Italian Antipolitics as a long run Question: “Bad Civil Societies” or “Bad Elites”? 
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Occasional Papers
No. 2/2008

Hrsg. von
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Impressum

PIFO Politische Italien-Forschung
Erscheinungsort: Gießen

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ISSN: 1866 - 7619

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Contents

1. How to manage the many meanings of the term “antipolitics” (Introduction) .................................................................................................................. 5
   1.1 The stigmatic use of the term antipolitics ............................................. 13
   1.2 What is connected to the communicative style? What depends on the syntax of new mass media! ........................................... 14
   1.3 A value-related definition is one that is contrasted by an “alter” definition ........................................................................ 16
   1.4 Is something to be called anti-(politics) just because the actors or actions involved (in the political life) are not accepted by one or more opponents? .............................................. 16

2. A “simple” definition of antipolitics ........................................................................ 18

3. Three characters of the antipolitical domain: ambiguity, antithetical philosophical meanings and antithetical effects on democratic systems ........................................................................ 20

4. What is antipolitics? A synthetic review of the just given definitions .......................................................................................... 21

5. Antipolitics as a particular culture elaborated in Italy by a minority of intellectual elites ................................................................. 22

6. Conclusions........................................................................................................ 68

References............................................................................................................ 75

About the Author................................................................................................. 77
1. How to manage the many meanings of the term “antipolitics” (Introduction)

The first realization, by now acquired from literature, is that antipolitics is a set of definitions of several species within a broader genus:

1) antipolitics can be thought of as discursive practice adopted by institutional and non-institutional subjects of politics who: a) lay heavy criticism on the political system and on the party system; b) demand real representation, that is not mediated by a party, or, in any case, truly capable of responding to the crisis of politics and to social questions;

2) antipolitics as the expression of political populism that reaffirms with force (within the democratic logic of a plebiscite) a link between the charismatic political leader and the people and the leader’s ability to interpret the will of the people;

3) antipolitics, above all, that formally deals with the non political aspect involved in politics, and, at the same time, with politics in the form of “absolute politics”, according to the definition by Pizzorno (1994);

4) antipolitics that can also be considered as politics, but politics that emancipates from absolute politics (also from the theological substrate of absolute politics) in order to approach (both in the semantic dimension and in the pragmatic one) policy and the pragmatic, interactive, fallible dimension of policies as experiments of public policies, in the form of actions shared by several subjects for the resolution of common problems, of public problems, according to the conception of Public given by John Dewey (1971).

Lastly, there are also those who put forward the hypothesis that, in its extreme forms, antipolitics can be associated to the emergence of the myth within the political speech, to the emergence of heathen or antichristian spiritual forms, to the emergence of the demonic (Scattola 2007, 180-183; Guardini 2005, 293-345).

The second realization is that the complex issue of the different species of antipolitics cannot be faced without adopting cross-sectional interpretation of the current debate:

1) antipolitics is a set of typical phenomena of a democratic system, though not just of democracies (Donolo 2000, 86). As a matter of fact, antipolitics occurs as a spontaneous movement from the bottom, exasperated criticism lacking perspectives or real alternatives, but also occurs as a movement from the top, a deformed function of government, a strategy of action that is exaggerated in pursuing forms of moral hazard (which is a form of self-interest...
of the politicians; an interest which consists in taking risky decisions for all the citizens and, at the same time, taking advantage of the lack of transparency in its own network, so as to safeguard the interests of a privileged part of the citizens);

2) antipolitics is a method, i.e. a conception and a practice of power like an empty space (Lefort 1988, 17-19). This empty space would materialize if the place of power were left vacant. Just that, if this result is pursued hindering those who are willing to occupy the place of the power, in fact, it means exercising a power and, consequently, preventing the place of power from actually being an empty place. In order to realize the empty space of power it is obvious, therefore, that the objective may only be reached by renouncing;

3) only democracy has the resources, instruments and processes suited to defuse antipolitics (Donolo 2000, 86). In other words, if antipolitics represents a challenge to democracy, it can be surpassed by more democracy, i.e. with the search for an answer to the problem of institutional, cultural and psychological distance between those who govern and those who are governed. The attempt to surpass – by means of authoritarian solutions, deprivation of authority or exploitation – the challenge of antipolitics or to favour it only produces a transfer of antipolitics from physiological manifestation to pathological manifestation (exemplar on this point are the Italian vicissitudes of 1893-94, but also those experienced exactly one century later when the government parties become submerged by the judicial inquiry called “Mani Pulite”, i.e. “Hands Clean”).

In my opinion, Donolo’s statement is strictly connected to the theory of power as empty space, a concept elaborated by the French philosopher Claude Lefort (1988, 224-235), and in this sense antipolitics may be considered a challenge to democracy. Thus, we may use Lefort to explain in what sense antipolitics is, or may be, a challenge to democracy.

Lefort explains the practice of democracy as a practice where the locus of power is only temporarily occupied, never by a stable elite, nor by the same persons (as in an aristocracy) or by one person only (as in an absolute monarchy) nor by a group or by a party (as in representative democracies which have transformed themselves in a party-cracy or parties-cracy). According to Lefort, the democratic process can degenerate in two ways: the liberal illusion of diversity-in-itself process and the populist illusion of unity-in-itself. Even if important as a whole, Lefort’s theory is interesting for us only in one point, in that he anticipated something which happened in the transitory process from communism to democracy in Eastern Europe: a few spontaneous leaders of the protest movements thought it was important to organize the post-communism
democracy as an effective emptiness, i.e. as a locus of power to be occupied by negotiation tables and not by elected representatives. According to Lefort’s theory of democracy, this need for empty place of power, organized with an effective and permanent emptiness, represents an excess of democracy, even if it is considered a form of populism or antipolitics.

Many theorists of democracy are sharing this opinion of Lefort’s that a manifestation of populism (or of antipolitics) is any ideal of being politically efficacious without organizing themselves as a party or as an institutionalized movement with definite roles and with a decisional structure suitable for occupying the locus of power with representative actors. Sometimes this need for movements that are not at all institutionalized can be temporarily shared by civil society for a while (not the whole time). It happens when civil society has the will to solve its own need for democracy directing its action exclusively upon ethical values and not at all on a theory of political power. Other times a not at all institutional movement (for instance a committee) may elaborate an antipolitical strategy for a single question (like a public policy) based on the assumption that the locus of power can remain empty, that political representatives may completely abstain from using political power on that particular policy. This single-issue excess of democracy is considered a form of deliberative or direct democracy and if it is limited to single questions, it is perfectly compatible with representative democracy and it may become a way of improving the quality of democracy. In this sense, it is more correct to refer to these episodes as unpolitical and not as antipolitical ones in that their main request is that all the elected representatives act as arbiters, i.e. in order to guarantee that Logic, Right and Ethics (in a natural sense and not in a formal one) are respected by different committees or by representatives, and that all the actors (civil society’s leaders and ruling leaders) interact.

When civil society’s demand only refers to temporary and single-issue matters, we have a non-political or an unpolitical position in that the possibility of having concrete effectiveness when living the locus of power as an empty space is not an illusion and it is perfectly compatible even with the fact that elected representatives occupy the locus of power for all the other issues, but one. The possibility of acting in a political arena transformed into an empty space of power is realistic (thus it is not a populist demand) when the rule of law is produced identifying the point of equilibrium through an inquiry and giving the representative politician the opportunity of assuming the role of the arbiter.
Otherwise, the wish to obtain the empty space of power, if not limited to a single issue, is unrealistic and it may have unexpected and undesired effects. The first of these effects is the genesis (or the trend to the strengthening) of a new political elite, non transparent and with an opportunistic rhetoric which promises to keep the space of power empty, while it is strongly occupying it.

In fact, while it is evident that it is not true, the new governing elite may state that it has just reduced, is reducing or is going to reduce its own space of action and of presence in favour of the citizens who take action in the processes of deliberative democracy offered by the new government. An example of this rhetoric is that of the primary elections presented as an instrument of democracy within the parties and as elections able to produce processes of deliberative democracy in the parties and the institutions. These primary elections that materialize on the border between antipolitics of movement and institutional antipolitics, if not government antipolitics, are outwardly showing the inner democratic dynamics of the parties. Such dynamics, which have recently become significant in Italy, have never been adequately investigated because, being within Italian parties or coalitions, they are generally described through untrue statements or, however, through “meaningful statements based on facade values” that purified the events from the bitterness of conflicts and the tougher forms of antipolitical manifestation within the party system. The primary elections, because of their public character and of the appeal to the party members and to the voters, are surfacing a perspective of party dynamics that is more controversial than expected (with losers pointing their finger at gerrymandering, lack of transparency, unfairness, etc.). The hypothesis is that the conflicts within the parties and coalition are such that no space remains for a truly active role of the citizens and for realistic concern about hegemony, in the sense of Gramsci (i.e. in the sense to yield a part of one’s own immediate interests in favour of inner or exterior oppositions).

The third realization is that antipolitics is a term that is often used in a stigmatic manner. In particular in Italy where “anti-“ is often used in a double stigmatic sense: to consider the term after anti- (for instance, fascism) as a form of emergence of the demonic or to consider the term together with anti- (for instance, antifascism) as another form of emergence of the demonic. In fact, until the Second World War, Benito Mussolini had been very good at giving the term “fascism” a positive meaning and the term antifascism a negative or stigmatic meaning: until the killing, in 1924, of the Italian parliamentary Giacomo Matteotti supporters and opponents of fascism accepted the stigmatic meaning for those thinking of themselves as antifascists and, when accused
of this, even many communists would say: “We are not antifascist”. After the killing of Matteotti, the relatively few irreducible opponents of fascism used the term antifascism as stigmatic towards the fascists, but only after the defeat in 1943 was the stigmatic use of the term antifascism accepted by most Italians, when referring to fascism.

In the last fifteen years antipolitics has become a topic of great interest in Italy in that the term has been used to indicate all the new entries in politics and those who were going to construct a new political language. With reference to the new language, the main difference, compared to the politicians of the First Republic, has been based on two different changes:

1) the preference given by traditional politicians to general concepts as parties, elites, gross budgets, antipolitics, and so on and the preference given by the new (anti)politicians to concrete concepts like private security, taxes, ownership, immigrants, and so on;

2) a mutation in the structure of public communication consisting in the fact that, in the past, private citizens were free to ignore politically correct language, while politicians were obliged to use an institutional and politically correct one; now, on the contrary, private citizens are obliged, by prospective judiciary consequences and by possible shame urged by partisan movements, to be politically correct, while politicians are free, because of the principle of freedom of speech and of immunity often given by the fact that, in Italian politics, everyone seems to be partisan, in order to speak as they wish. An example for all: a young woman, having just achieved her academic degree, asked Berlusconi how she could prepare herself for her own professional future, implicitly intending how she could get a good job and go on, and it was suggested to her, in reply, “she marry a rich man, perhaps Berlusconi’s son”. The Partisan feminist movement considered the answer politically incorrect and they tried to cast shame upon Berlusconi. But the young graduated woman declared to the mass media that she appreciated the ironic answer. In other words, ordinary people think that Italian leaders are free to use any form of political incorrect language.

Antipolitics has become a topic of great interest in Italy because of the great number of new politicians who are considered antipoliticians (in order of appearance on the political scene: Marco Pannella, Umberto Bossi, Silvio Berlusconi, Antonio Di Pietro, etc.) and of the great number of new charismatic antipolitical personages who played or are playing a more or less important political role (in order of appearance: Beppe Grillo, Nanni Moretti, Daniele Luttazzi, Marco Travaglio, etc.).
What Italian politicians ignore, in using the term antipolitics, is that the term has been used in the past even with a positive meaning. In fact, the term antipolitics was used by Friedrich Nietzsche to indicate the deepest sense of his own philosophy. In Nietzsche’s use, antipolitics consists in a form of hyper-realism unable to see any connection between political realism and the ideal of politics (it gives too much significance to the theme of conflict in political activity).

Later, in 1904, Thomas Mann introduced the concept of non-politics (unpolitisch) that is assimilated to the concept of antipolitics and, other times, considered as an alternative. In Mann’s conception, whoever took on a conservative and nationalist view was non-political. He concluded by saying that he did not know whether the non-political vision was, in turn, a political vision. After Mann introduced this new concept, some named Nietzsche’s position as non-political, while others defined Mann’s position as antipolitical. It is possible, instead, that the two concepts, the one by Nietzsche and the one by Mann, feature two different views, not at all complementary. The main difference consists in the fact that non-politics is not conceived, by Mann, as excess, while, in Nietzsche’s conception, it is assumed as excess.

Last philosophical, and the most interesting, use of the term has been that of Hannah Arendt who used the terms antipolitics, “apolitical” (always used as an adjective), unpolitics and non-politics as synonymous. Hannah Arendt’s definition of politics was connected to action and speech: “Wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition, for speech is what makes man a political being” (Arendt 1998, 3); “action is the political activity par excellence” (Arendt 1998, 9). Both, speech and action have the characteristic of occurring “directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter” (Arendt 1998, 7). Wherever speech and action are not at stake, there we have antipolitics (and the other synonymous) in that the term indicates what operates as a whole, as a body where people are related, as if they were members of the same family. Thus, a family is non-political (or unpolitical) and even a Community (in the Christian sense) is non-political. Arendt’s definitions may be completed by those given by Roberto Esposito according to whom any force going in a certain direction to create a body (or a Community) is surely unpolitical and, if it goes in this direction, breaking pre-existing political ties, it becomes antipolitical. In this sense, a collective movement is unpolitical and it becomes antipolitical when it crosses political (i.e. connected to actions or speeches) borders among parties with the aim, not only to ignore the preexisting forces, but also to contrast and disrupt them.
Arendt distinguished between the unitedness (which is unpolitical or antipolitical) and the togetherness (which is political). “The sameness prevailing in a society based on labor and consumption and expressed in its conformity is intimately connected with the somatic experience of laboring together, where the biological rhythm of labor unites the group of laborers to the point that each may feel that he is no longer an individual but actually one with all others (…). This unitedness of many into one is basically antipolitical; it is the very opposite of the togetherness prevailing in political or commercial communities, which – to take the Aristotelian example – consist not of an association (koinonia) between two physicians, but between a physician and a farmer, ‘and in general between people who are different and unequal’”. (Arendt 1998, 214-215). Any human activity which is not a form of personal independence and is a form of subjection to necessity was considered unpolitical in the ancient Greek world.

Lastly, “The popular belief in a ‘strong man’ who, isolated against others, owes his strength to his being alone is either sheer superstition (…) or it is conscious despair of all action, political and non-political, coupled with the Utopian hope that it may be possible to treat men as one treats other ‘material’” (Arendt 1998, 188).

According to Arendt, any collective movement is, at the same time, an unpolitical actor (or antipolitical) and a political actor, in that it interprets the need for a new beginning, and the beginning is the substantive political sense of any action. In fact, “To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, ‘to begin’, ‘to lead’, and eventually ‘to rule’, indicates), to set something into motion (which is the original meaning of the Latin agere). Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action” (Arendt 1998, 177).

Of course, any new beginning produces political action that is published as an antipolitical action by the traditional actors. Thus any collective movement in the form NIMBY (Not In My Backyard), WIMBY (Why In My Backyard?), NIABY (Not In Anyone’s Backyard), NIMTOO (Not In My Term Of Office), NIMEY (Not In My Election Year), PIITBY (Put It In Their Backyard), PIMBY (Please In My Backyard), YIMBY (Yes In My Backyard), TINA (There Is No Alternative), OIMI (Only In My Island), TAZ (Temporary Autonomous Zone), LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use), BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone), and so on, has not considered a demand for more quality of democracy, but an antipolitical refusal of rationality and dialogue. This frequent partisan evaluation shows, where present, a character of traditional representative politicians or parties: citizens are expected to be
passive even when elite’s decisions reflect on the day to day life of the citizens and, if they delude these expectations, they are stigmatized as irrational or as unwilling to dialoguing. In other words, while elites say that those committees refuse any form of dialogue, in concrete these elites treat their citizens as ‘material’ and they reveal to be antipolitical.

The most significant way of refusing any speech is the DAD syndrome (the syndrome of Deciding, Announcing, Defending), i.e. that way of doing politics which consists in the fact that the announcement of a policy is given as late as possible, the decision is taken without transparency and the defense consists in an attacking strategy based on the stigmatization of opponents, accusing them of being ideological men or of being the expression of antipolitics, i.e. that way of doing politics that strongly conflicts with NIMBY, TINA, and so on committees.

Another way of considering other human beings as ‘material’ is any communication to people exclusively based on the technique, i.e. any situation with people acting where speech has lost its power. A particular kind of antipolitician is the technician and the scientist. This form of antipolitics of the representative politicians has been described by J.S. Mill in *The Representative Government*. According to Mill’s opinion, this deviation from democracy is caused by the fact that elites often (and erroneously, as the practice of politics has demonstrated in last fifties years) think that to govern passive citizens is easier. Even if Mill does not use the term, this kind of opinion may be considered a form of elite’s antipolitics (and precisely the most significant cause of civil society’s antipolitics).

Antipolitics is also the consequence of an only formal conception of democracy, a conception based on the assumption that the points of view of the opponents are immeasurable with one’s own. A conception of antipolitics which would be destructive of democracy, as had already explained Max Weber: any bearer of apparently immeasurable themes needs to be recognized and accepted in democracy because their position, however extreme, can help to see, within the conceptions of current politics, problems that may be missed by the elites who consider the traditional points of view of politics no longer debatable (Weber 1974, 319; Gangemi 1999, 208; cfr. Rorty 1987).

For all these reasons, to think over antipolitics also means to think over democracy and its completeness; but it means to reflect, on one hand, on the political professionalism and on the ideologies (or the “alter” politics which
cannot be assimilated to antipolitics) and, on the other hand, on the value of living through any experience with enthusiasm, even that of government or at least of political responsibility.

1.1 The stigmatic use of the term antipolitics

Analysis of the term “antipolitics” is complicated by the fact that this term and related ones have recently acquired a central position on the political debate and they have assumed a symbolic value. Every time a term acquires a symbolic value in the political debate, it is often used in a stigmatic way and it loses its homogeneity and univocal meaning, and the question of its definition becomes a question of ambiguity. As a result, all the semantic domain of the term assumes part of the ambiguity of that term.

A reciprocal stigmatic characteristic is often present wherever a conflict is present and it is addressed to the adversary, who may be a person, all the parties, the governing parties, and so on. Any stigmatic use of the term implies a manichaean vision of the world: on one side the goodness and on the other side the badness. Thus, the problem is: how to use the term antipolitics without sharing a manichaean vision of the world? To obtain this result, you may observe at least three rules:

First one: “It is essential to avoid joining the side of those who use the term with a stigmatic sense against one side or another of the society”. An example of the use of this rule: if it may be said that antipolitics is connected to the presence of a “bad civil society”, one may verify the possibility that antipolitics is connected to the presence of a “bad elite”.

Second one: “Antipolitics, as any other term with the prefix anti-, refers to a conflict and it is important to distinguish what the forms assumed by the conflict depend on (the theories describing it and the languages of the opponent groups) and what is strictly connected to the conflict (the presence of a division in the society)”. The theories describing the conflict connected to the antipolitical semantic domain: 1) Who uses the term antipolitics (or the terms unpolitics and non-politics) against its own adversaries, generally shares the “paradigm of modernity”; 2) Who is proud to be defined antipolitical (or unpolitical or non-political) generally shares a particular version of the “paradigm of post-modernity”.
Third one: “It is important to distinguish what antipolitics is not, even if it is called antipolitics, when it depends on something that is extraneous to a scientific definition of antipolitics”. Surely extraneous to antipolitics are:

1) What refers to the communicative styles.
2) What refers to a value-related definition (what is not \textit{wertfrei}).
3) What is called anti- only because of unwelcome actors or actions.

1.2 What is connected to the communicative style? What depends on the syntax of new mass media!

Modern mass media (particularly television) cannot transmit complex discourses while they may transmit any destructuraction of the adversary’s discourses based on the use of short critical sentences or jokes. Thus, simple discourses may be considered antipolitical while they are not.

An example of communication style which is considered antipolitical, while it is not, is the “negative campaign”. Ronald Reagan was a great master in the negative campaign. In the USA, he introduced a new form of antipolitics. In fact, in his first important speech, he argued that the problem was not the government plan, but the government itself, i.e. the fact that it is not acceptable for a government to interfere into the lives of the citizens more than the minimum. This speech, not accidentally, was held by Reagan in favour of Goldwater’s candidature to the Presidency in 1964, the same year in which, in the USA, a new form of electoral campaign started, i.e. a new way of communicating which was going to deeply influence the political language: the negative campaign, i.e. electoral campaigns based more on criticism towards the opponents than on a concrete proposal. With Reagan, antipolitics became the privileged instrument of communication which consisted, when in the opposition, in criticizing the opponents, when their party has government responsibilities, instead of presenting solutions and, when its own party and even it itself has government responsibilities, in criticizing the concept of government speaking of it in the third person as if the speaker had no responsibility over decisions taken or as if the decisions had not been successful as they should have, because of the opponents or of the obstacles placed by the administrative organization.

Reagan’s antipolitics was limited to the communication level in that, while governing, he acted realistically. The newness he introduced was exclusively in the speech: he simply succeeded in being convincing when he criticized the idea of government while he was governing. This newness consisted in the
technical change operated by a new mass media (television) that demonstrated, in 1960, with the most cited debate Kennedy-Nixon that television may be determining. After that episode, the centrality of television strongly conditioned campaigns in that it was evident that the high cost and short spaces bought for publicity prevented the candidate from introducing his whole program (except during spectacular debates which helped to understand the main differences between two or more candidates). This technical problem has not changed politics, but it has changed the way to compete and to select the winner. As this technical need, imposed by the communicative limits of mass media, represents a political problem, it is considered a form of antipolitics, but it is not.

Silvio Berlusconi, after the very bad performance in the Regional elections in 2005, went on 30 months with continuous negative campaigns, he almost won the 2006 political elections and he won the political election in 2008.

Why is the negative campaign not antipolitics? The negative campaign was inaugurated in the USA in 1964 after the significance of television had become evident in the electoral campaign of 1960. It is not possible to consider antipolitical a candidate who uses television as a political instrument of communication better than his adversaries. The risk is to consider the good communicator antipolitical and the bad one political.

A characteristic of populism is the presence of a charismatic leader. In this case, we must pay a lot of attention. The problem is that, when we speak of a charismatic leader, we often intend a winning leader and when we think of losing leaders we say that they are not charismatic. Thus a leader may be defined as populist because he is a winner and may not be defined as populist because he has been a loser. Sometimes we have had populist leaders who were “charismatic” but not winners (Jean Marie Le Pen) or charismatic leaders who did not govern in a populist way (Benito Mussolini) or who were not populist in their governmental action (and when they attempted to be populist, they started to lose their popular consent).

Another example of communication style which is considered antipolitical and it is not: clamorous announcements made only to take up the first pages in newspapers and, after, being negated or explained (or defined a metaphor or a joke) by the spokesmen of the leaders.
1.3 A value-related definition is one that is contrasted by an “alter” definition

According to Hannah Arendt, politics is any beginning (and in particular a collective movement). According to many other scholars any collective movement is surely antipolitical. A value-related definition is one depending on a paradigmatic preference to a theory of knowledge. Tullio Altan defined antipolitics whatever “doesn’t operate in the logical-empiric dimension which fixes the condition of political realism” (Tullio Altan 1989, 21). But, the assumption that logical-empirical dimension may be fixed a priori is connected to the “paradigm of modernity” which is not generally shared. Who shares the “paradigm of post-modernity” cannot accept this definition of antipolitics in that he believes that the condition of political realism may be fixed only a posteriori.

The two competing paradigms (the modern and the post-modern) are connected to the two subsequent competing methodological principles: To know in order to act (an a priori assumption of political realism). To act in order to know (an a posteriori assumption of political realism). If a problem is connected to a single decision to be taken, the principle “to know in order to act” may be accepted; if a problem is connected to a process (thus to a decision, to the reaction of other actors, to other decisions, and so on creating an interactive situation) what must be accepted is the principle “to act in order to know”. Interactive processes move in an unknown environment where any action may produce undesired and unforeseen effects. Thus, to act is a way to know. Routine procedures move in a well known environment where any behaviour may produce foreknown and foreseen effects. Thus, to know is a way to act.

1.4 Is something to be called anti-(politics) just because the actors or actions involved (in the political life) are not accepted by one or more opponents?

Referring to themselves, and to their followers’ actions, a populist would use the term “popular” or “of the people”, but never the term “populist”! Why? The term populism and related terms are used only (or mainly) with a stigmatic sense. Populism is one of the terms that are given to a movement or to a party exactly because they refuse this name. Paradoxically if a party was proud of the name “populist” it would be named by another name. In a way, this is what
has just happened in Italy with the term populist: it has been replaced with a more stigmatic one (antipolitics) when it was clear that the first (the term populism) was no longer considered strongly stigmatic or it was not at all refused by those whom it was directed to.

If this hypothesis is true, we may explain why an institutionalised party is rarely called populist (and if it is, the name has no longer a stigmatic sense) and why a movement is often defined, by the opponents, as populist or antipolitical: an institution is a self-defining collective actor while a movement is a collective actor in search of its own definition (in the sense that, if it has a name it is always temporary). Movements may receive their temporary names by opponents or by others observing the movement from the outside (others who do not participate in the movement’s activity).

For many who use the terms populism and antipolitics in a stigmatic way, both the terms are synonyms, with a difference: antipolitics is believed to obtain a stronger stigmatic result.

Excluding, for a moment, the stigmatic function of the terms, we observe that most of the times the terms are used to indicate the subsequent situations: 1) a leader trying to realize the homogeneity of the people while governing; 2) a politician speaking of realizing the homogeneity of the people by criticizing the actions of the governing elite; 3) a governing leader who criticizes the abstract idea of government while he is governing.

Out of these three concrete situations, he who uses the terms antipolitics and populism may often be more populist and antipolitical than those he denounces as such. In fact, antipolitical is any refusal of any new actor in the political arena coming from the elite or coming from the ruled.

The refusal of the presence of new actors in the political scenario is generally expressed towards any collective movement and, from a concrete point of view, any collective movement is always the announcement of a new political beginning. A collective movement is a situation of Statu Nascenti. As every beginning is political (Hannah Arendt), a collective movement cannot be related to antipolitics, even if it is anti-system, anti-parties, anti-government, and so on.

Last, but not least: what is called, though it is not, antipolitics may depend on one of the three dimensions of semiotics. First dimension (the syntactical one): communication is the medium. Negative campaigns are connected to the syntax of the new mass media. Second dimension (the semantic one): communication is the message. A logical-empirical dimension of realism is
connected to the semantics of communication. Third dimension (the pragmatic one): communication is interaction. Collective movements are connected to the pragmatic dimension pertaining to actions and interactions. All these three dimensions are pertaining to the politics and the ability to use each of them better than others is not at all the consequence of an antipolitical or populist attitude.

2. A “simple” definition of antipolitics

Antipolitics is whatever implies “the existence of simple solutions even for complex problems” (Mastropaolo 2000, 29). Before accepting Mastropaolo’s definition, it is important to pay attention to a few methodological rules:

1) *It is possible to distinguish what is simple and what is complex only within the same paradigm but it is not possible to do so when the two terms are used in two different paradigmatic contexts.*

A specification of the rule: it is possible to conclude that something is more simple or more complex than something else only after having verified that:

a) different objects are not described within different competing paradigms;

b) the interpretation of the terms used is not referred to an implicit knowledge belonging to different publics.

What appears to be a “simple solutions” often is a “simple form of communication” internal to a public of converts. For this reason, often, images, metaphors and actions, which appears simple to a generic public, are complex codices prospecting, to a specialized public, complex solutions.

2) *The different positions in the simplicity/complexity continuum, must be considered in relation to the three dimensions of semiotics: the dimension of syntax, of semantics and of pragmatics.*

This second rule must be considered within the paradigmatic choice each scholar has made. In fact, the relation among the three dimensions of semiotics, and their reciprocal complexity or simplicity, is different if considered inside the paradigm of modernity or inside the opponent paradigm.

Medium, message and interaction, according to the paradigm of modernity, are formally structured in formal organization, when formal communication is considered more significant than the informal one. Think, for instance, of a modern mass party with millions of members: the organization is everything and it is centralized in the sense that the medium is the organization as a whole,
the message has been selected and controlled by the organization (which distinguishes what is orthodox and what is heretic or heterodox), and the interaction is mainly a formal one.

Medium, message and interaction, according to the paradigm of post-modernity, are not at all structured since the form of organization is more spontaneous and formal communication is considered less significant than the informal one. Think, for instance, of a collective movement: the organization is nothing and it is centred on informal interaction, the message is new and completely free from any distinction between what is orthodox and what is not, and the medium is the network (without a centre or a periphery and without a border) where it is not possible to distinguish what is orthodox (in that it is produced entirely inside the network) and what is heretic or heterodox (in that it is mainly produced outside the collective network), as in any situation where interaction is not yet formalized.

In the paradigm of modernity, the medium is within the organization, the message is produced or controlled by the organization, and the interaction is formal and established by the organization; in the paradigm of post-modernity, the medium is open to the external world, the message has the informal face of the metaphor, and interaction is completely informal.

What is antipolitics in a context that is well depicted by the paradigm of modernity? Whatever is outside the organization and contrasts the organizational objectives!

What is antipolitics in a context that is well depicted by the paradigm of post-modernity? Whatever is operating with the conviction that an organization exists when it no longer exists! In other words, whatever is practised according to the hypothesis that it is possible to control the medium, the message and the interactions among the actors!

3) Simplicity and complexity are relational evaluations.
Simplicity and complexity must be thought in a process in which it is important to choose the expected and needed (by electors) level of simplicity or complexity inside in a previous selection of the correct and adequate dimension of semiotics. He who uses simplicity is not antipolitical, and he who uses complexity is not a politician, while a good communicator, and a winner, is he who uses the most accessible position in the ladder of simple-complex dimension and the most adequate dimension of semiotics.
3. Three characters of the antipolitical domain: ambiguity, antithetical philosophical meanings and antithetical effects on democratic systems

a) If a strong ambiguity is embedded to the term antipolitics, the same ambiguity is transferred to the terms pertaining the same semantic domain.

The term antipolitics is sharing the same semantic domain with the subsequent terms:

1) politics;
2) unpolitics, apolitics or non-politics;
3) populism.

Thus, the problems are: what is politics and what is unpolitics, apolitics and non-politics? Only after these questions have found an answer, the problem becomes: what is antipolitics?

A new definition of antipolitics: if antipolitics is not a communicative style; if it is not the description of a logical-empiric situation; if it is not a simple communication for complex problems; what is antipolitics?

A realistic way to define populism or antipolitics may be based on the refusal of Kant’s categorical imperative: act in a way as to assume that your maxima has an universal value.

An example of antipolitics: In October 2007, the Italian Partito Democratico/PD (Democratic Party) organized its primaries and Antonio Di Pietro and Marco Pannella (two Italian antipolitical leaders) presented their candidatures which were refused. In April 2008, at the political elections, the PD made an alliance with these two leaders on the principle of having both, after the elections, in the same parliamentary group. The prior decision may be defined antipolitical in that it was not assumed as a maxima for the future. Other Italian examples are given in part 5 of this work.

b) We may have two antithetic philosophical uses of the term antipolitics

The definition given by Nietzsche favoured the redefinition of an aspect of Plato’s philosophy in terms of antipolitics; in Plato’s philosophy, antipolitics consists in a form of hyper-idealism or utopia unable to see any connection between the ideal of politics and political realism (stressing too much the aim of purifying society from conflict).

Both definitions of antipolitics are often considered responsible for (in that they can lead to) totalitarianism, and the second way (that of Plato) may be considered a form of effective populism.
c) The two different effects on political systems

Antipolitics is generally connected to totalitarianism and to perils for a
democratic system in that the most important antipolitical leaders are considered
Benito Mussolini (who governed from 1922 to 1943 and was the leader of the
Republic of Salò from 1943 to 1945) and Adolf Hitler (who governed from
1933 to 1945) who, both, came to power transforming a democracy into a
totalitarian regime. Many students and researchers have separately studied the
cases of these two totalitarian and antipolitical leaders.

However, in a mature democracy, antipolitics may be a factor of innovation.
See, for instance, Charles De Gaulle (because of his aversion to parties and to
their tendency to forget national and public interest) who constructed a new
party and a new party-system. See, too, the just introduced democratic leader
who has innovated the negative campaign: Ronald Reagan. As we explained,
in his use of the negative campaign, Reagan was credible in criticizing the
abstract idea of government even when he was the incumbent President.

The existence of antipolitical democratic leaders is not the only connection
between antipolitics and democracy. In fact, a few definitions of antipolitics
are strictly connected to forms of deliberative democracy. See, for instance,
Claude Lefort who explains the practice of democracy as a practice where the
locus of power is only temporarily occupied (antipolitics as the aspiration to
leave the locus of power empty). See, too, a few leaders of western European
movements who thought it was important to organize post-communism
democracy as an effective emptiness, i.e. as a locus of power to be occupied by	ables for negotiation and not by elected representatives.

4. What is antipolitics? A synthetic review of the just given
definitions

Antipolitics is a term used in many meanings:

1) whatever is antithetical to politics (the politics based on an illuminist
   approach, or a paradigm of modernity);
2) whatever is antithetical to ideologies (the politics that consider the
   future as foreseen and written);
3) whatever is on the side of the humble (not of the elite) and of the
   ignorant (not with a traditional or ideological knowledge);
4) whatever is considered to be “contrary to good politics”. This is the
   first stigmatic sense given to the term (antipolitics is not the name
given to an association, to a movement, to a party by their members,
but it is a name which is imposed to a movement, an association or a party by their opponents);  
5) those awaiting a technical solution (often a rhetoric one) instead of the correct political solution;  
6) a synonym of populism where populism indicates whatever is directed to:  
   a) the aim (or rhetoric) of constructing a direct relation between the leader and the people;  
   b) the aim (or rhetoric) of obtaining a more homogeneous people;  
   c) the aim (or rhetoric) of producing the government of the people;  
7) the same aims (or rhetorical speeches) which are indicated with the terms a-politics, unpolitics and non-politics, when they are more strongly pursued or believed;  
8) a lot of stigmatic uses of the term against opponents who may not otherwise be stopped. In this case, opponents talk of antipolitics, but it is politics. For instance, any stigmatic use of the term against:  
   a) the leader with a charisma who is a new strong competitor in the campaign for the consent of electors;  
   b) the mass media communicator who is capable of de-structuring the opponent’s campaign with the technique of negative campaigning;  
   c) the politician who uses metaphors and jokes to make politics, which is traditionally boring, more attractive;  
9) any form of civil society’s mobilization which shakes the tree of politics while opportunistic politicians pick up the fruits!

5. Antipolitics as a particular culture elaborated in Italy by a minority of intellectual elites

Antipolitics has been depicted as a conflict among forms of rationality, as a problem connected to government and State, as an answer to social fragmentation, as a defense of positions of social autonomy, as a challenge to western democracies and as a „device“ for putting into action social and discursive practices between modernity and post-modernity. As a great antipolitical culture has been elaborated in Italy before of the ideologically and revolutionary age (Niccolò Machiavelli’s and Giambattista Vico’s political
philosophy), our antipolitics has often assumed anti-ideological and anti-revolutionary positions. Other times, the revolutionary Machiavellian discourse has been assumed as a justification of an ideological party (see the analysis of Antonio Gramsci) and the reformist Machiavellian discourse a formulation of a democratic theory (see the analysis of John Pocock and Quentin Skinner), while the same interpretation of Vico has been assumed to support fascism (see Giovanni Gentile) or to support the old liberal political system (see Benedetto Croce).

**Machiavelli’s reformist and revolutionary antipolitical strategies**

Antipolitics appears in various forms that evolve in time, acquire various facets in space and various characteristics. In Italy it appeared regularly in the Italian political history. For the first time, it appeared when rich Italian urban elites demonstrated their incapacity and unwillingness to defend the lives and the goods of their citizens from the violence of the new international relations among European nation-States. That time, Niccolò Machiavelli elaborated and presented, in his main works, a political strategy to face these new problems coming from abroad. As it is well known to Machiavelli’s scholars, the strategy of this intellectual and politician from Florence has been formulated in two different versions: 1) in works like *Il Principe* and *Del modo tenuto dal Duca Valentino nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, il signor Pagolo e il Duca di Gravina Orsini*, as a revolutionary antipolitical strategy for the short run (a strategy based on the corporeal elimination of the adversaries of the winning leader, Duca Valentino/Cesare Borgia, or of the aspiring prince, a leader to come, luckier than Cesare Borgia); 2) in works like *I Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio* and *Dell’arte della guerra*, as a reformist (un-)political strategy for the long run (a strategy based on the cooperation between rulers and ruled, especially in defending the cities from external enemies and in defending the citizens from internal conflicts through the strengthening of the governmental and administrative institutions and especially of the reliability of judicial power).

**Reluctant Vico’s antipolitical philosophy: from politics to antipolitics**

While Machiavelli’s strategy was exclusively political (centered on institutional actions), two centuries later, another Italian political philosopher, Giambattista Vico, proposed a reformist strategy moving in two different directions: a) the institutional actions and their consequences, desired or not, assumed as the *factum*; b) the academic speech and the knowledge considered as limited and uncertain, but capable, if well organized, of becoming a form of *verum*. 

PIFO Occasional Papers No. 2/2008 | Seite 23
Vico’s philosophy had been thought as a cultural and political challenge to the political and cultural limits of Italian elites. Because of the misunderstanding of political, religious and academic authorities, that of Vico had gradually become a cultural and antipolitical challenge to the Italian elites.

At the beginning of XVIII century, Vico realised that the cultural limits of his contemporary elites consisted in a limit of their discourse, and in the inability to speak to the ruled in that they had a wrong form of speech, a speech constructed in a technical way. In fact, in Vico’s perspective, the “*togati*” (intellectuals with a University degree or a political role) use a geometric language about which Vico says: “to compose a civil discourse using a geometrical method, would mean to accept nothing sharp in the oration and to demonstrate exclusively things which are before our feet. It would mean to treat listeners as babies, who do not put anything in their mouth which has not been chewed before, and, to conclude with a unique word, it would mean to speak as a pedagogue [doctorem], instead of as an orator” (Vico 2008, 292). The Latin term “doctor” is generally translated as pedagogue, while, in Vico’s language, it could be translated as intellectual (“*togato*”) and, in modern antipolitical language used by Hannah Arendt, it could be translated as technician.

In this essay, “doctor” is interpreted as a term to indicate what is generally called “illuminist actor”, i.e. the actor anchored to the type of culture against which Vico’s thought was generally used in the following two centuries. The illuminist culture is based on the assumption that the scientific language is the base of communication and that scientific knowledge may be the propulsive factor of the economic and political development. In the Italian political language, the terms illuminist and enlightenment are used as a generic holder of many philosophical movements derived or connected to European philosophies: the Cartesian, the Hobbesian, the Hegelian, the Marxist, the positivistic, the neo-positivistic, and so on.

The political limits of Vico’s contemporary elites have historically been the absence of courage or willingness to go towards a more inclusive society and the preference given to the alternative of realizing only an inclusion of the elite and not at all of the ruled. Sometimes, these limits depend on the scarcity of resources, but other times they depend on the incapability of mobilizing new synergies and resources.

At the beginning of his philosophical discourse, Vico was unaware that these limits were structural and he thought that any problem was only a consequence of two centuries of bad Spanish government. Thus, at the beginning of the XVIII century, he thought that a new era could be possible even in the Vice Reign of Naples, with the new rulers arriving from abroad (the Austrian House
of Habsburg) and he enthusiastically announced this exigency as public orator at the presence of the viceroy, Cardinal Grimani. The strong reactions to his oration (De Ratione) showed him that this possibility was an unpolitical project. Because of this oration, he exposed himself to the risk of losing his job (orator of the University of Naples). During all the XVIII century, Vico’s philosophy had been practically ignored. When it was considered, conservative politicians and illuminist intellectuals systematically misunderstood and misinterpreted it.

In Vico’s philosophy, his political strategy started as a reformist one, an unpolitical strategy, but it slowly became a “revolutionary one” or an “antipolitical one”. Vico’s philosophy focused on the intuition that traditional elite is unable to speak to the people in that it uses a different language from that of civil society and on the proposal of how to eliminate this difference. Vico’s philosophy was elaborated in a moment in which he was the first and only to understand that the elites were unable to speak to the ruled (at the beginning of the XVIII century, in the transition from the Spanish government and the Austrian government of the Reign of Naples. It was 1708, the year of the oration De Ratione read at the University before the new authorities). During his life, Vico received little attention on behalf of the political and intellectual Neapolitan elite, but he received some new attention, to the point of becoming a new starting point and a challenge to the traditional Italian political culture, every time it became clear that governing elites were speaking a different language from that of civil society.

It occurred, in Italian culture, after the failure of the Jacobin revolution of Naples in 1799 and, after 1890, when a new starting point as an alternative to traditional political culture was produced in the form of the new Marxist culture and with the instrument of the modern ideological party (Partito Socialista Italiano). Since the end of the Second World War, Vico has almost been forgotten in that it has been assumed that Vico’s philosophy was partly responsible for fascism.

Now, at the beginning of the new century, after the crisis of the First Italian Republic (1992-1993) and after the evident crisis of the so called “Second Republic” (a never born republic in that it had different actors and the same defects as the previous one in terms of things that are not spoken about), interest in Vico’s philosophy is coming back.

Because of the dynamics of Vico’s philosophy which was elaborated as a political reformist project and became an antipolitical one, it is important to describe the way in which Vico’s thought evolved during his life. In fact, Vico may receive different interpretations according to the relevance and the
preference given to the three different stages of his philosophy: 1) the stage of *De Ratione*, Vico’s first important work, where Vico proposed a new political strategy for a “civil doctrine” with the aim of convincing the new Austrian elite that his cultural proposal was to be preferred to the traditional one; 2) the stage of *De Antiquissima*, Vico’s second important work, and that of *De Uno*, another important work, with which he fought to defend himself and his theory from the attacks of traditional intellectuals, politicians and religious authorities. In this second stage, instead of a political inclusion of Vico’s philosophy in the cultural Neapolitan academy, Vico remained marginalized but was not removed from the academic system; 3) the stage of *Scienza Nuova*, his main work, in which he elaborated his philosophy as an antipolitical cultural strategy (i.e. as a philosophy that was incommensurable with the traditional ones). In other words, Vico started with a reformist solution within the academic and political system, passed to an alternative cultural and political proposal within the system and arrived at a revolutionary cultural alternative. Of course, being a philosopher, his strategy had been reformist, alternative and revolutionary exclusively in the nature of speech and not in the nature of action.

Unpolitical proposals against revolutionary antipolitics

In Italy, as a reaction to the disappointments induced by the great French Revolution, we had two important (and minor) antipolitical projects which were elaborated with the aim of proposing two alternative processes to ideological practices: the now almost forgotten pamphlet by Vittorio Alfieri, *Misogallo* (the pamphlet was strongly critical of the great French Revolution, of French culture and of France); the political philosophy of Antonio Serbati Rosmini who had a great influence on a minority of intellectuals.

Alfieri’s unpolitical analysis was culturally neutralized when considered an oddity or a form of dislike of French people. Rosmini’s unpolitical analysis would have remained almost fruitless had it not been represented as a vision complementary to Vico’s analysis. In this sense, we had a revolutionary formulation of Vico’s philosophy when it was presented in the laical version of revolutionary movements during the Italian Risorgimento and an antirevolutionary formulation of the same philosophy when it was presented in the catholic version.

In the period of the Risorgimento, the engagement of intellectuals was very broad and room for an unpolitical attitude was real narrow; the proof lies in the fact that it was assumed by two intellectuals who were great but who have not been recognized in these positions: Alfieri’s unpolitical work is almost
forgotten (and it has been appreciated only by other unpolitical intellectuals) and Rosmini has never become a mainstream author and he has been recognized only by a minority of intellectuals.

**Vincienzo Cuoco’s unpolitical rediscovery of Vico’s philosophy**

After the failure of the Jacobin revolution in Naples in 1799, Vincienzo Cuoco hypothesized that the Neapolitan Jacobins had been too ideological and that they had tried to realize a political project that was extraneous to civil society’s demand. In fact they were bourgeois or aristocrats in a State where the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy were confined into the cities without any connection with the country. Moreover, they were conservative on the problem of the agrarian reform and they refused to realize the same politics of land redistribution realized by the Jacobins in revolutionary France. Instead of remarking this political error, Vincienzo Cuoco remarked the fact that the Jacobins did not understand that it was not enough to confide in culture, in the technical value of science and in the role of the scholastic institutions in order to obtain, even in the short run, the consensus and the participation of the citizens of a modern State. At least a process approaching the needs and demands of the people was necessary as a way to acquire, in absence of a civic spirit, the citizens’ confidence. In absence of this, an inquiry was necessary to understand the needs and demands of the agrarian society, and thus an agrarian reform. Cuoco’s conclusion was that Neapolitan Jacobins had been unsuccessful in that they had not been educated to Vico’s thought.

**Romagnosi’s contribution to the study of Vico’s unpolitical philosophy**

Vico’s thought was rediscovered, enriched and developed by revolutionary patriots and federalist scholars (Giandomenico Romagnosi and his pupils Carlo Cattaneo and Andrea Zambelli) all throughout the Italian *Risorgimento*. They thought of the construction of the Italian unitary State as a long run project; as a process starting with the education of citizens to the values of civism, cooperation and collective reason. In Romagnosi’s opinion, the process of “incivilimento” (civilization) was based on the utilization of a substantial autonomy in local economic growth, in education and in the opening of new trans-border (regional borders or State borders or Alpine borders) cultural and economic relations. They thought of a federalist institutional strategy as a way to strengthen civil society. In this sense, they were all strongly influenced by the work by Sismondi on Italian Republics. With a difference among them: thinking about medieval Republics, Romagnosi thought generically of Communes, while some of his pupils (first of all the well known Carlo Cattaneo) had in
mind the last phase, that of the regional Italian States, and others (first of all the less known Andrea Zambelli) had in mind the little historical Communes of the origins and their informal institutions which operated within little cities. This fact produced, after the death of Romagnosi, a differentiation among his pupils and, after the Italian Unity, among his pupils’ pupils. Romagnosi had proposed a new concept (the United States of Europe) to generalize the federalist institutions to the whole continent, while Cattaneo organized his political strategy on this concept. In fact, until the night before the insurrection of the city of Milan (the “Cinque giornate” of 1848), Cattaneo had been writing an essay in which he was going to propose an incremental strategy based on the hypothesis to construct, together, the Federation of the Italian States and the Federation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and to have them both in the larger United States of Europe imagined by Romagnosi. Thus, the richer and more developed “Lombardo-Veneto” (the Lombardy and the Venetia Region which formed a unitary political organization in the Austro-Hungarian Empire) could develop their economical and political relations with other Italian States and be substantially in the Federation of the Italian States while formally remaining in the Federation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, the independence and the unity would be substantially reached, even if not formally obtained. Of course, the revolutionary events of 1848 in Milan and in the whole of Europe made the project impracticable.

**Giacomo Leopardi’s antipolitical work: Paralipomeni della Batracomiomachia**

Leopardi first thought of this work in Florence, in 1830, after reading Storia del reame di Napoli (History of the reign of Naples) by Pietro Colletta and having conversations with this author and politician. He wrote the poem in the last years of his life during his stay in Naples (where he died in 1837). In this work, Leopardi spoke of mice (Italian liberals), of crabs (Austrians) and of frogs (Catholics). He gave a completely negative and terrible description of the liberals and, according to many patriots, he misunderstood them. He criticized the lightness and the inconclusiveness of liberals and the oppressiveness and the obtuse minds of Austrians. The basic Leopardi’s idea was that Italians were not educated to pursue great objectives. In his work, Leopardi mocks the dreams, the aspirations, the political essays of Italians and he considers them as non-realistic and, often, unaware of the actual consequences of their actions. He depicts, in this poem, an anti-providence vision of history in that he thinks that great ambitions and dreams are systematically eliminated by foreign rulers. This practice, which has been in progress for centuries, has
selected elites composed only by individuals with egoistic aspirations and unawareness, even when they thought about themselves as great men having great visions. According to Leopardi, if you have no great visions or great men, you only produce failures and disasters. The result of this selection is that Italians are always ready to speak, to question, to cry and to invite to action in favour of the right and against any abuse of power, but at the moment of the fight, only the most ingénues engage themselves while the others wait for the end of the fight „to bring help to the winner“.

**The antipolitical and revolutionary 1848-49**

After the revolution in France, in Berlin and, above all, in Vienna, riots broke out in Italy and, most important among them all, in Milan where, in five days (the “Cinqué Giornate”), the Austrians are forced to leave the town. With the aim to avoid a revolutionary process guided by radicals and republicans, the King of Sardinia, Carlo Alberto, declared war on Austria but was defeated twice (in 1848 and in 1849). In Brescia, in 1849, people fought against the Austrians for ten days. The revolutionary movement proclaimed the Republic in Rome and in Venice. With the defeat of the Piedmont army, normality was slowly restored in the Country. The last town to surrender was Venice, led by Daniele Manin, where the citizens of the town had withstood the siege for a year and they submitted to the Austrians only because of hunger.

**Alternative strategies in the period 1850-1858: federalism between antipolitics and unpolitics**

The review *Il Crepuscolo* (where “crepuscolo” means twilight and twilight refers to the presence of the Austrians in Italy) started its activity with an editorial staff mostly composed by followers of the Italian revolutionary Mazzini. In 1852, the review published a long essay divided into four parts. The author was a young man qualified to teach at the University of Pavia, Giuseppe Zanardelli. The title of his essay was *I Feudi* and the essay was an analysis of the process of civilizations involving little, medium and big Municipalities. The strategic assumption of this essay was that the imminent Italian unitary revolution should start from the little Municipalities where, as Tocqueville taught, the bourgeoisie is not conservative in that it is not allied to aristocracy. In this essay, cultural inspirations coming from Machiavelli, Vico, Romagnosi and Tocqueville are evident (in particular the consideration
of a more democratic spirit present in the North of the USA, where the local institutions were organized in little Municipalities, and a less democratic spirit present in the South of the USA, where the local institutions were organized in counties).

After the failure of a new insurrectionary act in Milan in 1852 and after the Austrian repression, the editorial staff of *Il Crepuscolo* came up with a more realistic project: the idea of a revolution guided by the House of Savoy (the Reign of Sardinia). After the failure of Pisacane’s insurrectionary attempt in the South of Italy, in 1858, Cattaneo wrote a long essay divided into four parts in *Il Crepuscolo*. The title of the essay was *La Città* and it was based on the idea that any new Italian federalist State should be organized as a federation of historical Communes that have organized themselves as States, conquering and subjecting the other weaker Communes and their territories. In 1855, the heroic President of the Republic of Venice during 1848-49, Daniele Manin, proposed the Abnegation Pact in favour of the House of Savoy asking the King of Sardinia to become the leader of a revolutionary war against Austria-Hungary. Many patriots accepted the Pact and, as a consequence, they went in search of a new strategy to maintain the substantial part of their political project: the strengthening of civil society.

The central event that changed the unpolitical/antipolitical attitude in Lombardy was the fact that many intellectuals in the big and small towns in the region were connected to the rest of Europe and immediately understood what was happening after the great exposition in London in 1851. It was the first in the world and it showed that Great Britain was not only a democracy and an Empire, in that it was the most modern and innovative country in the world. Thus, many towns in Lombardo-Veneto organized their industrial exposition and this changed the interest of public opinion completely from political revolution to economic development. The first politician to understand the consequences of this change was, in Lombardy, Giuseppe Zanardelli a young federalist and revolutionary. He thought of combining the revolution with development and he wrote a long series of essays on the Industrial Exposition in Brescia. These essays, which became a book, were considered the first document of a new reformist and unpolitical strategy: anthropological (revolutionary) federalism. After the Unity of Italy, after the end of the revolutionary need to free Lombardo-Veneto from the oppressive Austrian regime, a few moderate intellectuals and politicians (Angelo Messedaglia and his pupils) thought of combining the same project for an economic development in their moderate political strategy: this gave origin to the anthropological (reformist) federalism. For a long time, the discourse of the isolated Zanardelli (in his native Lombardy
town, Brescia) was considered as antipolitical by the intransigent catholic and moderate politicians. After Zanardelli succeeded in constructing the first local bank (*Credito Agrario Bresciano*), the intransigent catholic responded to his project by constructing a new competitive bank (*Banco San Paolo of Brescia*). Both banks were the main artificers for the fact that, one century later, Brescia became the most industrialized province in Europe. Anthropological federalism has been the artificer of the so-called “Veneto model of development”.

**Effects of the Abnegation Pact in 1859: politics interprets and leads antipolitical movements**

The 27th of April, the beginning of the war against the Austro-Hungarian Empire: the Reign of Sardinia was allied to France. The day after, with the assurance of Florence, patriots constituted a provisional government asking the King of Sardinia (Vittorio Emanuele II) to assume the dictatorship of Tuscany during the war. The same occurred in the Dukedom of Parma, in the Dukedom of Modena and in Bologna. Many volunteers led by the revolutionary leader Giuseppe Garibaldi were very successful in the war. The war ended before the entire result was achieved: the liberation of Lombardo-Veneto. After peace, Lombardy, Tuscany, Modena and Bologna joined the Reign of Sardinia through plebiscites. It was a great victory for the moderate politics, in particular for the Prime Minister of Piedmont, Camillo Cavour.

**Effects of the antipolitics in 1860: the liberation of the Reign of Naples**

On the 4th of April 1860 an insurrection in Palermo was immediately repressed but Garibaldi accepted to lead an expedition of volunteers to free the island. Difficulties created by Cavour produced delays in the expedition. It only began on the 6th of May with two boats leaving Quarto in Liguria. The volunteers (a few more than a thousand, and because of this number they were called *I Mille* – The One Thousand) arrived in Marsala, in Sicily, on the 11th of May and won the first battle in Calatafimi on the 15th. Garibaldi liberated Sicily on the 20th of July. The contrasts between politics (Cavour) and antipolitics (Garibaldi) become evident with the arrest of Giuseppe La Farina, the representative of Cavour in Sicily. Cavour tried to prevent Garibaldi from continuing his military campaign up to Naples. On the 18th of August, Garibaldi crossed the Straits of Messina. On the 7th of September he entered Naples and on the 1st and 2nd of October he won the last battle, his biggest, near the Volturno River. To avoid the possibility of having an autonomous revolutionary State in the South, Cavour obtained, by the great European States, the informal permission to occupy part of the Pontific State and to unite the South of Italy.
with the North. The consequences of this accordance, by the South of Italy, given to the Second King of Sardinia, who became King of Italy and decided to be called “the Second”, even if he was the First, was really relevant in that the Garibaldini (veterans from Garibaldi’s campaigns) did not become the new southern political elites, but were marginalized. Many of them had not abandoned their arms and ended their lives as brigands, shot on the spot when found with an arm in their hands. All the most important Sicilian literature (Verga, De Roberto, Tomasi di Lampedusa, and so on) and authors who had been volunteers (Umberto Saba) described the southern post-unitary period as a period of disappointment in which only a few volunteers became politicians and brought forward the subsequent Trasformismo, being allied to the old aristocratic and professional elites.

How to make Italians after having made Italy
The main objective of the Risorgimento was to make Italy, and Italy was made. But the first discovery, after the unity had been achieved, was that the Italians were still to be made. The unity of the nation had been constructed on the fact that the populations of the peninsula spoke the same language and political life in the new unitary nation proved that the same language was not enough. During the Risorgimento and after it, the Italian intellectuals felt committed in the object of making both the State and the Italians, especially the intellectuals working on the language (poets and novelists) and on political culture (philosophers, political scientists and politicians).

As Italy had been unified through two different strategies (the political one in the North and the antipolitical one in the South), the Italian political system was organized into two different parties: the Destra Storica (Historical Right) which governed by practicing a conservative politics based on the assumption that the new unitary State was a simple extension of the Reign of Sardinia (all the juridical system of the Piedmont had been extended to the rest of Italy); the Sinistra Storica (Historical Left), which tried to represent, in Parliament, the antipolitical civil society, contributed to the construction of Italy and was still engaged in the strategy to conclude the unitary process with the liberation of the region of Venice (which occurred in 1866, through another war, allied to Prussia, and the method of diplomacy and politics) and of Rome (after a few unlucky attempts by volunteers, in 1862 and in 1867, it occurred in 1870, through the method of politics; in 1862, Garibaldi was wounded by the
Italian Antipolitics as a long run Question: “Bad Civil Societies” or “Bad Elites”?  

Italian soldiers commanded by Colonel Pallavicini and the volunteers, who had left the Italian army to follow Garibaldi, were shot on the spot; the French army defeated the volunteers in 1867 and the Vatican State sentenced some volunteers to death.

During the government of the Destra Storica, the most urgent political problem was considered the proposal to conclude the construction of the State by obtaining the budget balance. When this objective was reached, the Country considered the function of the Destra Storica exhausted and gave the parliamentary majority to the Sinistra Storica that proved to itself and to the Country to be unable to accomplish a new strategy and a real change. The most evident consequence of the parliamentary change was that many antipolitical representatives of the Sinistra Storica came to an agreement with many conservative representatives of the Destra Storica. The problem was always the same: as Leopardi had stated many years before, the leftist elite was antipolitical in words and not at all in action. The winner, leader of the Left, Agostino Depretis, had the same idea as the Right on how to govern the new State and he actually governed with exponents of the Right. As a consequence, the few leftist representatives, who had elaborated new ideas (transforming their antipolitical will into a cultural project), were gradually margined, through the practice of Trasformismo (the term indicates an opportunistic alliance in the Italian Parliament among representatives of Destra Storica and Sinistra Storica).

The disillusion on behalf of civil society and of many intellectuals produced different kinds of reactions: 1) a new wave of antipolitics which has been particularly relevant after the scandal of the Banca Romana; 2) new strategies to make the Italians or, as they used to say, to complete the Risorgimento through the construction of the Italians. The most popular antipolitical project was the one first elaborated by Pasquale Turiello (1947; 1980) who thought that war was the instrument that could both reconstruct the morality of the leading classes and complete the Risorgimento.

From action to culture: Vico’s unpolitical philosophy in the new unitary State
After 1799, Vincenzo Cuoco understood that the same way could be scoured in the pragmatic field of politics, producing, where sufficient, a reformist solution or a revolutionary one where the crisis was, otherwise, irremediable. For the whole of the XIX century Vico’s scholars hypothesized that every plan (revolutionary or not) should fail if the revolutionary elites were unable to speak the language of the people, according to Vico’s indications. They maintained
that the central idea of Vico’s philosophy (verum et factum convertuntur) was that a culture is the synthesis of abstract thought and practical action and that in politics each one influences the other: action presumes a culture, and a change in the strategy of action always implies a change in culture; thought presumes a practice, and a change in the cultural perception always implies a change in politics.

During the Italian Risorgimento, Vico’s philosophy was shared by many politicians of the Sinistra Storica, while an illuminist culture (in Italy the term illuminist indicates any political strategy centered on the idea that science and a centralized vision of politics can produce a logic-empirical strategy before confrontation with the actors operating in the society) was shared by many politicians of the Destra Storica. In the new Italian unitary State, a reformist strategy deriving from Vico’s philosophy was experienced in a nook, the Italian North-East (corresponding, more or less, to the territory of Venice’s Republic), where it was possible to operate autonomously with the object of realizing political and economic local development. I suggested defining this strategy “anthropological federalism” (Gangemi 1994; 1999; 2000). In the same period, with a few exceptions, like Giuseppe Zanardelli, the leftist “revolutionary” politics evolved to become an illuminist or positivist pragmatic culture which gave origin to the practice of “Trasformismo”, which produced the convergence between politicians of the two parties (Destra Storica and Sinistra Storica). In practice, after the electoral victory in 1876, the Sinistra Storica never accomplished a leftist political program in that part of this left began to govern with a part of the Destra Storica and concurred to realizing a program in continuity with that of the Destra Storica.

The Trasformismo was only the first democratic manifestation of the usual political strategies of Italian elites consisting in the inclusion of the emerging elite into the governing elite without including the emergent society it represented. Any kind of Trasformismo is based on the practical assumption that the elite always knows what is best for the ruled and even a change in alliances and in the program is justified in the name of this superior knowledge. The Trasformismo was the parliamentary strategy that included a part of the Sinistra Storica in the project of the Destra Storica and produced greater distance between parliamentary representatives and civil society. It practically implied the abandonment of Vico’s cultural strategy (which was a strategy of nearness to the civil society). The last quarter of the XIX century in Italy was the period of the dominant positivist culture.
In the positivist view, politics is seen as a strong remedy and the politician as a powerful solver, certain of his competence and with enormous faith in the products of his science. In the alternative culture of Vico’s, politics is seen as a strong remedy with strong contrary indications and the politician as an apprentice sorcerer uncertain of his competence and in search of a knowledge that consists in knowing the doses needed to produce more advantages than contrary indications.

**The collapse of the political system constructed by the Risorgimento’s political elite**

The new culture that emerged from civil society after Trasformismo was expressing a form of indifference to Vico’s cultural strategy. Nevertheless, before collapsing, the practical culture of Italian elites had the opportunity to produce the first “moral crisis” in the Italian unitary State. At the beginning of the 90s (XIX century) a political and financial scandal involved the most important politician of the Sinistra Storica (Francesco Crispi, a protagonist of Garibaldi’s conquest of Southern Italy, in 1860). This scandal, named the “Banca Romana scandal”, has been hidden by the government and has not received the attention it deserved by the new Marxist party, Partito Socialista Italiano (see a letter by Friedrich Engels sent to Filippo Turati on the 1st of February 1893 completely dedicated to the problem and with a strong conclusion: “What the Hell! Where were the socialist deputies on these decisive days? In Germany our deputies would have never been forgiven for their absence in Colajanni’s session. This should have cost them their mandate”). The same year, another political scandal: the killing of Emanuele Notarbartolo, ex director of Banco di Sicilia, and the immediate suspicion that the deputy Raffaele Palizzolo was responsible for it. For this crime, Palizzolo was condemned to thirty years’ imprisonment in 1901.

The political solution to the crisis consisted in forcing Giovanni Giolitti (he tried to cover up political leaders, members of the Parliament, lawyers, journalists and private citizens involved in the Banca Romana scandal) to resign as Prime Minister and in choosing as a successor Francesco Crispi, one of the leaders guilty of the corruption. As a consequence, the new Prime Minister was particularly weak and thought of strengthening his own position by repressing, in a bloody way, a strong and pacific Sicilian movement named Fasci Siciliani (which was trying to obtain three-square, through the request of
contracts as tenant farmers). Giolitti wrote in his memoirs: Crispi put “in the foreground the question of the Fasci Siciliani [and he exaggerated], threats and perils, in order to make people put aside other questions, especially the moral question” (Giolitti 1922, 101).

After this moral crisis, Vico was retrieved and interpreted in two different ways: 1) as a follower of a revolutionary right-wing strategy identical to that elaborated by Macchiavelli in Il Principe (Croce and Gentile distinguished the Vico’s great philosophy of La Scienza Nuova and of De Antiquissima from Vico’s humble philosophy of De Ratione and of De Uno); 2) as a follower of a strategy indifferent to the right-left horizontal dimension of politics and only attentive to the ruler-ruled vertical dimension of politics, similar to that elaborated by Macchiavelli in I Discorsi and Dell’arte della Guerra. A strategy which could be reformist within the State and revolutionary against the external enemies (and their internal accomplices) and against any form of totalitarianism (see the exponent of the Sinistra Storica Giuseppe Zanardelli; see the exponent of the Destra Storica Angelo Messedaglia and his pupils Fedele Lampertico, Emilio Morpurgo, Luigi Luzzatti; see the freemason and revolutionary antifascist Silvio Trentin, the catholic and pacifist antifascist Giuseppe Capogrossi, and others).

The first interpretation was considered (by Norberto Bobbio) responsible for the fascism and was contrasted, while the second interpretation was simply ignored and slowly forgotten after the Italian Resistance. This favoured the convergence of both the catholic and the Marxist political culture to the form of an “illuminist culture”. By this expression, in Italy, we intend a culture that holds the possibility of knowing a priori what it is necessary to plan the future. Vico’s antipolitical critique to this position focused on the claim that it was not possible to govern the country by decree because human nature was weak: the “heterogenesis of ends” could not be avoided, i.e. the possibility of obtaining, as a byproduct, unexpected consequences instead of the results planned.

The birth of a new political system
The collapse of the Risorgimento’s political system was not sudden and unexpected. The scandals of the Nineties were the beginning of the end, not a sudden end. In time, a few changes were gradually produced in two different directions: a typical European ideological direction which prevailed in the short run (what Stein Rokkan indicates as Labour/Capital cleavage which produced the Socialist Party) and a specific Italian unpolitical (which later become antipolitical) direction, which was unsuccessful, resulting from the request for a new “party of honest men”.

Italian Antipolitics as a long run Question: “Bad Civil Societies” or “Bad Elites”?
The PSI (*Partito Socialista Italiano*) was the first Italian mass party. After World War I, a second mass party was founded, the “Popular Italian Party” (*Partito Popolare Italiano*/PPI); it was a catholic party founded by the priest don Luigi Sturzo. The PPI party was similar to PSI (in that it realized what Rokkan indicated as State/Church cleavage) and an answer to the request for a party of honest men and of representatives nearer to the needs of civil society (first of all the need for peace). In Sturzo’s intention, the party, at the national level, should be both things: ideological, in the sense of an intransigent party (it being a “catholic party” and “anti-Marxist”) and a pragmatic party; at the local level, as it had been experienced for decades, and it should remain mainly a pragmatic party.

These two antithetic cultures (the catholic and the Marxist, the mainly pragmatic and the mainly ideological) found a favourable context for self-development in the regional States where annexation to the Reign of Sardinia was shared by moderate elites with a large consensus; they found more difficulties (with a few local exceptions) in the South conquered by radicals and where consensus of the House of Savoy had been given with the aim of “changing everything to change nothing”. Thus, when the *Risorgimento’s* political system collapsed, the North and the Center found the opportunity to construct two “alter” political cultures (the red or Marxist culture of the inferior North-East and of the superior centre and the white or catholic culture of the superior North-East) and a political culture (the illuminist or Hegelian culture prevailing in the North-West and in the area historically influenced by Rome, the new capital of the State). The South remained apparently unchanged and this was considered a success for the objective of “changing everything to change nothing”. Even though many things did change, first of all in Sicily, when an alternative to the *Risorgimento’s* political system would be produced in the form of a collective movement: the *Fasci Siciliani*. When this alternative was offered, the movement had no opportunity to resist the repression and the indifference of the rest of civil society and of the “alter” Marxist politics (which had been organizing itself as a party in the many years) and thus, while nothing apparently changed, everything actually changed (from bad to worse).

*The Southern antipolitical culture: between Plato’s utopia of a party of honest men and Nietzsche’s hyper-realism of retirement in favour of the most violent men*

The unexpected and undesired consequence of the repression of the *Fasci Siciliani* was that many Sicilian “*Fascianti*”, having learnt the modern organizational design in the movement, transferred this new competence to
a new criminal organization named “Mafia”. The Fasci Siciliani movement was not what it would have liked to become in the willingness of many of the Fascianti (a modernization factor in the agricultural field) and they have been what they did not want to become: a modernization factor in racketeering.

Sometimes it is said that in Southern Italy a political culture does not exist. Actually, it does exist and presents more antipolitical traits than the other Italian subcultures: private speech and action are preferred to public speech and action; the personal rule of politicians is practiced more than the rule of law; nepotism and corruption are more evident and sometimes exhibited as a manifestation of its own influence and power; and so on.

According to Vico’s dictionary, a condition of Second Barbary consisting in a systematic use of illegality on behalf of the administrative system and of the gendarmes took place in Southern Italy. The most important southern scholars denounced the problem and tried to identify a new strategy to remedy it; it was unsuccessful. Napoleone Colajanni thought that it depended on the fact that Sicily was treated as a colony and, at first, he proposed to have a Sicilian Prime Minister who could understand better than others how to treat such a Sicilian movement as the Fascianti. But he received the Prime Minister he wanted, Crispi, and the latter, instead of listening to Sicilians, sent the army to repress the movement; only later did Colajanni understand that the problem did not lie in the person (a southern politician to be preferred to a northern one like Zanardelli), but rather in the strategy whose aim is the reconstruction of political morality. Thus he was inclined to the idea of constructing a parliamentary majority of honest men who supported an “ethic government”. This aim was shared by Gaetano Salvemini, who denounced the illegality during the “Giolitti Age” (1901-1913) and named Giolitti “Minister of the criminals”.

The latter first tried to change the PSI in the direction of a party engaged in the morality question and later tried to produce an alternative ethical party. He was condemned by the PSI as an apostate or a heretic of socialism, even if he continued to be considered, by socialist workers and peasants, a socialist and to be voted at the elections.

While laymen and a few Marxists were going to construct an only party of honest men, a Sicilian priest, don Luigi Sturzo, thought of constructing a new party having as one of its main objectives the morality of a new political class. Obviously, he thought that honesty was not enough and that it would only be useful within a more general vision of the world (Weltanschauung). Thus, not a single-issue party of honest men, but a party with a broad vision of politics and a morality constructed on the basis of this vision: the morality of the catholic religion which was not the same as the laymen’s morality. The theoretical and
political project of Luigi Sturzo had its roots in the traditional political catholic thought, which was always federative at the level of local communities and it was, often, confederative at the national level – see, for instance, the (con-) federative thought of Gioacchino Ventura, Vincenzo Gioberti e Antonio Rosmini. In 1901, in the newspaper *Il Sole del Mezzogiorno*, Sturzo proposed a federative project based on the assumption that the increasing gap between North and South in Italy was caused by the centralism of the State and by the uniformity of taxation in the two different areas. He proposed, as a remedy, to give a substantial autonomy to local institutions of the State: Regions and Municipalities. In his vision, these local institutions could not be simple bureaucratic or decentralized offices in that, in Regions and Municipalities, citizens must realize self-government in relation to the issues on the use of the territory and on local development. A party of the honest men was not enough to achieve this (even if this was an essential pre-condition) and an a-ideological (in this sense unpolitical) party was necessary. An interesting symmetry between Rosmini’s political philosophy and Sturzo’s political theory may be observed: thinking that the evil at the end of the XVIII century was the revolution, Rosmini focused on the aim to construct a post-revolutionary political culture; thinking that the evils at the end of the XIX century were ideologies, Sturzo focused on the aim to construct a post-ideological political culture. In other terms, Sturzo tried the “Americanization” of the Italian political system. He constructed a party similar to those USA parties that Theodore Lowi named constituent parties, while the Marxist model of parties, prevalent in Europe, is the responsive party model; in the sense of Stein Rokkan (Rokkan 1982; 2002), they have structured the political system of the European Countries on cleavages: Center/Periphery; Capital/Labour; Agricultural/Industry; State/Church.

Sturzo wrote, in the newspaper *La Croce di Costantino*, a few interesting analyses which showed he was aware of the fact that a constituent party (i.e. a pragmatic party interested in policies) was possible only if this level was autonomous from the national level. In an article dated 1913, he considered that the national dimension of political action was strictly connected to politics (in that politics was constituted by general programs and ideals), while the local dimension of political action was strictly constituted by day-to-day interests and the needs of the citizens.

Sturzo presented, as an example, his action and activity in the Municipality of Caltagirone (when he had been pro-mayor for seven years and member of the Town Council for almost twenty) he operated with the aim to separate the administrative life of the Municipality from the ideological conflicts among the
Italian Antipolitics as a long run Question: “Bad Civil Societies” or “Bad Elites”?

parties. At the national level of political action, he thought it was not possible to act as a constituent party in that a responsive party was present (the PSI, atheist, collectivist and Marxist) and the pragmatic approach of Sturzo became, inevitably, anti-ideological (i.e. assumed through the antithetical contraposition on the negative face of the ideological structure of the adversary).

With the laymen who were not ideological, Sturzo maintained a substantive dialogue and tried a form of cooperation. For instance, in the spring of 1922, Sturzo arrived in San Donà di Piave, a little town in Veneto, to participate in the congress of consortia (an old practice by groups of people, companies and countries working together on a single-issue which was particularly used by Venice’s Republic) and to speak to Silvio Trentin, a liberal freemason politician and the last and greatest interpreter of anthropological federalism. This meeting had come too late to avoid the victory of fascism, but it demonstrated the great interest Sturzo had in a-ideological parties that paid their attention to pragmatic problems and pragmatic solutions.

Sturzo lived long enough to see the Catholic party, with the new name of Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy), get away from respect of the political morality of the beginning; he tried to react and, being unsuccessful, he used, against all the parties, the new term invented by the jurist Maranini: “Partitocrazia” (a stigmatic term which may be translated as “party-cracy” or “parties-cracy”). The term Partitocrazia is analogous and symmetric, from the stigmatic point of view, to the term antipolitics. Partitocrazia is used by exponents of civil society against politicians, while antipolitics is used by politicians against the men, groups or collective movements that question elites and parties. The strong communicative value of the term Partitocrazia and the fact that it has been used by important scholars and political men shows that, in Italy, a great part of culture has, for a long time, been engaged in an extra-parliamentary position or point of view. Recently, Partitocrazia has been proposed as a new term (la casta/caste) that is receiving great consensus and is widely used in the political debate.

The Italian antipolitical line against the administrative and political infringement

Many scholars of the political Italian crisis have produced important literature in Italy. There were not only southern scholars, even if the most numerous came from the South, in that they came from many other regions as well. The first, of course, was Napoleone Colajanni whose book had the significant title of Corruzione politica (Political Corruption), was edited in the second half of the Eighties of the 20th century. In Colajanni’s analysis, corruption is
normality in many democratic countries and, as the USA have “politicians” (but they are inquired into and, more often than elsewhere, they pay for their crimes), Great Britain has “placemen” (but the Crown of England, more than elsewhere, had a moralizing influence), Italy has the “affaristi” (unscrupulous speculators) who operate in politics sure of their immunity (in that many in the institutions participate in the plot) and no institution (the House of Savoy or the parties, first of all the extreme left, represented first by Depretis and later by Crispi) was interested in moralizing public life. The second, a moderate of the right, was Matteo Manfrin of the Veneto region (first a deputy of the Destra Storica and later a senator of the reign). His main work on this subject was Sull’arbitrio amministrativo in Italia (About the administrative infringement in Italy), edited in 1894 (Roma, Fratelli Bocca ed.). His main hypothesis was that corruption was a consequence of the monopolistic presence in economics and he pointed his attention to two Italian monopolies (that of salt and that of tobacco) to state that these administrations were responsible of a great part of political corruption. The proto-socialist Napoleone Colajanni responded to him with the book L’azienda dei Sali e l’azienda dei tabacchi. Note alla memoria del Senatore Manfrin Sull’arbitrio amministrativo in Italia, a short analysis of the administration of the Italian Salt and Tobacco monopolistic firms, edited in Rome in 1894, that the administration was not the problem, in that the problem was the political class.

The most violent antipolitical analysis of Italian politics was the Vilfredo Pareto’s 53 notes (Cronache) published, in the period 1892-1894, by the Giornale degli Economisti. The first of these notes was dated 1st September 1891 and it was an analysis of the economic market. It was with the second note, published 1st April 1893, right at the time of the Banca Romana scandal that the notes became the most important antipolitical sociological analysis of the Italian political elites. On the Banca Romana scandal Pareto wrote: “Italian aristocracy is absolutely inadequate for the task that it could and should have in a free Country. Under Depretis government dipped itself in the pitch of dubious speculations and scarcely came out of Giolitti’s pseudo-democracy it serves now in the Crispi’s anterooms, without any shame of the actions with which it demonstrates the contempt it has of morality and honesty” (Pareto 1965, 392). On the way in which Crispi faced and “resolved” the Fasci Siciliani matter, he wrote: “misfortunes in Sicily had, to a great extent, origin in the actions of a network of wicked men, who were protected and supported by the government” (Pareto 1965, 406).
The PSI was, as above mentioned, almost indifferent to the *Banca Romana* scandal (see the letter by Engels to Turati in which the former reported the fact that the socialists elected in the Parliament were absent when Napoleone Colajanni denounced the scandal) and to the movement named *Fasci Siciliani* (see the correspondence between Antonio Labriola and Friedrich Engels where the latter asked him to support the Movement and Labriola remarked “they are not Marxists”). In some cases, socialists supported Crispi’s repression of the movement (see the political position of port workers in Palermo, the first Sicilian unionized workers). There was a great ideological misunderstanding. More than a crime, it was been a political mistake: erroneously the PSI thought of the *Fasci Siciliani* as a backward tendency (almost a medieval residue) on the modern political scene.

The antipolitical declaration is often linked to the realization of electoral tricks, which are considered the proof of political corruption. These tricks were reported by Colajanni, after 1894, in the book *Gli avvenimenti di Sicilia e le loro cause*. In this direction, the most violent declaration was that by Gaetano Salvemini with the book *Giolitti. Ministro della malavita*.

During fascism, it was forbidden to speak of political corruption. According to the propaganda of the regime, this corruption was exclusively the characteristic and problem of the old liberal political system. It was also forbidden to speak of savage crimes when the efficiency of the investigating forces was not equal to the task (see, for instance, the Ciro Limoni case who has been imprisoned with a great emphasis on the newspapers and, when discovered innocent, Italian political authorities interdicted any form of publicity to the event and he passed the remaining part of his life considered guilty by all).

After the institutional referendum of 1946, through which the Italian Republic was instituted, the elections were no longer suspected of being systematically tricked and the report of actions by bad elites were centered on their incapability of governing (see Ernesto Rossi’s review of essays on the argument of *Malgoverno*, i.e. bad government) and on cases of economic elites which were favoured by their explicit relations with rulers (see Ernesto Rossi’s *I padroni del vapore*, Eugenio Scalfari’s *Razza padrona*, and so on).

**The elite theory as an explanation to the elite’s limits**

Last but not least, the elite theory has definitively convinced well-educated Italians that the hope of changing the old elites with new, more altruistic and honest ones was unrealistic. In fact, Gaetano Mosca explained that the ruled adapt to the rulers, and the traditional behavior of the rulers was one of whims and infringement (Mosca 1982, 691). Vilfredo Pareto, in the *Trattato generale*
di sociologia, presents a more complex hypothesis. He hypothesizes that a modern bourgeoisie does not exist in Italy in that liberal culture has not yet been fed by an entrepreneurial spirit, but by the pseudo-entrepreneurial spirit of those who act exclusively in terms of pure personal utility. Any economic actor moves along the line of the least resistance and if he can choose between the entrepreneurial risk and the possibility of being favoured by his connections with representatives and members of government, he will prefer the latter to the former way. “Thus, in Italy, after the constitution of the new reign, the bourgeoisie got accustomed to relying upon the government to defend its own interest. It had just one problem: preventing the government from being turned into the hands of its own adversaries; within the bourgeoisie, many factions competed with each other for the government’s favour, through intrigue, corruption and sometimes crime” (Pareto 1988, 775-776). It was not a coincidence that the theory of elite was elaborated by two Italian authors (Mosca and Pareto) and that its third main theorist (Michels) had lived in Italy for a long time. Italy was a sign of the fact that our country did not need a revolutionary or a “maximalist” socialist strategy, in that, first of all, it needed to be defended by its “bad elites”.

**Fascism as an antipolitical Second Barbary**

After the Hegelian conception of the State prevailed in the theoretical culture of the Destra Storica and in the practical culture of the Sinistra Storica, and after it prevailed in the Marxist version in the new Italian Left, Vico’s philosophy was used again (with a different interpretation) to react to all the traditional political culture: 1) the neo-idealistic interpretation of Croce (La filosofia di G.B. Vico) and Gentile (Studi vichiani) who thought Vico became a great philosopher through the works in which he dismissed a part of his humility and acquired some of the Cartesian pride (Croce 1980, 27); 2) the idealistic alternative interpretation of Giorgio Del Vecchio (Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, 1925) a fascist who had been the only Italian full professor with the membership card of the fascist party before Mussolini became Prime Minister.

In my opinion, it was especially the philosophy of Pasquale Turiello that had some influence on the antipolitical process towards fascism. In fact, his idea that Italians at war during the Risorgimento were more patriotic, of course, but even more civic and honest, has been strongly shared in the new Italian Right after the crisis of 1893-94. The political philosophy of Turiello had, at first, influenced Crispi’s action, the action of a Prime Minister who was trying, as Giolitti said, “to make them quit the scene to other questions and especially
the moral question” (Giolitti 1922, 101). His adventure was stopped in Africa in 1896, when the Italian army had been defeated in the battle of Adua, where it revealed the un-preparedness for a colonial war. Turiello’s myth of war as an instrument for the reconstruction of the virtue of a people and of the morality of the nation was retrieved again during the war in Libya (Turiello 1947; 1980). In Italy fascism revealed itself as the conservative revolution that elaborated the concepts of apolitical and non-political and which ended up disguising the colonial Italian politics as “non-political” action (in that it was considered a form of civilization and political “aid” for people needing a leading nation). The myth of the First World War as the last (the fourth) war of independence and as an instrument for reforming the morality of the nation was operated throughout the first year of war, when Italy had not yet engaged in the conflict. After the war, the myth of the movement of combatants, as a movement devoted to the renewal of a political system surpassed by the events, influenced the young generations (from Silvio Trentin to the federalist Partito Sardo d’Azione guided by Emilio Lussu and Giovanni Bellieni and others). The movement of combatants had flowed together the fascist movement and it was seen as an (apolitical) opportunity to free Italy from corruption, inability, moderation and crisis of the old elites. Croce, Gentile, Trentin, and others saw in the antipolitical fascism guided by Mussolini an occasion for change and they gave their consensus to the first years of Mussolini’s action as Prime Minister. But what fascism promised as an antipolitical movement was not really offered to the antipolitical opponents when fascism occupied the locus of power. Antipolitics reappeared in other forms influencing one of the most important poets of the XX century, Eugenio Montale, and other intellectuals: Leo Longanesi, Mino Maccari, and so on.

Ossi di seppia, published in 1925, was Montale’s masterpiece and it expresses the eclipse of every political myth. In the months preceding the publication of this work many things had changed in the relations between rulers and the ruled (the killing of Giacomo Matteotti had shown the violent face of fascism and produced, in more sensitive citizens, the fall of any kind of illusion about the regime), the Parliament had approved new totalitarian laws and even the relations within the fascist party had changed becoming more authoritarian and bureaucratic.

The great success of the book proved that a lot of people shared the opinion of the poet: firstly, the conviction that political life was a life of illusions and disillusions; secondly, the awareness that politics was constructed from efforts and bankruptcy. According to the poet, politics was sharing, with other aspects of human life, this disappointment and only poetry presented the possibility
to live our lives without being disappointed. Montale communicated, to his readers, his disappointment with the war, the movement of combatants and fascism. *Ossi di seppia* is a work that expresses a form of resistance to all the optimistic and edifying vision of the world and a form of impotence towards any attempt needing a collective effort. Montale’s poetry was interpreted as a form of unpolitical antifascism based not on historical arguments but on poetic ones. These poetical arguments, being expressed in the language of poetry, a language that was considered hermetic and not easy to understand outside the restricted circles of intellectuals, had been left to circulate freely during the fascist regime.

Montale was not alone in this unpolitical reaction to the regime. Mino Maccari was another unpolitical intellectual. He directed the journal *Il selvaggio* (The savage) and he exalted the municipal, peasant and plebeian culture against the “modernity” represented by fascism: a modernity which is assumed to be erroneously engaged in the objective of going beyond localism, agricultural tradition and the needs of the ruled. In Maccari’s journal, Leo Longanesi wrote a lot of essays to represent a degraded picture of fascist’s uses and customs with a satirical language in that authorities relatively permitted this language, as the poetic language.

**Differences between Mussolini and Hitler’s populism**

As we just said, Mussolini and Hitler are considered two charismatic antipolitical leaders and, as such, they have been separately studied. From an Italian point of view, more interesting than the separate analyses of their antipolitical action are the cultural consequences of the relation between the two, i.e. the analysis of Italian history after Hitler’s coming to political power. Mussolini was helped, at the beginning, by an Italian culture that shared his antipolitical attitude, and consent to his politics was growing after 1933 to reach its climax in 1935-36. Unfortunately (for him) the academic Italian culture predicted a factor of crisis in the recent evolution in Mussolini’s regime in the period of maximum consent to his politics. Because he did not perceive this factor of crisis, Italy entered the conflict and the crisis became evident even to ordinary people. Hence the collapse of the regime, and the origin of the Resistance which produced the end of fascism and the end of monarchy, in that both had been too involved in fascism. This factor of crisis was originated by Hitler’s politics in Germany and by the desire on behalf of many Italian fascists to imitate “National Socialism”.

We may introduce this argument by observing it from the point of view of those who were contrary to this hypothesis (Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son in law, Achille Grandi, and others were the most studied because they were fascists), i.e. from the prevalent point of view of fascists before Hitler’s victory in German. In particular, we may ask how Mussolini was antipolitical and populist in the first decade of his government. Mussolini represents the case of an antipolitician who succeeded in homogenizing (with violence) the Country, in constructing a formal efficiency of administration (it is still said that, under Mussolini’s government, “the trains travelled without delay”), in beating corruption (in the sense that it was possible to speak of this matter only as a problem of the liberal elites) and delinquency (in that it was almost forbidden to talk about bloody crimes in the mass media, see the Giro Limoni case).

Mussolini succeeded in producing a more homogeneous society: he destroyed the internal enemies (parties and trade unions); he excluded communists and antifascists (who were in prison, abroad or confined); he reduced to silence political, sexual or other minorities who formally disappeared from the political scene; etc. Thus, why the beginning of fascism’s crisis?

After the first antipolitical years up to 1935-36, Mussolini constructed and improved his political consent through the instrument of law. In doing so, he was helped by Italian culture he submitted to, by the structure of a mass party he organized on the model of the modern socialist party, by the inclusion of each cohort in a specific organization (Balilla, Figli della Lupa, etc.), and so on. This consent was based on an authoritarian law, but on the law (law was used as a political instrument to produce security and identity).

Mussolini was a charismatic antipolitical opponent who governed as a political leader, until he used the law as an instrument to produce more homogeneity. Adolf Hitler was a charismatic antipolitical opponent who governed as an antipolitical leader in that he used an instrument that was more radical than the law to realize more homogeneity (the “Führer-Prinzip”, i.e. the principle according to which the order, the word, of the Führer was stronger than the law and had to be obeyed “extra legem” and even “contra legem”). The crisis in Mussolini’s regime began when the Italian leader started to imitate Hitler in order to realize more homogeneity: 1) first he acted through the law (see the “racial laws” of 1938); 2) later with decisions which he took alone and, more and more, without any respect of formal law.
The case of Mussolini demonstrated that it is easier to bypass the system of law and the mass party, on the wave of an initial movement rush, rather than after an institutional process. When a regime has taken on institutional forms, the attempt to bypass the intermediation of law, administration and party may produce insecurity and a continuous decrease in consent.

What happened in Italy, from a cultural point of view, from 1935 to 1943, strongly influenced the subsequent period (1943-1945) and the party system building between 1945 and 1948. It is a story that is told in other ways while, from the particular point of view we are going to introduce, it is a story of politics and antipolitics.

In 1935, Francesco Carnelutti asked (and he succeeded) to be transferred from the University of Padua to the University of Milan. Here his first significant action was to deliver an opening lecture, which was immediately published, in which he presented the fascist corporative order as the way to found justice on law, a way that is “alongside right”, actually “above right”. With this opening lecture, Carnelutti stated the theory of action, the hegemonic Italian juridical culture, up to fascism. It was an interpretation of what was happening in Germany and the search for an Italian solution to the populist aim to imitate and to control what was happening there. Other jurists proposed other solutions. For instance, and controversially towards Carnelutti, Salvatore Satta affirmed the private production of right (to affirm that the State has not, according to the theory of action, a role in the production of the law). Satta was abandoned by his colleagues because they thought that Satta was right in theory, but he was wrong in that moment, in the new European context.

The prevalent reaction to the risk of a populist drift came from some jurists who became significant for the Partito d’Azione (first of all, Piero Calamandrei) and for some fascist politicians (all the ministers of justice tried, from 1934, to launch again the process of production of a Codex of Civil Law and they succeeded in 1942). Calamandrei held an important lecture in 1940, in which he reaffirmed the importance of the law as a guarantee against the risk of a charismatic leader who could bypass the intermediate orders (law, administration and party) to speak directly to the “pure people” After this definitive adhesion of the theory of action to the alternative positivistic paradigm, the Partito d’Azione lost definitively its cultural function and remained only a recruiting structure among intellectuals oriented to the Resistance (where a mass organization was not needed, in that any clandestine organization needs many little groups of fighters who cooperate but who know very little about the other groups’ organization).
The new principles of the Italian political culture was formalized by Norberto Bobbio during the period 1951-55 when he published a few essays which have been collected in a book named *Politica e Cultura*. This book represented the definitive adhesion to neopositivism (and to the idea that, to avoid populism, it is important to found right on positive law). What the intellectuals of the *Partito d’Azione* believed was that the law is a guarantee when democracy is weak or missing. Satta’s solution may represent a concrete and realistic solution in the present years, if our democracy has become (as we think) mature and with the correct antibodies to a new populist drift.

**Vico’s philosophy, fascism and a democratic alternative**

Being fascism the political regime, Vico’s philosophy became an instrument of reaction to fascism. It depended, obviously on the interpretation given to the question: why did fascism prevail in Italy? The interpretation by Silvio Trentin was, in the Thirties, that fascism prevailed because of a centralized State, of the lack of autonomy of the Municipalities and of the Regions, and of the crisis of the idea of State and of Right (in the sense of natural Right). The cultural parting from antipolitical fascism (when it became an authoritarian political regime) was founded on three important cultural movements: 1) the ideological opposition of the very liberal (as Benedetto Croce who elaborated, as an instrument of cultural reaction to fascism, the concept of the “religion of liberty”) and of the Marxists (who were an international revolutionary movement against European fascisms); 2) the unpolitical non participation and cultural resistance to the regime in the name of Vico’s philosophy (see Giuseppe Capograssi who proposed an important Catholic unpolitical culture based on a new interpretation of Vico’s and Rosmini’s philosophies and of the German theory of action introduced in Italy by Giuseppe Chiovenda with his work on the juridical theme: *L’azione nel sistema dei diritti*, published in 1903); 3) the antipolitical interpretation of Vico’s philosophy which influenced, in the Thirties, the above-mentioned Silvio Trentin, an antifascist scholar co-founder of *Giustizia e Libertà*, the movement of Nello and Carlo Rosselli, who later became leaders of the French (1940-1943) and Italian (1943-1944) Resistance; 4) the other antipolitical popular refusal of war and of defeat (the Italian practice of “bringing aid to the winner” is well known).

All these tendencies, after the Second World War, were in dispute over the cultural post-fascist debate. Unfortunately, Trentin died in 1944, because of the fascists’ tortures and Capograssi died in 1956, three days before becoming the first president of the newly constituted Constitutional Court. These two tragic events favoured the prevalence of the ideological cultural reaction to the
fascism. In this new ideological cultural context, as we already said, the neo-idealistic interpretation of Vico was considered an expression of antipolitics and a cultural movement that paved the way to Fascism – cfr. statements in which John Dewey (1953, 40), Otto Neurath (1945-46, 504-505), Bertrand Russell (1984, 639), Karl Popper (1974, II, 303) and Norberto Bobbio (1980, 267) –, explicitly took on this position. The solution given to the aim of preventing the return of fascism in Italy by Italian culture was that offered by Norberto Bobbio; a solution operating completely in the semantic dimension of the semiotics: to replace the speculative and abstract knowledge of idealistic philosophy with the concrete and empirical knowledge produced by empirical researchers and scholars. The solution given by German culture to its own antipolitical tendencies was based, on the contrary, starting with the important politician, Ludwig Erhard, on the proposal of operating exclusively on the pragmatic dimension of semiotics (see Foucault on this point): to replace the omni-comprehensive State with a more liberal conception of State, a conception based on an administrative praxis as an alternative to that of the German Second Reich, which was completely continued in these aspects by the politics of the German Third Reich.

While the neo-idealistic interpretation was contrasted and defeated, the other two interpretations were forgotten after the death of their proponents. At the end of the Sixties, the new dominant culture in Italy was neo-positivistic (a culture which Italian culture refers to as the “illuminist reformist perspective”) which was based on two assumptions: 1) it is necessary to know every facet of a problem before taking a decision; 2) the knowledge we acquire before a decision may be, and sometimes is, complete and exhaustive. On the contrary, Vico’s perspective was based on assumptions that were dissimilar to the illuminist culture and similar to the Pragmatism assumptions, in the interpretation of Peirce and Dewey’s philosophy: acting is a way of knowing; knowing (verum) and acting (factum) reciprocally influence each other (convertuntur).

A popular antipolitical approach alternative to the ideological vision of politics

Giovanni Guareschi (1908-1968) was a humorist and a famous Italian novelist. From 1936 to 1943 he was the editor in chief of the humorous magazine Bertoldo and during the war he was arrested by the Germans and sent to a concentration camp in Poland. He was right-wing, a Monarchist, and he was a strong adversary of communists. In 1945, he founded a satirical review, Candido. He invented two important characters that made him very popular: Father Camillo, a parish priest, and Peppone, a Communist mayor, both living
and working in a small village. They opposed each other, but sometimes they dismissed their reciprocal contrasts and cooperated in the name of a common sense that they considered a form of superior practical rationality, compared to the abstract rationality of ideologies. This preference given to common sense, with respect to ideologies, was the focus of Guareschi’s implicit antipolitical project. Many of the stories of Father Camillo and Peppone were adapted for the screen with two important actors: Gino Cervi and Fernandel. The movies produced in the Fifties and Sixties are still popular in that they are continuously present in the palimpsests of the main TV channels. This presence, though not only this, shows that what was considered antipolitical and anti-intellectual in the past, wasn’t at all. In the long run, Guareschi’s critiques to ideologies are considered proof of an underground (with respect to the dominant cultural ideological positions of the past) political culture which expressed, and is expressing, an important popular point of view. Recently, a video and a song inspired by these two popular characters have been produced.

1968: the “alter” politics misunderstands and deforms the antipolitical movement

At the beginning, we had the need and the demand of young generations towards traditional (and generally intended as natural) authorities: the father and the teacher. The request the new generations had in relation to these figures was not that of substituting themselves for them, but it was that of participating in debates with them. Young people were aware that they could not substitute them in the family or in the education, but they demanded to produce the decision together with each authority. This request changed the family during the sixties and from 1968 it would change school and university. It should have changed the parties too, but this attempt completely failed in that they offered few leaders of young generations the chance to enter the parties without changing the decision-making process. Italian parties are often characterized by holding their position all life long.

The Aldo Moro case

Aldo Moro, who has been, in normal conditions, a typical politician, has become an antipolitician in an abnormal situation: when kidnapped and imprisoned by the Red Brigades, Moro wrote many letters which may be considered the most important antipolitical documents of the Italian First Republic. Aldo Moro’s antipolitical conversion: while imprisoned, Moro discovered and wrote that his family was more important than politics and that he refused to consider the risk of being killed as a professional risk to the politician; when he was
kidnapped, he was the most important Italian leader, he was the “kingmaker” in the construction of the new government, and he intended to take on the role of President of the Republic, to be elected at the end of the mandate (six months later) of the incumbent President Giovanni Leone. Aldo Moro was antipolitician only for the last 55 days of his life.

**A few examples of leftist antipolitics in a post-modern context**

Until around 1976, the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano/PCI) had a great organization and it benefited from the 1968 movement; nevertheless, it hadn’t understood that this movement had a cyclic life and the tendency to reappear in different conditions (often against those who were favoured without having understood it); thus, the 1968 movement reappeared in 1977 with its seat in the town of Bologna and with a critical position towards the PCI; from this date, the PCI began to lose its electorate, halving the consent from 1979 to 1992 (when it changed name and it became the Leftists and Democrats party, Partito Democratico della Sinistra/PDS).

The misunderstanding may be described with Gramsci’s words: “This study also leads to a few definitions of the concept of State which, as usual, is intended as a Political Society (or dictatorship or coercive apparatus to comply with the popular mass according to the type of production or the economy in a certain moment) and not as a balance between Political Society and Civil Society (or hegemony of a social group on the whole national society exercised through the so called private organizations, like the Church, the Unions, the schools, etc.), and it is precisely in Civil Society that the intellectuals operate (Ben. Croce, for instance…). According to me, this conception of the intellectuals’ function enlightens the fall of medieval Communes, which were unable to create their own category of intellectuals and, thus, to exercise a hegemony besides dictatorship” (Gramsci and Schucht 1997, 791; Gramsci 1975, 2012-2015).

The misunderstanding of collective movements is the first cause of the crisis of these political organizations. The second is their patronage which was extended to the intellectuals: politicians and intellectuals are bound together in that they are treated as a resource: politicians need intellectuals to realize their own interests inside the party and not at all the party’s interests inside the society, and the intellectuals need politicians to realize their interests inside the academy. “This fact [the hegemony] is ‘spontaneously’ obtained in the historical periods in which a given social group is really progressive, i.e. it produces the progress of the whole society (…) But, as soon as the dominant social group has exhausted its own function, the ideological block tends to crumble and the
‘constriction’ may take the place of ‘spontaneity’” (Gramsci 1975, 2012). Of course, “Between consent and force we have the corruption-fraud (which is the characteristic of certain situations in which it is difficult to use the hegemonic function, as the use of force involves too many perils)” (Gramsci 1975, 1638). This case of corruption-fraud begins with the patronage and the dependence of the intellectuals on certain politicians with strong connections with each other; connections which are useful to the single politicians and intellectuals and not at all to their party.

These connections, when producing dependence, are the reason why all the errors we are going to describe (particularly the uses of the Goodman’s Model and electoral surveys, which have proved to be inadequate) have not yet produced any change in the relations between politicians and intellectuals who proposed the use of this model or the surveys as a way to understand society. This situation is typical when Civil Society lacks hegemony. According to Gramsci, in fact, “in the hegemonic system, there is democracy between the ruling group and the ruled groups proportionally to the possibility the legislation (or the practice) offers to favour the passing from the ruled groups to the leading group” (Gramsci 1975, 1056) or to favour the admittance of new intellectuals and politicians in the leading groups.

It was after the death of Enrico Berlinguer, in 1984, the last PCI secretary having charisma, that the crumbling of the PCI’s hegemonic apparatus became evident and the subsequent non charismatic successors of Berlinguer thought of enforcing with mathematics and a technical apparatus the sense-making that should, usually, be produced in the interaction, inside the party, among intellectuals and politicians, and outside Civil Society.

First example: Achille Occhetto
The strategy of communication adopted by the secretary of PCI, Achille Occhetto, was based on the assumption that a change of name was necessary to stop the drop in consent and that the process could be controlled by controlling electoral communication: every drop in consent must be explained by the centre (by the secretary and his experts). In order to obtain this objective he resorted to a mathematical model (named “Goodman’s Model”) and to an expert considered unerring (Stefano Draghi, named the “red magician”). Goodman’s model was used in 1985, 1987, and 1990 to blame the left and the right of the party and to conclude that the secretary was right. In 1990, this conclusion was not considered enough and Goodman’s Model was used to sentence that, to next political elections, if the name was changed, would obtain 20% of votes (in 1976, the votes were 33%). Thus, Achille Occhetto
prudently communicated: “19% of votes will be a great victory; 18% will be a victory; 17% not a good result (a defeat); with less than 17%, I will resign”. In 1992, the PCI, now named PDS, obtained 16.4%. The “red magician” lost his role as expert, while Occhetto did not resign at all. Thus, the PDS had the time to lose another election: that of 1994, which, unfortunately for the entire left, became a constituent election. Occhetto was compelled to resign in 1995.

*Second example: Massimo D’Alema*

The new secretary has changed the name, from PDS to DS (Leftist Democrats), but he has not at all changed the form of communication adopted: the medium continued to be considered more important than the message. From 1996 to 1998, he was the President of the Bicameral parliamentary Commission, needless to say that the President was always on the mass media. In 1999, as Prime Minister he organized a big Conference on Federalism in Venice to give a formal promise that he was going to introduce the Fiscal Federalism asked by citizens of Northern Italy. Three days before this event, the War in Kosovo broke out and the Conference was delayed and later forgotten: it was easier to be on the mass media when bombing Kosovo. The following year, of course, he badly lost the regional elections and was compelled to resign as Prime Minister.

*Third example: Walter Veltroni*

In 1995, the “people of faxes” proposed him as new secretary, i.e. a lot of leftists whose fax messages poured into the secretary’s office of PDS stating the preference for Veltroni, rather than Massimo D’Alema, as secretary. He refused this investiture saying that D’Alema and he were acting and thinking politically in an identical way. Obviously, it was not true. It was a way of refusing informal communication and messages and to inform the party’s apparatus that he respected formal party institutions. When D’Alema became Prime Minister in 1998, Veltroni received the reward he earned in 1995: he was elected secretary of the party. When a new centre-leftist party was founded, Democratic Party (PD) as the union of a centre party (*Margherita*) and of a leftist party (DS), he accepted to compete for the secretariat only after the formal assurance that he would be the only candidate coming from the DS. Thus, he was the leader of three different electoral lists to the primaries of the new party. No one, among leftist electors, understood why there were three competing lists with the same leader: Ventroni1 competing with Ventroni2 and both competing with Veltroni3 and all three competing with the other two candidates (Rosy Bindi and Enrico Letta). Obviously, D’Alema obtained a
distinctive permission: to be the only candidate in his own district without any competition. In this way, he avoided the risk of competition with Bindi and Letta and to be considered Veltroni’s supporter (obviously, with or without primaries he was and he is more important than the new PD secretary).

**Fourth example: Pier Luigi Bersani**

When asked by leftist electors to compete with Veltroni, Pier Luigi Bersani refused answering that he thought and acted like Veltroni did. Obviously, it wasn’t true. It was clear when he started to criticize Veltroni during and after the 2008 electoral campaign. From another point of view, it was true that they were identical from a “methodological” aspect: like Veltroni twelve years earlier, that of Bersani was a way of refusing informal communication and messages and to communicate to the party’s apparatus that he respected formal party institutions. Bersani will receive the reward earned in 2007 in the short or medium run: Bersani will be the next leader of PD with Veltroni’s same communicative style. The message to leftist electors is that nothing changed from 1995 to 2007: the old PDS had been and the new PD is unable to understand the communicative style and an investiture coming from civil society.

A conclusion from the examples: the PCI misunderstood the 1968 movement and it had the 1977 movement against it; Occhetto misunderstood the communicative style in a post-modern party and he lost the 1992 and 1994 elections; D’Alema misunderstood the communicative role of a modern Prime Minister and he lost his 2000 administrative elections; DS misunderstood the 2001-02 movement named the “Girotondi” (Italian for the children’s game “Ring around the Roses”, where children dance in a ring around something or somebody) which was against the right-wing and they obtained the *Vaff******* day (*Vaff****** is the equivalent of the English F*** you) against the right-wing and the left-wing; Veltroni misunderstood the communicative style in 1995 (refusing to compete with Massimo D’Alema) and in 2007 (refusing to have internal competitors to the primaries) and he lost 2008 elections.

**Antipolitical is any form of indifference to the identity of its own militants and electors**

To change the party’s name means to change the party’s members’ identity. All the old parties have changed their names: the “extremes” began to change their name during the “first republic”.

*Italian Antipolitics as a long run Question: “Bad Civil Societies” or “Bad Elites”?*
MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano/Italian Social Movement) – where MSI, at the beginning, was an implicit reference to Mussolini - changed in MSI-DN (MSI-Destra Nazionale/National Right), then in MSI-AN (MSI-Alleanza Nazionale/National Alliance), and lastly in AN.

The old Italian Communist Party (PCI) changed its name in 1991, becoming the Party of Leftist Democracy (PDS) and losing the extreme left which took on the name of Party of the Communist Re-foundation (Partito Rifondazione Comunista/PRC); the PDS took on, in 1995, a new name: Leftist Democrats (Democratici di Sinistra/DS).

Reformist parties changed their name after Mani Pulite, when many things changed in Italy and, in a few years, the political system lost the parties that were in charge of the government in the previous 45 years (from 1948 to 1993). Christian Democracy/DC, Italian Socialist Party/PSI, Italian Socialist Democratic Party/PSDI, Italian Liberal Party/PLI, Italian Republican Party/PRI have disappeared. The other parties have changed or just changed their names.

In 1993, the old Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana/DC) took on the name given to the first Italian Catholic party by the founder, don Luigi Sturzo, Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano/PPI) losing the rightists of the party who entered Forza Italia (Berlusconi’s party) and even Alleanza Nazionale/AN (the post-fascist party of the First Republic), and, when, in 1997, the PPI lost the centre of the old DC party, which joined the Catholics entered Forza Italia two years earlier, PPI blended with a few laymen and became a new moderate party: the Marguerite (Margherita). Recently, in 2007, DS and Marguerite, losing another part of the left, blended together taking on the “American” name of Democratic Party (Partito Democratico).

Other parties have been founded and they changed their name too: Forza Italia/FI (Berlusconi’s first party) now named Partito della Libertà/PdL (Berlusconi’s recent winning coalition, FI and AN, which are going to become a new party); PPI (Partito Popolare Italiano/Italian Popular Party) which become Marguerite (Margherita) after having lost the UDC (Unione Democristiana e di Centro), i.e. the Italian catholic party in alliance with the rightists from 1994 to 2007; from the old PSI have been derived three little Socialist parties, the most important being SDI (Socialisti Democratici Italiani), i.e. the Italian socialist party in alliance with the leftists; IdV (Italia dei Valori) founded by Antonio Di Pietro; UDEUR (Unione democratica per l’Europa), i.e. a little catholic party founded by Clemente Mastella; and so on.
The antipolitical federalism of Lega Nord movement

In the upper North-East (the territory belonged to the peninsular part of the State of Serenissima), anthropologist federalism remained as a nook experience until the 50s, in the XX century, when the PPI, now with the new name Christian Democrats, DC, having occupied the national locus of power (having become the majority party to guide the coalition of rule for half a century), abandoned anthropologist federalism (more or less when don Luigi Sturzo, disappointed, began to speak of partitocrazia). After a few decades, the antipolitical roots of anthropologist federalism became the strategy of Lega Nord (a political movement which emptied most of the consensus to the DC before the final crisis following the inquiries on political corruption named Mani Pulite); in the lower North-East (the territory once belonged to the church and to Tuscany), anthropologist federalism evolved from a nook strategy to an “alter” strategy within the system (a Marxist regional subculture alternative to the mainstream culture). After the 90s, this subculture evolved to a reformist culture of rule without any residue of antipolitical culture (not yet, at least). As a consequence of this transformation Lega Nord has begun to obtain a consistent electoral consensus in these Regions.

The Italian second Republic and the three different dimension of the semiotics

1) The syntactical dimension is based on the principle that communication is the medium. At the beginning of the Italian so-called Second Republic, only a few things were clear about new actors (Umberto Bossi, Silvio Berlusconi, Pier Ferdinando Casini, Fausto Bertinotti, etc.) and parties (FI, Lega Nord, PPI, PDS, AN, etc.). Many students observed that it seemed (and perhaps it was) that the more the electors were exposed to the television medium propaganda of a party, the more the votes it collected. Thus, many politicians demanded equity on the media and they invented the “par condicio” and enacted it as a rule to be observed during any electoral campaign: each party or candidate must receive, during the electoral campaign, the same time on the television medium (even an Italian “soap opera” was suspended during the campaign when a protagonist of the television program was a second place candidate).

2) The semantic dimension is based on the principle that communication is the message. The more the electors knew the new actors and the parties, the more the time of exposition to the mass media became useless for the victory. In the second phase of the Italian Second Republic, the electoral campaign
was organized from the intuition that competitive advantage was the message. Simple messages at the beginning and, later, the winning strategy was the ability to communicate a more complex message than the opponent’s.

3) The pragmatic dimension is based on the principle that communication is interaction. In a third phase, in my opinion, starting in 2006, when both the competing coalitions had governed for five years, it was clear that the concrete action was going to become more important than the message. It was on the pragmatic dimension of communication that the winning centre-left coalition of 2006 completely lost its consent in less than two years. Thus, the winning centre-right coalition of 2008 based its communicative style on not being in the mass media too often and on not promising too much, on being realistic in describing what the government can do or cannot do.

An antipolitical new charismatic leader: Silvio Berlusconi
At the beginning of the new Second Republic (as the new political system was, at the time, optimistically called), a new leader occupied the political scene: Silvio Berlusconi, a mass media Italian tycoon. He was able to create a new party (which became, in just a few months, the most voted Italian party) and to win the electoral competition in 1994. He won again in 2001 and in 2008. He is considered (but is he?) the most important antipolitical Italian leader.

What he introduced into the Italian political debate was a new public and political language constructed on the normal, private language of the citizens. During the First Republic there was a specialization in the use of the language: simple citizens were permitted to use a politically non-correct language in their private lives, while politicians were obliged to use a politically correct one. Nowadays, private citizens may incur in judicial problems if they do not use a politically correct language, while politicians are free, because of their political immunity, to speak of everything and in the way they prefer; we often hear our politicians saying to the adversaries: “They are liars!”, “They have won with intrigues!”, “They are going to cheat!”, “He is a killer in that his judicial inquiries have driven honest politicians to suicide!”, etc.; or to say to other powers of the State as the judges: “They are red gowns!”, “Their inquiries are politically oriented!”, “They need a psychiatric test!”, and so on; to say about his own female supporters: “We don’t candidate ‘veline’! (i.e. pretty young showgirls on television) We know what else we can with them”; to say to the electors who are against him: “Those who vote left-wing are morons!”, but the term used is “testicles”; to say to athletes cooperating in the opponent’s electoral campaign: “He is without a head!” and so on. Umberto Bossi was
the first to make the “gesture of the umbrella”, a common coarse gesture, in a political meeting and he was criticized. But Berlusconi has never been criticized when, in a political meeting, he started the gesture and stopped it before the end.

The consequence was that the political language has become worse and in the 2008 elections we heard the competing leaders using implicit and explicit sexual expressions: “Berlusconi is sexually attracted by me, but I am not interested in giving it to him”; “I did it in a park!”; “Sex for a politician in the electoral campaign is a secondary thing!”; “My favourite panties are … !”, and so on. The most interesting political (?) debate in the 2008 electoral campaign was the following hypothesis put forward by Berlusconi: “women voting right-wing are surely prettier that women voting left-wing”. An “interesting” alternative hypothesis put forward by leftist politicians was that “leftist women do it better!”. As we can see, the private vulgar language has become the public political (?) language in the electoral campaign.

After the crisis of Mani Pulite, the new antipolitical leader (Umberto Bossi who opened a new season) brought forward the arrival, on the political scene, of Silvio Berlusconi. This new antipolitical leader won two electoral competitions (in 1994 and 2001). The latter understood the possibility of changing the communicative style of the old politicians (who, because they were involved in scandals emerging from judiciary inquiries, had lost their reputation and were even laughed at) and he relied on his own communicative skills using instruments of marketing strategies. The most important difference between Berlusconi and other political leaders was the fact that, while the old leaders were unable to resist judicial inquiry (see for instance the resignation of Minister of Justice, Clemente Mastella, at the beginning of 2008, and the consequent crisis of government), Berlusconi is able to resist and to react to a judicial inquiry.

This ability is often explained by the fact that he is able to speak a new language, a language made of things, jokes and common expressions (sometimes a coarse one) that is immediately comprehensible to electors. Moreover, he is able to use the negative campaign, i.e. criticizing the opponent during the electoral campaign instead of presenting his own political project. What we know is that he was unable to win the two times he had as an opponent Romano Prodi, whose language was quiet and almost immobile. On the contrary he won the two times he had as an opponent, an old leader of the PCI (Achille Occhetto) and a new leader who based his way of communicating on good looks (Walter Veltroni).
After Mani Pulite: a philosophical Italian debate

Antipolitics became an important cultural event even before the success of these political leaders (after Umberto Bossi and Silvio Berlusconi, Antonio Di Pietro and, before, Marco Pannella). First of all Roberto Esposito wrote a book on the concept of unpolitics and this produced a debate with another important Italian philosopher and politician: Massimo Cacciari, three times elected mayor of Venice.

According to Esposito, unpolitics started with Niccolò Machiavelli’s main works. In fact, „Unpolitics is the politics seen from his external border (...) with this meaning, all the political realism – i.e. all the non theological thought on politics – was unpolitical starting from Machiavelli“ (Esposito 1999, 20). Unpolitics is a concept whose origin lies in the statement that man is not naturally good and honest, and that he may be wicked. This implies, for realists, that only the legitimate strength may be used to contrast the illegitimate strength. In democracy legitimacy springs up from the elections and depends on the law (everything for the politician) and not on justice (nothing for the realist politician). The consequence is that, from the point of view of realism, unpolitics does not exist in that everything is a question of politics, i.e. of power.

In Esposito’s dictionary, realist politics, unpolitics and antipolitics are synonymous. “A real alternative to the power does not exist, a subject of anti-power does not exist, for the main reason that the subject is already, from a constitutive point of view, power. Or, in other words, that power is naturally inherent to the dimension of the subject, in the sense that it is its word (...) [Thus], the only way to restrain power is to restrain the subject” (Esposito 1999, 21). In other words, political realism consists in thinking that western civilization is not at all different from other civilizations. Nevertheless, being our civilization based on roots that are not those of political realism (Greek philosophy, Roman right or the idea of natural right and an idea of a mankind that is not only material, in that it is above all spiritual and destined to an eternal life, and has produced a religion as the religion of the humble, i.e. of people without power), it is necessary to find a place for unpolitics within political realism: a place corresponding to the objective of restraining the subject in order to obtain the restraining of power.

Thus, unpolitics is the fulfillment of the categories of politics, it is the un-thought, the unexpressed, the forgotten, i.e. the silence which surrounds power, but it is also the ability to follow nature, instead of contrasting it. In other terms, it is the particular noise (apparently a silence) of a growing wood that surrounds the (political) noise of a falling tree.
From a philosophical point of view, unpolitics moves among many alternatives, two of which are realistic and extreme: the one represented by the Hobbes-Schmitt line (and it is the line of modernity, of realism based on strength) and the one represented by nihilism (and it is the line opened, in Italy, by Massimo Cacciari and prosecuted by Giuseppe Cantarano). As a third alternative, moving with the aim to avoid the devil of Schmitt and the deep blue sea of Cacciari, we must start from a philosophical line which begins with Machiavelli and, through Spinoza, arrive at Vico, prosecuting them, to stay anchored to Italian philosophers, like Rosmini, to jurists and men of the Resistance like Silvio Trentin (he elaborated the idea of federalism, a structure to participate, and the idea of Autonomy of Autonomies which reduces the role of the politician to a simple arbiter, the arbiter of Logic, Right and Ethics), to jurists and philosophers like Giuseppe Capograssi (he theorized a project of direct democracy and he proposed a conception of philosophy as philosophy of the humble, which presents a Christian political alternative which reduces politicians and philosophers’) and to liberal political scientists like Bruno Leoni (whose concept of rule of law does not recognize the politician’s right to a legitimate use of power outside a regulatory conception of law based on the assumption that law must be first discovered and later decided, and not first decided and later imposed).

Unpolitics is, in both Cacciari’s and Esposito’s analyses, the refusal of great politics. Moreover, unpolitics is not the refusal to invent great new stories, i.e. new ideologies, but it is the awareness that no ideology may construct or legitimate action (Cantarano 2000, 206). Cacciari, after having identified absolute politics as the identity of power and good, concentrated his analysis on the representation of good and concluded that unpolitics was the indifference towards politics and unpolitics. And what does it remain? According to Cacciari, nothing! In fact, nothing needs our political attention. In this way, he falls “in a nihilist perspective, of pure adhesion to the existent, of satisfied acceptance of what it is” (Cacciari in Cacciari and Esposito 1988, 19). In the same year in which he was debating with Cacciari, Esposito had just published the volume *Le categorie dell’impolitico* and he was proposing, as an alternative to Cacciari’s concept of unpolitics, a definition describing unpolitics as present in a “community where individuals are bound to death, the only event that is shared by all” (Esposito in Cacciari and Esposito 1988, 9). In a subsequent edition of the same work, Esposito corrected this conclusion and stated that unpolitics “is referred to the socio-cultural dynamics introduced by events which have marked our more recent history; and in particular with the extraordinary acceleration of crisis – but it would be better to say the
tempest – which has crossed and bashed (in Italian “percorso e percosso”) all the political institutions of this Country: non only parties, but even the so-called movements, not to speak of ideologies as such” (Esposito 1999, X). Note that between the first edition of the book in 1988 and the second one in 1999, we had the inquiry of Mani Pulite and the fall of the so-called First Republic.

Esposito sees a similitude between the concepts of unpolitics and antipolitics (for instance the fact that both coincide with politics), but he points his attention to the fact that they differ in a substantial aspect: while antipolitics, presenting itself as the negation of politics, produces the effect of strengthening politics and, first of all, the recourse to the use of force to realize its own objectives, unpolitics, not presenting itself as the negation of politics, tries to channel politics in the way of a nature considered as construction of community or collective roads (the reduction of the subject is realized through the regulation, i.e. in an infinity of interactive micro-events in which no one controls the entire process and the strategy resulting is “a strategy without strategist” – see Foucault and the concept of “device”).

Doing so, the unpolitical man can use his realism in order to reduce his own power and the power of the rulers; only if he presents himself as an antipolitical man, consequently he does not reduce the strength of his presence and the strength used by the rulers. This is, in Esposito’s opinion, the main difference between unpolitics and antipolitics: identical is the impulse but different is the use of impulse (antagonist or not) in relation to politics. According to Cacciari’s vision, this difference is not at all present. Unpolitical man is free to present his power strengthened by the fact that he is “wertfrei” (independent from any value). In this sense, the unpolitical nihilist does not set anything against the politician in that he is free from all and from everything. According to Esposito, the unpolitical man is he who annihilates himself in the community, if he does not assume an antithetic position towards politicians, while, according to Cacciari, the unpolitical man is he who annihilates his relations and obligations to the community (that is a different thing).

On the pragmatic dimension of politics, we have no example of the way in which Esposito would act unpolitically, if engaged in politics (he always refused this kind of active engagement), while we have an example of the way in which Cacciari acts unpolitically. In fact, Cacciari was a candidate to mayor of Venice four times: the first with the old electoral law, that of the First Republic, and the other three times with the new law which gives a prominent role to the candidate; in the First Republic, he was not elected, while he was successful the other three (in 1994, 1998 and 2005). In 1994 and 1998 he was
the candidate of a large number of parties and he was not completely free to interpret, according to his character, the electoral campaign. But the last time, in 2005, he was the candidate of a little party and he could enter in campaign using the strength of his personality against the opponent, with the typical approach of the negative campaign.

Starting from the premise that power is congenital in the individual in that the actor is already constituted as power, he concludes that unpolitical man may only be “sovereign indifference towards politics” (Cacciari in Cacciari and Esposito 1988, 19). This conclusion, obviously, permits him to enter in the 2005 competition using the strength of negative arguments with “sovereign indifference”.

But, is it possible to go straight along the road imagined by Esposito for unpolitics? In my opinion, this road is the same as the one indicated by Nichi Vendola, new President of the Apulia Region, when, during the months after the victory 2005, he was going round saying: “remove me from power”. After a few months, he started to say “remove me from power, with moderation”. If it is possible to go straight along the road indicated by Esposito, it is possible to go along the road indicated by Vendola. According to Esposito, unpolitical concept organizes the problem in this direction when it is said that politics may be taken in the direction of unpolitics, i.e. that politics may be realised starting from its own limits. The solution expressed in the form “remove me from power” is only a beginning, a road to an impossible objective of perfection. To understand its own limits means that the pure objective of the complete absence of power is impossible. Anyway, being a beginning it is again action. The perfect objective is that to interpret and practice the “remove me from power” in this sense: replace your (of the people) capacity of regulation to my capacity of action in producing rules when you feel that you all may and wish to participate and deliberate (when the collective action is no longer the action of a noisy minority which overcomes the silence of the majority) or let me act with my legitimate power when you do not feel the need to participate and I, the legitimate politician, can act with my role of representative.

Realism is an unpolitical man who is conscious that the solution is not in obtaining the entire result (annihilation of the actor), which is possible only in the perfection of saints, but it is the attempt to obtain this result with the method of trial and error relatively to single issues.
About antipolitical language: the communicative strategy of metaphorical stretching

The 12th of January 2002, during the inauguration of the judicial year in the seats of the Court of Appeal, many young Italian attorneys and judges (especially those involved in investigating mafia crimes and terrorism) questioned the government’s refusing to wear (during the ceremony) their gown (as tradition prescribes) and, in some cases, at the beginning of the speech by the representative of the government, abandoning the hall. On the same occasion, Francesco Saverio Borrelli, the Attorney General of Milan, who had had an important role during the, unfortunately too short, period of “Mani Pulite” delivered an energetic speech against the present government. His speech ended with the subsequent request: “to resist, to resist, to resist as on the Piave Line!”. This request was a quotation from the famous speech of an important Italian Prime Minister and was used as an image in that Borrelli explicitly referred to a historical event: during World War I, in 1917, the Italian army was in Caporetto and the Austro-Hungarian army invaded the plain and was stopped only on the Piave Line (the Piave is a river debouching not so far from Venice). In these new positions, the Italian army stayed for a whole year before definitively defeating the Austro-Hungarian army in another historical battle. That year, between the defeat and the victory, the Prime Minister of the time (Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, premier from the 29th October 1917 to the 23rd October 1919) pronounced a well known discourse in which he urged soldiers and citizens to repeat the same verb three times: “to resist, to resist, to resist!”

From a technical point of view, it was the presentation of two species: judges who are defending the Constitution and their role and soldiers who were defending their country, in an extreme and difficult line, before the definitive victory. If the analogy and the proportion had been respected (we, judges, are, in the courts of law, as the soldiers were on the Piave Line), that of Borrelli would have been only the figurative description of what was well known about relationships between the Italian government and Italian judges.

After the protests of judges all over Italy, in spite of Borrelli’s explicit quotation of the Piave Line, many exponents of the government and of the parliamentary majority focused their attention on the aim of substituting the image of judges resisting as soldiers on the Piave Line with the image of judges resisting as partisans in the Italian Resistance during World War II. Since Resistance was a civil war which opposed Italian fascists and other
Italians (but, first of all, militants of the Italian Communist Party), the image of judges who resist as communists resisted fascism was used to confirm or to prove that judges, who were criticizing the government, were strongly influenced by communist ideas.

According to Berlusconi’s arguments, when Borrelli made the request to resist, to resist, to resist, Italian leftists thought he was addressing a resistance identical to that of the civil war, during World War II, named Resistance. Berlusconi and others added that this was the evidence that in Milan there were a lot of “red gowns” (i.e. judges influenced by a communist ideology and unreliable in that they were judging in accordance with preconceived ideas).

Why did the present majority need to react to Borrelli’s words with a metaphorical stretching? The answer is in the fact that, after Borrelli’s urge, spontaneous committees, in many Italian cities, organised new forms of political manifestations: citizens met around the Law-Court buildings, hand in hand and moving in an ideal ring around the building.

A few months later, policemen represented Borrelli’s image and, this time, used it against examining judges. Before the demonstrations in Genoa (G8 summit, July 2001), when many no-global demonstrators, were brutally treated by policemen (with many illegal arrests, many people injured and a demonstrator – Carlo Giuliani – killed), in Naples, on the 17th March 2001, less brutal, but however illegal actions had been carried out by policemen. In the month of May 2002, a few of them were imprisoned and almost one hundred were charged. Repeating the style of demonstrations in solidarity to judges, policemen met around police stations, hand in hand and moved in an ideal ring around their station. In a Television interview (Sciuscià hosted by Michele Santoro), a policeman, of one of the special police-corps (the one named Celere) whose function is to control people’s riots, declared that they were not guilty of any crime because they were just obeying the order from the Home Secretary: “to resist, to resist, to resist!” (of course as Italian Soldiers resisted on the Piave Line, not as communists resisted during the Resistance).

Policemen restored the metaphor in the original sense given by Borrelli. But the end of the question was different from this: during controversies in the Italian Senate related to the passing of an act on “justified suspicion” (legittimo sospetto) according to which, a trial can be transferred from a Law-Court to another (with other judges), because many leftists thought that the new decree, if approved, would be used to transfer the trial against Berlusconi to another Law-Court and result in a delay that would produce a new negative
prescription, many leftists demonstrated in the streets to question the urgency shown in passing the decree. In these demonstrations, in the last days of July, Borrelli’s metaphor “to resist, to resist, to resist!”, definitively referred to the Resistance.

Having obtained this important result (to oblige the opponents to abandon any reference to soldiers on the Piave Line), Berlusconi started a new controversial phase. He attacked leftists saying that the real slogan of the left was not “to resist, to resist, to resist!”, but it was “to lie, to lie, to lie!”.

Piero Fassino, the political secretary of DS, answered that Berlusconi’s slogan against the left was “to swindle, to swindle, to swindle!”. On this new ground, the leftists, in the new form assumed by the old controversy, completely lost their original advantage in that they lost their priority and were forced to react to Berlusconi’s attacks.

**About the language of a collective movement: antipolitical language or metaphorical stretching?**

Any growing collective movement is characterized by a production of many metaphors that are connected, from a linguistic point of view, to each other. The first recent phenomenon of this kind was produced during the time of **Mani Pulite**. In that period, under the street sign bearing the name of the city, Milan (in the outskirts) appeared a placard with the new name “**Tangentopoli**”. The word was made up of two parts: the first to indicate a “**tangente**” which is the Italian word for “bribe”; the second “**opoli**” to indicate the idea of city, as in the Italian version of Walt Disney’s cartoons. In fact, the most popular cartoon town is named, in Italy, “**Paperopoli**” which means, more or less, “city of Donald Duck”. **Tangentopoli**, i.e. “city of bribes”, became almost immediately, after the publication of the photo on an important newspaper, the name for the city of Milan, in that, in Milan, **Tangentopoli** had its beginning.

In a few weeks, this metaphor became really popular and, in the Italian mass media, this opened another view of producing titles through the production of new metaphors: „**Mafiopoli**“, which means the city of **Mafia**, to indicate Palermo, in Sicily; “**Camorropoli**”, which means the city of **Camorra**, to indicate Naples; „**Affittopoli**“, which means the city of rent, to indicate Rome as the city of another scandal: a lot of members of the Parliament, of the majority and the opposition, were found to be living in ancient and important palaces without paying anything or paying only very low rent.

A more recent analogous phenomenon was observed in the movement of the “**Girotondi**” (Italian for the children’s game “Ring around the Roses”, where children dance in a ring around something or somebody). The 2nd of February
2002, the Ulivo party’s most important leaders (Francesco Rutelli and Piero Fassino, the Secretary of DS, and others) were speaking to a few electors (much of Rome’s Piazza Navona was empty). An unknown professor who had organized the dancing in a ring around the Law-Courts in Florence had spoken before them. Francesco Pardi, this was the professor’s name, became very popular the following weeks. After Fassino’s and Rutelli’s speeches, suddenly, from the public, Nanni Moretti (an Italian well known film director and an actor who was among the public in that political event) went up the orators’ platform. Being well known, they let him speak. And he spoke in this way: “Before Fassino and Rutelli, we listened to Pardi who was saying interesting things. Fassino and Rutelli spoke later repeating the same things, as if they had not listened to him. Pardi should be our future leader, with such leaders (Rutelli, Fassino and D’Alema) we’ll surely lose the game”. It was not an oblique or metaphorical speech. It was reported by the mass media as an angry and direct discourse. The direct discourse was identical to the metaphor as commonly intended in one of his previous movies (“April”). The evidence lies in the fact that what Moretti said was quickly forgotten and his political speech was substituted and represented, to leftist electors, by the cry of a woman, before his speech, shouting to him: “Moretti, say something leftist!”

The mass media reported the cry and it became an important metaphor in the subsequent months. As a metaphor it was used on all the possible occasions. After a few days, many militants from protest movements started to use the cry changing just the surname and the final word. Spontaneous demonstrations were an occasion to produce new messages with a unique structure: a family name, the expression “Say something ...” and an adjective to conclude the phrase. After the Piazza Navona meeting, we heard and saw a lot of new slogans: “Berlusconi, Say something ... legal”; “Rutelli, Say something ... correct”; “Mr X, Say something ... honest”, and so on. During a visit by Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, President of the Italian Republic, to Padua, “No Global” scholars extemporized a demonstration with one big banner: “Ciampi, Say something ... constitutional”.

In other words, spontaneous demonstrations were constructing a new political language to say that the leftist leaders do not do what people expect them to do, that Berlusconi is only formally legal, that others are only apparently honest, and so on. Last, but not least, even President Ciampi is presented as a President who is not defending the Constitution. These things were said without any risk of contempt.
As any other essay, to introduce new expressions, to renovate the political language, and as any way to use exclusively the syntactical dimension, these forms of metaphorical stretching are generally considered as an antipolitical discourse. Because of the first reason, these new expressions are not at all antipolitical or they are antipolitical in a positive sense; because of the fact that they have no generative effect (in that they do not produce a real semantic or pragmatic meaning, i.e. in Arendt’s terms, they do not distinguish real things or produce any form of real activity), this group of expressions may be considered antipolitical in a negative sense.

**Antipolitics on the Internet**

The new technologies linked to the web, as they are structured and developed, allow the creation of communities or virtual antipolitical public squares, even permanent ones, in which interaction is implemented (no longer only at a hierarchical level) and active participation where all are members and leaders, and apparently elites are not present. In these virtual sites, a new sense of belonging and sharing is arising among people who, in real life, would, probably, never have met and could never have expressed unitary issues and uneasiness, if not by resorting to the parties. New movements and groups of pressure have being constituted. Those already existing locally are strengthened or are joined, taking on a regional or national feature (for instance, local groups that are opposing, with the same fighting methods as the opposing to incinerators and rubbish dumps). The web is thus becoming the breeding ground of that special type of antipolitician that the Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori defined as “parochial”, or “total contenders” and “activists”. A net, a galaxy of interconnected pages is created in order to exchange information, to create consent and to plan even real and concrete actions of rejection, refusal, but also of proposal. The resources and the commitment needed to participate in these “computerized agoras”, to actively participate in the “electronic democracy”, are more limited if compared to the usual traditional political commitment.

Indeed, the traditional political commitment presupposes a traditional organization of consent, which is costly and heavy, and still rests its foundations on the parties’ local offices in the territory and tries to maintain consent through control of the few great mass media. On the web, instead, the temporal and hierarchical perception of relationships with the politician has changed too. The customers-constituents-“internauts” expect to express their own observations and their own criticism directly to the traditional politicians, to their own representatives; at the same time they expect to receive consistent, appropriate, direct and resolute answers.
In Italy, the most interesting virtual antipolitical sites are managed by the most heterogeneous figures: authors of mockery (two examples for all are Beppe Grillo and Daniele Luttazzi), authors of satire and theatre (Dario Fo and Franca Rame), journalists (even television and newspaper, for instance, Marco Travaglio, Sandro Ruotolo), politicians (take the Blog of ex Minister Antonio di Pietro), independent journalistic and electronic heads, associations, committees, movements, blogs of single “intellectual” citizens, “polymaths” and “columnists” (Carlo Bertani, Eugenio Benetazzo, Piero Ricca, etc.).

People of Internet must meet sometimes in a face-to-face interaction: small groups meet at the restaurant; large groups meet at meetings (of course an antipolitical meeting). Beppe Grillo indicted, on the 8th of September 2007, a mass petition drive to collect signatures to propose a new law to the Italian parliament (a law on the morality and on the eligibility of deputies and senators). He was present at the meeting in Bologna while many other towns had places where people could go for signatures (and Beppe Grillo’s discourse was broadcast on internet). The discourse was memorable in that the comedian, to express it in a more polite way, told many Italian politicians to go to hell. Actually, he used the word *Vaff*******. Because of this expression, used by the comedian, 300.000 persons rushed to these places to sign their names in all the Italian towns, and this event was reported the day after as “*Vaff*****-Day*” or the “*Vaff-Day*”. The day was memorable for many young people and it was repeated the 25th of April, on the anniversary of the *Resistenza* (the victory against the fascists in 1945). The choice of the date is really significant.

6. Conclusions

Antipolitics is a question of demand (bad civil societies) or a question of supply (bad elites)? Probably, the question is more complex or it is badly posed. In fact, in democracy, they say, each electorate has the politicians it deserves. First of all, for the simple fact that each elected politician is the representative of his electorate. This in a double sense: 1) he is requested to speak and act on behalf of the electorate in a Parliament or in any local elective assembly; 2) he is considered typical by the particular group of electors giving him their votes. Thus, in democracy, we have a good civil society and good elites or we have bad civil society and bad elites; sometimes this bad civil society and this bad elites are considered antipolitical elites and antipolitical groups in civil society. But, if we have both antipolitical (or bad) elites and antipolitical (or bad) groups in society who/what is the cause and who/what is the effect? In
other terms, is any civil society responsible for its antipolitical elite? Or is any elite responsible for its antipolitical civil society? Who/what was the first to affect or bias the other? Who/what can be relieved of this “tremendous” (inverted commas will be explained later) responsibility?

If we introduce the question in this form, we will inevitably relapse into the traditional dilemma: which came first, the egg or the chicken? In other words, what came first, antipolitical civil societies or antipolitical elites? Chickens hatch from eggs, but a brooding mother chicken must keep an egg warm for it to hatch. This mutual reliance causes uncertainty between two possible answers: to many of us, the question about what first gave rise to the other, when limited to chickens and eggs, remains uncertain in that it is like playing heads and tails (many of us do not need any cultural mediation or value-related interpretation to choose between the two alternatives). Any question about who/what was the first relapses into a question of ambiguity when the choice is not between eggs and chickens, but between the possible preference given to the thesis of civil societies influencing the elites or to the opposite thesis of the elites influencing civil societies. To many of us, this is a question of ambiguity in that we surely need a cultural mediation or value-related interpretation to choose between the two alternatives. Who/what was the first? It means: who/what first incurred this “tremendous” responsibility and who/what can be relieved of this mortal sin? Who/what was the first means: who/what was the “corrupter” and who/what the “corrupted” (if any “corruption” exists)?

If we consider the Italian political experience, the problem of bad civil societies has not been considered the main problem, but rather the second one, by all the scholars on the matter. The first problem has always been that of bad elites. In the history of Italy, we have known two different kinds of political systems: the model of Florence, well known and that of Naples, less known, which has been described as producing, in the long run, increasingly greater distance between the rulers and the ruled and a critical antipolitical philosophy (that of Machiavelli and that of Vico); the model of Venice which was an alternative and has not studied thoroughly what produced a political practice that was the antecedent of what I named anthropological federalism.

The second question is: what is it antipolitics? We have just tried to explain what antipolitics is not:
1) the negative campaign which is finalized to the aim to win the elections, and sometimes one defines antipolitician the most skilled communicators, those politicians who are better than adversaries in that they know how to conduct a negative campaign at the national level (see Silvio Berlusconi and his 2006 campaign) or in the regional level (see Massimo Cacciari and his 2005 campaign);

2) the unrealistic promises in that the decision of what is realistic and what not, cannot be given in an a priori evaluation, but it is always an a posteriori evaluation (and the implementation process is significant);

3) the interactive processes which produce local situations which only a door to door campaign (conducted by those living in the same area and frequenting the same bar or churches or squares) may recuperate electors to politics (with the uninominal college – one candidate, one elected – these local interactive dynamics were recuperated directly by the candidate; with the new Italian electoral law, these dynamics are recuperated only by the mayors);

4) the Italian political alternative elaborated by Vico and Rosmini and others to ideological politics. This latter is, often, presented as an “other” politics while it is often the same form of politics that antipolitics intends to change or, rather, it exists only in a scientific and methodological conception of logic and of the empiric analysis: the illuminist vision of the world (the Cartesian, the Hobbesian, the Hegelian, the positivist, the neopositivist, and so on).

But what is antipolitics, when it is not politics, but something that is wrong and “contrary to good politics”? In my opinion it is important to change the current definition of populism and antipolitics given by Italian scholars. I have just explained why it is not possible to accept the definition given by Mastropaolo who considers antipolitics as the “the existence of simple solutions even for complex problems” in that this definition may be applied to the electoral speech and to political action (and surely this dimension of the speech, especially in the electoral campaign, is normal practice by both competitors). Now, I want to explain why I should like to change even the definition given by Tullio Altan: populists are those political actors who are unable to operate in the “logic-empirical dimension that fixes the condition of realistic politics” (Tullio Altan 1989, 21). This definition assumes the objectivity of analysis, while this objectivity doesn’t exist.

On the contrary, it exists, on the tradition which considers that the certum of human beings may aspire to the verum, but never be sure to have reached it and the maximum verum that may be obtained is that produced by an invisible college (the term was introduced by Robert Boyle in his controversy with...
Hobbes), or by a jury or with a mutual partisan adjustment (the well known expression introduced by Charles Lindblom). If this is true, and in my opinion it is, our rationality, and, before all, our political rationality, which defines the conditions of realism, may be thought only as a posteriori. As a consequence, the only realistic way to define populism or antipolitics may be based on the refusal of Kant’s categorical imperative: act in a way to assume that your maxima has a universal value. Referring this imperative to the driving, one may considere populist or antipolitical the man who, as a driver, declaims against pedestrians and, as a pedestrian, declaims against drivers. Referring this definition to the politics, I consider antipolitical those actors criticizing those who govern for the same things they did when they governed in the past and they will do when they govern again.

This paradoxical antipolitical situation is frequent in Italian politics and it has often been noticed in the leftists and the rightists of the Second Republic. For instance, the 2006 national electoral law was defined a dirty trick by the leftists, while the same law was first approved by the leftist regional government of the Tuscany Region. More interesting is the fact that, since 1994, the parliamentary minority has criticized the majority for the fact that they elect as Presidents of the Camera and of the Senate two exponents of the majority, while they expect to have a President selected among the members of the minority. In 1994, the centre-rightist majority elected two centre-rightists (Scognamiglio and Pivetti); in 1996, the centre-leftist majority elected two centre-leftists (Mancino and Violante); in 2001, the centre-rightist majority elected two centre-rightists (Pera and Casini); in 2006, the centre-leftist majority elected two centre-leftists (Marini and Bertinotti); in 2008, the centre-rightist majority elected two centre-rightists (Schifani and Fini). Nevertheless each time the centre-leftist minority advances the same rejected by the centre-right. Next time, the centre-rightists will advance the same request that was punctually refused by the centre-leftists, and so on. So far, five times. This is not the proof that leftist and rightist parties are both antipolitical, but it is the proof that antipolitical behaviour is present in both coalitions.

But antipolitics is not only this. It is many other things. The best way to give an exemplification of Italian antipolitics is to quote a poet: Eugenio Montale. He has been present with his poetry in all the most significant events of the Century: in the First World War when he fought as a volunteer (he was born in 1896); in Fascism which disappointed him (he lost his job because he refused to obtain, opportunistically, the membership card of the fascist party); in the
Second World War; in 1968 which disappointed him, and he gave his poetry a new style which he represented in form of diaries: *Diario del ‘71 e del ’72* (Diary of ’71 and ’72); *Quaderno di quattro anni* (Work-book of four years); and so on.

He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1975 and died in 1981. His poetry was centered in the vision that was alternative to that of “*poeti laureati*” (graduate poets), those poets speaking an aulic language. Sometimes Montale spoke of life as a tall wall or as a wire netting and once, of life as the climbing of a wall having broken pieces of bottles on top, and of the illusions of men (and especially of boys) as a search for a broken link in the wire-netting. It is possible for somebody to get over this wire-netting and to become what he wished to be, but only a few may do it and not the poet. He concludes, in one of his more famous poems: “Don’t ask us the formula that can open worlds to you/ but some crooked syllables and dried as a branch./ Only this to-day can we say to you/ what we are not, what we do not want”.

On one hand, there is the life of the ordinary people who ignore and it is in search of the evil that worm-eats the world, the little mistake of a lever that stops the universal instrument. But this lever does not exist. Only the knife that cuts exists, i.e. a deciding and resolving mind is needed. Whoever does not have this kind of mind is ignorant. A very frequent word in Montale’s poetry is the term ignorance. Montale considers ignorance his own real substance; he defines the ignorance of a woman “mine, ours, and your sweet ignorance”; in another part he says that he ignores everything but the speechless message; and so on. On one hand, the “divine indifference” and the impossibility to act; on the other, those who have a deciding and resolving mind. These men have ideological, religious or philosophical minds and they are not humble. To be humble, says Montale, means to be connected to the real world: “to you I return myself in humbleness. I am nothing else than a spark of a fire-brand. I know it well: to burn, this, not else, is my meaning”.

After 1968, Montale said again that movement offers many changes without giving much: the change has been a change in a new ideology, while to go from one ideology to another does not realize a real change (not in what is really essential in our lives). Thus, he concludes, the scholars’ movement has been as every stupid childhood. Childhood is the confused age. After the confusion, the illusion “of finding a mistake of nature/ the deadlock of the world/ the ring which doesn’t hold”. Childhood of every man, and even of every movement, is the visionary age (*età illusa*).
Antipolitics is the ignorance, the humbleness and the impossibility to act. As long as this antipolitics does not invent a new beginning, and suddenly becomes a form of politics (in that it requires a deciding and resolving mind); as long as it does not become a habit, it is a politics and it maintains the substantive form of antipolitics. After having become a habit, it becomes only politics, something to contrast with a new beginning.

Pier Paolo Pasolini said of Montale that he was a great poet, but he added that his poetic language was extra-historical, in that it was not ideologically significant (in a Marxist sense). This judgment reveals the most important Italian question of the XX century: intellectuals were, and perhaps are, torn between a political (ideological) vision and an (un)political (a-ideological) one; the question consists in the fact that those who think in an ideological way (indifference is of the right or of the left) do not understand those who think in an a-ideological way (and a great part of people is a-ideological). A second proof in the direction of this hypothesis is the identical judgment given by an Italian economist on the work of the most important Italian economist of the XX century: Piero Sraffa. After the publication of *Produzione merci a mezzo merci*, an important Italian economist, Claudio Napoleoni wrote that Sraffa’s work was scientifically unobjectionable, but historically speechless. In other terms, Napoleoni intended that Sraffa’s work resolved an error in the Marxian theory of value, but it obtained the result by renouncing to giving a solution in terms of value, i.e. in terms of the cleavage Capital/Labour or in ideological terms. The same question is raised when you wish to interpret and apply Stein Rokkan’s theory (Rokkan 1982; 2002) to more recent events: being true that, in Europe, political systems have been modeled by four cleavages (four different ideological alternative positions), the question is: was the year 1968 and the swarm of movements deriving from the first scholars’ movement the beginning of a fifth (and maybe a sixth) cleavage, or was it the beginning of a new pragmatic, i.e. a-ideological era?

This question is connected to the philosophical concept of regulation, anticipated by Vico, introduced as a term by Kant, used by Rosmini, and so on, up to Michel Foucault. The same question is raised when you try to interpret a collective movement as the protest of citizens of Vicenza who are questioning the enlargement of the USA military base: is it an ideological movement in favour of peace or is it the action of a single-issue committee with more pragmatic (environment, traffic, and so on) problems? In my opinion,
antipolitics is the real alternative both to politics as a habit and to politics as an ideology. It may be defined as a pre-modern competitive paradigm to the paradigm of modernity; a new paradigm is going to become central in the post-modern political scene.

The future is unwritten and it will be written in a pragmatic way if the minds of those who are questioning are not modeled in an ideological way.
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Bisher erschienen:

Alexander Grasse
*Die italienischen Parlamentswahlen 2008: neue Konturen für die „Zweite Republik“*
PIFO Occasional Paper No. 1/2008

Giuseppe Gangemi
*Italian Antipolitics as a long run Question: „Bad Civil Societies“ or „Bad Elites“?*
PIFO Occasional Paper No. 2/2008