2006c: 2).

5.7.5.1 Under debate: Turkey’s national identity
Harmonizing Turkey’s public diplomacy in terms of consistency between the inside and outside is extremely challenging given the internal collisions in the country which are not only of an organizational nature: “Whereas new investment agency sells modern, open Turkey, the tourism board highlights the country’s ancient, mystic and exotic features. Forging these different elements into a consistent whole will be difficult, in particular since Turkey itself is still engaged in a fierce debate about its national identity” (Barysch, 200a7: 6).

The debate touches upon most basic questions: “The fundamental issue is that kind of a country do they want to be? What kind of government do they want to have? Are they mildly Islamist? Are they going to move back towards their Atatürk tradition of a military-secular dictatorship? Are they genuinely going to be democratic? Are they going to be democratic Islamist? What are they gonna be?” (Wally Olins).

In fact, Turkey witnesses the most intense struggles between modernist and fundamentalist streams of all Muslim nations in the sample of a 2008 PEW value survey.
It seems like a historic irony that it takes with the AKParti, an Islamist-rooted government, to redirect the country towards the EU, partly heavily opposed by the heirs of Atatürk’s political legacy: “It is indeed puzzling to note that present Turkish politicians who are, with all their power and skill, working on Turkey’s accession to the European Union constitute a cadre who have emerged from Islamic communitarian movements feeling alienated by the ‘reformist’ officialdom, while an important section of the so called ‘secular’ officialdom is trying desperately to stop the process of Turkey’s formal integration with Europe” (Tezel, 2005: 152).

And likewise many issues related to foreign policy largely affect the ongoing process inside the country. In general, Turkey’s westward orientation is under debate: “You could have a kind of backlash in Turkish society itself, just like the very low scores of Turkish support for (...) EU, occasionally you see in opinion polls, the negative attitude of Turkish people for the United States for example is quite remarkable. It’s lowest, I think, in Europe, if you include Turkey” (Peter van Ham). For Turkey as a NATO ally country, a favorable opinion for the US has dropped significantly in the polls down from 52 percent in 2000 to only 12 percent in 2007 (Smith, 2007).

The internal controversy on Turkey’s EU membership is entangled with the debates about national identity: “Should we join the EU’ is often synonymous with ‘What kind of Turkey do we want?’” (Barysch, 2007: 2).

### 5.7.5.2 Turkey’s identity in historical negotiation

The negotiation of identity has been a long-term existential challenge for Turks and Turkey – geographically and mentally situated between Orient and
Occident: “Turks historically faced many disruptions in identity as they transformed from Central Asian nomads, to Muslim soldiers, to multicultural Ottomans, and finally to modern Turks” (Ger/Askegaard/Christensen, 1999: 168). In this way, traditionally the Turks adopted Orientalist imagery, while a broad range of positive attributes such as reason, productivity or freedom and democracy were identified as Western and Occidental (ibid.).

Turkey’s so called modernization culminated in the foundation of the Turkish Republic under Kemal Atatürk in 1923, which meant a massive structural transformation towards a Western oriented nation: “At the historical juncture, Islam was replaced with other ideals and universals such as Turkism, modernity and étatism. The sudden and large-scale shift away from religion followed by vigorous ethnic assimilation efforts created a contradictory context between the state and ethnic/religious segments of the population” (Saatçı, 2002: 549).

As one of the sources for Turkey’s historic lack of a common identity, the installation of the new republic was not a result of votes, but of heroic figures “with almost transcendental properties” (Tezel, 2001: 49). The nation would have never voted to choose such a way: “No consensus-building process of representative democracy was involved. Indeed, a project that entailed such a radical dismantling of Islam in the public sphere would surely have been rejected by the Muslim populace if it had been tested in the ballot box” (Tezel, 2001: 49).

The Turkish Republic is a prominent historical example for branding having been an important strategy in the nationalistic repertoire: “Atatürk’s branding operations in the defeated Ottoman Empire after the First World War rivalled those of the first French Revolution in scope and scale; they involved a new alphabet, new clothing (all men had to wear smart Western headgear or at least a Turkish version of it), ethnic cleansing, a new name for the nation and new names for all inhabitants, and perhaps most importantly in view of recent developments, a secular rather than a religious state” (Olins, 2002a: 245).

Many of the complex problems and contradictions puzzling contemporary Turkey’s society can be traced back to these redefinition processes of Turkish identity. The dualism between urban and rural Turkey or between the religious and secular powers seems rooted in the constellation in 1923 (Tezel, 2001). “Modern Turkey of the 21st century is still an enigmatic country. This enigma emanates from the complications if not contradictions of the prolonged Jacobin attempt to change the political culture of a society which exists on a cultural/civilizational tradition asking men and women to be obedient ‘slaves’ in front of God's revelation” (Tezel, 2005: 152). And also, the tension resulting from ethnic problems remaining today such as the Turkish-Kurdish discord can be traced back to the founding of the republic (Saatçı, 2002).

5.7.5.3 A pluralistic identity for Turkey

Turkey recently witnessed some developments in its identity question. Prime Minister Erdoğan stated in fall 2005 that religion should be the backbone of Turkish society. While the upper identity is first and foremost to be a citizen
of the Republic, the bonding cement of the Turkish society would be religion (Anon./Zaman, 2005b). In light of earlier Turkish policies vis-à-vis the Kurdish minority, this approach of Erdoğan developed a hierarchy of Turkish identity. Under the roof of the upper identity as a Turkish citizen, subidentities like a Kurdish identity will have a legitimate place (Hacaoğlu, 2005: 1).

The reactions towards these positions were quite critical about the priority put on religious issues threatening the secular constitution of the state but generally supportive for a future multi-ethnical, pluralistic concept of Turkey: “Totalitarian ideologies always find ways of creeping in into the minds of young people of Turkey under the guise of patriotism due to the insufficient democratic culture of the Turkish society. Religion alone cannot be a unifying bond of this nation. The cultivation of a modern pluralistic democratic society can be precipitated if the youth is made part of this vision” (Anon./Briefing, 2006a: 2).

These discourses will eventually become visible to the EU-Europeans and help shape the Turkish nation brand.

5.7.5.4 Nationalism and nation branding

With regard to the EU application, the discussion of primary identities and the particular Turkish nationalism are potential burdens: “as a political culture, as a country's self image and self awareness, the idea of Turkishness. It's very, so to say, different from, I feel, the spirit you need to have in order to be part of the EU” (Peter van Ham).

The self-awareness on display is omnipresent: “It doesn't take long for a recent arrival here to soak up the enormous and often complex feelings of national pride and identity which are so central to Turkey's image of itself” (Morris, 1997: 1). Such a massive demonstration of the national identity is often quite irritating for European visitors: “For most Turks it's the most normal thing, but I'm always flabbergasted, especially in Ankara, but also in other places, (...) you are continuously bombarded with Turkishness, all the symbols, all the myths, (...) It reminds me of Communism” (Peter van Ham).

Commenting on Turkey’s population’s expressive support for military operations in Northern Iraq during 2007/2008, the historian Perry Anderson recently stated: “A comparable intensity of integral nationalism has not been seen in Europe since the 1930s” (Anderson, 2008: 17).

The icons like Atatürk’s portrait and the Turkish national flag distributed throughout public spaces are remarkable outposts of ongoing exercises in internal branding. With the movement towards the EU, nationalism in Turkey has apparently picked up momentum again (Balci, 2008b: 3). There have been numerous censorship incidents on the internet regarding national identity, for example the banning of YouTube in Turkey for a few caricatures of Atatürk (Strittmatter, 2008b), are also noteworthy in this regard.

The debate on the paragraph 301 of the Turkish penal code, making the insulting of the spirit of Turkishness a punishable offence, took place not only in
Turkey’s domestic politics but also became an important criterion for the EU (Çevik, 2007; Grossbongart, 2007). This is another indicator of the extent the national identity is negotiated in modern Turkey and a prominent example how closely national identity and a nation’s image are correlated.

With the EU and Turkey two different political cultures meet in the question of nationalism. “viele Europäer haben ein Stück grundsätzliche Probleme mit einem gewissen nationalen Selbstbewusstsein, was ja in Europa vielleicht glücklicherweise ein Stück in den Hintergrund getreten ist in den vergangenen Jahren, aber in so einem Land wie in der Türkei eben noch eine ganz besondere Bedeutung hat, dass man stolz ist auf sein Land, dass man eben ein Selbstbewusstsein hat als Türke, dass man von daher eben auch um seine Überzeugung kämpft” [Many Europeans to some degree have general problems with a certain national self-awareness, which in Europe potentially fortunately has somewhat taken a back seat, but in a country like Turkey it still has a quite special meaning to be proud of their own nation, that there is this self-consciousness as a Turk to fight for his/her convictions] (Heinz Kramer). The powerful presentation of national pride leaves also an impression in the neighboring countries, which is not really reflected in Turkey: “Talk to a Greek or an Armenian. Or even a Bulgarian, or Serb or an Arab about Turks and I think you'll find they, mostly smaller countries, around Turkey, are slightly frightened of Turkey. The Turks don't get this at all. They don't seem to see or have any understanding of why others should find them remotely threatening” (Gareth Jones).

While a strong national identity is usually an asset for nation branding and public diplomacy, in the case of Turkey’s EU accession process it also might partly become a burden. It looks as if Turkey will have to find a balance between a self-conscious presentation to the world of all nation brand assets without, at the same time, scaring Europeans away by an overly proud demonstration of Turkish nationalism for domestic policy purposes.

5.7.6 The Nation Brand Effect
As indicated, nation branding and public diplomacy are not only about turning national identity inside out, but also work in the opposite way: “public diplomacy serves as a window into a society and as a window out” (Melissen, 2006c: 2).

An external campaign can have tremendous amplifying impacts on the notion of identity of the domestic population: “just as commercial branding campaigns, if properly done, can have a dramatic effect on the morale, team spirit and sense of purpose of the company’s own employees, so a proper national branding campaign can unite a nation in a common sense of purpose and national pride” (Anholt, 2002a: 234). National identity and the nation brand are mutually meshed, sustained and reinforced in a full cycle of brand building.

34 The article 301 was modified in spring 2008 by replacing “Turkishness” with the “Turkish nation” and the maximum sentence was cut down; these amendments were welcomed by the EU, while in Turkey there was criticism of the lessened sense of identity (Gültaslı, 2008c).
Turkey’s EU project and the related public diplomacy strategies are an interesting case. Prime Minister Erdogan was repeatedly quoted as making the Copenhagen Criteria the Ankara Criteria (Anon./Zaman, 2007n), which expresses the aim to fully incorporate the EU accession goal and the standards of the Western neighbors into Turkish society. If Turkey manages to have public diplomacy activities also target the interior, and at the same time deliver the accomplishments at home to the European audiences, the country could positively profit from the “nation brand effect” coined by Jaworski/Fosher (2003) and develop a new self-esteem based on the progress made (Kiniklioğlu, 2007a; Balcı, 2008b).

Simon Anholt comes to a similar conclusion regarding the case of Turkey and the role nation branding could play in the country’s fight for identity: “In a deeper sense, place branding also provides a way for Turkey to re-establish and broadcast its true cultural, social and historical identity, and carve out a positive and helpful place for itself in the global community. In this sense, national brand is national identity made tangible, robust, communicable and useful” (Anholt, 2006f: 187).

In the following section the strengths and opportunities as well as threats and weaknesses of Turkey will be summarized. As was set out before, a public diplomacy strategy for Turkey’s EU accession will largely be about managing the multitude of potential messages and facets of Turkey’s opaque nation brand.

5.8 Management summary: handling the multitude

The previous analysis has revealed a broad range of potential public diplomacy strategies for Turkey’s EU accession in the different dimensions of the

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Figure 5-16: National Brand Effect (NBE) Cycle (Jaworski/Fosher, 2003: 107)
nation brand. In the following paragraph the handling of this multitude should be discussed referring to the experts’ recommendations.

5.8.1 Positioning and targeting polarities
Looking at the entire spectrum of Turkey’s nation brand, it becomes apparent that the country is stuck in several regards between rivaling and partly contradictory poles. Many of them within the individual nation brand dimensions were touched upon earlier, for example:

- Fear and fortune of positive demographic developments or of a booming economy.
- The temptation of taking Istanbul pars pro toto for Turkey in tourism, economy or cultural contexts.
- The alienation effects of profitable mass tourism versus the risks and opportunities of an authentic presentation of Turkey.
- The conflicting modes and styles of political communication in Europe and in Turkey.
- Balancing Turkey’s and Ottoman history between representing a burden or an opportunity.
- Displaying Greek and Roman antiquities for tourism purposes while longing to put forward cultural modernity.
- Reaching to the Turkish diaspora and dealing with the perceived identity of Turkish expatriates and Turkey itself.

Mobilizing affection for Turkey takes quite an effort given these polarities: “vielstimmig, nicht einheitlich, mal vorwärts, mal rückwärts, Reformen ja und dann wieder zurück (...) Es ist ein uneindeutiges Bild und die Türkei ist schwierig, also sie macht es einem nicht leicht, zu sagen ich bin Freund oder Feind” [Many-voiced, inconsistent, sometimes forward, once backward, yes to reforms and then back. It is an inconclusive image, and Turkey is difficult, she doesn’t make it easy to say I’m friend or foe] (Christiane Schlötzer).

Four interesting central dichotomies or conflicts, which run across different nation brand areas and seem to complicate the handling of them all, should be regarded in more detail.

5.8.1.1 Similarity vs. otherness
Turkey’s otherness and Europe’s alienation of the Turks, as the imagological exercise in Chapter 2.2 pointed out, have been historical burdens for a substantial time. As early as 1919 the British historian John Arthur Ransome Marriott stated: “The primary and most essential factor in the situation is the presence, embedded in the living flesh of Europe, of an alien substance. That substance is the Ottoman Turk. Akin to the European family neither in creed, in race, in language, in social customs, nor in political aptitudes and traditions, the Ottomans have for more than five hundred years presented to the European powers a problem, now tragic, now comic, now bordering almost on burlesque, but always baffling and paradoxical” (quoted by Kubicek, 2004: 45).
The alienation of the Turks has in principle continued to the very day: “The other. Das ist doch (…) sehr häufig dann der Grundbefund, dass man feststellt, doch, es gibt eine Grundeinstellung, die sagt, die sind nicht wie wir” [There is often the finding that one states there is a basic attitude saying they are not like us] (Heinz Kramer). Nowadays, otherness means actively excluding the similarities: “So the picture of what the average Turk is like gets reinforced all the time by this exclusion of anything more Western than fits the original picture itself” (Willemijn van Haften). Andrew Vorking, World Bank representative to Ankara until 2007, predicted the otherness label would become a self-fulfilling prophecy: “if you keep saying that Turks are different, Turks may eventually begin to think that maybe they are different” (Kanlı/Demirelli, 2006).

Many Europeans indeed locate Turkey in the Oriental hemisphere of their mental maps: “most Europeans they thought we are living like Arabs, or in old terms so this is why they think that we are not a part of their value-system” (Mehmet Ural). And for positioning purposes, it is sometimes even suggested to assume the role of the other: “I think that’s what I would stress rather than ‘oh, we’re like you, we actually belong in your midst’, you know we don’t really believe that. No, that’s not how I would approach it. I would rather stress the exotic for sure” (Amberin Zaman).

The tourism dimension of nation branding for example could profit from a touch of exotic, potentially Arabic otherness: “Turkey also needs to promote its otherness for purposes of tourism, so that people would be attracted to that. As long as it’s not too other, and too threatening, that’s part of Turkey’s charm, part of its attraction. But it can be seen partly familiar, but at the same time exotic. It’s kind of like exoticism light” (Gareth Jones). In the saturated European tourism market, Turkey should be presented as an “exotic country with many things to offer, a beautiful country” (Jose Ligero-Cofrade).

The discourse on otherness is certainly fragile and debatable given Europe’s immigration history of the past 50 years: “the idea that the Turk is essentially other cannot be sustained intellectually without contradicting the multicultural basis of modern European societies” (Brewin, 2000: 98). The intensified endeavors for more integration in the West European immigration societies strive to normalize otherness and might eventually prove Huntington’s (1996) prominent theory of a harsh “clash of civilizations” wrong. In addition, the majority of the Turks would reject the notion of being other than their European neighbors: “If you ask Turks probably 80-90% will tell you that we are as civilized as you are” (Murat Sungar).

With regard to the economic situation the Western European countries would also probably agree to that: “This is a company that’s like in our ballpark. It’s coming closer to what we are and what we hold as being the values of a successful country brand” (Richard Anderson).
Turkey has a broad arsenal of icons that would underscore the similarity with the West: “The business district, the skyscrapers (...), these very modern very sophisticated shopping malls, tower blocks, businesses, offices, maybe in terms of trying to promote Turkey as a country that would fit in easily into the EU, as a country that's basically western in its orientation” (Gareth Jones).

Moreover in terms of political systems, “Turkey started to highlight its similarities with the French system” (Barysch, 2007a: 3). And also from the visitor's perspective, Turkish cities resemble their Mediterranean counterparts in Europe: “When people come to Ankara for example, and people normally don't come to Ankara, it's not a tourist destination, to Izmir, to Kayseri, or something quite prosperous provincial Turkish cities, they don't look so different to cities in other parts of southern Europe. Yes, they're Muslim, yes it's a different cultural environment, but at the end of the day it's the food, the air, the people, the drink, it's not so different. In fact it is very similar. So maybe trying to project this idea, Turkey's been another Mediterranean country like Spain or Italy” (Gareth Jones).

The tension between the poles of otherness, which makes sense for differentiation reasons for example in the tourism domain (Şahinbaş, 2007), and similarity, which could be a relevant strategy for the economy and people dimensions of Turkey’s nation brand, resembles a dilemma at first sight. But potentially this conflict cannot or does not have to be resolved and this dilemma makes up Turkey’s tribute to the EU – harmonizing tradition with modernity: “Even if they are not the same type of images, one is the modern industrialized and then the other is the more traditional, where there are perhaps needs where the EU can contribute, the one is where Turkey gets something to us and the other is where we can give something to Turkey” (Josa Kärre).

Turkey's historical struggles for identity between the poles of Orient and Occident, being “lost between East and West” (Fontaine, 2004a: 5), are represented in this polarity.

### 5.8.1.2 Addressing friends or foes

Partly conflicting standpoints were also exchanged on the question of whom to principally target most with Turkey's public diplomacy – the friends or the foes of Turkey's EU accession.

One section of the informants suggests to think in worst case scenarios and work backwards from there, which would mean to tackle the hardest opponents first: “Ich würde mir auch immer die besonders starken Gegner vornehmen und mit ihnen auch diskutieren und fragen und erst mal kucken, würde sie fragen und wenn wir uns auf den Kopf stellen und so und alles. Sie könnten sagen, was wir alles machen müssen, gibt es überhaupt eine Chance?” [I would always take the specifically strong opponents to task and discuss with them, ask questions and see, if we turn ourselves upside down. They could say what all we need to do and if there if a chance at all] (Ruprecht Polenz).
In practice this seems to imply leaving the countries behind where Turkey faces the least problems: They need “priorities in trying to read just Turkish image in Europe, it’s not Spain of course, because in Spain they don’t have a problem. They have a problem in Germany in Austria, in France, so in Spain there is no controversy about Turkey” (De la Pena). Similarly, the UK would not be on that list: “If I was Turkey I wouldn’t spend much time in The UK, because it’s not the UK they need to convince. It’s other countries in Europe” (Stephen McCormick).

A rival argument would hold that Turkey cannot afford to more or less ignore countries with favorable esteem. In marketing terms, loyalty management is also recommended. Turkey currently “tends to focus on countries that are problematic such as France, Germany, but doesn’t look into countries like Britain, Spain, Portugal or Greece or Italy where there is more favorable opinion and I think one shouldn’t count that such favorable opinion will sustain indefinitely and see what the trends are in these countries and take appropriate measures to make sure that that favorable opinion stays that way” (Suat Kıncıoğlu).

MEP and Turkish tourism entrepreneur Vural Öger adds another facet when suggesting to gain the support of new member EU member states, which are mostly neutral so far: “Undecided countries are ignored by Turkey […] We hardly hear Poles or Romanians speak about Turkey” (Oğuz, 2008: 1). He also thinks that “excessive campaigning in countries like France or Austria, where public opinion is heavily against Turkey’s accession, would be a waste of energy” (ibid.: 1).

A key question for the handling of this polarity is if there is any effective opinion leadership among the European countries that could be utilized for Turkey’s purpose; Stevens (2007) suggests that one success might produce a domino effect for other countries to follow.

Like countless other EU related questions, the case of Turkey also serves as an impressive example that a common European publicness or public sphere is, at the best, nascent (Gerhards, 2002; Giannakopoulos/Maras, 2005b; Risse, 2003). As was shown in the data analysis in Chapter 2 and underscored by Ruiz-Jiménez/Torreblanca (2007), public opinion on Turkey’s membership is structured along national lines and reveals different expectations for the future of Europe (Demesmay/Weske, 2007). It depends on whether the discourse on Turkey is seen as a matter of foreign affairs (e.g. Spain, UK) or as a matter of internal politics (e.g. Germany, France). The heterogeneous Eurobarometer data on Turkey’s accession (see Chapter 2.1) has exactly this message; there are no general patterns across Europe, but only country-specific particularities (Giannakopoulos/Maras, 2005b: 217).

This is why Barysch (2007a) is convinced that a single European wide campaign would not meet the voters’ and Turkey’s needs. It should not be forgotten that EU accession will have to be handled with unanimity among existing member states; that means, every country counts. Turkey is advised not to
wait for Europe to find a common stance on the issue of Turkey’s accession or for another strong opinion leadership, but should rather address each EU country individually to win its support for EU membership (Dişli, 2007).

The apparent static dichotomy of friends or foes needs to be resolved into an individual strategy for every single EU country. The strategies will need to pay heed to local particularities: “in France one effective method of doing that is actually having some opinion makers, the intellectuals, on your side. Apparently that’s very important for that culture. In Germany, it’s the local media. It’s sort of in smaller groups. The circles are smaller. So each country has different channels, or structures of doing that” (Ümit Boyner).

In tourism promotion, these insights recently led to a revised advertising strategy. For a while Turkey’s ministry of Culture and Tourism awarded the lead role for Turkey’s tourism campaign in over 30 countries worldwide to only one advertising agency35. In January 2008, the ministry changed this strategy and split the budget into numerous singular accounts for every country, presumably to better individualize the promotion strategy.

Within the country segments, targeting certain age groups could be a promising option: “The young generations probably would like to see fun and historical places, somewhere to travel the older ones are of course more conservative. (...) Maybe for older generations they should stress the values like hospitality and things like that because that’s more important for them, family, not for younger generation” (Mateja Petelinkar).

From here the reference goes back to research and evaluation needs (Chapter 5.5.3). As Fisher (2006) underlined, data provides the groundwork to learn about foreign audiences and to understand the importance of responding differently in different cultures, both as information for policy making and for effectively targeting an audience.

5.8.1.3 Internal and external symbolism
Turkey’s radical actions to install national unity in the early years of the Turkish republic, described in Chapter 5.7.5.2, seem to be the origin of the ongoing heated clashes and rifts in Turkey about the country’s upper national identity. In the process of becoming a nation in the 1920s, Turkey produced a great number of national symbols such as the Turkish flag and a particular Atatürk iconography, which are omnipresent in Turkey’s everyday life and are rigorously legally protected.

To European or other foreign audiences however, this abundant inventory of national symbols is not only irritating, as described before in Chapter 5.7.5.4, but also apparently worthless or ineffective in marking the value of the Turkish nation. Turkey “suffers from an image which has been forged during an earlier and very different political era, and which now constantly obstructs its

35 See information on www.sea.de (retrieved on 02/18/2008)
political, economic, cultural and social aspirations. In many ways, Turkey’s brand image today in the West is in the same shape as if Ataturk had never lived” (Anholt, 2005d: 3).

The analysis of Turkey’s brand image in Chapter 2.2 and 2.3 showed that the country’s perception is still to a considerable degree stuck in pre-modern associations. The Western face of Turkey expressed in economic structures or political orientations like NATO membership are not present in the European public consciousness and should potentially be stressed also at the level of symbolic politics.

In a branding perspective, from the outside Turkey is not identified with a consistent symbolic entity leading to positive associations. For Turkey it is curious that some historically owned symbols nowadays do not belong to the country anymore:

- On the occasion of Starbucks’ expansion to the Turkish market starting 2003 the historic irony of coffee and coffeehouses returning to Turkey was discussed (İlhan/Thompson, 2006). “No one would have dreamed that the strange black liquid drunk by the Turks was to become the commonplace beverage or many cultures” (St. Clair, 1973: 16). Given the long history of coffeehouses in Turkey dating back to the 16th century (İlhan/Thompson, 2006: 128) and the European embrace of Turkish coffee in the Turchophilie Movement discussed earlier (Chapter 2.2) the lost ownership of the national symbol of coffee is remarkable.

- Also tulips, nowadays clearly associated as a national symbol with the Netherlands, in the European cultural history are of Turkish offspring and were brought to Europe starting by the end of the 17th century: “The most delightful legacy of Turco-European interchange in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the tulip” (St. Clair, 1973: 18). With Tulip festivals for example, nowadays Turkish cities are trying to reclaim the dominion of the Tulips; Istanbul for example has launched an initiative called ‘Istanbul meets tulips’ and spent approx. € 3 Mio on planting 23 Mio tulip bulbs since 2003 (Kılıç, 2008c).

An approach to bring a symbolic value of Turkey to the European mind would be to play with existing stereotypes. Although it is tempting to discard existing stereotypes because they are mostly familiar and not new, out-of-date and partly hard to bear, they could be the starting point in getting in touch with foreigners. As Scots will supposedly talk about Kilts or Swedes about Elks, “it is essential to let people come through the door they already know” (Anholt, 2007a: 80). The case of Turkey shows that there are rarely new country launches in the world market of nations which are successful right from the start. As analyzed earlier, Turkey’s restart in 1923, although most radical in its extent internally, did not manage to surpass all existing historical or cultural knowledge about the Ottoman Empire in the European minds.

In fact it is mostly easier to take existing perceptions as a starting point, even if they are negative, since you have something to attack and you are already
positioned on the consumer’s mental shortlist – called ‘evoked set’ in marketing terminology– which is again a limited space (Anholt, 2007a: 81).

Turkey’s symbolic value to the European audiences could therefore be developed by building up on existing prejudices, presupposing the readiness to overcome some known problems of Turkish elites to take on a self-critical stance, as explained earlier (see Chapter 5.6.4.3).

5.8.1.4 Rational vs. emotional
Partly linked to the lack of national symbols is the need to balance the rational and emotional assets of Turkey’s nation brand.

Numerous good arguments for Turkey’s EU membership have been listed before (see Chapter 2.4.4) that include well-founded demographic, economic or geo-strategic reasoning. Numerous voices from the experts however express doubts if these arguments will suffice to convince the European voters of Turkey’s membership, because “it’s hard for them to take a more, shall I say, strategic approach and say well we need them to pay off our pension plans and we need them because Europe is getting old and we need them because it will project greater military strength, regionally and even internationally and give us more muscle, that's not the way people think in their daily lives, that's how governments and leaders think” (Amberin Zaman).

While the political leadership needs to rationalize these discourses, many approaches seem far too abstract to be caught on the street: “Diese typische Argumentation: ‘Wir brauchen jetzt die Türkei, weil das auch toll Arbeitsplätze in Deutschland sichert über zukünftige Investition, über Exportchancen usw. und sofort’. Das ist eine intellektuelle Argumentation. Die mag ja richtig sein und die stimmt, aber die glaubt kein Mensch” [This typical reasoning: we need Turkey now because it will safeguard jobs in Germany by future investments, export opportunities and so on and so forth. This is an intellectual rationale, which might be correct, people just don’t buy it] (Frank Stauss).

Brand theory provides a conceptual framework for political communications to differentiate between the functional perceptions of parties or leaders and the emotional attractions of a political entity (Scammell, 2007: 187). For the EU accession process Turkey needs to find positive emotional hooks for the nation brand: “If you look for branding strategies, you need indeed emotional rather than purely informative kind of connections. And at the moment, people may, on the base of information say, rationally, it's a good idea to get Turkey on board for the reasons indicated, you know. Economic, demographic issues, and so forth. But emotionally sound, (...) that's a very, sort of, sort of tricky thing, because emotionally, a lot of people are uncomfortable with Turkey” (Peter van Ham).

The importance of emotional engagement with purchase decisions has been lengthily proven in the commercial world (Scammell, 2007), and it seems to also hold for Turkey: “We have to find out more emotional visuals, other than
rational ones, but more emotional. (...) The people always think with their emotions, act with their emotions. Even before the rational issues you have to show them the emotional part of this problem. So it's also the easiest way to make people to react, just to use their emotions. Contact with the emotions. Rational (...) you can talk to business communities, but when it comes to general public, again people to people” (Mehmet Ural). Especially the cross-cultural exchanges between the civil societies will require emotional bonding and should find positive counterpoints to the fear-driven debate on Turkey in continental Europe (Anastasakis, 2005).

Emotional presentations of Turkey should build up on reality and not draw a distorted propaganda picture: “Truthful doesn't mean unemotional. Emotional is just a way of communicating but the base must be facts. I haven’t seen any contradiction...could be truthful and emotional” (Mehmet Ural).

But apparently finding positive emotional approaches to Turkey’s EU accession will be quite a challenge: “I don’t think you would have many emotional arguments” (Stephen McCormick).

Religion, for example, is definitely not an obvious emotional connection: “Wenn man sozusagen den Islam verwestlichen will und pazifizieren will, ist es gut, wenn wir die Türkei gut behandeln. Das können sie natürlich sehr, sozusagen, das ist eine ziemlich intellektuelle Anstrengung, die sie da bringen müssen, um das hinzukriegen. Das kriegen sie also fürchterlich schwierig auf ‘Bildniveau’ runter” [If we aim to sort of Westernize and pacify Islam, it would be helpful in treating Turkey well. This is quite an intellectual struggle to get there, and it’s very difficult to bring this down to a tabloid press level] (Heinz Kramer).

And neither a historical European-ness of Turkey could evoke instant emotions: “das wäre dann auch schon zu reflektiert zu sagen, ich kann das europäische Abendland ohne Kleinasien nicht denken, denn da ist Paulus Hauptwirkungsstätte gewesen, also da sind wir auch schon wieder auf einer anderen Ebene. Ich krieg dieses Argument nicht sinnvoll hin zu sagen, jawohl, das ist ein Teil Europas” [It would be also too reflective to say I can not think Occident without Asia Minor, because this has been Paul’s main place of activity, this is again another level. I can’t get the point right to say: yes, this is a part of Europe] (Heinz Kramer).

A first conclusion is therefore rather pessimistic: “Also ich sehe da nichts, wo man sozusagen rein über die emotionale Schiene sozusagen auch das Subkutan umkrempeln könnte.” [So, I don’t see anything that merely on the so to say emotional track could turn the basic feeling upside down] (Heinz Kramer).

The literature in general supports this reading, underlining that complex policy making at the nation level rests on dynamics emphasizing rational considerations and leaving little room for emotional elements (Fan, 2008).
Notwithstanding this, Turkey still seems to be in need to overcome its alienation from Europe and stress its (emotional) proximity: “The point about Turkey is that it’s right on the European border, part of it is in Europe. That is, it’s geographical position makes it so fascinating (...) If it were a long way away, it would be different, but it isn’t a long way away. It’s near” (Wally Olins).

A prospect might be found in contemporary cultural assets. Again Istanbul could potentially provide a positive emotional twist to Turkey’s story by underlining the values of tolerance and multiculturalism: “Wenn man diesen Melting Pot, eben auch Istanbul sieht, wo ich jedenfalls mit meiner Wahrnehmung das Gefühl habe, das ist ein faszinierendes Miteinander, dann wäre das für mich eigentlich emotional auch für Europa ein tolles Bild” [If one looks at this melting pot, like Istanbul, where I sense a fascinating co-existence, to my mind this would also be a great image for Europe] (Rainhardt von Leoprechting). In this suggestion once more the problem of showcasing Istanbul as representative of Turkey shines through (see Chapter 5.6.4.5). Nonetheless, the contemporary hype around Istanbul, reminding of Barcelona’s rise in the 1990s (Jose Ligero-Cofrade), supported by impressive cases from music, film, art or fashion could create a positive emotional platform setting a role model for the rest of Turkey.

5.8.2 Unifying the dichotomies
Facing this abundance of messages, a debate about whether or not these strategies should be unified under a common umbrella seems reasonable.

5.8.2.1 In search of consistency
Some experts favor consistency among the messages Turkey sends out: “of course you have to have one common message for tourism, for business, for security” (Mehmet Ural). Other countries are taken as benchmarks: “We need to have focus. Like in the case of Ireland. They did focus on tourism and foreign investment. In terms of foreign investment they made an inventory of the possible areas and they came up with the IT. So they have IT and tourism in the menu” (Ayşegül Molu).

In the literature, finding a joint narrative starting point for a public diplomacy strategy is often regarded as essential (Melissen/d’Hooghe, 2005; Leonard, 2002b). Individual episodes should be connected by a common story: “You have to think about linking tourism with foreign direct investment, with grand export. You have to think about what ‘Made in Turkey’ means, you have to think about all kinds of issues around not just tourism, but the Turkish brand as a product, the investment in Turkey and so on.” (Wally Olins). For Turkey there are considerable deficits in this regard: “Whatever Turkey reflects is not well matched with each other. We have this and that and so many. We have historical baggage, we have all those geographical sites and everything. What will you put forward?” (Ayşegül Molu).

On the other hand such consistency seems a challenging task to accomplish in the case of Turkey: “Turkey is very hard to brand with one or two simple
messages. It's difficult to simplify and focus on one thing about, one or two chapters you can spend too much to talk about but you have to prioritize them” (Erkut Yücaoğlu). A connecting thread between Turkey’s different narrative streams seems inexistent: “es gibt immer wieder eine ganze Menge von punktuellen Geschichten. Nur, es gibt sozusagen im Augenblick für mich nicht den Punkt, um den rum ich das alles verdichten kann, wo dann wirklich ganz logisch auf einmal so alles da an der Sache zusammenfällt” [there is again and again a good deal of selective stories. Only, for me there is not the point around which all of that could be concentrated, at which everything could consistently coincide] (Heinz Kramer). The skepticism also pertains the possibility of one united voice: “I fear that some people may expect or understand from such a coordination effort, that it should always be giving the same messages, through different actors overall” (Murat Özcelik). Such an expectation seems rather unrealistic: “speaking in one voice in Turkey is difficult, because there is not one Turkey” (Suat Kinkiloğlu).

The intense fights for a united Turkish identity analyzed earlier (Chapter 5.7.5) of course perpetuate in the discussion of Turkey’s unified public diplomacy messaging. “Turkey first of all has to decide how it wants to present itself. The Turkish intellectuals, especially the left, and Turkish elite, Kemalist elite are so anti-headscarf, anti-Islam, anti-AKParti, and they just can't reconcile themselves with that part of Turkey” (Nicole Pope). The rift within the society makes a unique perception from the outside almost impossible.: On the one hand Turkey is “a, relatively speaking, reasonably-minded Muslim country. It's got a huge intellectual and economic potential in terms of its westernized section. On the other hand, it's a military state, it's, although it has a secular foundation, there are quite dangerous elements which are fundamentalist. The nationalism” (Wally Olins).

Without trust, unity and self-confidence stemming from the inside, the outside messaging becomes a question of credibility: “secularist (…) people find it very hard to advertise Turkey. Especially Turkey with Erdoğan at its head. And I think that it creates how can they convince people that this Turkey is not a threat if they themselves think it is a threat? And I think this a major dichotomy and this dual-personality that many Turks have is a problem” (Nicole Pope). As Roy (2007: 570) pointed out: “The most critical function of any nation branding strategy (…) is uniting a heterogeneous population with one common vision”.

It was shown before that also in terms of geography or tourism Turkey is impossible to streamline: “If people go on holidays to Turkish resorts in the Mediterranean for example, then it's clearly a very attractive and very easy place to live in. If you go to the Black Sea, it's a totally different matter. If you go to Istanbul, you see a city which is in very many ways an incredibly sophisticated and very beautiful with very, very effective corporations working there. But if you go to other parts of the country, you see quite the reverse” (Wally Olins).
5.8.2.2 Unity in diversity
The challenge to umbrella-brand Turkey seems quite unique in difficulty compared to other countries: “Turkey is too diverse and too complicated to lend itself to (...) categorization. I've lived in many countries, including Japan and Russia, and the Balkans Bulgaria, as well as Western Europe, and I would say of all those countries Turkey is the hardest to categorize. Even harder than Russia” (Gareth Jones).

It looks as if Turkey should familiarize with the thought that a copybook strategy of a united nation brand will not be reached: “One should, you know, expect and accept, actually, that there will be differing voices on how to communicate, what to communicate. That's just part of life here in Turkey.” (Suat Kınıklıoğlu).

But more, the multiplicity could become a perspective on its own: “So I think that the lack of homogeneity is giving a lot of different perspectives and sort of putting it in a melting pot is very difficult” (Ümit Boyner). Manifoldness and tolerance might be European core values Turkey could display most convincingly to the foreign audiences: “The plus side is I think cultural diversity (...) Because in the end it's about who Europe is, not so much about whether Turkey is a part of Europe. I think it's about what kind of Europe people want and my gut feeling is that open minds will prevail” (Amberin Zaman). Potentially Turkey’s role as ‘moderator of multiplicity’ is the national meta-narrative that could be underscored in regard to the bridges the country is expected to build – if it were to join the EU – between the poles of East and West, Islam and Christianity, Arabia and Europe and so forth.

For such a scenario, certainly top-down brand management will not work in Turkey: “But that umbrella thing will be created as an outcome of the sub-segments. It's not something we shall impose on” (Ayşegül Molu). As discussed earlier, listening to all relevant sub-segments of Turkey’s nation brand and supporting their activities rather than pressing all of them into one schema will be a core task of Turkey’s to be founded national Public Diplomacy Agency.

Anholt (2007a: 83-84) sees those problems as common to larger countries and underlines the impossibility of imposing a common strategy top-down. Internal soft power is indispensable, as is the endorsement and support by a critical mass of the important stakeholders: “There will be lots of spokespeople for Turkey depending on the issues that we will be discussing or trying to communicate. And they'll range from artists to civil initiative leaders to businessmen, to politicians, so there will be many spokespeople including foreigners” (Ümit Boyner). This demands a strategy draft that is catchy enough to inspire, well-marketed to the inside and wide and open enough to facilitate a sense of shared ownership.

And this last aspect leads to one message Turkey should definitely not be inconsistent about: “this is something which is very important in that branding
strategy, that you communicate to Europe that you are willing and really committed and that you are willing to, to make compromises” (Peter van Ham).

Very important for an EU bid is to have the entire political elite behind this goal and not allow for any outliers. This was the case in past successful EU applications, when the entire party spectrum was united behind one goal, as, for example, in the case of Slovenia (Andrei Grasseli). The ambiguous Turkey should be united in “one clear message to the rest of the European Union. We are European and we are willing to really participate fully in the European integration process” (Peter van Ham).

As we will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, the call for unified voices is one of the traditional parameters of communication management. Given the more recent developments often summarized as ‘2.0’, this model is clearly under pressure from phenomena such as the blogosphere (Oehlkers, 2006). The trend once more reveals the paradigmatic tensions in communication theory summarized earlier (Chapters 3.5.8-3.6).

### 5.8.3 Status quo and To Do: Summing up Turkey’s public diplomacy

The analysis of Turkey’s situation showed that it is certainly much easier to theorize about public diplomacy than to put it into action. Certainly, neither governments nor NGOs have control about the societies which they project to in the outside world. Furthermore, the world is already full of abundant information. How could Turkey stand out or hide? Considering the public diplomacy framework developed earlier to sum up Turkey’s public diplomacy, the following strengths or weaknesses and opportunities or threats appear important to be considered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time/Domain</th>
<th>Time/Channel</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political/Military</td>
<td>Public diplomacy as lobbying</td>
<td>National policies and goals, National ideals and values, Common understanding and mutual cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Public Diplomacy as Public Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Societal/Cultural</td>
<td>Public Diplomacy as Nation Branding</td>
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5.8.3.1 Time horizon

With regard to the time dimensions and the degree of activity, Turkey’s public diplomacy at present seems clearly too reactive. Although a lack of information about Turkey was identified as an important source for Turkey’s negative reputation abroad, the task of active strategic reputation management has yet not been made one of the government’s priority issues. Revisiting marketing’s hierarchy models of engagement showed that information, awareness, interest, and engagement are necessary preconditions for actions to be taken by consumers (e.g. voting in referenda).

Turkey’s short-termed news management in terms of serving the different media channels has reached a satisfactory level in the more recent past. The few proactive modes of communication largely stem from advertising in the areas of tourism and investment promotion. Turkey should be alert not to repeat mistakes made before: “Politicians and other dilettantes of public diplomacy have confused it with advertising [...]. They tend to believe in the effectiveness of manipulated news and facts. [...] In war, credibility could often be sacrificed to a short-term tactical end; but I do not know of any peacetime instance when what has come to be called ‘spin’ was effective in public diplomacy” (Bardos, 2001: 434).

The fact that Turkey has not yet started a comprehensive forward-looking public diplomacy initiative beyond isolated advertising campaigns gives reason for the concern that the country will leave reputation matters to the last minute, implying a start of intensive activities only towards the end of EU accession negotiation. Referenda are not regarded to be urgently threatening: “That actually the chapters will be closed and there would be in, the possibility of the referendum looming at the end, it seems to be still too distant for people to be urgently thinking and taking measures for that” (Suat Kınık-lioğlu).

Since it was underlined that a country’s reputation is quite inert, this might be too late to pay off for the EU membership bid, as Wally Olins outlined in an interview to a Turkish newspaper: “[Commercial campaigns do not change people’s minds. People’s ideas do not change in five minutes. We’re not selling apples, pears, cars. You’re trying to sell the image of the country. This will take at least 20 years. Actually even longer] (Şahinbaş, 2007: 2). Therefore the criticism from Turkey’s leading columnist Mehmet Ali Birandt seems reasonable: “The authorities who are supposed to promote the EU in Turkey and promote Turkey in the EU – ranging from the prime minister to all the ministers – did not conceal in their private and public remarks that they were late, that action had to be taken immediately. They said it bravely, but months have passed since then and they have never managed to press the button” (Birand, 2006c: 1).
Relationship building with the foreign publics by a new approach to tourism or especially in the area of civil society dialogues was shown to bear lots of potential, but is still largely unused and will take considerable time.

### 5.8.3.2 Channels

Turkey’s lobbying will also have to be intensified with regard to other negative lobbies at work against Turkey. While business lobbies seem comparably well connected, in other areas, such as handling religious affairs or actively addressing political activists to learn about Turkey, quite some potential was detected.

In general, most of Turkey’s programs, mainly for budgetary reasons, seem to focus rather on information elites and multipliers in contrast to a direct reach of European publics. In Turkey’s formerly miserable and currently slightly improving press relations, still one-way dominates two-way concepts of communication. Also, the communication relations to foreign audiences are mostly not symmetrical. Relationship networks based on partnership, knowledge and mutual understanding should therefore be established especially for the media hubs abroad in Europe, while the treatment of foreign media correspondents in Turkey has reached a professional level in the meantime.

Compared to other countries’ programs and the relevant discourses in the literature, the few public diplomacy activities in Turkey are too government-driven and too centralized to meet current standards. With the undoubted need of targeting European publics, not all experts are convinced if such governmental and promotion-driven publicity will lead to the desired effect: “boring government public relations campaigns will not overcome prejudice” (Barysch, 2006b: 5). Non-governmental actors are not sufficiently integrated into a joint strategy, and coordination of different activities is an ongoing debate. Not only the campaign, but also the dialogue needs to go public: “so far the dialogue has been mainly between politicians, so it is about time to extent this platform to the publics” (Cüneyd Zapsu).

On a global scale, Turkey’s nation brand is neither developed nor clearly profiled. There is not a single brand dimension in which Turkey produces noticeable scores. Some positive modern facets appear under promoted in Europe, while rather simplistic and negative perceptions prevail. “Branding goes beyond PR and marketing. It tries to transform products and services as well as places into something more by giving them an emotional dimension with which people can identify. Branding touches those parts of human psyche which rational arguments just cannot reach” (van Ham, 2005: 122). The absence of emotional connections to Turkey’s EU ambitions in Europe or of learned national symbols with external relevance seems rather meaningful in this regard.

Quite important in this context is also the tensed state of internal nation branding. Given the immense spectrum of topics and countless contradictions between issues or agents, finding a consistent nation brand strategy inside
and outside of Turkey will be quite a challenge, and potentially the multitude itself could become the brand core.

5.8.3.3 Purpose
Understanding the internal and external character of Turkey’s nation brand at the same time is important when evaluating Turkey’s performance in the different purposes of public diplomacy.

The strong penetration of the country’s national goals or policies to the inside while enforcing unity as a national value in a top-down mode is regarded with a touch of skepticism from the outside. Turkish politicians as official public diplomacy agents are not particularly good representatives of comparably attractive national values like tolerance or openness to their European counterparts or publics.

A common national identity is not negotiated, but more or less imposed top-down and partly barred in legal corridors. The institutional, but also ideological difficulties to coordinate a national narrative based on common values or goals are obvious. A bottom-up mode of finding a common identity seems out of sight. The strong rifts within the society also seem not to qualify to promote multiplicity, too strong is the often articulated longing for the unity of the Turkish nation. The obsession with speaking in one voice and displaying consistency is typical for a modern state that is struggling to accept plurality as an asset and not as a burden.

The efforts of building a common understanding and mutual relationships with outside actors suffer from the internal tensions. Like the nation brand cycle theory showed, internal and external brand activities accompany each other. Turkey’s failure to effectively bridge to the Turkish diaspora in many EU countries underlines the challenges the country faces in aligning image and identity. And the fact that good tourism relations seem not to positively impact the foreigners’ understanding of Turkey indicates that the link between personal encounters and the political macro-context is not established.

In terms of targeting, Turkey needs to individualize its outreach towards a country-by-country relationship approach containing all EU members. The country can’t afford to only address the opponents of Turkey’s EU membership, since also current friends and supporters need to be sustained.

5.8.3.4 Domain
The domains of Turkey’s public diplomacy are dominated by hard-power issues and are largely matter-of-fact driven. The rational political arguments like security or energy prevail, but an emotional momentum for Europe to embrace Turkey was not found. For the political arena it was repeatedly underlined that actions speak louder than words, pressuring Turkey to pursue significant policy changes in sensitive and symbolic areas such as human rights or freedom of speech.
The economy has significantly developed with regards to both attracting foreign direct investments and selling Turkey’s exports abroad in the more recent past and should be the source of good news. For numerous reasons though this good news fails to get through and cannot counterbalance the negative and backward perceptions of Turkey. In tourism furthermore, potentially misleading signals are sent. Mass tourism was shown to potentially lead to further cultural alienation rather than approximation, while an authentic presentation of all assets and shortcomings of the current Turkey to the visitors would clearly do the country better.

In the cultural sphere, Turkey is laden with the burden of religion in Christian Europe, but hope stems from a modern cultural identity and a new interpretation or attribution of Turkish, Ottoman and Antique history (Stevens, 2007). Turkey needs to be careful not have Istanbul interpreted as representing the entire country, although the metropolis is clearly the spearhead of the country’s economic and cultural modernization. It was furthermore elucidated that Turkey does not make efficient use of its people at home and abroad with shortcomings in the internal communication of the EU project as well as in diaspora diplomacy. All in all Turkey could make much better use of its cultural capital: “It is most disappointing that Turkey scores so low on the culture and tourism axes: yet here, surely, is the area in which Turkey’s brand image shows the greatest potential for improvement and increased warmth of feeling. Brand Turkey is – or should be – a rich treasure-house of positive cultural associations – the rich cultural heritage, history and landscapes of this lovely country and the warmth and hospitality of the people – all of which surely do not lie too far beneath the surface of Western consciousness to be retrieved and revitalised” (Anholt, 2006f: 186-187).

In Turkey’s public diplomacy more links between the different domains of the nation brand have to be found while balancing numerous dichotomies. Tourism experience should not contradict economic modernization, for example, and the political sphere should represent the human rights progress has improved. The absence of an emotional connection for most Europeans to Turkey remains a cardinal challenge. Such hooks need to be found and offered across all relevant public diplomacy domains.
6 Discussion of evolving theories: nation branding and public diplomacy revisited

The two evolving concepts of nation branding and public diplomacy were taken as theoretical backgrounds for the analysis of Turkey’s EU application process. For the purpose of this study, and in line with important themes in the literature, both concepts were integrated into one comprehensive model of public diplomacy (Chapter 3.6). Based on the case insights generated for Turkey, in the following theoretical outlook the two concepts should be revisited and discussed with regard to their differences and commonalities and later be consolidated given similar sociological and technological contexts as well as some megatrends in political communication.

6.1 Branding and Diplomacy: legitimacy of commercial analogies

Numerous voices have been raised on whether the originally commercial brand communication concept is applicable to nation branding, public diplomacy and to the non-profit field in general (Csaba, 2005). Many nation-branding projects are exposed to some principal unease. Some of the tensions between private and governmental institutions in Turkey, for example between the MFA and TÜSİAD, seem also remarkable in this regard. Branding is often associated with promotional techniques like advertising (Teslik, 2007c) having the intention to sell and manipulate while projecting a certain identity (Anholt, 2007a) – in sum “a fairly rigid and sometimes even superficial approach of country promotion” (Melissen, 2006c: 4). To a non-negligible degree it is the terminology to cause trouble: “The problem seems to be not so much with what goes on but with the words used to describe it. It appears that is the word ‘brand’ which raises the blood pressure” (Olins, 2002a: 246).

6.1.1 Unease and reservations

Olins (2002a: 246) goes on identifying three potential reasons for this unease: snobbery, ignorance and semantics. It is either the notion of superiority over business triviality (snobbery), mutual knowledge gaps with businessmen being as ignorant about cultural and historical traits as cultural scientists are about business (terminology), or it is simply the fixed semantic reference of branding to business contexts that is causes discomfort. Around the turn of the 21st century (e.g. Klein, 2001) brand techniques gained a reputation as a “perverse tool used by greedy companies, with the objective of manipulating consumers minds and increasing their profits” (Freire, 2005: 350). Applied to places, branding was feared to corrupt the location’s authenticity and result in the abuse of natives.

For Olins (2002b), none of these arguments can pose a substantial scientific objection to the theoretical approach of transferring the concept of branding to nations. Clearly the one-sided blame towards insatiable entrepreneurs as the evil behind branding completely ignores sociological and cultural insights that caused the evolution of brands as identity markers (Holt, 2004). How-
ever, for the case of nations and national identity there might be stronger ideological forces at work than would be expected in other social areas. Csaba (2005: 145) accuses Olins of overseeing the tension between the sacred and the profane in the question of nation branding. Even with waning force, as the case of Turkey showed the extraordinary value of nationhood and national identity is still unbroken, and much of the principle resistance against the nation branding project might rely on such emotional ties.

Approaching the overlap of branding with national affairs is seen as a striking example for a “neoliberal political rationality within which the lack of autonomy of spheres (for example political and economic) is no longer visible” (Dzenovska, 2005: 177). The animosity complained by Olins (2002a) could be read as ongoing principal discomfort with the integration of economic and political spheres that historically had been separate (Dzenovska, 2005: 178). Good nation brand management will need to discover and articulate these discomforts.

An important question seems to be which conceptual understanding of branding is applied. In general, the packaging and advertising association of branding is the least attractive to nations (Anholt, 2007a: 7) and promotional tactics are only an intermediate step for nation branding: “State branding will develop from economic salesmanship and political bimboism to an essential survival skill” (van Ham, 2004: 18).

In the literature a broader reading of branding as a philosophy of how to run places has evolved that promises more value when applied to a political entity like a nation. Nation branding is ascribed to be a methodology of political management and statesmanship: “For places to achieve the benefits which the better-run companies derive from branding, the whole edifice of statecraft needs to be jacked up and underpinned with the learnings and techniques which commerce, over the last century and more, has acquired. Much of what has served so well to build shareholder value can, with care, build citizen value, too; and citizen value is the keynote of governance in the modern world” (Anholt, 2005a: 121). In such a process, branding might turn out to increase the local self-esteem and thereby contribute largely to preserve a place’s particularities (Freire, 2005: 359) – as expressed in the Nation Brand Effect (Chapter 5.7.6).

Successful cases like, for example, Spain or Poland indicate that some brand techniques are useful for nation branding: “What governments can learn from branding are the prescribed methodologies; polls are similar to brand benchmarking surveys – there’s an initial query phase, then hypotheses are formed on the product side – what the product should be called or how it should be positioned” (Frost, 2004b: 3).

However, several significant problems should be considered as further impeding the analogy of commercial and nation brands:
• The analysis of identity and of target group perception will be much more complex for nations than for products.
• The goal of obtaining a fully integrated communication mix for branding will prove quite difficult.
• Modification, alternation or repositioning of the product(s) is much easier in the commercial world and will be sometimes impossible for nation brands.
• Measuring success by isolating factors seems often impracticable. Corporations can, for example, rely on balance sheets and profit-loss statements for measuring their progress, while similar indicators for countries seem neither at hand nor in sight (Frost, 2004a).

6.1.2 Nation brands as corporate brands
The key problem in analogies like the ones above seems to consist in the fact that nations are mostly considered with regard to product brands – an often unsuited analogy (Pryor/Grossbart, 2007; Skinner/Kubacki, 2007). There is good reason to compare nation brands rather with corporate brands instead. The nation brand in the advanced understanding goes clearly beyond promotion of individual products of a nation: “The idea of a nation as a brand – as Kellogg’s Corn Flakes is a brand – is a very big mistake” (Frost, 2004a: 1). Rather, tourism, exports, inward investments or singular cultural products are components of a comprehensive nation brand. They can be promoted and sold, but individually they don’t fully identify the nation. In fact, as shown for the case of Turkey, promotion will not turn out to be the strongest tool to brand-manage such a complex entity as a nation (Anholt, 2005a: 118).

Corporate brands serve usually as an umbrella brand for the product brands. The task for nation branding is to manage the orchestration of the reputation assets (Kotler/Gertner, 2002), not primarily to sell individual products on global markets. The strength of the core brand will influence all individual levels. The stronger the nation brand, the more promising is the use of this asset for the promotion of single products. The analysis of Turkey’s current measures, with some promotional activities in tourism and investment promotion without links to other brand dimensions, underscored such a need for coordination.

In that nations offer a large variety of outputs and at the same time represent a general strategy common to all different categories, they appear comparable to large corporations with multiple business fields (Papadopoulos/Heslop, 2002: 307-308). Under this umbrella the different products of a nation brand as presented above will be united.

As nations, corporate brands are multiplex, federally governed, organized on a supra-level and not easy to change (Balmer/Gray, 2003). Critical factors for successful corporate brands are the degrees to which internal target groups (mainly employees) live and understand the corporate brand (Anholt, 2002a). The analysis of Turkey showed that this question is also crucial for nations,
expressed in the degree to which the inhabitants incorporate the nation brand as part of their reflexive (national) identity.

The construct of reputation, found to account better for collective perceptions than 'brand image' (Chapter 3.3), did develop in the course of differentiating product and corporate brands (Chun, 2005) and is mostly discussed related to the complex brand effects of corporations.

The similarity between nation brands and transnational corporate brands can also be observed in the opposite direction: global brands are taking on roles of the nation brand: “Global companies and brands have to assume many responsibilities that were previously seen as the responsibility of nation-states. In some senses, such brands have become part of the public domain and have to take political, cultural and moral responsibility. As such, country and company branding have become more similar and therefore share similar political and managerial challenges” (Kleppe/Mosberg, 2002: 40-41).

The fact that Turkey’s industrialists’ and businessmen association TÜSİAD, led by global holdings like Koç or Sabancı, was identified as a key driver not only behind Turkey’s nation branding and public diplomacy activities, but also behind the entire EU application process (Kramer, 1996), underlines the importance large companies have for the nation branding process. Olins (1999) even goes so far in saying that companies and countries begin to trade identities, with nations discovering the branding domain at the same time as companies learn to face questions of the public.

In line with Balmer/Gray (2003: 975) and Csaba (2005) the conclusion suggests the analogy of nation brands as a broadening of the corporate branding concept. Many of the problems mentioned above like the identification of target groups or the isolation of success factors will also hold for nation brands; this comparison will clearly improve many shortages of the currently predominant analogy of nation and product brands:

- “Corporate brands are fundamentally different from product brands in terms of disciplinary scope and management;
- Corporate brands have a multi-stakeholder rather than customer orientation; and
- The traditional marketing framework is inadequate and requires a radical reappraisal” (Balmer/Gray, 2003: 976). ¹

While the analogy to corporate branding relieves nation branding and public diplomacy of some basic controversies, buying into the branding concept still means inheriting some other general problems from the marketing world.

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¹ Therefore, Balmer/Gray (2003) have to be supported in their finding that this branch of marketing has yet to be developed, that is the theory of corporate level marketing/branding. The anthology by Schulz/Antorini/Csaba (2005) can be read as one general attempt for such theory development.
6.1.3 Renovation of brand concepts
Given some fundamental shifts in the information societies, core assumptions of branding are under attack both at the theoretical and the practical end.

Holt (2004: 14) identifies four different models in brand theory and practice with each specific axioms and assumptions:

- The classical brand theory, which is still predominant in most textbooks, stems from the management-centered marketing paradigm. In this model, brands are organized around the key words 'USP'\(^2\) or brand essence, to be defined by brand management. A brand is a set of abstract associations.

- In the midst of the 1990s the model of 'emotional branding' entered the stage. Terms like brand personality and brand experience underscored the acknowledgement of the consumer in this model. A brand becomes a relationship partner for the consumer.

- Together with the rise of the internet and new communication behaviors, the model of 'viral branding' developed. Aiming at spreading (brand-related) viruses via lead consumers into the social networks shifted the authorship of a brand even further to the consumer.

- With the cultural branding approach Douglas Holt recently added his reading of (successful) brands as cultural icons and authors of their own myth. As a member of the emerging stream of consumer research, Holt sees brands performing an identity myth for the consumer in the post-modern marketplace.

Due to these paradigmatic tensions in marketing, some concepts find themselves stuck between different perspectives. For example, despite its vital success, the concept of image (see Chapter 3.3) is applied quite controversially. Within marketing, a range of dissimilar and partly contradicting definitions, nomenclatures, models and conceptualisations for brand image can be identified – indicating that the construct is lacking theoretical foundation and became quite fuzzy: “Over time and through overuse, or misuse, the meaning of ‘brand image’ has evaporated and has lost much of its richness and value” (Dobni/Zinkhan, 1990: 110). The definitions in the literature cannot provide a clear-cut delimitation between concepts like attitude, stereotype, prejudice or image, also making the definition of image in international political contexts quite a challenge (Kunczik, 2005).

Common models still mostly rely on an isolated human being trying to make sense of the world all by him- or herself, caught in a narrow form of “stimulus-organism-response paradigm within a linear associationistic model of behavior” (Mick, 1988: 2). A broader approach accounting for the social construction of images by the interaction between the individual and the society would lead to a more socio-cognitive, discourse analysis perspective (Mick,

\(^2\) Unique Selling Proposition = the main selling point of a product or brand to be stressed e.g. in advertising
226

1988: 2) often incorporated in the emerging literature on corporate brand reputation (see above).

The cultural approach to brands and brand image posits an intense relationship between brand meanings and the surrounding cultural structures and processes (Thompson, 2004b: 98). More than just a symbolic source for constructing the individual identity, brands are interpreted symbols of cultural ideals, shared by like-minded people as foundations of a group identity (Holt/Quelch/Taylor, 2004: 71). Popular culture absorbs brands in its various spheres; hence the degree of manageability as direct control over brand meanings is regarded as rather small in this paradigm. In the cultural reading, successful brands are regarded as icons, fulfilling the basic human need for myths (Holt, 2003: 43-44). As entities to which people rely to express their identity, Holt (2004: 5) sees countries (and places in general, also NGOs, social movements and politicians) as prime candidates for cultural branding embodying socially relevant myths. As culturally and collectively shared entities, nations’ reputations could be interpreted as a form of myth.

Pryor/Grossbart (2007) showed that “place brands are socially and culturally embedded, and co-created and reified by social actors” (ibid: 302). Their findings suggest that the social and multifaceted nature of place brands prove the conventional branding models insufficient to explain, for example, nation brand phenomena (ibid: 291).

In this context, the rigidity of the distinction between sender and receiver, basic to the concepts of the classical brand theory, has been criticized from semiotic and organizational culture-related perspectives (Hatch/Schultz, 1997; Christensen/Askegaard, 2001). These positions underline that for complex commercial enterprises such as corporations it does not seem to make sense to maintain an absolute division line between the internal and external affairs of an organization (thus they propose not to keep up the distinction of image and identity).

The role insiders play in a communication context is enormous: “In today’s knowledge and service society, brands are delivered through and represented by people. [...] The internal development and acceptance of the brand, the understanding, sharing and living of its values and its vision are essential for recruitment and retention and also ‘to ensure consistent external communication’” (Wetzel, 2006: 144).

As the examples of Turkey’s people and Turkish diaspora showed, these opportunities also hold for the analysis of nation brands and frame modern public diplomacy: “New approaches in public diplomacy emphasize working with and through one’s own society as a means to get through to foreign audiences” (Melissen, 2006b: 9).

Overlapping areas where senders become receivers and vice versa (who is insider, who is outsider of a brand?) prevent a clear-cut demarcation. A unidirectional sender-receiver model does not correspond to the current main-
stream theories of communication (see Chapter 3.5.5) and meaning-negotiation. For all marketplace activities, consumption is also seen as production, involving “signifying and representing selves or identities in the image of the images sought” (Askegaard/Firat, 1996: 8).

According to this theory trait, the dichotomy of the functional and the symbolic in the marketplace introduced by Levy (1959) must be questioned, since symbolic exchanges of signs are also utility based discourses. Symbolic and functional values of objects merge, and necessarily images become interactive entities. Acknowledging this expresses the rediscovery of the ability of goods to communicate beyond their inscription (Askegaard/Firat. 1996: 14), which is a strong argument against a single-sided sender- or receiver-perspective. Marketing communication is seen as a way of constructing the world and understanding, “but not by way of monologic brainwashing – rather, as a dialogue for negotiated meaning” (Mick, 1988: 2).

6.1.4 Public diplomacy 2.0
The last argument in particular sounds all too familiar given the evolution public diplomacy has taken, outlined earlier (Chapter 3.5). As was shown, in its more recent paradigmatic turns from one-way asymmetrical towards dialogic symmetrical communication and community building, public diplomacy provides more evidence that the days of the management-driven marketing theory are numbered: “The shift from 'one-way' to 'two-way' communication mirrors, and was perhaps influenced by, shifts in the scholarly discussion of public diplomacy, public relations practice, and branding, where 'relationship' models are now strongly advocated as more ethical and even effective than 'information' or 'persuasion' models” (Oehlkers, 2006: 3).

Cowan/Arsenault (2008) therefore suggest that the collaborative layers of public diplomacy building up on dialogue and listening to provide the ground for longer-lasting relationships are at times the most important for public diplomacy: “There is growing agreement that projects and associations that bridge racial, social, ethnic, gender, and national divides, are essential for democracy building, increase social and political trust, and can help ameliorate social, political, and ethnic conflict” (Cowan/Arsenault, 2008: 23).

For this development, what is commonly referred to as web 2.0 is clearly the breakthrough technology (Cowan/Arsenault, 2008). Dialogue-oriented internet applications, the rise of virtual worlds or online gaming sites have brought along new channels for those concerned with public diplomacy to move beyond online information portals to include much more broadly based forms of collaboration and multiplication of information in an age of digital diplomacy: “When everyone has a blog, a MySpace page or Facebook entry, everyone is a publisher. When everyone has a cellphone with a camera in it, everyone is a paparazzo. When everyone can upload video on Youtube, everyone is a filmmaker. When everyone is a publisher, paparazzo or filmmaker, everyone else is a public figure. We’re all public figures now. Your reputation in life is going to get set in stone so much earlier. More and more of what you say or do or
write will end up as a digital fingerprint that never gets erased” (Friedman, 2007).

Given this background, Castells (2008) describes a new public sphere arising as a substitute for nation-state governments which – due to a number of shortages in legitimacy, efficiency or identity – lose their sovereignty in handling global affairs. The final purpose of public diplomacy is therefore not to equip governments to better reach publics, but to build a public sphere to harness the dialogue between different nongovernmental social collectives. This task was also identified as an urgent priority for Turkey’s EU bid.

Here (with Anholt, 2007a: 105) public diplomacy and nation branding become quite closed in meaning. While the traditional diplomacy as government-to-government (G2G) relations and conventional public diplomacy as government-to-people (G2P) approach maintain some relevance, effective nation branding and public diplomacy have also to include the people-to-people aspect (P2P).

Nation branding in political contexts becomes a role model for a new political communication. It is essentially in the loss of control in which public diplomacy unites the current domains of commercial and political marketing: “National image is communicated through a complex web of channels and sectors, and none of the ‘owners’ of those channels have absolute control over all the factors that affect their interests” (Anholt, 2007a: 274). Likewise Melissen (2006b) underlines that public diplomacy is to large degrees not controllable to the extent diplomats usually like.

6.2 Political communication revisited

In many regards the evolution of public diplomacy can be considered as an example of a changing style of political communication in general. In an age of (consumer/citizen) empowerment (Firat/Dholakia, 2008), political analysis also needs to incorporate the bottom-up momentum and the power of opinion, images and reputation.

Connecting to questions that occupied political science for more than half a century following Lippmann’s and Dewey’s debates on public opinion, leadership and the role of media in communication (Gregory, 2008: 278), Neack localizes the lines of conflict between a traditional realist and a rival pluralist perspective in international relations theory: “The first view derives from the pluralist model of policy making. This view is a ‘bottom-up’ approach, which assumes that the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the foreign policy making process. In sum, leaders follow masses. The second view representing the conventional wisdom in literature suggests a ‘top-down’ process, according to which popular consensus is a function of the elite consensus and elite cleavages trickle down to mass public opinion. This view is consistent with realism, as it envisions a persistent national interest pursued
by elites and a passive, acquiescent, or inconsequential mass public” (Neack, 2003: 104-105).

### 6.2.1 Post-modern contexts of politics and marketing

Many of the social trends influencing the context of brands and marketing communication (at least for the Western world) in the last two decades, that led to the broader understanding of cultural or iconic brands (Chapter 6.1.3), similarly apply to the political stage. In short, what is generally referred to as post-modernity is not only a philosophical category, but also an important aesthetic strategy and an epochal cultural shift that has reached politics.

Political debates adapt to the vanishing of reference points in post-modern identity (Axford/Huggins, 2002). There is, for example, increasing evidence of electoral volatility (Butler/Collins, 1999; Bartle, 2000), paired with a constant decline in loyalty and psychological attachment towards parties (Lock/Harris, 1996: 18; Bartle, 2000: 33). At the same time there is a growing relevance of group activities with a high degree of mobilization across traditional political (party) structures focusing individual fields like, for example, ecology/energy, consumer protection or fair trade, organized cross- or trans-nationally within global infrastructures.

The formal boundaries of politics are dissolving in the context of the meltdown of the nation-state. Historical caesuras such as the end of the Cold War lead to substantial challenging of the grand narratives of politics like the left versus right schema (Bartle, 2000: 17). Accordingly, we witness fragmented political discourses, transmitted through increasingly individualized media and information systems.

Employing the metaphor of the theatre, while modernity made masses an audience rather than participants in the act; post-modernism seeks to enlarge the stage and make it more inclusive (Fırat/Dholakia, 2008): “In marketing terms, post-modernism erodes the professional layer of insulation between the corporation (the stage) and the marketplace (the audience). It spills the corporate decision process into public view and lets the consumers toggle – often via information technology – the stage props of marketing tactics and act out their managerial and creative fantasies” (Fırat/Dholakia, 2008: 267). As outlined for current public diplomacy models, similarly marketing and political communication in general develop from managed to collaborative, from centralized to diffuse and from ordered to complex modes of operation (Fırat/Dholakia, 2008).

In the post-modern order constructivism is a theoretical home to explain that reality is necessarily a social construction, a hyperreality (Fırat/Dholakia, 2008) and contingent on the power of structures and how (state) actors reproduce their own constraints (van Ham, 2008). Related to the theory delv-

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3 See the discussion of the concept e.g. by Axford/Huggins (2002), Fırat/Dholakia (2008) or Giddens (2001).
opment of international relations, “the poststructuralist idea according to which one acts on what one perceives something to be, and not how it is, has gained momentum in much recent literature on international politics” (Svendsen, 2006: 3). The relationship between soft and hard power was described in this context in Chapter 3.2.

Consequently, the evolving centrality of signs over words⁴ and the intense aesthetization of every day life (Axford/Huggins, 2002) greatly influence the post-modern style of politics. The production of the correct imagery becomes “politically more significant than the creation and execution of policy, the old concept of governing” (O'Shaughnessy, 2003: 297).

Practical political marketing and communication under these circumstances need to optimize the presentation of politics for transforming media environments. Important aspects are the increasing personalization of political campaigning or adoption of promotional techniques; the difficulties in ‘managing’ contemporary political discourses due to the growing prominence of spin and buzz; and the upcoming influence of new communication technologies (Dermody/Wring, 2001: 198).

6.2.2 Political Branding

In the context of these new forms of presentation and collaboration, the branding of politics has gained some significance. Also in the political arena, branding is not equal to advertising or other forms of dissemination of messages, but rather stands for a two-sided model of interaction between stakeholder parties (Lock/Harris, 1996: 22). Politics have arrived at the level of symbolic entities; they have become a narrative. As such politics are comparable to brands: both entities react to their changing social setting by taking an iconic turn.

In the past decade there have been a couple of discussions on how to integrate branding into the political world. Some authors explain the principal unease with marketing in politics with the fact that marketing oftentimes suffers from the stigma of being non-substantial and merely ‘trendy’ (Lees-Marsment, 2001). Others blame a general lack of skill or willingness (for example, protection of academic territory, Bartle/Griffiths, 2002: 34; Scammell, 1999) on the side of political scientists to integrate image into their models.

The general discomfort seems irrational: “Why should we assume that the public readily buys into the seductive meanings of consumer capitalism but remains rational and objective when making political decisions?” (van Ham, 2001: 3). Without doubt certain distinctions between publics and markets need to be recognized (Kruckeberg/Vujnovic, 2005: 303), but in general branding promises some merits.

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⁴ In Baudrillard’s reading of modern societies as symbolic entities, see Axford/Huggins (2002: 192).
Branding is suggested to be employed moreover as a complex methodology to analyze and conduct politics than as an ideology: “The study of the processes of exchanges between political entities and their environment and among themselves, with particular reference to the positioning of those entities and their communications. [...] As an activity, it is concerned with strategies for positioning and communications, and the methods through which these strategies may be realized, including the search for information into attitudes, awareness and response of target audiences” (Lock/Harris, 1996: 22).

From the standpoint of a contemporary branding theory based on the post-modern understanding that brands and images are volatile and rarely under complete control, a key criticism of political science analysis is that it is mainly static, that is, it explains the moment, but not the unpredictable dynamics and random nature of politics as they happen (Scammell, 2007: 187).

Consequently, in post-modern branding contexts the model of political communication seems to change. The permanent campaign model, largely developed during the Carter administration in the USA in the early 1980s (Newman, 1999b), which is characterized by continuous polling and news management reacting to media images, could be outdated. In essence, this model means spin doctoring, which has a value in approachable media contexts, but seems insufficient for a holistic proactive leadership approach and finally even undermines public trust. Since the permanent campaign is more or less exclusively about media politics, the question is probing what happens in times of declining trust in media (Edelman, 2006)?

In effect, the mass-media “one-size-fits-all” advertising driven model of political communication seems to lose relevance. The branding methodology promises a broader approach of understanding of citizens/people not only as consumers of media, and strives to provide reassurance, uniqueness, consistency, emotional bonding and visions/images connected to politics and governance in more direct communication contexts (Scammell, 2007). As such “branding is both a cause and effect of the shift toward a thoroughly consumerized paradigm of political communication. [...] It is a progression of the process of the remodeling of the government-citizen relationship along consumer lines” (ibid: 188).

Currently there is a fundamental mismatch observed between consumers and citizens: “Affluence and choice had empowered people as consumers, but globalization, threats of terrorism, and environmental erosion had led to insecure citizens” (Scammell, 2007: 190). The sense of control that individuals gain as consumers making the choice to buy or not based on their personal values is not mirrored in conventional politics, consequently blamed for a rising climate of social fracture and insecurity (ibid.). “Consumer power had led to a paradigm shift within marketing, from ‘interruption marketing’ (unasked for, unwelcome) to ‘permission marketing’ (anticipated, relevant, personal). [...] Political campaigns must follow marketing and develop more personal, interactive messages” (Scammell, 2007: 190).
The rise of so-called ‘open-source politics’ (Sifry, 2004), referring to opening politics to direct citizens interaction through, for example, blogs, video sharing or discussion participation, seems to mark such a new era of collaborative political communication. The 2004 US presidential campaign by Howard Dean is usually regarded as the dawn of the politics 2.0, and the role web portals like YouTube or Facebook have played in the US presidential campaign of Barack Obama in 2007/2008 illustrates how this trend is gaining momentum.

Like consumer marketing, the political domain also witnesses a reinterpretation of power relations and participation. New modes of collaboration and co-creation between what were called the sender and receiver of messages in earlier communication paradigms arise more or less simultaneously in both marketing and political domains. The concept of branding undergoes a redesign and reappears as a solid methodology for consumer engagement and therefore qualifies far beyond being not more than a quasi-science related to shopping: “although the usual context of brand theory may be buying and selling and promoting consumer goods, this is a thin layer that covers some of the hardest philosophical questions one can tackle: the nature of perception and reality, the relationship between objects and their representation, the phenomena of mass psychology, the mysteries of national identity, leadership, culture and social cohesion, and much more besides” (Anholt, 2007a: xii).

It is in this context that place branding, along with soft power and public diplomacy, becomes a natural part of a wider spectrum of post-modern power; as a key element to build personal or institutional relationships and dialogue routines with foreign audiences by focusing on values this new art differs from classical diplomacy which primarily deals with issues and refers to the political communication model of the permanent campaign (van Ham, 2008).

Conversely, marketing communications theory can also profit from an evolving theory of political branding (in international relations contexts). The model nation brand is an interesting extreme case for complex brand structures, and the Nation Brand Effect (Chapter 5.7.6) underscoring the closed interrelatedness of the inside and outside of brands will challenge today’s quite manifest boundary lines between internal and external communication. From this follows, as indicated in Chapter 3, a basic questioning of the rigid conceptual distinction of brand image and brand identity, which for the case of nation brands were shown to be rather closely connected and permeable.

In consequence, both worlds seem to enrich each other in delivering a new understanding of political branding and marketing communications: “Political marketing borrows from marketing but integrates lessons from political science to produce new directions” (Lees-Marshment, 2001: 709). Branding is certainly neither a savior nor good or ill per se, but a more or less innovative technique promising interesting new potential, but also creating anxieties that political actors need to be aware of (Scammell, 2007: 191).
7 Conclusion: Turkey’s public diplomacy and Europe

While, following from the above, “branding can be seen as a post-modern variety of identity-formation” (van Ham, 2002: 265), Turkey might in many regards have not arrived in post-modernism and current marketing contexts. Corresponding to that, the application of public diplomacy and nation branding in Turkey were found to be premature. Vis à vis the country’s desire to join the European Union, substantial changes in these areas seem inevitable.

7.1 Closed-source politics

Starting from the obvious, in times when academicians are sentenced to prison for insulting Atatürk (Anon./Zaman, 2008b) while YouTube is blocked by the Turkish government for similar reasons, and when Orhan Pamuk and Elif Shafak Turkey’s most famous authors had been brought to court for insulting Turkishness (Zaptcioğlu, 2006b) as were the Turkish intellectuals who initiated an Armenian apology campaign in January 2009, a bottom-up approach to public diplomacy for Turkey seems quite remote, although nonetheless desirable. There can be no doubt that “one of the main reasons for weak public diplomacy is the lack of freedom of expression” (Karabat, 2007c: 1).

A more decisive Turkish stance on developing a stronger Turkish civil society was found fault and desirable (Kamp, 2008). As indicated, Turkey’s identity formation was historically not the result of intra-societal negotiation. Open and collaborative civil society dialogues, potentially promising the most important momentum for a turnaround of Turkey’s reputation, certainly imply equality rights and freedom of speech (Fisher, 2006). It seems evident that “the countries who are successful in public diplomacy are the ones who have better human rights records” (Karabat, 2007c: 2).

Furthermore, organizationally Turkey’s public diplomacy has way to go to reach open-source structures. A classical management centered top-down marketing and branding paradigm is for example manifest when looking at the wording of Turkey’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism’s promotion planning: “In the next few years, new projects and programs shall be devised to tackle the constraints and eradicate the demise caused by these unfavorable impacts, involving the launch of a variety of promotional campaigns dedicated to sending a better image of the country in people’s minds” (Ministry of Culture & Tourism, 2007: 29). In this Ministry’s perspective, Turkey’s perception abroad appears manageable to large degrees, which in fact does not seem to be the case, as the analysis showed.

In addition, the activities of the potentially to be founded Public Diplomacy Agency of Turkey concentrate on the decision makers, hoping to activate top-down multiplication in a traditional asymmetrical key opinion leader campaign. What seems to have been overseen is that in the current contexts advocacy can come from anywhere. That is, the potential of a bottom-up momentum seems not considered to be relevant for the time being.
Turkey is organized in centralized long-term planning cycles (with currently all related activities ultimately targeting the year 2023, 100 yrs of the Turkish Republic) coordinated by the powerful state planning organization DTP, affiliated with the Prime Minister and bound to “advise the Government in determining economic, social and cultural policies and targets of the country by taking into account every type of natural, human and economic resources and possibilities of the country [and] to prepare long-term development plans and annual programs conforming to the targets determined by the government” (Turkish Republic Prime Ministry State Planning Organization, 1994: 1). Accepting a potential loss of control, typical for new public diplomacy streams (Leonard, 2002a) by installing open-source elements would be a substantial mind shift given these structures.

As was analyzed in detail when looking at organizational implications for Turkey’s public diplomacy, to a certain degree the country seems stuck in the widely held notion of the 1980s that only governments can use public diplomacy (Gilboa, 2008: 57). The difficulties described for governmental institutions to align with the nongovernmental spectrum were interpreted as strong indicators of Turkey’s traditional Kemalistic state-centred approach to politics and political communication. Newer participative interpretations and tools for place branding like cultural mapping or visioning, based on dialogue and collaboration between all stakeholders (Bianchini/Ghilardi, 2008) are not yet visible in contemporary Turkey.

7.2 Modern and post-modern concepts of power

If the most relevant conditions of post-modern cultures and societies like ‘hyperreality’, ‘fragmentation’, ‘decentering’, ‘paradoxical juxtapositions’ and ‘tolerance for difference and multiplicity’ (Fırat/Dholakia, 2008: 261-264) are invested for the case of Turkey in light of their attached attributes, the nation’s public diplomacy challenge in essence could turn out to be the one of a modern nation struggling to adapt to post-modernism contexts and conditions.

- **Hyperreality**: Turkey’s public diplomacy was marked by the difficulties of constructing a nation brand personality and the absence of clear external national symbols as the country’s significations beyond tangible assets.
- **Fragmentation**: The troubles in handling the complexity of Turkey’s nation brand and the problems of the country’s disjointedness while lacking order and coherence reveal some rifts in society and culture.
- **Decentering**: The ability to profit instead of suffering from the nation’s otherness and disorder was identified to potentially mark an essential quality of a post-modern Turkey in a post-modern Europe.
- **Juxtapositions**: It seems to be similarly important to endure Turkey’s multiple paradoxes rather than trying to harmonize them by force, as well as it appears valuable to stand and invite opposition.
- **Difference**: In sum, as shown before, a post-modern Turkey could be able to put tolerance, diversity, deference and multiplicity, it’s oscillation between the poles, at the heart of its identity.
In reality, however, as the analysis has shown, Turkey appears as a nationalist type of a country bidding to enter the poststructuralist supranational entity EU. The dominance of soft power in the European community of nations is countered to a large degree by the still hard-power driven Turkey, as countless military interventions or ‘velvet coups’ indicate.

These different perspectives will most definitely bring along major challenges: “In the conception of the interaction between post-modern states (...) diplomacy must deal with the complex, multi-layered network of relations. This requires a conceptual shift from the emphasis on a ‘top-down process’” (Fisher, 2006: 18-19).

With Noya (2006c) the dualistic approach of either hard or soft powers (e.g. pursued by Nye, 2004) needs to be put into perspective with regard to the significant divide between nations; it is down to a nation’s status in the world and the level of development in another nation to determine the extent of soft power’s potential impact. Post-modern audiences of international politics would be ready to submit themselves to soft powers to a similar extent as they would to hard powers (ibid: 64), while for modern or pre-modern societies soft power might turn out to be a weak or useless force. The following relations of soft-power components to different stages of modernity can be established.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-modern powers</th>
<th>Modern powers</th>
<th>Pre-modern powers</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Culture</td>
<td>• Economy</td>
<td>• Geographic size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Democracy</td>
<td>• Technology</td>
<td>• Population</td>
</tr>
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<td>• Language</td>
<td>• Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International aid and cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7-1: Power categories of nations (Noya, 2006c: 59)

This order not only might explain some of the apparent paradoxes found in the interviews before, but could also reconfirm the way previously identified towards more effective public diplomacy for Turkey:

- The good news from Turkey’s economy might not be highly valued in a post-modern European contexts, as well as the military control obviously does not convince EU Europe as effective soft power.
- Size-arguments related to geography or population will furthermore not reach most audiences in Europe, but rather seem to produce additional fears or aversions.
- Effectively, the messages of culture and democracy, as was articulated in several experts’ opinions, will most probably have the strongest impact on post-modern EU citizens.

Soft power is therefore not a power per se, but any power can be soft power, as long as it is found convincing by the receiver without hard proof, but by ascription. “Perception and legitimization (or the lack thereof) are es-
sential parts of power. A resource becomes power inasmuch as it is recognized as such and is considered legitimate” (Noya, 2006c: 57).

For the case of Turkey the Nation Brand Effect (Chapter 5.7.6) linking inside and outside of a brand comes into effect. Powers that are perceived to the inside of a society (as apparently coercive power might still to a certain degree in Turkey) should ideally be in harmony with powers employed and displayed to the outside (such as human rights or freedom of speech would be for the case of Turkey as signposts of democracy, or cultural richness). Regarding Turkey’s EU application internal and external legitimating of power shows significant asymmetries.

7.3 Turkey’s future in Europe

Although for many EU politicians the benefits of Turkey’s accession are obvious and guide their decision making in favor of integrating the country, their arguments have not yet impacted on the public opinion and Turkey’s nation brand image across the EU. It was shown that vehement dichotomies are in the way of a clear-cut positioning of Turkey, which is why supporters and opponents might also talk past each other in terms of time horizons or collective versus personal considerations (Barysch, 2007a).

It was argued that debating Turkey means automatically debating European identity (Leggewie, 2004: 319), which does not make Turkey’s task to convince Europe easier, but rather – in defining the ‘us’ and ‘they’ of Europe – leaves Turkey with the role as “the convenient Other that can tell us who we are” (Svendsen, 2006: 5).

Consequently, “Turkish EU membership is not only a public relations exercise persuading EU’s citizens that Turkey is just like Europe” (Akule, 2007: 45). Analyzing current models of public diplomacy it was shown, that advertising or traditional PR tools will not meet Turkey’s needs; rather especially in horizontal relationships between European publics and intensive civil society dialogues some promising potential for Turkey can be assumed.

As was suggested, the real issue for Turkey is not merely fulfilling the official corridor of negotiation with the EU, but lies in the intangible momentum surrounding the political scorecard: “Accession to bodies such as the European Union is an iceberg: the tip represents the practical, tangible entry requirements; below the waterline are the invisible cultural, historical, social and emotional factors that drive public opinion, as well as the private opinions of decision-makers (Anholt, 2007a: 118).

For the question of Europe’s future identity a rift between public and leadership opinion was described that was also partly resembled in fault lines with regard to Turkey’s EU membership. Referenda as expressions of public opinion keep counteracting the will of the leading political class.
As Anholt nicely put it, the views of publics are easier to measure and to understand, but quite hard to change, while the opinions of foreign ministries or governments could be harder to measure and understand, but—at least in theory—should be more susceptible to alternation (Anholt, 2007a). From the present situation, accordingly, more emphasis is needed to be devoted to the public opinion and reputation dimensions, for which all data and findings suggested urgent needs for action.

Maybe naïve, surely ignorant, certainly careless and hopefully as not more than saber-rattling therefore some first public footprints by Turkey’s first full-time EU accession negotiator taking office in January 2009, Eğeman Bağış must be read. According to him “those naysayers are small in number and their attempts to prevent Turkey’s integration in Europe [...] will just be footnotes in history” (Doğan, 2009: 4).

On the contrary, the political climate for Turkey’s accession among Europe’s leaders turned out to be quite volatile and the courage by the politicians to lead public opinion rather than following it (Barysch, 2007a: 6) was not always observed for the case of Turkey, especially since the current contexts of Islamic terrorism seem not particular helpful for Turkey (Lombardi, 2005) and more European heads of state may become increasingly sensitive to their publics’ views: “In today’s Europe policy-making is no longer just the concern of the select few, it requires the support of the democratic majority as well as public opinion in the country in question” (Paschke, 2001: 11).

Applying this, Turkey’s activities—as was shown—still embrace the elitist approach to reach key opinion leaders in the political and economic domains, whilst almost all practitioners and researchers underline the inertia of nation brand images and reputations in the public mind: “the image of a nation is a precious good: easily ruined and difficult to re-establish. But images of nations can be very stable. Once established in a group, stereotypes tend to persist” (Kunczik, 2005: 1).

Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt was quoted on the sidelines of the fifth-annual Bosphorus Conference in Istanbul in October 2008: “Turkey is to many Europeans a very foreign country, and very foreign countries are countries that you do not necessarily want to have inside the European Union. It is only when we make Turkey less foreign to European audiences that citizens will begin supporting it. (...) Turkey (...) has to be more active around Europe in marketing itself” (Kiper, 2008: 1).

Turkey’s hesitance to thoroughly attack the challenge of solving its reputation problems in Europe remains puzzling in this respect, given not only the conclusive evidence by both public opinion and nation brand data on Turkey discussed in Chapter 2 and the fact that the problem is broadly acknowledged by all experts inside and outside of Turkey, but also with regard to the abundance of promising potential approaches, as were discussed throughout the second part of this thesis.
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U

V

W

Y


B Portraits of informants

- **Richard Anderson** is CEO of BBDO Turkey, the Istanbul branch of one of the world’s largest advertising networks. When moving to Turkey from UK in 1990, he found the agency Alice in Istanbul that was later on sold to BBDO; he hasn’t left Turkey ever since.

- **Adam Achouri** is a Swedish expatriate in Ankara. He moved from Sweden to Turkey for romantic and business reasons. He is engaged to a Turkish woman with a child and has been in Turkey by the time of the interview for approx. 1.5 years. He works in medical business consulting with an education background in management.

- **Erkan Arikân** was editor in chief of the Turkish radio program “Köln Radyosu” of WDR in Germany between 2003 and 2007. With his parents being first generation guest workers, he was born and raised in Berlin. The journalist had worked for other German media before dealing with this specific Turkish issue.

- **Christer Asp** has been the ambassador of Sweden in Ankara since fall 2005. He served in a leading role during Sweden’s EU accession process.

- **Ümit Boyner** is heading a committee of TÜSİAD responsible for an EU PR campaign starting in 2006. Apart from that she has been with BOYNER HOLDING in Istanbul for more than 12 years and currently serves as a member of the board of directors, responsible for finance.

- **Luis Fernandez De la Pena** had been the Spanish ambassador to Turkey since summer 2004. Before coming to Ankara, he served as an ambassador to Slovenia and before that worked in Croatia, providing him with some experience on EU accession processes.

- **Andrei Grasseli** is the Slovenian ambassador to Ankara and has been living in Turkey since 2003.

- **Gareth Jones** is the British REUTERS correspondent in Ankara, responsible for covering political issues to the English-speaking world. He has collected a decent number of expatriate experiences e.g. in Russia, Japan and Balkans before coming to Turkey in 2002.

- **Josa Karre**, who works as 2nd secretary in the Swedish embassy in Ankara and who is mainly occupied with economic affairs, has been living in Turkey since 2004.

- **Suat Kınıklıoğlu** was elected Turkish MP in 2007 and assigned spokesperson for the parliamentary commission on Foreign Affairs. Within his party (AKP) he is the spokesperson for Public Diplomacy matters. Before becoming MP, he was executive director of the German Marshall Fund’s office in Ankara.

- **Uros Kovsca** was a graduate student from the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and exchanged student to Bilkent University in Turkey between 2006 and 2007. He has a professional background working for NGOs in Slovenia.

- **Heinz Kramer** is Head of Research Division 'External Relations' at the Berlin-based think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and publishes regularly on Turkey’s political situation. He taught Political
Science at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey in the early 1990s and he is considered as “one of the leading German experts on Turkey” (ESI, 2006: 3).

- **Jose Ligero-Cofrade** is a Spanish expatriate in Ankara with 5 years experience in Turkey. He has lived in Istanbul before and holds a managerial position in a Spanish railway construction company in Turkey.
- **Stephen McCormick** worked in the political department of the British embassy in Ankara. He has been living in Turkey since 2004. He is also connected to some economic and matchmaking issues taken care of by the embassy.
- **Ayşegül Molu** is the general director of the Turkish Advertising Agency Association (TAAA) in Istanbul. She largely coordinated the project “TÜKIYE” (unsuccessful attempt to nation brand Turkey) and edited the final framework report. She had several media appearances on the issue of Turkey’s nation brand.
- **Dirk Nieuwboer** is the Turkey correspondent for several Dutch and Belgian newspapers including De Telegraaf and De Standaard. He has been living and working in Istanbul since 2001.
- **Brigitte Özbalı**, a German citizen, has been living in Turkey since the late 1980s. Together with her Turkish husband she rebuilt and now runs a quite successful hotel in the Kelebek valley closed to Fethiye, well positioned in the nature-tourism niche. Her academic education background is in sociology.
- **Murat Özcelik** headed the to-be-founded department for Public Diplomacy in Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara between 2006 and 2007 and became Turkey’s special envoy to Iran in 2008. Before, he was a career diplomat with missions to USA and Europe.
- **Wally Olins** is the chairman of the brand consultancy Saffron and has advised several countries and cities on brand formation and brand management. Currently, he is working on a nation branding programme for Poland. He published various books about branding and place branding.
- **Owen Parker** is a member of Turkey Team at the European Commission in Brussels. He is employed in the General Directory (DG) “Enlargement”, headed by EU commissioner Olli Rehn. Parker has been working on the issue of Turkey’s membership since 2002.
- **Mateja Petelinkar** was a graduate student from the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics exchanging to Bilkent University in 2006. She is closely affiliated with her family business, which currently tries to establish some trade contacts with Turkey.
- **Ruprecht Polenz** is one of the most profiled experts on Turkey within the German parliament. He is chairman of the foreign committee of the German Bundestag and has been Member of Parliament for 18 years. Earlier, he worked as the general secretary of the conservative party CDU of chancellor Angela Merkel. Within the CDU of he is one of the rare voices clearly in favor of Turkey’s EU accession.
• Nicole Pope has been living in Istanbul for more than 15 years. She is the correspondent of the French newspaper Le Monde in Turkey and freelanced for The International Herald Tribune and The Independent, but also works as an author for other publications and books on Turkey's history and current society.

• Christiane Schlötzer has been the Turkey correspondent of the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung until October 2005. She had lived in Istanbul for 5 years and worked in Turkey before as a journalist during the 1980s.

• Frank Stauss is one of the most profiled German communication experts for political campaigns. He worked for the Clinton presidential campaign in 1992 and for German Social Democrats between 2002 and 2005. He is managing director of the advertising agency "Butter" and has only little personal experience with Turkey (a holiday trip 20 years ago).

• Murat Sungar served as the secretary general of the European Union General Secretariat for three years until he resigned in August 2005. The career diplomat had served in many other functions and positions worldwide before. Rumours held his resignation was also expressing discontent with the slowing down speed of EU accession activities on the Turkish side.

• Mehmet Ural is Chairman of the communication agency Yorum Publicis in Istanbul. He had been a Board Member to the Turkish Advertising Association and Chairman to the Turkish Advertising Foundation for many years. He consulted to the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). Mehmet Ural is President to the European Association of Political Consultants (EAPC) and member of the Global Board of IAPC.

• Willemijn van Haaften has served as the first secretary in the political department of the Dutch embassy in Ankara since 2003. She is occupied with questions of the inter-religious exchange as well as minority rights etc.

• Dr Peter van Ham is director of the Global Governance Research Programme at the Clingendael Institute in Den Haag (Netherlands) and teaches at the College of Europe in Bruges. His research interests are European security and defence policy, transatlantic relations and place branding.

• John Verhoeven is teaching industrial engineering at Bilkent University in Ankara. He is a Dutch citizen and married to a Turkish woman. Both moved to Ankara in 2003.

• Reiner Freiherr von Leoprechting is head of public affairs of the German-based METRO Group, which retail store brands like real or Praktiker become increasingly present in Turkey. Leoprechting is also Vice-Chairman of the Turkish-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TDIHK). He visits Turkey at least 2x a year. METRO AG is member of the Foreign Investor Advisory Council to the Prime Minister.

• Erkut Yücaoğu was head of the board that run the (unsuccessful nation branding) TÜ®KYE project between 2002 and 2004. Until 2000 he was chairman of the Turkish industry and businessmen association.
(TÜSİAD). He runs an international trade company in the energy market.

- **Amberin Zaman** is correspondent of The Economist and some other English language newspapers in Turkey and lives in Istanbul and Ankara since 1999. Of Turkish origin, she was brought up and educated in all parts of the world and finally came back to do journalistic work in Turkey.

- **Cüneyd Zapsu** was special advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan and member of the AK Parti Central Decision and Administration Board (MKYK). Large part of his youth he spent in Munich, Germany. Besides his political ambitions, he is a successful entrepreneur. Known as Prime Ministers Erdogan’s right-hand man, he resigned from his political positions in March 2008 deploiring a lack of time for his personal life.
C Tourism advertising for Turkey

AT, 2000
PT, 2000
Vis ton rêve. La Turquie

FR, 2001
Kein Traum kann schöner sein.
The City of Rhythm

Turkey

For further information please call "Hello Turkey" on 09000 88 77 50 (call charged at 60p per minute) or visit our website www.turkey.co.uk
IT, 2002
UK, 2002
LAAT U MEESLEPEN DOOR HET RITME...
GENIET VAN TURKIJE

NL, 2003
EUROPA ODER ASIEN
WARUM NICHT BEIDES?

Kultur oder orientalischer Zauber?
Istanbul, Streifzug durch verschiedene Kulturen,
Brücke zwischen West und Ost bietet Ihnen:
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E Erklärung/Declaration


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